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Evaluating	Democracy	
Assistance	Policies
An assessment of the emerging policies and priorities 
of the Visegrad Four countries
Jeff Lovitt
Executive Director, PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society)
As a network of independent policy centres engaged in issues around democratic transition, the members of PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society) share a 
wealth of experience of the intricacies of policymaking during the transition to democracy. 
However, the network also includes think-tanks whose scope for participation is thwarted 
by authoritarian leaders blocking multi-party democracy, freedom of expression, and pro-
tection of human rights - not only before the fall of the Berlin Wall, but up until the present 
day in some post-Soviet countries.
As PASOS occupies a unique space, bridging policy thinking in Europe’s new member 
states with the perceptions of thought leaders in the countries of the Western Balkans, the 
Black Sea region, and Central Asia, not to mention Ukraine, Belarus and Russia, the issue 
of the European Union’s policies towards its eastern neighbours is high on the agenda for 
policy analysts and policymakers in the region.
At the annual meeting of the PASOS members in Istanbul in November 2006, it was 
agreed that PASOS should engage in the debate on the fostering of a more flexible app-
roach to EU funding in support of democracy and human rights, and should examine 
potential future models for European democracy assistance. As a result, PASOS became 
involved with other civil society actors across the EU in the formation of the European Part-
nership for Democracy (EPD), which was launched in Brussels in April 2008. At around 
the same time, PASOS decided to take a closer look at the democracy assistance poli-
cies of both the EU and the new member states, so that our contribution to the debate 
on democracy assistance would be based on hard data, and an evaluation of the new 
members’ record to date.
This is how the project, Evaluation of the Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities of 
the Visegrad Countries, came to life, resulting in this book, Democracy’s New  champions, 
and a series of policy briefs, and extended reports on the policies of each Visegrad 
country (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland) and on the impact of their 
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democracy assistance efforts in four target countries (Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Cuba, and Ukraine). This publication includes those reports, which are also individually 
available at www.pasos.org, in some cases in a longer version. 
The project was made possible with the financial support of the International  Visegrad 
Fund1, the Open Society Institute Think-Tank Fund2 , and the Local Government and Public 
 Service  Reform Initiative (LGI) of the Open Society Institute.3
The project involved four PASOS members from the Visegrad countries, namely  EUROPEUM 
Institute for European Policy, Czech Republic, the Center for Policy Studies at the Central 
European University, Hungary, the Institute of Public Affairs, Poland, and the Institute for 
Public Affairs, Slovakia. Researchers from another PASOS member, the International Cen-
tre for Policy Studies in Ukraine, also participated in the project, along with independent 
researchers who worked on the evaluation of the Visegrad Four countries’ democracy 
assistance policies in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, and Cuba. 
For the purpose of our research, we have defined democracy assistance as “a policy 
aimed at helping third countries build institutions of democratic governance, foster public 
participation in democratic governance, support pluralism in the shape of multi-party 
 politics, freedom of expression and independent media, promote and protect human 
rights, and work towards establishing the rule of law”. 
The methodology underpinning the research was initially drawn up by David Král, Direc-
tor of EUROPEUM, including a brief for the Visegrad research, for research at the EU 
level in Brussels, and for the target country research. The methodology was refined in 
consult ation with Jacek Kucharczyk and myself (editors of this final publication), and the 
individual country researchers, so that it could be adapted to the very different circum-
stances in the four target countries. 
Throughout the project, the researchers’ work was overseen and reviewed -  in the early 
stages by David Král, then later by Jacek Kucharczyk and myself. The policy recommenda-
tions set out in each chapter were the joint efforts of Jacek Kucharczyk, myself, and the 
respective researchers.
The methodology of the individual research papers was further strengthened by the use of 
roundtables in the target countries, including the participation of Visegrad Four embass-
ies, other donors in the target country, and civil society actors implementing democracy 
assistance in the respective countries. These roundtables, held in Sarajevo, Kyiv, Bratis-
lava (for Belarus), and Prague (for Cuba) provided an important opportunity to test out 
initial policy recommendations on some of the key stakeholders involved. The feedback 
was very useful, and in the case of Visegrad Four embassy representatives often very crit-
ical of the procedures of their own Foreign Ministries. 
A second set of roundtables were held in the Visegrad Four countries - a further round to 
test the evolving policy recommendations emerging from the project. The results are the 
final reports and this book, Democracy’s New champions. The project has benefited from 
a combination of open meetings, and also off-the-record meetings with represent atives of 
the Visegrad Four embassies, in addition to the extensive interviews carried out by the 
respective researchers. In the interests of protecting the security of some interviewees in 
Cuba and Belarus, their names have not been included in this publication.
The timing of the project opens up some important opportunities to influence the Visegrad 
Four’s policies in the field of democracy assistance, not least because both in Poland and 
in Hungary a new national democracy assistance strategy is currently being finalised, in 
Slovakia a new director of the Slovak Agency for International Development Co-operation 
(SAMRS) has just taken office, and the Czech Republic is about to hold the EU Presidency 
in the first half of 2009 - at a time when EU enlargement to the Western Balkans, EU-Russia 
relations, and the EU’s relations with its eastern neighbours are among the top agenda 
items of the Czech Presidency. 
PASOS will also continue at the EU level to work with the EPD and the democracy caucus 
in the European Parliament to make further recomm endations for the review of the Euro-
pean Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, and to push for greater flexibility and 
direct support to civil society working in repressive regimes.
In addition to all those who helped the researchers by providing time for interviews, we 
would like to thank the following for their support and inspiration, in some cases in making 
it possible for the project to be launched in the first instance, and in some cases the care 
and time they took to look at some of the texts and recommendations:
Igor Blažević, Balázs Jarábik, Juraj Marušiak, David Král, Pavol Demeš, Edward McMillan-
Scott, Jana Hybášková, Kristóf Forrai, Thomas Carothers, Kalman Mizsei, Marta Pejda, 
 Eva  Rybková, Eliška Sláviková, Gabriela Dlouhá, Kristina Prunerová, Helena Štohanzlová, 
Goran Buldioski, Scott Abrams, Petr Pajas, Dobrila Govedarica, Jana Kobzová, Rodger 
Potocki, Martin Bútora, Lenka Surotchak, Justyna Frelak, Andrew Cartwright, Violetta Zen-
tai, Roel von Meijenfeldt, Marieke van Doorn, David Stulík, Iryna Solonenko, Viorel Ursu, 
Vitali Silitski, Iryna Ozumok, Jan Marian, and Ludmila Vacková.
Endnotes
1 www.visegradfund.org
2  www.soros.org/initiatives/thinktank
3 http://lgi.osi.hu
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Re-energising	Europe	to	
Champion	Democracy
The Visegrad Four bring fresh transition experience to 
the donors’ side of the table
Jacek Kucharczyk
Research Director, Institute of Public Affairs, Poland
Jeff Lovitt
Executive Director, PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society)
The support given during the 1990s by the United States and Western Europe to the emerging democracies of Central Europe was a major factor in their successful trans-
ition to full-fledged democracies. It culminated in the membership of ten former communist 
countries in the two most important groupings of democratic states within the framework 
of Euro-Atlantic relations, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the 
European Union (EU). The EU enlargement of 2004 (in 2007 for Bulgaria and Romania) 
was arguably the greatest achievement to date of the EU in the field of democracy promo-
tion. The success of the Visegrad Four countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and 
Poland) has placed them in the position of stable market economies with an increasing 
interest in spreading the benefits of democratisation to their eastern and southern neigh-
bours and, in the case of the Czech Republic, even further afield. 
The zeal to spread the successful Central European experience of democratic transition is 
far from exhaustion, and the new EU members demonstrate a particular interest in secur-
ing a greater place for democracy promotion on the agenda of the EU, in particular in the 
context of the EU’s eastern neighbours. This contrasts sharply with the scepticism about 
democracy promotion prevalent in the EU-15 (the EU’s 15 members until the enlargement 
of 2004), and in the corridors of the European Commission in Brussels, in the wake of the 
apparent fiasco of the Bush administration’s plans to spread democracy throughout the 
Middle East through the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.  
During the past decade, there has been a whiff of defeatism about the prospects for 
spreading democracy worldwide. Alongside the death-toll caused by suicide bombings 
in Iraq, we have witnessed the entrenchment of authoritarian rule in Central Asia, democ-
racy’s fits and starts in much of Africa, the emulation of Fidel Castro by Hugo Chávez in 
16
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the government in its strengthening of democratic institutions, but the flow to civil society 
groups slowed to a trickle, not least because many senior figures in Georgian civil soc-
iety had joined the government. Even domestic critics of Saakashvili are united in their 
condemnation of the aggression by Russia in August 2008, but there are real differences 
concerning domestic and foreign policies: those alternative voices should be supported in 
their work as democratic actors in Georgia.
One of the biggest challenges that Europe has to face beyond those neighbouring 
countries that want the perspective of EU membership is fighting the backlash against 
democracy - from Russia to Central Asia - where autocratic leaders have learned to use 
modern propaganda techniques to tarnish and outmanoeuvre democratic forces and their 
international backers. The tools available to democracy activists, such as working with 
the media or monitoring elections, are keenly studied by the authorities in Belarus and 
Kazakhstan, who are intent on staying one step ahead of the game.  
But if the Visegrad Four are to emerge as democracy’s new champions, they also have to 
argue the case for greater EU commitment to the promotion of democracy around the world. 
The new EU member states’ fresh experience of the transition to democracy places them in 
a position where they understand very well the positions on both sides of the donors’ table, 
and have a good grasp of what donor practices have been effective, and which have not. 
Furthermore, they are well placed to learn from the best of both US and EU approaches, and 
to help the EU find a way forward that does not mistake “democracy promotion” as a failed 
project of the Bush administration, but embraces it as a strat egic objective in the interests of 
those people who continue to suffer under authoritarian reg imes, and which also serves the 
interests of democratic societies around the world, whose citizens benefit from the peace, 
prosperity and stability that comes with democratic develop ment in other countries.
Democracy	Promotion	after	Iraq	-	
Doubts	in	US	and	in	Europe
Concerns over a backlash against the “freedom” and “anti-terrorism” agenda of the cur-
rent Bush Administration in the United States resonate in the Middle East, but less so in 
other parts of Asia and Africa, or in the former Soviet bloc.2 In the US, a serious debate 
about the effectiveness of democracy promotion was started by Fareed Zaharia’s ass-
ertion that the introduction of multi-party democracy and competitive elections should be 
preceded by efforts to build strong and efficient state institutions able to ensure the rule 
of law on the territory in question. In similar vein, Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder 
argued that “it is dangerous to push states to democratise before the necessary pre-
conditions are in place and that prudent democracy-promotion efforts should pay special 
attention to fostering those preconditions”.3
Venezuela, and the recurrent interference in politics by the military in south and south-east 
Asia (Pakistan, Thailand and Bangladesh, to name but a few instances). On the EU’s 
doorstep, the continuing suppression of dissent by Aleksandr Lukashenko in Belarus, the 
splits in the Orange camp in Ukraine, and the conflict between Russia and Georgia do 
not conjure up a rosy picture either.
According to Freedom House, at the end of 2005 there were 122 “electoral democra-
cies” in the world.1 This figure amounts to 64% of the world’s states, compared with 40% 
in the mid-1980s. However, after the impressive gains in the 1990s, progress has halted. 
The end of the cold war certainly ushered in a new era of freedom for many, but it is 
hardly surprising that the gains in democracy were not immediate in every corner of the 
world. That is cause for neither losing faith in the power of democracy, nor for retreating 
from the task of championing democracy and supporting those striving to protect and 
promote human rights around the world.
In fact, some of the new recruits to the community of democracies are the most insistent 
that the benefits of democracy should not be limited to those 122 “electoral democracies”, 
but that the fruits of freedom should be shared with others as well, starting with their neigh-
bours either at an earlier stage of the transition or where the transition has been stalled, 
or even reversed. 
It is too early to say whether the release of political prisoners in Belarus in August 2008 
is a temporary phenomenon: certainly, the parliamentary elections on 28 September did 
not mark the beginning of a multi-party system. Lukashenko is for the moment keen to face 
westwards while Russia threatens to increase oil and gas prices, and applies pressure for 
Belarus to endorse its support for the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; it is 
hard to predict how far this expediency will lead to an opening up of political life or just 
the economy (not unlike the situation in Cuba under Raúl Castro), or how soon Lukashenko 
will again accept the embrace of the Kremlin.
In Ukraine, the parliamentary elections since the Orange Revolution have met inter national 
standards for fair and free elections, but the transition is not a one-way street. The estab-
lishment of the appropriate institutional checks and balances, for instance the division of 
powers between the semi-executive president and parliament, have seen different interests 
vying for influence, rather than a common determination to strengthen the democratic 
foundations of the state.
In Georgia, while the recent presidential and parliamentary elections have been free and 
fair, the international community is open to the criticism that - rather like with Boris yeltsin 
a decade before - they placed all their hopes in one charismatic leader, Mikheil Saakash-
vili, rather than seeking to ensure that there was an effective multi-party democracy, with 
competing political parties capable of serving in turns as effective opposition and alter-
native government. After the Rose revolution, donor money was diverted to supporting 
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revolutions. Although the European Parliament welcomed the Orange revolution with a 
declaration of a “European perspective” for Ukraine, EU policymakers did not follow 
their example, and any mention of further EU enlargement towards the East has been 
scrupulously avoided.
  
In the years that followed, the EU (as well as the US) has been reluctant to substantively 
respond to a resurgent Russia, promoting its own idea of “sovereign democracy”, an 
Orwellian term denoting a crackdown on democratic freedoms at home and increasingly 
aggressive policies in Russia’s “near abroad”. The war and the subsequent partition of 
Georgia in August 2008 are a consequence of Russia’s new confidence and the West’s 
inability to confront it. Divided between Russia’s critics and apologists, the EU managed to 
respond in one voice to Russian aggression, but its response went only as far as demand-
ing the restoration of the pre-war status quo. Not only the existing differences of opinions 
and interests among EU members, but also Europe’s dependence on Russia’s energy supp-
lies, make the EU’s options vis-à-vis Russia so limited.
Europe’s track record in democracy promotion in its southern neighbourhood also remains 
at best mixed. Wary not to alienate the southern Mediterranean states, EU politicians tried 
to play down the importance of democracy in order to focus on the development of fruit-
ful relations with the current regimes in the region. The US botched the democratisation 
of the Middle East, and the European colonialist past seems to have a crippling effect on 
the EU’s ability to talk straight about democracy in the region. The Union for the Medi-
terranean, created on the initiative of French President Nicolas Sarkozy, is also unlikely to 
become a milestone in democracy promotion in the South.
As regards the EU’s own institutional tools of democracy assistance, the most important 
recent change has been the reform of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights, designed to make it more flexible and better equipped to provide support to 
democracy activists in difficult political terrain. The most important changes include the 
possibility of funding non-registered NGOs and (in exceptional cases) individuals, intro-
ducing possible re-granting tools, diminishing the administrative burden for smaller grants, 
and an easing of the financial guarantee requirements. 
As Věra Řiháčková argues in this book, the reform of the regulations was important, but 
the real challenge lies in modifying the administrative culture of the EU institutions respon-
sible for the implementation of the EIDHR, which continue to operate on the basis of the 
“rules first, quality second principle”. In general, even this limited reform of the key EU 
external assistance instrument remains a significant victory for the EU civil society actors 
that lobbied for such (and other) changes.
Another important step in making the EU institutionally better equipped to tackle the 
challenge of democracy promotion was the establishment in Brussels in 2008 of a new 
foundation under the name “European Partnership for Democracy” (EPD). The idea of 
The idea of “sequentialism” in democracy promotion was in turn criticised by other demo-
cracy theorists, such as Thomas Carothers, who asserted that “prescribing the deferral of 
democracy - and consequently the prolongation of authoritarian rule - as a cure for the ills 
of prolonged authoritarianism makes little sense”.4 Carothers’ own position, which he calls 
“gradualism”, implies the recognition that in some cases, such as in countries ravaged 
by civil wars, conducting free elections may not be a plausible choice in the short term. 
Nevertheless, he rejects “sequentialism” as it provides a good excuse for autocrats to 
postpone democratic reforms until the conditions are ripe, which may mean indefinitely. 
At the same time, even the most committed supporters of the idea of democracy promo-
tion could not help but notice the damage that the Bush administration caused through the 
incompetence of US policies in Iraq since the removal of Saddam. As Carothers has put 
it, the idea of democracy promotion needs to be “decontaminated”. An opportunity may 
have arrived with the 2008 US presidential elections, in which both frontrunners have 
strongly criticised the Bush administration’s record on foreign policy.
John McCain endorsed Robert Kagan’s proposal for the establishment of a League of 
Democracies, a sort of democratic equivalent of the United Nations, as a tool for re-
invigorating the idea of spreading democracy across the globe. Some top advisers of 
Barack Obama have also endorsed the idea, although Obama has not taken a stance to 
date. The reception to this idea in Europe has been rather lukewarm. Concerns have been 
expressed that the attempt to divide countries into democratic and undemocratic ones 
will alienate the emerging global powers, especially China, or resurgent Russia, whose 
co-operation the West badly needs in order to tackle some important global challenges, 
such as climate change. 
Thus, the insistence on spreading democracy through the League of Democracies might 
clash with Europeans’ desire for a multi-polar world and a multilateral approach to inter-
national politics, which they hope to see in the post-Bush era.5 On the other hand, the idea 
of the League of Democracies has provoked an interesting debate, and even its critics 
had to admit that - short of establishing a new organisation - international adjustments are 
needed in order to make global progress in democratic governance.6
The EU’s own record in democracy promotion remains a mixed one. After the enlargement 
of 2004, as well as the euphoria of the Orange and Rose revolutions in Ukraine and Geor-
gia, in which the idea of “Europe” played a mobilising role, the EU could plausibly claim 
the success of its “soft power” in comparison with the failure of American “hard power” in 
Iraq. The celebrations were, alas, not to last. The rejection of the EU Constit utional Treaty 
by France and the Netherlands started a period of European “navel gazing”, which has 
been prolonged by the 2008 Irish “No” vote against the Treaty of Lisbon. 
At the same time, the EU failed to offer Ukraine and Georgia an incentives package 
commensurate with the high expectations generated in these countries during the colour 
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Czech	Republic Slovak	Republic Poland Hungary
Target	
countries	
for	
democracy	
assistance	
In 2004, only projects 
in Iraq were funded.
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Moldova 
Georgia 
Serbia 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  
Iraq 
Cuba 
Burma 
Serbia (including 
Kosovo) 
Ukraine 
Belarus 
Montenegro 
Afghanistan 
Kazakhstan 
Kenya 
Kyrgyzstan 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Sudan 
Macedonia 
Ukraine
Belarus (non-ODA 
official bilateral 
assistance) 
Moldova
Georgia
Afghanistan
Angola 
Iraq
Palestine Authority 
Vietnam 
2004-6:
Serbia
Montenegro
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Vietnam
Macedonia 
Moldova
Mongolia
Ukraine 
Kyrgyzstan
Palestine Authority
Ethiopia
yemen
Cambodia 
Laos
Afghanistan
Iraq
2008:
Serbia
Belarus 
Moldova
Albania
Cuba
Palestine Authority
North Korea
devoted to democracy assistance, but its allocation of € 4.7 million in 2006 was roughly 
the equivalent of the democracy assistance to Ukraine of Sweden and the UK combined. 
Moreover, more Ukrainians receive scholarships funded by the Visegrad Four (partly 
through the International Visegrad Fund) than by the rest of the EU put together.
Democracy assistance funded by the Czech Republic in 2006 amounted to € 2m 
(1.56% of Czech ODA), up from € 0.57 million (0.53% of ODA) in 2005, while in 
Hungary - after a fall in ODA during budget cuts in 2006 - democracy assistance rose 
from € 0.65 million (0.6% of ODA) to an estimated € 1.25 million in 2007. 
“In our country, there will be no pink or orange, or even banana, revolution,” commented 
Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko after the election of Viktor yushchenko as 
President of Ukraine in January 2005. “All those coloured revolutions are pure and simple 
banditry,” said Lukashenko, who proceeded to have countless opposition figures arrested 
such an institutional instrument, modelled along the lines of the US National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED), was first proposed in the Polish non-paper prepared for the EU 
Copenhagen summit in December 2002, and then championed by some governments 
(especially the Czech government) and pro-democracy organisations such as the Nether-
lands Institute for Multi-Party Democracy and PASOS. Launched in April 2008, with the 
participation of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso, EPD has the chance 
to become an important European contributor to worldwide democracy assistance.  
Central	Europeans	Get	Serious	About	
Democracy	Assistance
In Central Europe, the memories persist of the strong US support to dissident movements, 
such as Charter 77 in then Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland, when there was 
much less European engagement in the communist bloc. This is true of both the US govern-
ment (mainly through NED) and George Soros’s Open Society Institute (as well as other 
private donors). US support was also crucial during the early stages of the transition, 
when many NGOs were established thanks to American institutional support. At the same 
time, as we already observed, the prospects of EU membership (as well as EU financial 
assistance) helped the Central Europeans to make progress in terms of meeting the so-
called Copenhagen criteria on democracy, the rule of law, protection of minorities, and 
an effective market economy.  
Following the 2004 EU enlargement, the new members from Central and Eastern Europe 
have moved towards becoming donors of democracy assistance, establishing their own 
publicly funded aid programmes. 
In 2006, more than € 10 million was deployed by the V4 governments in the field of 
democracy assistance, with a strong focus on support to Ukraine and Belarus. This ranks 
as a tiny drop in the aid business, compared for instance with the estimated € 340m 
provided in the same year by Sweden (24% of Swedish bilateral ODA), the EU’s most 
generous per capita supporter of democracy around the world, but the 2006 figures rank 
better alongside France, whose € 52m allocated to “governance” represented just 0.7% 
of France’s official development assistance (ODA), compared with € 6.5m committed to-
wards democracy assistance by Poland, amounting to 7% of Poland’s bilateral ODA, and 
an average of € 1.9m per annum in Slovakia from 2004-2007, amounting to as much as 
34% of Slovak bilateral ODA. 
Poland is one of the key donors in Ukraine, and the size of its democracy assistance to 
Ukraine rivals that of the leading European donors in the field. Poland was not only more 
generous than Sweden or the UK in terms of the percentage of ODA to Ukraine that was 
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administered by embassies are blunted by slow, centralised decision-making processes, 
combined with limited embassy staff resources in recipient countries.
In fact, the V4 countries are still going through a transition in their own civil society 
sectors, where capacity is still being developed to be able to engage effectively on the 
inter national stage, for instance to gain the attention of EU institutions in Brussels, and 
to be robust enough to be major players in development aid and democracy assistance 
abroad. Nevertheless, a consistent conclusion from the research conducted by PASOS 
was the need for more funding to go directly to NGOs and individuals in the recipient 
countries, if there is the absorptive capacity. Where the capacity is lacking, priority should 
be given to building sustainable partnerships with local actors - and to use the limited 
resources of the V4 governments to maximum effect, for instance as matching funding for 
grants from larger donors, including the EU.
Support	in	European	Integration	is	
Clear-cut	Niche	for	Visegrad	Four
The democracy assistance programmes of the V4 countries remain at a relatively early 
stage in their formation. Notably, there is a limited quantity of funding and projects com-
ing from the V4 countries for democracy assistance towards some of the target countries, 
and assistance is spread too thinly. 
Most of the democracy assistance projects pursued by the V4 donors are not large in scope, 
especially when compared with those supported by other international donors  active in 
this field, such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the Delegation of the 
European Commission to the respective countries (in the case of Ukraine and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, for instance). However, the relatively low visibility of V4-sponsored projects 
may also indicate that these projects are poorly targeted, and that they do not fill the gaps 
in democracy assistance projects sponsored by big donors, in other words they do not 
sufficiently draw on the comparative advantages of the V4 countries’ experience.
V4 countries should narrow their focus to a specific set of issues where their contribution 
could provide most “added value” to democracy-building efforts.
Thus, in strategising their democracy assistance to the target countries, the V4 countries 
should take into account the following factors: 
the level of monetary commitment by V4 countries for democracy assistance; • 
the weak areas of democracy, where V4 transition experience would be useful for • 
during the 2006 presidential election campaign in Belarus. Three of the Visegrad Four 
countries border on Ukraine, while Poland also borders with Belarus and the Russian 
enclave of Kaliningrad. The need to end autocratic rule, and to support consolidating 
demo cracies, will remain high on the Visegrad countries’ agenda so long as tyranny 
persists on their doorstep.
With their intimate knowledge of the EU accession process, the Visegrad Four (V4) coun-
tries are also in a position to draw on the “soft power” credibility of the EU, but at the 
same time on their own experience of engagement with US democracy promotion. The 
democracy assistance programmes of the V4 countries remain at a relatively early stage 
in their formation, but the democracy know-how of the countries goes far beyond their 
governments’ own programmes. 
There are a number of dynamic V4 non-governmental organisations (NGOs), for instance 
Pontis Foundation and People in Peril Association in Slovakia, People in Need in the 
Czech Republic, and the organisations active under the umbrella of Grupa Zagranica in 
Poland, working to strengthen non-governmental forces and human rights campaigners in 
autocratic regimes, for instance in Belarus, Cuba, and Burma. 
At the same time, other NGOs such as the government-supported International Centre for 
Democratic Transition (ICDT) in Hungary, are building up expertise in supporting demo-
cratic structures in both governmental and non-governmental sectors, particularly in the 
western Balkans, but more recently also in Belarus. 
Consultants and even some diplomats from the new member states, notably the Visegrad 
countries and the Baltic states, have a high reputation in the western Balkans and in 
Ukraine, as they perceive the European integration process through applicants’ eyes, and 
they are more likely to understand and even speak the local language. Consultants from 
the V4 countries are also increasingly hired by US and other western governments and 
development agencies, as they have an intimate understanding of the transition process. 
The	Need	for	More	Effective	
Structures	and	Policies
There is no single V4 approach to funding or modes of democracy assistance, and co-
ordination of their still modest resources is limited to the International Visegrad Fund - with 
a budget of € 5.8 million in 2008, only a fraction of which goes to democracy projects. 
Moreover, the respective V4 governments are only now beginning to set up development 
aid agencies, let alone democracy assistance agencies (with the exception of the Trans-
ition Promotion unit at the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Moreover, small grants 
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promoting change; and 
the activities of other international actors in effecting change in weak areas of a coun-• 
try‘s democracy in order to ensure the efforts of the V4 countries are complimentary. 
Moreover, the V4 countries should co-operate with local actors already active in democ-
racy-building in order to better formulate an effective strategy for achieving the desired 
goals of their democracy assistance policy. 
Championing	Democracy	as	an	EU	Priority
Above all, democracy’s new champions must insist that the EU enshrine as a key pillar of 
a European common foreign and security policy the support and protection of democracy 
and human rights throughout the globe. That does not mean that Iran, North Korea, or 
Saudi Arabia for that matter, should be targeted for “regime change”. What it does mean, 
however, is that the EU should extend and deepen its expertise in the field of democracy 
assistance - providing support to civil society working for democratic change and, where 
change is underway, support to governments and political parties to develop democratic 
institutions as well as continuing support to non-governmental actors.
The EU needs to combine its “soft power” - the respect for its democratic values - with the 
assumption of more responsibility within NATO, so that the latter’s security umbrella can 
be extended on the basis of a credible European commitment to defend its members from 
aggression. In the case of Russia, “soft power” is simply not enough. The EU needs to 
work also at the diplomatic level with other democratic partners, including the US, but also 
Turkey, for instance, with its greater understanding of the Islamic world, and perhaps with 
Ukraine, with its close understanding of Russia, to put in place achievable goals to support 
democratic actors in ways that combine concern for their security with a determination to 
spread democracy throughout the globe.
The Visegrad Four members have made democracy assistance a top priority of their of-
ficial development assistance. They must also shoulder their share of responsibility for 
development assistance to the poorest parts of the world - in particular sub-Saharan Africa 
- but they should not lose sight of their comparative advantage, the transition to demo-
cracy and their understanding from first-hand experience of the need to tear down the 
walls of authoritarian rule. If they can ensure that this remains a dynamic feature of the 
EU’s common foreign policy, they will have proved themselves to be “democracy’s new 
champions”.
 
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	VISEGRAD	FOUR	
COUNTRIES	IN	
DEMOCRACy	ASSISTANCE
The	 V4	 countries	 are	 potentially	•	
key	actors	in	helping	neighbouring	
countries	 with	 the	 EU	 integration	
process. They are regarded positively 
by local stakeholders. As such, if the V4 
countries decided to focus their demo-
cracy assistance work in this area, this 
would undoubtedly be well received by 
local actors. 
Visegrad	governments	 should	 co-•	
ordinate	 more	 on	 funding,	 and	
engage	 in	 common	 advocacy	 at	
the	 Brussels	 level	 to	 strengthen	
EU	 policies	 towards	 the	 eastern	
neighbours - and the implementation of 
those policies. 
The priorities of V4 governments do not dif-• 
fer much from the priorities of USAID, the 
EU, SIDA or other big donors. The	value	
of	V4	support	rests	on	the	fact	that	
V4	government	and	NGO	experts	
have	 democratisation	 	experience	
that	is	easily	applied.	
Continuity	 and	 coherence	 of	 joint	•	
projects,	 and	 the	 variety	 of	 co-
	operation	areas:	Whereas co-operation 
with NGOs from old EU member states has 
an ad hoc nature and the scope of projects 
is limited, the co-operation with V4 NGOs 
has continuity and coherence, and meets 
target countries’ needs. Joint projects have 
covered various aspects of democratis-
ation, and this should be continued.
The	 role	 of	 the	 V4	 embassies	 in	•	
promoting	 democracy	 should	 be	
given	more	prominence, and should 
be strengthened in future democracy ass-
istance policies of the V4. The work of the 
V4 embassies is generally regarded very 
positively. 
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One	 of	 the	 crucial	 issues	 for	 the	•	
development	 of	 democracy	 is	 the	
strengthening	of	 the	 civil	 society/
NGO	sector. This could prove to be an 
area on which the V4 countries could 
 focus their democracy assistance policies. 
However, since a plethora of international 
actors have been very active in address-
ing this particular issue, V4 activities in 
this area require substantial co-ordination 
with other international actors involved, as 
well as careful prioritising in terms of the 
types of assistance and organisations that 
should be supported.
The	 V4	 countries	 should	 signif-•	
icantly	 improve	 the	 co-ordination	
of	 their	 democracy	 assistance	
programmes,	 and	 set	 up	 a	 joint	
Visegrad	Democracy	Fund	either	in	
individual	countries	or	 in	regions,	
such	as	the	western	Balkans. Grants 
provided by most embassies are very 
small. If all four embassies in a given tar-
get country were agreed on a particular 
project they wanted to support together, 
there is not a mechanism or resources to 
do so. Co-operation could take the form of 
setting up a permanent committee of amb-
assadors, which would meet regularly in 
order to exchange information and co-
ordinate their priorities in this area. 
The	 establishment	 of	 long-term	•	
partnerships	 with	 select	 NGOs	 in	
the	 target	 countries.	 V4 democracy 
ass istance programmes should help to 
build a vibrant and sustainable civil society. 
In order to achieve this aim, their funding 
should not be limited to support for indi-
vidual projects. A revised approach should 
include the establishment of long-term part-
nerships with select NGOs, which might 
then receive some multi-year institutional 
funding, enabling institutional development 
of these NGOs as well as helping them 
build the capacity, sustainability and 
co-funding in order to be able to bid succ-
essfully for grants from larger donors.
V4	 democracy	 assistance	 prog-•	
rammes	 should	 encourage	
co-	operation	between	V4	civil	soc-
iety	 and	 target-country	NGOs	 by	
funding	 projects	 that	 incorporate	
the	participation	of	a	V4	partner,	
but	do	not	require	the	V4	partners	
to	be	the	lead	or	the	particip	ation	
of	 at	 least	 three	 V4	 partners	 (as	
in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 International	
Vise	grad	 Fund). Additionally, V4 
programmes could encourage regional co-
operation by instituting trilateral projects, 
with the participation of two NGOs from 
non-V4 countries and one V4 partner. 
Feedback during the research indicates 
that both emb assies and target-country 
NGOs consider that the V4 countries 
could encourage stronger local ownership 
of projects.
In	order	to	better	utilise	their	spe-•	
cific	 know-how	 regarding	 the	
transition	to	democracy	and	Euro-
pean	integration	processes,	the	V4	
countries	 should	 help	 strengthen	
independent	 think-tanks/policy	
res	earch	 institutes	 in	 target	 coun-
tries, whose management and researchers 
could be trained through study visits and 
internships in their V4 counterparts and 
who would collaborate with such V4 
counterparts on future project work. The 
emergence of effective independent think-
tanks can provide an important stimulus to 
wider public debate and public participa-
tion in democratic decision-making. 
The	 V4	 countries	 should	 build	•	
on	 their	 successful	 initiatives	 in	
providing	 scholarships	 and	 study	
visits	 to	 V4	 countries	 for	 young	
demo	cracy	 activists, and also ass-
ist the emergence of a new generation 
of democratically oriented citizens by 
supporting youth and NGOs engaged 
in activism for democracy. In addition, 
long-term internships in NGOs should be 
supported.
Through	 sharing	 their	 own	 exp-•	
erience,	 the	 V4	 countries	 could	
make	 a	 significant	 contribution	
to	 the	 strengthening	 of	 dialogue	
between	 political	 actors	 and	 civil	
society	groups. V4 NGOs could share 
their experience of establishing civic dial-
ogue with government in their respective 
countries. This should include NGO/pub-
lic administration co-operation at other 
levels of government, and not just the state 
level.  
The	 V4	 countries	 are	 uniquely	•	
placed,	through	sharing	the	know-
how	 acquired	 in	 their	 own	 EU	
accession,	 to	 assist	 neighbouring	
countries	 in	 the	 process	 of	 Euro-
pean	 integration. EU candidate and 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement 
(SAA) signatory governments receive an 
annual report on the respective country’s 
progress towards fulfilling EU requirements 
for the accession process. There is a sec-
tion within the report that addresses issues 
related to democracy strengthening. That 
report could be used as an inspiration for 
the setting of the priorities of V4 demo-
cracy assistance related to EU integration. 
V4 grants should also assist target-country 
NGOs in bidding for EU grants, for ex-
ample by providing local NGOs with the 
required matching funding. 
V4	countries	should	continue	their	•	
peer	pressure	on	target-country	pol-
iticians	for	further	demo	cratisation, 
and in the western Balkans and Ukraine 
remain advocates of the respective count-
ries‘ European aspirations, at the same 
time as promoting/supporting the idea of 
using what is on offer from the EU (e.g. 
deep free trade, border management and 
migration, both within the EU and the re-
spective countries). They should provide 
more expert support to alignment with EU 
norms and standards in the framework, 
for instance, of the EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement (especially regarding the rule 
of law and independence of the judic-
iary), and identify areas of alignment with 
the EU acquis communautaire that could 
be supported from funds within bilateral 
ass istance.
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Limited	Resources,	
Global	Ambitions
The Czech Republic’s Democracy Assistance 
Policies and Priorities
Vladimír Bartovic
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Czech Republic
As values-oriented diplomacy is supported by all the mainstream Czech parliamentary political parties1, democracy assistance has become one of the Czech Republic’s most 
important foreign policy priorities. According to the Transition Promotion programme con-
cept - the official strategy of Czech democracy assistance - “the promotion of demo cracy 
in terms of the participation of citizens and protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms is a foreign policy priority of the Czech Republic as it enhances security, stability 
and prosperity.”2 
The Czech Republic has been providing democracy assistance since the middle of the 
1990s as a part of Czech development aid. In 2005, transition promotion rose in im-
portance in the framework of Czech foreign policy and became a distinct policy area. 
The majority of Czech democracy assistance aid is managed by the Human Rights and 
Trans ition Policy department (HRTP) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) through the 
so-called Transition Promotion programme, and the remaining aid is managed through 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) regional office in Bratislava and the 
embassies of the Czech Republic in target countries. The funds managed by UNDP are 
a part of the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund in the framework of Czech development aid, while 
HRTP has a separate budget. The principal focus of this evaluation is on the democracy 
assistance managed through the Czech MFA’s HRTP department.
The Czech Republic’s Transition Promotion programme focuses on two groups of target 
countries:
Developing countries and countries in transition - countries of the former Soviet Union • 
(Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia), the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and 
Iraq.
Countries with undemocratic regimes where human rights are violated, such as Cuba, • 
Belarus, and Burma.
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The two main goals of Czech democracy assistance are democratisation and social trans-
formation3. Different goals and types of activities are supported in each of the two groups 
of target countries. While in the first group the fostering of civil society, reform of state 
administration, and capacity-building activities predominate, in the second group human 
and political rights, particularly freedom of expression, are the principal areas of support. 
The values-oriented diplomacy, and co-operation with Czech NGOs, enables HRTP to 
work without the permission of the host country, which is extremely important in the case 
of undemocratic regimes, such as those in power in Cuba, Burma, and Belarus.
The Czech government supported the idea of the reform of the European Initiative for 
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), participated very actively in its re-negotiation, 
and consulted with Czech NGOs (such as People in Need) before developing its position 
on the EIDHR reform.
The MFA tabled several proposals with the aim of making EIDHR more flexible and mak-
ing its regulations more understandable. One of the most important proposals made by 
the Czech side was to ensure that democratic forces in target countries are included in all 
stages of EIDHR (preparation and formulation of priorities for each country, evaluation, 
etc). The Czech negotiators also stressed that the European Commission Delegations in 
the target countries should stay in permanent contact with those democratic forces. 
Almost all the Czech proposals were successful, with one notable exception: that state 
institutions in target countries (especially parliaments) should become eligible to receive 
funding from the reformed EIDHR. 
Generally, the Czech government considers the European Instrument on Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR II) to be a substantial and useful instrument, which should compl-
ement other EU policies and instruments, but views as problematic the cohesion of all EU 
democracy assistance policies. Greater cohesion and effectiveness should be made a pri-
ority in the coming years, argues the Czech MFA, which wants to see a stronger, long-term 
focus at the EU level on democracy assistance, and supports the British initiative for a so-
called “European Consensus on Democracy”, rather like the existing European Consensus 
on Development. The Czech Republic would support a substantial increase in EU funding 
for democracy assistance, but only if there was clear demand in the target countries and 
if the EU were able to precisely define how the additional funds would be deployed.
The Czech government also welcomed the creation of the European Partnership for Demo-
cracy (EPD), and was the first EU government to pledge funding to the new foundation, 
when it was launched in April 2008: the MFA donated CZK 2.5m, or € 100,000, for 
activities in the post-Soviet space. In addition, the MFA is sympathetic to the idea of 
channelling a part of EIDHR through the EPD, and for EIDHR and EPD to operate on a com-
plementary basis - EIDHR focusing on longer and bigger projects, while EPD could operate 
on a more flexible basis, able to react to immediate needs for democracy assistance.
KEy	CONCLUSIONS
Although a relatively small country, the 
Czech Republic can be considered one of 
the most visible actors in the area of demo-
cracy ass istance and protection of human 
rights. The creation of the Transition Promo-
tion programme in 2005 has complemented 
the efforts of the Czech government to 
promote democratisation and transition pro-
motion - in different international forums and 
in its bilateral relations with countries with 
undemo cratic regimes and countries in trans-
ition.
The importance of democracy assistance 
policies for the Czech government is ref-
lected also in the existence of a specialised 
Department at the MFA dealing with trans-
ition promotion and human rights. The Czech 
Republic has created a special budget line, 
outside the framework of official develop-
ment assistance, supporting NGO projects 
in this area. 
An increasing number of Czech NGOs 
under stand the importance and utility of the 
transfer of knowledge generated during the 
transition period in the Czech Republic to 
countries with autocratic regimes or countries 
in transition. In recent years, NGOs have 
gathered first-hand experience implement-
ing democracy assistance projects, and the 
creation in the summer of 2008 of DEMAS 
(the Association for Democracy and Human 
Rights), an association of Czech NGOs work-
ing in the field of democracy assistance, is a 
further step towards their professional isation 
and better co-ordination of their activities 
and the representation of their interests to the 
MFA and other stakeholders.
On the other hand, there is still a lot of scope 
for improvement. Although the budget of the 
Transition Promotion programme is constantly 
rising, in 2006 it represented only 1.56% of 
the budget allocated for the Czech Republic’s 
official development assistance. Combined 
with the inadequate human resources cap-
acity of the Transition Promotion Working 
Group of the MFA, this does not correspond 
with the political support that is proclaimed 
for democracy assistance. 
The consultation of democracy assistance 
policies, co-ordination of activities and ex-
change of information between the MFA and 
NGOs, and between NGOs themselves, are 
still based mainly on personal contacts and 
sometimes are not sufficiently transparent. 
There is also a lack of information activ-
ities that would explain, and gather support 
among the broader public for, democracy 
ass istance policies. 
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	CzECH	GOVERNMENT
Czech EU Presidency 
(January-June 2009)
initiate close co-operation with the Euro-• 
pean Parliament, particularly with its 
democracy caucus, to ensure that the Par-
liament conducts a mid-term evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the European Instru-
ment for Democracy and Human Rights 
(EIDHR II), with a focus on a qualitative 
rather that purely financial evaluation, 
complementary to the evaluation sched-
uled to be undertaken by the European 
Commission in 2009;
establish close co-operation with the • 
Swedish presidency in order to complete 
this process;
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decide on a clear preference for the Euro-• 
pean Partnership for Democracy (EPD), 
and for more flexible, less bureaucratic 
and hands-on European-level approaches 
to democracy assistance; and express 
whether it prefers on balance to support 
more EPD’s grant-making capacity or 
knowledge hub for democracy assistance 
best practices; depending on this posi-
tion, it has to engage in coalition-building 
among EU member states and EU instit-
utions, and to target key stakeholders 
(and to form a realistic strategy towards 
the German political foundations) in supp-
ort of EPD; 
give better visibility in Brussels to DEMAS, • 
the newly created platform of Czech 
democracy assistance NGOs, e.g. by 
supporting a joint conference during the 
Czech Presidency;
Priorities, policies, implementation, 
evaluation
adopt a more tailored approach to the • 
types of projects and activities supported 
in individual target countries; this should 
be done in consultation with Czech 
embassies, grantees implementing demo-
cracy projects, or other organisations 
working in the democracy assistance field 
in target countries;
these tailored priorities should be • 
published and serve as guidance for 
evaluating projects submitted under the 
annual grant scheme;
consult priorities of democracy assistance • 
with Czech NGOs active in this field 
prior to the announcement of the annual 
grant-making scheme, and use the newly 
established DEMAS as a permanent con-
sultation forum between MFA and NGOs; 
concentrate on supporting projects where • 
most of the activities take place in the 
target countries, and supporting projects 
with significant multiplier effects;
refrain from providing long-term scholar-• 
ships for studies in the Czech Republic; 
other sources should be used for scholar-
ships (e.g. Ministry of Education, EU 
programmes such as Erasmus Mundus); 
these activities should be financed from 
Transition Promotion programme funds in 
only exceptional circumstances - where 
two conditions are met: (i) there is a direct 
link between the area of study and a poss-
ibility to improve the state of democracy, 
governance or human rights in the target 
country, and (ii) the students undertake the 
obligation to return, at least for some per-
iod, to the target country; 
support only activities with a clear demo-• 
cracy assistance component; avoid 
financing very specific activities that can 
be financed by official development ass-
istance (such as reconstruction projects, 
purchase of specific health care equip-
ment, etc); 
regularly exchange information on the • 
supported activities and future plans with 
the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund and other 
don ors (e.g. East-East Partnership Without 
Borders programme of the Open Society 
Institute) in order to avoid the duplication 
of activities or redundant competition, and 
in order to achieve greater synergy;
implement a more complex approach • 
to democracy assistance in the Western 
Balkans, and include among the priority 
countries Albania, as well as Kosovo, as 
the countries furthest from a prospect of 
EU membership;
significantly increase democracy ass istance • 
funds as a share of overall develop ment 
assistance budget: demo cracy assistance 
should be publicly stated as the top priority 
of Czech development aid;
increase the share of funds distributed • 
through the grant-making scheme since it 
is more transparent than ad hoc support, 
but preserve the ad hoc support possibility 
for its flexibility;
create concrete criteria and guidelines for • 
applications for ad hoc support;
refrain from requiring a full project prop-• 
osal in the case of co-financing of already 
approved projects; consider automatic co-
financing if EIDHR funding is granted;
create micro-grant scheme (up to € 5,000) • 
at the embassy level in each priority 
country; the use of this funding should be 
reported to the Human Rights and Trans-
ition Policy department (HRTP) in order to 
create a complete database of projects 
implemented in the field of democracy ass-
istance.
Transparency
publish information on each budget alloc-• 
ation (distributed through grant scheme or 
as ad hoc support) and actual spending 
- with the exception of grantees who could 
be persecuted for receiving support;
justify the reasons for declining support • 
for concrete projects submitted under the 
grant scheme;
prepare an annual report with a list of • 
supported activities and their budget allo-
cation, and plans for future development 
of democracy assistance policies;
support activities that will lead to a better • 
understanding of, and support for, demo-
cracy assistance among the wider public, 
including systematic support to promote 
public awareness about democracy ass-
istance, and improve synergies between 
all public relations activities carried out/
supp orted by the MFA. 
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	CzECH	NGOS
finalise the establishment of DEMAS and • 
make it transparent and inclusive; focus 
on its sustainability, independence, and 
on effective representation in Brussels of 
Czech NGOs working in the democracy 
assistance field;
exchange information on prepared init-• 
iatives or concrete activities and events, 
possibilities for co-operation, and reliable 
partners;
follow up projects better on the ground; • 
try to avoid the short project cycle app-
roach often resulting from granting 
requirements;
conduct better, more in-depth research into • 
local needs in order to avoid the duplic-
ation of already existing mechanisms;
develop exchange of information and co-• 
ordination with other V4 NGO networks, 
such as Grupa Zagranica in Poland, and 
with other V4 NGOs (and NGOs from the 
Baltic states);
secure funding to commission at least • 
once every two years an independent 
evaluation of the implementation of their 
projects as necessary feedback about the 
actual impact of their work.
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Understanding	Democracy	Assistance	
in	the	Czech	Republic
The democracy assistance policy of the Czech Republic is called “transformační spolu-
práce” - in English “transformation co-operation” - although the MFA prefers to use the 
expression “transition promotion”. According to the Transition Promotion programme con-
cept, transition promotion concerns “the promotion of democracy and the defence of 
human rights, it focuses on the establishment and reinforcement of democratic institutions, 
the rule of law, civil society and the principles of good governance through education, 
provision of information, views and experience, in particular experience in the field of 
non-violent resistance to the totalitarian system and subsequent process of social trans-
formation, experience of the Czech Republic and other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe gained in the 1980s and 1990s.”4 
Historical	Overview
The Czech Republic’s democracy assistance policies were launched even before the creat-
ion of the Transition Promotion programme. In 2003, the Czech government dec ided to 
participate in the economic reconstruction and stabilisation of Iraq. Soon, the government 
realised that - in addition to the reconstruction of the country’s physical infrastructure - 
Iraq needed also support with the creation of civil society, with the implementation of the 
principles of the rule of law, and with the education of its people. At the end of 2003, the 
Czech MFA started to support educational and training activities, study trips and intern-
ships in Iraq.
The first funds - CZK 12 million (approximately € 376,000)5 - were allocated specifically to 
democracy assistance in March 2004 upon the decision of the Czech government. Those 
funds were aimed at covering the education, training and internships of Iraqi experts with 
Czech companies. This was the first step in the creation of the transition promotion policy 
of the Czech Republic. In order to administer those funds in the future6, the MFA created 
the Transition Promotion unit. Formally, it was established on 1 July 2004, and took the 
form of a special unit, a form of organisation the MFA uses rather exceptionally as an 
“evolution stage“ before upgrading it into a classical department.
After the positive experience in Iraq and strong lobbying from the NGO sector (mainly 
the largest Czech development NGO, People in Need), the government decided in Feb-
ruary 2005 to extend the application of transition promotion also to other countries and 
increased its funding for the year 2005 to CZK 14m (€ 470,000).
In April 2005, the Transition Promotion programme concept was adopted, which de-
termined the priority policy areas and forms of democracy assistance provided by the 
Czech Republic. The Transition Promotion unit of the MFA allocated the first funds through 
a limited call for proposals.
Despite the recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD)7 to include transition promotion under the framework of Czech development 
assistance, in August 2007 the MFA decided to merge the Department of Human Rights 
and the Transition Promotion unit within the MFA, and created the Human Rights and 
Transition Policy department (HRTP). 
This decision was motivated by the desire to improve the co-ordination of policies in 
the field of human rights protection in target countries. While the Department of Human 
Rights dealt mainly with research and analysis and represented the Czech Republic’s 
interests in different international organisations and their bodies responsible for monitor-
ing  human rights, the Transition Promotion Unit was responsible for the management of 
specific projects improving the standards of human rights in target countries. The MFA also 
took into consideration the point that although transition promotion is considered part of 
development aid, its interconnection with the protection and promotion of human rights 
is more important.
Institutional	Framework
Czech democracy assistance is conducted on the basis of the Transition Promotion prog-
ramme concept. This conceptual strategy paper was adopted by the Collegium of Ministers8 
in 2005. The document defines the Czech Republic’s assistance priorities, fields and forms 
of supported activities, and the target countries of Czech democracy assistance.
According to this document, Czech democracy assistance is co-ordinated by the MFA9, 
and represents a distinct governmental policy area. It is complementary to the state for-
eign development aid and the humanitarian aid provided by the Czech Republic. Czech 
democracy assistance is in conformity with Czech foreign policy priorities, and is deter-
mined by the national interests of Czech foreign policy.
HRTP is responsible for the management of funds devoted to democracy assistance, the 
selection process, and the evaluation of individual projects. Specifically, within HRTP there 
is a Transition Promotion programme Working Group, which is responsible for the co-
ordination of democracy assistance. Currently, three HRTP officials are members of this 
working group. The department closely co-operates with other MFA departments - on 
conceptual issues with territorial departments10 and with Czech embassies in the target 
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countries, and technically (the same or similar budgetary and bureaucratic procedures) 
with the Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid Department. 
HRTP can be considered to be an “implementation agency” of Czech democracy ass-
istance. As far as HRTP is responsible for the management of democracy assistance, 
strategic decisions on priorities and target countries are taken by the collegium of min-
isters and are subject to consultation with the majority of MFA departments (especially 
those with strong stakes - territorial departments and embassies in target countries). The 
only decision taken at the governmental level is the decision on the overall amount of 
funds spent on democracy assistance. Since 2006, the funds earmarked for transition 
promotion have been approved by the government as one package in combination with 
development assistance funding.
The majority of projects supported by the MFA from the budget allocated to democracy 
assistance are implemented by Czech NGOs. The funds for projects implemented by 
NGOs are distributed through a grant scheme announced in the autumn of each year. The 
successful projects are announced at the beginning of the year, giving grantees enough 
time to properly implement projects so that they can complete them and the corresponding 
reporting by the end of the year.
This represents approximately 50% of available funds for each year. A further approx-
imately 25% of funds are reserved for multi-annual projects approved in the grant scheme 
in previous years. The remaining 25% of funds are held as a reserve and distributed dur-
ing the course of the year on an ad hoc basis. Although this is a less transparent way of 
allocation, it is important because its flexibility makes possible an immediate reaction to 
inputs and developments during the year. These funds are implemented either by NGOs 
or directly by the MFA or embassies in target countries.
To date, there have been five rounds of calls for proposals under the grant scheme mech-
anism - in 2005, 2006 (a regular call and a special call for Belarus), 2007, and 2008. 
In 2005 - due to the lack of time - there was only a limited call for proposals without clear 
set of criteria, requirements and settled procedures. Several organisations submitted prop-
osals, and they were approved by the MFA on a rolling basis. Together, 13 projects were 
approved in this limited call.
The regular grant scheme was implemented for the first time in 2006. After manipulated 
presidential elections in Belarus in the spring of 2006, the Czech government decided to 
allocate an additional CZK 20m for democracy assistance in Belarus, and the Transition 
Promotion unit11 issued a special call for proposals. 
The grant scheme regulates the types of projects supported, defines eligible applicants 
and activities, and sets the financial and legal requirements for project applications. Each 
applicant must secure at least 10% of co-financing for the project. 
Organisations eligible to receive funds from Transition Promotion programme comprise:
civic associations• 
public benefit companies• 
foundations• 
churches• 
regional governments and municipalities• 
universities• 
interest-based associations of legal entities.• 
Evaluation of the submitted projects is undertaken in a three-step procedure: 
checking the fulfilment of formal criteria1. 
internal evaluation within the MFA2. 
commission of officials and independent experts.3. 
All the project proposals are checked at the beginning of the evaluation to determine 
whether they meet the formal criteria (eligibility as a legal entity, match with priority areas 
of transition promotion, co-financing, etc). This is done by the so called “envelope comm-
ission”, which consists of MFA officials. After this step, the projects are evaluated by HRTP 
and the respective MFA territorial departments, as well as the embassies in the target 
countries. HRTP evaluates how the projects contribute to the transition policy of the Czech 
Republic according to the following criteria:
contribution of the project to the target country development and knowledge of local • 
conditions (30%)
expert quality of the project (10%)• 
financial and technical feasibility and timing (10%)• 
adequacy of the budget in relation to the aims of the project (15%)• 
proven expertise of the applicant organisation and its experts (15%)• 
co-financing (15%).• 
Embassies and territorial departments evaluate projects from the territorial point of view 
(feasibility and relevance of the project implementation in the target country), and give 
their recommendation as to whether to support the project or not. Projects that receive 
more than 50% from HRTP and/or are recommended by territorial departments and emb-
assies are submitted to the Commission of MFA officials and in dependent experts. Those 
where the recommendation of HRTP, territorial departments and embassies differ are also 
passed to the Commission with a note that a common recommendation could not be 
found.12
The final decision is made by the Commission. The Commission members are proposed by 
the director of HRTP, and they are appointed by the Chief of the Security and Multilateral 
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Section of the MFA. Commission members’ names are published only after the evaluation 
and publication of their decision on projects. 
Commission members each mark the project proposals submitted for their consideration 
by 0 - ½ -1 points, and the projects with the highest numbers of points are approved.
Projects approved by the Commission usually then enter the so-called “negotiating phase”, 
where successful applicants have to amend the projects according to the recommend-
ations of the Commission. In this phase, budget cuts are also applied to many projects 
The Commission can also approve a project but for budgetary reasons postpone its imple-
mentation until the necessary funds are secured. 
As to the transparency of the process, HRTP does not publish information explaining why 
specific projects were not approved. It is, however, open to each applicant to consult 
HRTP concerning the grounds for refusal. 
Transition	Promotion	programme	grant	scheme	statistics	(2005-2008)
2005 2006	
(regular)
2006	
(Belarus)
2007 2008
Project	proposals	
received
13 35 23 53 42
Passed	formal	
criteria	check
N/A 33 22 41 40
Passed	internal	
evaluation
N/A 29 2213 32 32
Approved 13 19 10 17 14
Approved	with	
postponed	
implementation
0 0 0 6 414
Instruments	of	Democracy	Assistance
According to the Transition Promotion programme concept, the Czech Republic’s demo-
cracy assistance focuses on the following priority policy areas:
Education in the fields of key importance for the process of social transformation (eco-• 
nomics, justice and legislation, armed forces and security, education, social system, 
state administration and local government, rehabilitation of political prisoners, reform 
of special services and of the army, restitution, privatisation, etc);
Promotion of civil society, civil life and relations within local communities, promotion • 
of activities of NGOs (in particular in fields important for social transformation), prom-
otion of public engagement in decision-making processes;
Promotion of the establishment and work of independent local media, improvement of • 
the standards of journalists’ work;
Assistance in resolving problems related to undemocratic rule and/or to the practices • 
of repressive regimes, as well as in reducing these problems or eliminating them, prov-
ision of support to persecuted persons or groups (e.g. mediation of material, legal, 
psychological, assistance), promotion of alternative ways of spreading information;
Scientific research on aspects of transformation issues (economic, sociological, socio-• 
psychological, legal, etc.) as a direct part of projects of transformation co-operation or 
their theoretical preparation;
Financial support (co-funding) of projects in the above areas, for which financing is be-• 
ing sought from the funds of the EU or other international organisations.15
The document also specifies the following types of eligible projects:
Training activities: study visits and scholarships, seminars, conferences;• 
Publications;• 
Study, work and exchange visits for students and young people, specialists, junior and • 
local politicians, journalists, representatives of NGOs, etc.;
Cultural events, presentations of cultural and training institutions;• 
Projects launched independently by entities in the recipient countries.• 16 
As mentioned before, the priority policy areas and also the forms of democracy assistance 
vary from country to country. There is no document specifying the preferred policy areas 
or forms of transition promotion for the individual target countries. The decision is made 
on an ad hoc basis by HRTP (after consultation with Czech embassies in target countries), 
although it can be assumed that the decisive factor is whether the target country has a 
democratic or undemocratic regime.
In practice, the following policy areas have been mainly but not exclusively considered by 
MFA as crucial in different target countries:
Belarus 
support of freedom of expression, independent media and information• 
education of alternative political elites• 
assistance to unjustly persecuted people• 
Cuba	and	Burma
support of democratic opposition and dissent• 
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Ukraine
transfer of knowledge of the EU and NATO accession processes• 
Serbia
development of corporate sponsorship/philanthropy, development of corporate social • 
responsibility, increasing NGOs’ fundraising skills
NGOs’ capacity building• 
Georgia
capacity building of NGOs working with refugees and internally displaced persons• 
Moldova
capacity building of NGOs in Transnistria• 
facilitation of co-operation of NGOs from both sides of Dniester river• 
Iraq
fostering the non-governmental sector.• 
Finances
Distribution	of	funds	according	to	priority	countries	in	2005	and	2006	
(real	spending)18
2005	
number	
of	projects	
supported
2005	
	CzK
2005	
		€
2006	
number	
of	projects	
supported
2006	
	CzK
2006	
		€
Burma	 2 580,000 19,000 3 1,787,000 63,000
Belarus	 9 3,835,000 129,000 26 18,900,000 667,000
Cuba	 5 894,000 30,000 2 1,399,000 49,000
Moldova	 1 1,075,000 36,000 2 1,637,000 58,000
Serbia* 2 303,000 10,000 4 3,370,000 119,000
Ukraine	 1 99,000 3,000 4 2,822,000 100,000
Georgia	 0 0 0 2 1,311,000 46,000
Iraq	 2 660,000 22,000 8 11,627,000 410,000
*In 2006, part of the funds were used also in Bosnia and Herzegovina
The funds allocated to democracy assistance through the Transition Promotion programme 
increased from CZK 12m (€ 376,000) in 2004 to CZK 14m (€ 470,000)17 in 2005 and 
to CZK 54m (€ 1.905m) in 2006. The sharp increase of funds in 2006 was due to the 
extraordinary budget line created by the MFA after the manipulated presidential elections 
in Belarus in 2006. This budget line amounted to CZK 20m (€ 706,000). The estimated 
spending for 2007 was CZK 41m (€ 1.477m). Some of the above-mentioned spending 
was used also on projects that cannot be considered as democracy assistance, (e.g. 
purchasing medical equipment for Iraqi hospitals, reconstruction of an organ in Cuba). 
However, these activities do not represent a significant amount of the funds allocated by 
the MFA to democracy assistance.
All the priority countries of Czech democracy assistance are listed in the OECD Develop-
ment Assistance Committee list of official development assistance (ODA) recipients. Funds 
allocated to democracy assistance projects are therefore considered a part of the Czech 
Republic’s ODA. Czech ODA is constantly increasing. While in 2002 it was € 48.11m 
(0.065% of gross domestic product (GDP)), in 2006 it reached € 128.21 million (0.12% 
of GDP). Funds allocated for democracy assistance increased from 0.49% of total ODA 
in 2004 to 1.56% in 2006, but the figure still remains extremely low in comparison with 
other types of development aid.
Czech	Official	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	-	millions	€19
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
ODA	total 48.11 80.14 87.01 108.64 128.21
bilateral	ODA 33.19 71.12 51.1 51.77 61.93
multilateral	
ODA
14.93 9.02 35.98 56.88 66.28
Democracy	
Assistance	
from	Transition	
Promotion	
programme
N/A N/A 0.38 0.47 1.91
Democracy	
Assistance	
from	 Czech-
UNDP	 Trust	
Fund20
N/A N/A 0.05 0.1 0.1
Czech	
Democracy	
Assistance	 in	
total
N/A N/A 0.43 0.57 2
Democracy	
Assistance/
ODA
N/A N/A 0.49% 0.53% 1.56%
ODA/GDP 0.065% 0.101% 0.106% 0.114% 0.120%
42
DEMOCRACy'S  NEW CHAMPIONS
Part I
43
Democracy Assistance Policies - Trends and Approaches 
Czech Republic: Limited Resources, Global Ambitions - Vladimír Bartovic
Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (editors)
Target	Countries
The target countries of Czech democracy assistance correspond with the Czech Republic’s 
foreign policy priorities. The Czech Republic, as a country with extensive experience of 
life under an undemocratic regime, and of the subsequent transformation and integration 
into the international community, including organisations such as the EU, NATO, OECD, 
and the World Trade Organization (WTO), has generated experience worth sharing 
with other states. At the same time, the Czech Republic considers the support of stability, 
freedom and security to be an investment into its own future political and economical 
relations.
On the basis of the Czech Republic’s foreign policy priorities, the MFA decided to include 
the following countries under the country’s democracy assistance programmes:
Developing countries and countries in transition - countries of the former Soviet Union • 
(Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia), the Balkans (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina), and 
Iraq.
Countries with undemocratic regimes where human rights are violated, such as Cuba, • 
Belarus, and Burma.
The list of these countries was drawn up in 2005 within the Transition Promotion 
 prog ramme. During the process of selecting the countries, consultations were held with 
Czech NGOs, such as People in Need, and with the group of people around former 
Czech President Václav Havel, who repeatedly emphasized the necessity for the “export 
of demo cracy” to countries ruled by undemocratic regimes. 
There was only one change in the list, which arose when Serbia and Montenegro split. 
The MFA decided that only Serbia would be the target country of Czech democracy ass-
istance. MFA officials reached the judgement that Montenegro had already implemented 
the majority of necessary reforms and was in less need of assistance than other countries 
of the Western Balkans (Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular).
Although there is no formal ranking of target countries, attention to date has been foc-
used on Belarus and Iraq. In the case of Belarus, the decisive factor was, as already 
mentioned, the manipulated presidential elections in 2006. In the case of Iraq, it was a 
pilot country for Czech democracy assistance. In the future, the MFA would like to support 
more projects in other priority countries, but it mostly depends on the projects proposed 
by Czech NGOs.
The MFA rarely supports activities in destinations other than target countries (e.g. North 
Korea, Iran). Less than 1% of the funds are allocated on an ad hoc basis to projects in 
these countries.
Other	Sources	of	Czech	
Democracy	Assistance	Funding
Czech-UNDP	Trust	Fund
Part of Czech democracy assistance is provided through the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund. It 
was created in 2000, but until 2004 focused primarily on projects delivered in the Czech 
Republic. The mission of the Fund was changed in 2004, when it was decided to focus on 
projects in ex-Soviet republics and Western Balkans countries in the following areas:
HIV/AIDS prevention• 
environmental issues - Czech experience of removing the communist legacy of environ-• 
mental problems (hot spots) and other areas of Czech good practice
good governance, support for transformation to democracy and related issues - • 
 institutional capacity building, parliamentary democracy
Czech experience of economic transformation• 
The last two areas can be regarded as “democracy assistance”. The first projects  under 
the new focus of the Fund were supported in 2005. The modus operandi of the Czech-
UNDP Trust Fund differs from the Transition Promotion Programme. The fund primarily 
accepts project proposals from the respective country offices in destination countries, and 
afterwards looks for implementing organisations in the Czech Republic. This is carried 
out either by directly approaching specific Czech organisations or by public calls for 
proposals.
As the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund comprises a component of Czech development assistance, 
there is no official co-ordination with HRTP.21 The fund is managed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) regional office in Bratislava, and co-ordinates its activ-
ities with the Department of Development Aid of the Czech MFA.
Funds	allocated	to	democracy	assistance	projects	from	the	Czech-UNDP	Trust	Fund	
(2004-2006)
2004 2005 2006
Czech	contribution	(€) 313,000 504,000 648,000
Democracy	assistance	
projects	(€)
53,000 97,000 96,000
Democracy	
assistance/Czech	
contribution
16.93% 19.25% 14.81%
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Czech	embassies
The MFA annually allocates certain funds to Czech embassies in the priority countries 
of Czech development assistance (Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, yemen, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Serbia, Vietnam, and Zambia), which can be distributed among recipients in 
these countries on the basis of the decisions of the respective embassies. These funds can 
also be used for democracy assistance projects, but this depends on each embassy’s pri-
orities. In 2004-2006, these funds amounted to CZK 500,000 per year in each country, 
in 2007 and 2008 the allocation was CZK 1m, and for 2009 it is envisaged that CZK 
2m will be spent in each of these countries.
Changes	in	Czech	Democracy	Assistance	Policy	
Since democracy assistance emerged as a distinct policy area in the Czech MFA only in 
the second half of 2004, there have been no major changes in this field to date. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to identify some patterns in the evolution of a policy, which started in the 
form of technical assistance in Iraq in 2004, and whose scope of activities was extended 
during the following three years.
Several patterns have emerged:
Although there have been no changes in the list of target countries (except for the excl-• 
usion of Montenegro after the split from the federation with Serbia), in 2004 and 2005 
the projects conducted were predominantly in Iraq. In 2006, greatest attention was 
focused on Belarus (presidential elections). There were almost no projects implemented 
in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Georgia. This situation changed in 2007, 
when five projects were funded in Serbia, three in Bosnia and Herzegovina22, and one 
in Georgia.
From 2009, Kosovo will be included in the list of priority countries, following the dec-• 
ision of the Czech government to recognise its independence.
The MFA is trying to improve the system of evaluation of projects. The plan is to intro-• 
duce a system of monitoring project outcomes. So far, only two projects (in 2005) were 
subject to financial control. Occasionally, the control of projects’ implementation is carr-
ied out by the embassies in target countries (e.g. by attending the events undertaken in 
target countries) or by HRTP (meeting with groups visiting the Czech Republic). 
The MFA is focusing its attention more on projects conducted directly in target countries • 
rather than supporting study trips and internships in the Czech Republic. 
Democracy assistance has become more important: the Transition Promotion unit was • 
upgraded to the position of department and merged with the existing Department of 
Human Rights. This will strengthen its analytical and research perspective.
Funds allocated to this field are constantly rising (from CZK 12m in 2004 to more than • 
CZK 41m in 2007). 
Eleven Czech NGOs working in the field of democracy assistance decided to create a • 
common platform with its own secretariat for co-ordination and administrative support 
of their activities, co-operation with the MFA and other donors, and advocacy activities. 
The secretariat should be operational from September 2008. It is expected that the MFA 
will secure financing for the initial period. 
Foreign	Donors	Supporting	Czech	Democracy	
Assistance	NGOs’	Projects
After the fall of communism, many foreign donors decided to assist Czech society in its 
transition towards democracy and pluralism. This process was successfully completed with 
the Czech Republic’s integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (OECD, NATO and EU), and 
the donors brought to an end most of their funding for Czech NGOs. However, some of 
them realised the value of the knowledge and experience of Czech NGOs and individuals 
generated during the transition period in the Czech Republic. They also understood that 
it would be worth using this knowledge and experience in countries still on the path to 
becoming fully democratic and stabilised. 
In addition, the countries in receipt of democracy assistance in the region of Eastern 
Europe and the Balkans consider the Central and Eastern European transition exper-
ience very much applicable, unlike that of Western Europe or the USA, which never went 
through this process. This led several foreign donors, such as the US National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED), Open Society Institute (OSI), Center for a Free Cuba, or Directorio 
Democrático Cubano, to support Czech NGOs in their efforts to transfer their knowledge 
and experience to countries with undemocratic regimes or countries in transition. While 
Center for a Free Cuba and Directorio Democrático Cubano supported People in Need’s 
projects only in Cuba, NED also financed projects in Iraq and Eastern Europe, and OSI 
financed projects in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe and Central Asia.
National	Endowment	for	Democracy	(NED),	USA
NED has drawn on the expertise of Czech NGOs mainly for projects aimed at fostering 
the skills of journalists, NGOs (in all supported countries), independent groups, such 
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as dissidents and unregistered NGOs (Belarus, Cuba), and local administration (Iraq, 
 Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine).
Indicative list of projects of Czech NGOs supported by the NED:
2004
People in Need, € 172,000 for projects in Cuba, Belarus and Iraq• 
2005
People in Need, € 169,000 for projects in Cuba, Belarus, Moldova and Iraq• 
Prague Society for International Co-operation, US$ 12,000 for project in Russia• 
Transitions Online, US$ 52,000 for projects in Russia• 
2006
People in Need, € 254,000 for projects in Cuba, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Iraq• 
Transitions Online, US$ 63,000 for projects in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and • 
Turkmenistan, and US$ 108,000 for project in Russia
In 2007, NED started to finance projects conducted by Civic Belarus in Belarus, and by 
Prague Watchdog in the North Caucasus.
Open	Society	Institute	(OSI)
OSI finances democracy assistance projects through its international programme, “East-
East Partnership beyond Borders”, which supports co-operation between partners from 
Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. The main goal of the 
programme is to help the post-Soviet countries in their transition to become standard 
democratic states. The foundation supports projects fostering, for instance, the rule of 
law, development of the NGO sector, anti-corruption measures, managing migration, and 
promoting equal opportunities. In 2005, OSI decided to launch a sub-programme for 
European integration to support co-operation between new EU member states, EU cand-
idate countries and EU neighbours. Between 2004 and 2006, OSI supported 24 Czech 
projects that can be regarded as “democracy assistance”.
Besides the projects mentioned above, OSI supported the travel of Czech representatives 
in the framework of projects undertaken with the support of the East-East Partnership 
 Beyond Borders programme in other countries.  
Projects	supported	by	the	East-East	Partnership	Beyond	Borders	programme	of	OSI
2004 2005 2006
Number	of	projects 8 5 12
Granted	amount	(€) 41,000 24,000 85,000
Organisations	Working	in	the	Field	
of	Democracy	Assistance
There are about 20 organisations in the Czech Republic that work in the field of demo-
cracy assistance. Apart from Civic Belarus, none of them was created solely for this 
purpose, and democracy assistance is not their exclusive area of work. Many NGOs 
working in this field are think-tanks and research institutes, such as the Prague Security 
Studies Institute (PSSI), EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Association for Inter-
national Affairs (AMO), or Democracy and Culture Studies Centre (CDK), which use their 
expertise generated during the transformation process of the Czech Republic and transfer 
it to countries in transition. In recent years, the field of democracy assistance has been 
dominated by People in Need (PIN), which was the first Czech NGO to start working con-
sistently in the area. Other NGOs23 began implementing democracy assistance projects 
mainly after the Transition Promotion programme was launched, although even before this 
some projects fostering good governance were funded by Czech ODA and by the OSI 
East-East Partnership Beyond Borders programme.
The establishment of the Transition Promotion programme boosted the activities of Czech 
NGOs in the area of democracy assistance. They soon realised the need for co-ordination 
of their efforts when duplication of activities for the same target groups started to occur. 
With its overview of the activities funded through the annual grant scheme, the MFA was 
aware of the duplication, and from the beginning strongly supported the need for co-
ordination. 
On the initial impulse of People in Need24, 11 Czech NGOs  decided to create the 
 Association for Democracy and Human Rights (DEMAS) that will serve as a platform 
for co-operation, discussion, advocacy, lobbying, and promotion of the activities of its 
members in the field of democratisation and promotion of human rights. The association 
will be registered as an association of legal entities with its own secretariat that should be 
operational by the end of 2008. 
DEMAS is likely to complement the Czech MFA in advocacy for the Czech democratis-
ation agenda in the EU (especially during the Czech presidency of the EU Council in 
the first half of 2009) and in other international forums. It is expected that the MFA will 
provide initial funding for DEMAS. 
Endnotes
1  With the exception of the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM)
2  Transition Promotion programme concept, http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?ido=15782
&idj=2&amb=1&ikony=False&trid=1&prsl=False&pocc1=
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24  The final members upon registration in the summer of 2008 were: People in Need, EUROPEUM 
Institute for European Policy, PASOS (Policy Association for an Open Society), Association for International 
Affairs (AMO), Transitions Online, Civic Belarus, Forum 2000 Foundation, Agora Central Europe, 
Democracy and Culture Studies Centre, Yes for Europe, Respekt Institute. 
3  Meant as the transformation of society.
4  Transition Promotion Programme concept, http://www.mzv.cz/wwwo/mzv/default.asp?ido=15782
&idj=2&amb=1&ikony=False&trid=1&prsl=False&pocc1=
5  Annual average exchange rate CZK/EUR: 31.904 (2004), 29.784 (2005), 28.343 (2006), 
27.762 (2007)
6  Funds were administered in 2004 by the Department of Bilateral Economic Relations.
7  In 2006, the OECD Committee for Development Aid conducted an assessment of Czech development 
co-operation. One of the recommendations of the Committee for improving the co-ordination of Czech 
development co-operation was the inclusion of the Transition Promotion unit under the Department of 
Development Co-operation.
8  Advisory body of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which, inter alia, adopts concepts and strategies of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Members of this body are the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister’s 
deputies, and other senior officials of the Ministry.
9  With the exception of the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund.
10  South Europe & South East Europe Department, North Europe & East Europe Department, American 
Department, and Asia & Pacific Department
11  In 2006, it was the Transition Promotion Unit of MFA, before the unit was merged into HRTP.
12  To date, the Commission has never approved a project proposal where there were different 
recommendations from HRTP, territorial departments and embassies.
13  There was not a regular internal round. 
14  All these projects proposed activities in Georgia, and the MFA asked applicants to prepare a joint 
project that would be supported from the Transition Promotion programme.
15  Taken from Transition Promotion programme concept
16  Ibid.
17  Although in 2005 only CZK 8.5m (€ 285,000) were spent. The unused funds were moved into the 
reserve fund of the MFA that can be used only with the government’s authorisation. The government agreed 
with the use of part of this reserve in 2007.
18  This table shows the distribution of funds according to target countries, allocated in each year, and 
includes neither allocations for multi-annual projects approved in previous years nor funds for projects where 
there is no specific target country, e.g. scholarships for students from all priority countries at CERGE-EI 
(Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute).
19  Original data in USD. Annual average exchange rate USD/EUR: 1.061 (2002), 0.885 (2003), 
0.805 (2004), 0.804 (2005), 0.797 (2006) 
20  More detailed information in section, Other Sources of Czech Democracy Assistance Funding
21  Only occasional consultations were held between HRTP and the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund in recent 
years. 
22  Two of these projects have been implemented in both countries.
23  with the exception of EDUCON Prague, which has been implementing knowledge-transfer projects 
financed by the Czech-UNDP Trust Fund since 2000.
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Hungarian	Minorities,	the	
Balkans	...	and	the	Far	East
Hungary’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities
Áron Horváth
Center for Policy Studies at the Central European University, Hungary
As of summer 2008, Hungary does not have a strategic document outlining the defin-ition, mechanisms, priorities and options of the government in terms of democracy 
assistance, although it is a field of action underlined in Hungary’s Foreign Relations Strat-
egy. However, there is a clear commitment to co-ordinate democracy activities within the 
international development co-operation (IDC) policy field: an institutional framework, a 
Democracy Workgroup, exists within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to discuss and 
decide on democracy assistance projects, but it remains a loose organisational entity. 
There is also a separate appropriation for democracy assistance within the MFA budget, 
but this does not cover all Hungarian democracy assistance projects, and has not been 
handled to date in a very transparent manner. 
Without a coherent policy strategy, democracy assistance can be preliminarily con-
ceptualised as a category of activities that fall under the Euro-Atlantic1 commitments of 
Hungary. In 2007, democracy assistance was not a sub-category of IDC policy, but as 
the government is planning to move towards a formal definition of democracy assistance 
activities, it has since been assigned a distinct category under the scope of the Department 
for International Development Co-operation (DIDC). This change has not as yet resulted 
in any departure from the principle laid out in July 2007 by Gabriella Kereszty, former 
Department Head of the Secretariat of the State Secretary for Multilateral Diplomacy - and 
confirmed in interviews conducted with MFA officials - according to which Hungary em-
barks on democracy assistance activities in places where the target country is receptive 
to these initiatives. 
Thus, in general, Hungary has a preference for good working and diplomatic relations 
with the recipient countries: it implements democracy assistance programmes or projects 
in a safe environment, with the full support of the host government entities, in places where 
it has knowledge of the local social and governmental environment. Nevertheless, by 
summer 2008, signs had emerged that Hungarian democracy assistance is also embark-
ing on a more assertive and less co-operative approach, characterised for instance by its 
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policies towards Cuba, where Hungary would like to contribute to a slow and peaceful 
regime change.2
In terms of capacity, Hungary is a minor player in the international donor arena. This 
status, and the fact that there is strong competition for external funds between the new 
EU member states in general and the Visegrad Four countries (V4) in particular, drives 
MFA officials to conceive innovative ideas that do not necessarily require large funds, but 
are visible actions that will gain recognition from other donor countries. More significant 
impact, however, can often be achieved through partnerships with more experienced and 
wealthier donor countries or organisations, which can also add to Hungary’s experience 
and prestige in the international arena and vis-à-vis its regional competitors. 
Regarding the substance of democracy assistance, Hungary has no clearly defined set 
of democracy assistance instruments or tools, but rather helps with issues where it has 
experience, which embraces basically the entirety of democratic transition, especially 
institution-building and good governance.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	THE	HUNGARIAN	
GOVERNMENT
Priorities
 
Draft a concept of democracy assistance 
 including, but not limited to:
institutional framework• 
existing programmes categorised as • 
 democracy assistance
priorities (thematic, geographic)• 
financial instruments available• 
relations with NGOs.• 
Thematic and geographic priorities
Decide and focus on the activities where • 
Hungary can provide real added value: 
e.g. governmental human rights dialogue 
or education in countries where demo-
cratic transition of some kind is imminent; 
reconstruction of institutions in war-torn 
countries; fostering democratic transition 
through a bottom-up process in undemo-
cratic countries
Continue with same priority countries in • 
the long run (as much as possible)
Since Hungary is a minor player in demo-• 
cracy assistance, co-operation with other 
partners with similar transition/historical 
backgrounds can multiply its achieve-
ments: it would be advisable to create 
platforms where competing new EU mem-
ber states could also co-operate on certain 
issues or single projects (similarly to the 
regional partnership framework - V4 plus 
Slovenia and Austria)
Engage more in democracy assistance • 
in Belarus, building on the International 
Centre for Democratic Transition’s current 
capacity-building of NGOs in Belarus 
- init ially by involving some Hungarian 
NGOs in common projects with other 
V4 partners focusing on Belarus, and as 
a second stage the involvement of the 
Hungarian government. There is space 
for the involvement of Hungarian NGOs 
in the support of small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Belarus, in local and comm-
unity initiatives, capacity-building of 
NGOs, and in the support of independent 
publishing activities. 
Implementation
Design the new IDC project database in a • 
way that will allow filtering of democracy 
assistance projects and data
Expand improving non-governmental • 
development organisations (NGDO) 
rel ations framework to democracy assist-
ance NGOs as well, e.g. by creating a 
joint Democracy Workgroup and democ-
racy assistance NGO forum as a start, 
and progressively creating linkages to for-
eign service missions in order to conceive 
meaningful projects
Pay more attention and financial means to • 
NGO capacity-building if unsatisfied with 
the current situation and the lack of expert-
ise of NGOs
In the case of a democracy assistance • 
grant-making scheme, improve granting 
procedures to Hungarian NGOs, in order 
to respond to their needs:
Allow for NGO accreditation vis- .
à-vis the MFA to ease the burden of 
having to provide extensive (and exp-
ensive) proof of the organisations’ 
administrative background with each 
application. This would accelerate 
public procurement processes in a 
transparent manner.
Organise tenders for capacity-building  .
of NGOs, which is still needed in Hun-
gary today
Provide matching grants to NGOs,  .
to be used for co-financing projects 
funded by other donors
Grant-making through embassies: organ-• 
ise this instrument better to avoid ad hoc 
grant-making: 
Communicate plans for the future on  .
this instrument: will it be scaled up, or 
will it remain as limited and pilot-like 
as it is today?
Make clear how Hungarian NGOs  .
can benefit from the present and future 
mechanism, or if there is a role for 
them at all within this framework
If the lack of funds is the obstacle to  .
better V4 donor co-ordination, coher-
ence and complementarity, then at 
least make clear how much money will 
be available in the medium-term per-
spective for embassy grant-making
Educate officers in the foreign service  .
on Hungarian democracy assistance 
policy if project proposal and impl-
ementation tasks are expected from 
them
Fund target-country NGO operations  .
and local capacity-building/training 
capacity, not only projects, by provid-
ing larger grants, perhaps through 
co-operation with other V4 embassies
If possible, ease the bureaucratic bur- .
den of decision-making by shortening 
the time-lag between application and 
signing grant agreements and delegat-
ing more responsibility from MFA to 
embassies for approval of grants and 
for reporting lines, or by delegating 
and training responsible and govern-
ment strategy-aligned local granting 
specialists entrusted with the direct 
 allocation of funds
Include matching grants in the grant  .
portfolio - to let NGOs co-finance 
larger projects through other interna-
tional sources (EIDHR, etc.)
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History	of	Democracy	Assistance
Following its own democratic regime change in 1989, Hungary adopted a certain demo-
cracy assistance and stabilisation role in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, which 
Transparency
Communicate the democracy assistance • 
concept through the MFA website and 
other channels 
Refurbish the IDC section on the MFA • 
website, and allocate a sub-section for de-
mocracy assistance
Include a budget line for the communic-• 
ation of results in each democracy 
assistance (and likewise IDC) project, 
and elaborate a long-term communic-
ations plan to reach the public, gradually 
starting from professional audience and 
moving gradually towards lay public
Engage in discussion with stakeholders • 
from other sectors (civil, private, inter-
national) in order to formulate and/or 
implement the Hungarian democracy 
assistance concept - similarly to the Depart-
ment for International Organisations and 
Human Rights (IOHR). This should not be 
difficult, since there are only a few play-
ers.
Report on annual democracy assistance • 
activities and financing within or separ-
ately from IDC, in line with the concept
Leave more time for the assessment of the • 
previous year’s results, by approximat-
ing Hungarian reporting to the reporting 
schedule of the OECD (which asks for the 
reports to be sent later within the year as 
opposed to the practice of the MFA where 
the IDC report is due in the first quarter of 
the next year) 
Establish a grant-making instrument for • 
democracy assistance separately from or 
within the annual IDC NGO tender and/
or from the Promotion of Democratic Trans-
ition appropriation
Communicate financing intentions - as opp-• 
osed to exact numbers - envisaged for at 
least two years ahead to allow recipients 
or grantees to anticipate the government’s 
help in line with its available resources.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	HUNGARIAN	NGOS
Concentrate on finding partners and fund-• 
ing for longer-term projects for which 
the government could contribute with co-
financing grants
Follow up projects better on the ground, try • 
to avoid the short project-cycle approach 
often resulting from granting requirements
Conduct better, more in-depth research • 
into what the local needs are in order to 
avoid the duplication of already existing 
mechanisms.
was evident in the number of international organisations that set up regional centres in 
the country. Budapest continues to serve as a regional hub for such organisations to the 
present day3. In the beginning, this was due to its status as a model country among the 
transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and nowadays the growing number of 
private sector investments, combined with the presence of international organisations, the 
quality of services and networking opportunities create an attractive location. The earlier 
stabilisation role was important for the Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary’s 
borders and also for political and economic reasons. 
With the advent of the 21st century, the scope of such activities enlarged with Hungary’s 
accession to membership of NATO (1999) and the EU (2004) - and the expansion of 
these organisations’ respective scopes. As a consequence, Hungary’s stance towards 
democracy assistance changed from regional stability to thinking about how to “sell” the 
transition experience to a wider audience, taking into consideration the strengths and 
limitations of Hungary in democracy assistance. The International Centre for Democratic 
Transition (ICDT) was conceived in 2004 and established in the second half of 2005, 
and only subsequently did the MFA start thinking about a more systematic approach to 
democracy assistance. In 2007, the MFA set up the Democracy Workgroup, and the rule 
of law, security, democracy and sustainable development became the third set of strategic 
directions set forth in the Hungarian Foreign Relations Strategy, adopted by Parliament 
in March 2008. At the time of writing, the formulation of a distinct democracy assistance 
strategy had been set for the final quarter of 2008. 
Organisational	Structure	
of	Democracy	Assistance
Democracy assistance activities are co-ordinated by an interdepartmental workgroup 
within the MFA, the Democracy Workgroup. The Democracy Workgroup was called to 
life in 2007, and started to function formally in 2008. The member departments are:
Department of International Organisations and Human Rights• 
Second Department of Europe (covering South-Eastern and Eastern Europe, the Western • 
Balkans, and some parts of Eurasia)
Department for Africa and the Middle East• 
Department for the Americas• 
Strategic Policy Planning and Information Department• 
Department for International Development Co-operation• 
The tasks of the Workgroup are to set the strategic direction of democracy assistance, to 
decide on the democracy assistance projects to be financed from the Democracy App-
ropriation, to co-ordinate between the different departments, and to organise external 
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communications. The head of the department is the State Secretary for Bilateral Relations 
with Extra-European Countries, International Development, Economic and Scientific Co-
operation - currently László Várkonyi. Nevertheless, the Workgroup is more a co- ordinating 
body than an institution directing democracy assistance.
Selection of democracy assistance projects
The Workgroup receives project proposals from embassies, civil society (thus far mainly 
from ICDT), and other institutions (e.g. HUN-IDA, DIDC’s contracted implementing agency). 
Although the Workgroup is the forum where project proposals are discussed and deci-
sions are taken as to which projects will be funded from the Promotion of Democratic 
Transition Appropriation, the member departments, especially DIDC, have a very strong 
influence on the final decision. Given their implementer role, they are the ones to decide 
whether a particular project is in line with their strategy or not, while the Workgroup 
ensures the projects’ compatibility with the (to date non-explicit) democracy assistance 
strategy. Despite its interdepartmental setup, the Workgroup operates under the auspices 
of the DIDC: the head of the department has a major influence on the selection of projects, 
the Democracy Appropriation is from this perspective an integral part of the IDC Appro-
priation, although a separate budget line, and the office of the Workgroup’s secretary is 
located in this department.
The network of the Workgroup can be depicted as follows: 
External communications on democracy assistance 
In general, external communications funds are very limited, and are centralised at the 
ministerial level. There is a fund tendered out to civil society amounting to HUF 20m 
(€ 80,000), of which democracy assistance could become one thematic element. The 
general public knows little about democracy assistance in general, so communications - 
especially with such limited capacities - have a low news factor. 
Planned communications about Hungary’s democracy assistance strategy are directed to-
wards political and professional audiences through the means of ministerial speeches and 
the publication of policy documents (e.g. the Foreign Relations Strategy in March 2008). 
NGO involvement
As of May 2008, besides ICDT, there is practically no NGO involvement in democracy 
 assistance activities. Consultations are scarce, but the democracy Workgroup does in-
tend to engage the civil society sector in the future, and consultation with NGOs in the 
framework of IDC improved significantly through June 2008 (see Relations with NGOs 
below).
Department for International Development Co-operation (DIDC)
The head of DIDC emphasized at a PASOS roundtable organised in Budapest4 in May 
2008 that Hungarian international development co-operation (IDC) activities (started in 
2003-2004) are as a whole still in a learning phase, which is particularly true about 
demo cracy assistance. Since the IDC and democracy assistance fields are so interlinked, 
it is worth taking a glimpse at how DIDC operates, and the capacities it has acquired 
since Hungary launched its donor activities. 
 
In the 1990s, decentralised and ad hoc IDC activity was mainly funnelled through multi-
lateral organisations (IDC Concept, 2001), until in 2001 the IDC Concept created a 
strategic direction aligning Hungarian IDC to the international donor community’s 
principles and practices - most importantly to those of the UN and the EU - since such 
convergence was an element of the acquis communautaire that Hungary had to adopt 
to secure membership of the EU - and also to the guidelines of the OECD’s Development 
Assistance Committee, the most important soft co-ordinator of global IDC activities and 
trends. 
According to the concept, as an element of political and economic foreign affairs act-
ivities, IDC concentrates on promoting Euro-Atlantic integration, on fostering regional 
stability, and on supporting national interests. The document asserts, similarly to the focus 
cited above concerning democracy assistance, that Hungary has to concentrate its efforts 
in fields where it has experience and skills to leverage. 
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The fields listed directly relevant to democracy assistance are: 
the transfer of Hungarian experience pertaining to democratic transition• 
intellectual capital, knowledge-based assistance• 
education (graduate and post-graduate), expert and technical expert education, cur-• 
riculum development, distant learning.
Although these democracy assistance fields are central to the conceptual framework of 
the IDC, according to an official working at the DIDC, in 2001 no democracy block was 
explicitly formed; it was rather included in the overall national approach towards interna-
tional development - similarly to the EU’s approach. 
The IDC strategy published in 2003 identifies the MFA as the elaborator of the IDC policy 
and the cross-ministerial co-ordinator of planning and implementation. On 1 October 
2002, DIDC came into being, and put in place the organisational background of Hung-
arian IDC, including democracy assistance activities. 
Organisational structure of DIDC
The tasks and target countries for DIDC’s work are defined by the Cross-Ministerial 
Comm ittee (Tárcaközi Bizottság), over which the Minister of Foreign Affairs presides. 
The Cross-Ministerial Expert Workgroup (Tárcaközi Szakértői Munkacsoport), made up of 
the relevant ministries’ department heads responsible for international relations, provides 
the basis of DIDC’s mandate, since this is the main co-ordination body of each ministry’s 
international development activities (and as such does not substitute for the funds and the 
activities of the line ministries). The IDC Work Committee (Munkabizottság) handles the 
budget appropriation devoted to IDC projects, ensures that the projects are in line with the 
above-mentioned strategic directions, and follows up on the status of these projects. The 
Social Advisory Body (Társadalmi Tanácsadó Testület) is the IDC activities’ evaluative and 
consultative body, which also has a mandate to raise social awareness for the activities. 
Hungarian IDC is also supported by an Implementing Agency, which is contracted for a 
monthly fee by DIDC to organise, carry out, monitor, and evaluate NGO tenders issued 
by the government, but does not give grants. Since the onset of IDC activities, this agency 
has been HUN-IDA Kht., a public non-profit company, which also carries out IDC projects 
of its own financed from the MFA’s IDC appropriation. 
Institutional capacity-building
Strangely enough, the institutional and organisational background was not induced by EU 
institutions as might have been expected in the context of Hungary’s EU accession proce-
dure. Instead, Hungarian IDC capacities were developed based on the support of other 
countries and institutional players. The two most decisive aid programmes promoting 
Hungarian IDC capacity-building were that of the Canadian International Development 
Agency’s (CIDA) ODACE (Official Development Assistance in Central Europe) programme 
from 2002-2004, targeting all the Visegrad Four countries; and that of the UNDP, over-
seen by the Bratislava regional office in the same time period. More recently, a conference 
and workshop funded by the MATRA Flex Programme at the end of 2007, and the Finn-
ish Development Agency’s six-month capacity-building programme, ending in July 2007, 
financed by the EU’s “Twinning light” programme, made up for this European hiatus. 
Bilateral study tours have also served as important exchanges shaping Hungarian IDC, 
namely those organised to Ireland, Austria, Finland, Germany and Sweden, while the 
Danish government helped in building the fieldwork capacities of Hungarian embassies. 
In parallel to the capacity-building programmes, shared funds were set between the MFA 
and different partners, which either served as a practice in setting up and managing 
development projects, or amounted already to actual IDC activity. One component of the 
ODACE programme co-financed each year some civil society projects selected by CIDA. 
The Regional Partnership Programme, run by the Austrian Development Agency (ADA), 
financed pilot projects in development. The funds aimed at the new EU member states and 
cost-sharing occurred between ADA (67%), the government of the respective new member 
state (23%), and the implementer - mostly NGOs (10%). Three annual calls for applic-
ations were issued between 2005-07. UNDP has also run a trust fund with the MFA since 
2004, which targets the Western Balkans. Initially, US$ 1m (HUF 220m) were allocated to 
this fund and, at the time of writing, there were plans to renew this financial arrangement, 
but it was uncertain how much money would be available. 
Relations with NGOs
According to the IDC strategy and annual reports since 2003-04, the civil sector and the 
private sector are also involved in the orientation and implementation of IDC policy. The 
Hungarian Association of NGOs for Development and Humanitarian Aid (HAND) has 
held consultations with the MFA since the beginning of the donor activities in 2003. A 
2006 DIDC report asserts that “civil organisations are important actors in the implement-
ation of the international development and humanitarian aid policy. Their representatives 
took part in the elaboration of [Hungary’s] IDC policy as members of the Social Advi-
sory Body, and as implementers in its execution.” (IDC report 2006). In May 2008, the 
MFA approved the “Sector-Specific Civil Action Plan of the MFA (2008-2009)”, while bi-
monthly consultations between HAND and DIDC became exemplary within the ministry.
 
ICDT’s structure and relevance
In August 2005, the government founded the Centre for Democracy Public Foundation 
(CDPF), a quasi-governmental NGO with a mandate to “collect, synthesize and dispatch 
the experiences of democratic transition without geographic limits”. It is an organisation 
endorsed by all the Hungarian parliamentary political parties, which are represented 
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on the board of trustees headed by an independent intellectual, Elemér Hankiss - a rare 
field of consensus between the Hungarian government and opposition. ICDT is CDPF’s 
independent institute, and in this manner it is neither directly owned by, nor founded by, 
the government, which keeps it - at least symbolically - further from the latter’s control. 
This is important to ensure its autonomous status and image, both of which - according 
to government sources - are taken seriously by the MFA, since this is a prerequisite for 
the organisation to be able to raise funds from international donors wary of supporting 
government entities. 
The operations of the institute are financed by the Hungarian government, but most of the 
projects are financed by external donors. The fact that ICDT receives operational support 
from the government clearly distinguishes it from other NGOs, as this is an exceptional 
practice. This support can seem puzzling when the head of the organisation is explicitly 
distancing its activities from governmental interference. Probably, this situation can be att-
ributed more to the personal charisma and fundraising skills of the CEO and President of 
the centre than to a government democracy assistance strategy.
 
Since its foundation, ICDT has been the face of Hungarian democracy assistance towards 
the outside world. This face is indeed very visible, as the institute’s international board 
consists of 25 highly acclaimed ex-government officials, with names such as former US 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright or three former US Ambassadors to Hungary. 
Hungarian democracy assistance activities did exist before 2005, but these were neither 
explicit nor publicised to a wider local and international audience. ICDT represented an 
opening towards the outside world in terms of this activity. Its foundation was announced 
at the April 2005 Chile Conference of the Community of Democracies. 
However, ICDT is not the sole implementer of governmental democracy assistance, and 
the MFA does not want to portray it as such, but it is one with a very special status. How 
special the relationship is between the MFA and the institute is reflected in their mutual-
help regime: the MFA gives the centre access to its international partners, while the ICDT 
is always exchanging views and experiences with Hungary’s missions abroad. This close 
co-operation between the centre and the MFA results in the ICDT being somehow also an 
actor of Hungarian diplomacy. 
 
According to the MFA, the two entities’ relationship is a synergy that advances the int-
erests of both. Moreover, the ICDT itself also works in partnership with other NGOs or 
experts, because it does not have the capacity to solve everything by itself. Thus, in this 
manner, it has a multiplicator effect. 
Contrary to DIDC, which publishes tenders for funds to be spent directly by NGOs, demo-
cracy assistance executed by some of the MFA’s other organisational entities is channelled 
through public foundations. This is the case of ICDT, which partners or with, or even 
outsources some of its projects to, other organisations or experts. ICDT has full discre-
tion in choosing its partners. It has several strategic partners such as the United Nations 
Democracy Fund (UNDEF) and Freedom House. It also embarks on so-called “expert 
seconding”, which entails finding experts for certain tasks or problems. According to its 
annual report for 2005, for instance, ICDT was working on establishing connections with 
various knowledge networks. 
ICDT also has to organise tenders when making grants, depending on the value of the 
activities outsourced. 
NGOs or research institutes with whom ICDT has worked include:
Organisation Marocaine des Droits Humains • 
European Movement in Serbia• 
Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO)• 
Balkan Trust for Democracy• 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA).• 
Consultancies with whom ICDT has partnered include:
Political Capital• 
European Center for Not-for-Profit Law.• 
The same is the case with Hungary’s two larger regional assistance programmes: the Nyír-
egyháza Initiative, which has the objective of assisting Ukraine in its EU integration work 
through training of experts, conferences and knowledge transfer; and the Szeged Process, 
which provides assistance to the countries of South-Eastern Europe, principally Serbia, to 
bring about their integration into the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence. Both programmes 
have separate, dedicated public foundations that carry out projects of their own and issue 
calls for applications to NGOs and local institutions in the target countries and Hungary. 
Target	Countries
Similarly to the organisational and institutional backgrounds, the Hungarian IDC strategy 
and the forthcoming democracy assistance strategy focus on overlapping target countries, 
although there are identifiable differences, and target countries can change priority status 
from one year to another. 
International Development Co-operation
Hungary’s IDC has 16 target countries, each with different priority status that determines 
the funds dedicated to each country. As of 2007, the priority regions were as follows5:
62
DEMOCRACy'S  NEW CHAMPIONS
Part I
63
Democracy Assistance Policies - Trends and Approaches 
Hungary: Hungarian Minorities, the Balkans ... and the Far East - Áron Horváth
Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (editors)
Strategic partners: Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vietnam • 
Other partner countries: Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Pal-• 
estine Authority 
Least developed countries (LDCs): Ethiopia, yemen, Cambodia, Laos • 
International commitments: Afghanistan, Iraq • 
China was removed from the list of target countries in 2006, a step justified by its high 
rate of economic growth and the minuscule contribution Hungary could add to that. 
Democracy assistance
The selection of the target countries of Hungary’s democracy assistance policies builds 
on the IDC areas of interest with some additional criteria: the country in question has 
to be before or in the process of democratic transition; the country has to fall within the 
(geographical or political) areas of interest of the Hungarian government; Hungary has 
to have good knowledge of the local political and social landscape, and/or the involve-
ment of Hungary in the given country should be positively recognised by its partners in 
diplomatic terms. 
Judging from the programmes underway in the field of democracy assistance, it would 
seem that the likely target countries of democracy assistance would be: Serbia and Monte-
negro (Szeged Process), Ukraine (Nyíregyháza Initiative), Moldova, Vietnam and also 
China in the light of the continuing Human Rights dialogue process in effect with Hungary 
since 2000. 
However, the MFA communicated the following countries as the ones targeted by demo-
cracy assistance as of May 2008:
Within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and other regional commitments: • 
Serbia, Belarus, Moldova, and Albania;
Related to IDC policy and international commitments: Cuba, Palestine Authority, and • 
North Korea.
These target countries are not set in stone in the forthcoming democracy assistance strat-
egy of Hungary, but are rather handled as a continuously evolving set of countries. This 
explains why the current issue of target countries is still a little bit fuzzy and will, it is to 
be hoped, be settled at least on an annual basis, starting from the publication of the first 
democracy assistance strategy.  
Contrary to the official position on Cuba back in 2007, in May 2008 the democratis-
ation of Cuba was placed officially on the map of Hungarian democracy assistance, 
even if progress is envisaged in a slow and peaceful manner due to financial constraints, 
the relevant experience of Hungary in the field of such regime change, and the tactful 
style of Hungary’s democracy assistance as set out in the introduction. Cuban activities 
are also an important factor in improving Hungarian-US bilateral relations. Furthermore, 
Hungary has a relatively long history of relations with Cuba - with thousands of college 
and university graduates living there who once studied in Hungary. The current Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Kinga Göncz, is also keen on seeing more co-operation on this front, if 
the opportunity arises, i.e. in Hungarian parlance if the Cuban authorities become more 
receptive to such initiatives. 
Projects	and	Programmes
The following comprise the activities conducted so far by or through the MFA in the field 
of democracy assistance: 
the projects of DIDC pertaining to this category• 
the Nyíregyháza Initiative and the Szeged Process• 
ICDT’s projects• 
the contribution made to, and the work executed in, international organisations and • 
mechanisms linked to democracy and human rights.
Interviews revealed that it is a matter of debate within the MFA what exactly belongs 
under democracy assistance, which is a normal phenomenon when a clearly set strategy 
is lacking, and intradepartmental co-operation in the field is still in its early stages. From 
this perspective, it is understandable that Hungary’s democracy assistance is in a learning 
phase. 
Information on projects was difficult to collect, since the DIDC section on the MFA’s website 
is disorganised and the project selection information provided in July 2007 omits many 
of the dates of project approval and implementation. This situation may improve with the 
introduction of a new electronic database anticipated for November 2007, albeit later 
postponed until autumn 2008.
DIDC projects with democracy assistance content
The annual IDC appropriation does not make a distinction for democracy assistance 
projects, nor do any of the written reports consulted by the author. Nevertheless, there are 
projects that can be categorised directly or indirectly as democracy assistance in a selec-
tion, but not in the case of all the target countries listed above. 
The implementers of IDC projects vary. DIDC implements projects through its Implementing 
Agency and by tendering out grants to NGOs. 
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Democracy	Assistance	Projects	(based	on	IDC	Report)	
2004 €
Training of Palestinian election experts: 
Ministry of Internal Affairs International Training Centre (MIATTC)
70,000
Training of Afghan police: MIATTC 360,000
Training of Iraqi police in Jordan:  MIATTC 269,100
Development and strengthening of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  DemNet 28,000
Financial contribution to organisation of elections in Georgia:  OSCE 40,000
Study trip of Chinese lawyers in the framework of human rights conversation: HUN-IDA Kht. 4,000
Visit of Vietnamese delegation to study governmental subsidy system for SMEs: HUN-IDA Kht. 32,000
Chinese experts’ study tour to the Office of Hungarian Assembly’s Ombudsman:  Office of 
Hungarian Assembly’s Ombudsman
2,360
Vietnamese national assembly delegation study tour to Hungarian Parliament: HUN-IDA Kht. 29,600
Visit of Bosnian government delegation on Roma issues:  Prime Minister’s Office 935
Contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund (LOFTA) in Afghanistan: UNDP 100,000
SUBTOTAL 935,995
2005 €
Support for Iraqi elections 52,000
Strengthening Serbian central government co-ordination:  UNDP Trust Fund 32,000
Capacity building of local government in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina: UNDP Trust Fund 120,000
Strengthening of internal governmental co-ordination mechanisms in Serbia: UNDP Trust Fund 216,000
Strengthening regional government of Vojvodina, Serbia - preparation of project: UNDP Trust Fund 3,440
Expansion of market access for women entrepreneurs in Vojvodina, Serbia: UNDP Trust Fund 16,000
Reception of Vietnamese delegation to study local government election system: HUN-IDA Kht. 32,000
Training for Iraqi public administration experts:  Perfekt Gazdasági Tanácsadó Rt. 50,000
Continuation of Palestinian election capacity-building programme: Ministry of Internal Affairs  60,000
Training of Chinese justice experts at Constitutional Court:  HUN-IDA Kht. 12,000
Course on EU integration for Balkans countries: IOM 26,400
Continuation of Iraqi police training:  Ministry of Internal Affairs 100,000
Support for Iraqi elections:  Ministry of Internal Affairs 52,000
SUBTOTAL 771,840
TOTAL 1,707,835
HUN-IDA Kht. is the official Implementing Agency of DIDC, and has been selected as 
such in two consecutive calls for applications in 2004 and 2006. The fairness of these 
tenders and the expertise of the agency were contested in a 2007 article appearing in 
Magyar Narancs, a weekly with low circulation. HUN-IDA Kht. denies the allegations. 
The breakdown of projects implemented by HUN-IDA Kht. through the 2004-2006 period 
was unavailable. 
 
The IDC appropriation also covers international development projects implemented by 
other line ministries. The projects selected for their democracy assistance content from the 
ones published on the DIDC’s website (only 2004 and 2005 projects were available) are 
listed here (table on the right).
HUN-IDA Kht., as the implementing agency of DIDC, is also responsible for the evaluation 
of NGO projects besides the ones it executes itself. The evaluation of the NGOs is based 
on reports issued by the grantee organisations, but the projects are not directly evaluated 
by the agency, i.e. more in-depth evaluation on the ground is currently lacking, although 
the director of HUN-IDA Kht. affirmed that it will be introduced at a later stage.
Detailed project evaluations were not available, but the DIDC report of 2004 and 2005 
included the following paragraph: “DIDC is continually evaluating the reports and moni-
toring assessments coming in from the implementers and embassies. The execution of the 
projects by the implementers is in general satisfactory, but some organisational, technical 
and cost-effectiveness problems do occur.”
The Nyíregyháza Initiative
The programme was launched in 2003, as an element of the Hungarian contribution to 
the ENP. Its objective is to advance Ukraine’s regional and EU integration by strengthen-
ing local civil society, human resources, public administration effectiveness, and local 
expertise through education and informational projects (e.g. conferences). In so doing, 
it deepens the cross-border co-operation of civil society and local public administration, 
and  - starting from 2008 - the integration of Roma minorities is also a focus of the pro-
gramme.
The governmental funds are administered by the EuroClip Public Foundation, founded by 
the General Assembly of the City of Nyíregyháza and the General Assembly of Szabolcs-
Szatmár-Bereg County, and funded by the MFA from its Implementation of East- and 
South-East Europe Governmental Strategy appropriation. To date, more than 300 projects 
have been completed.
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Without any project breakdown available for the 2004-2006 period, the financial reports 
of the organisation reveal the cumulative sums spent on projects that - apart from a few 
exceptions - can be categorised as democracy assistance, judging from the orientation of 
the initiative. These are:
year 2004 2005 2006
Project	disbursement	(€) 39,020 357,440 245,127
The public foundation evaluates the projects it generates by itself or through tendering and 
sends the reports to the MFA for review. 
The Szeged Process
The programme was launched in 1999, and its objective is to foster the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of South-Eastern European countries, especially Serbia, where a significant 
Hungarian minority lives. The Szeged Process has become larger in recent years in line 
with Hungary’s emerging donor status in IDC and the launch of the Budapest Forum. The 
enlarged programme’s new focus is the promotion of European integration through the 
strengthening of local authorities, and regional, cross-border co-operation. 
The programme has three pillars:
Projects implemented with the mediation of the Opportunity for Stability Public Found-• 
ation (Esély a Stabilitásra Közalapítvány), which distributes MFA funds through tenders 
to NGOs for area development, intercultural communications, and community develop-
ment in the region, especially in Serbia 
Projects implemented from the IDC appropriation and handled by DIDC • 
Budapest Forum: established in 2005 on Hungarian initiative at the Regional Partnership • 
- Western Balkans meeting of foreign ministers. The forum is to assist the democratis-
ation of the Western Balkans region by transferring the knowledge and experience of 
the member countries to those going through transition - in six working groups headed 
by each of the partnership member states. The members are the V4 countries, Austria, 
and Slovenia. Hungary handles the Internal Affairs and Justice Co-operation chapter 
under the joint co-ordination of the MFA and the Ministry of Justice and Law Enforce-
ment, and financed by the latter. 
International Centre for Democratic Transition
Although ICDT was established as an independent institute disseminating Hungary’s 
know-how about democratic transition, and the MFA asserts that it does not interfere with 
its project decisions, the organisation’s operations and some of its projects are funded by 
the government, which makes it necessary to include it in the governmental framework of 
democracy assistance.
ICDT was founded in 2005 and is very active in planning and implementing democracy 
assistance projects. Besides the MFA, it has 17 donors, who fund different projects. The 
organisation proclaims itself global in scope, and is accordingly looking for projects all 
over the world. 
The organisation consists of an international board, executive committee, and govern-
mental advisory board. Separate organisational and operational policies govern the 
functions and mandate of these bodies.
The fields of action of the organisation are summed up in one of their memoranda written 
to the MFA as follows:
to assist the transition process, based on the relevant experience in the given field and • 
internationally accepted best practices 
to address and involve indigenous stakeholders in the process of democratic transition• 
to elaborate toolkits for flexible application of appropriate models for the creation and • 
solidification of democratic institutions  
to strengthen cross-cultural and cross-regional dialogue.• 
After conferences, trainings and workshops, immediate feedback is sought from the 
participants, while follow-up monitoring is also available. In the case of the Belarus 
 capacity-building project, the follow-up is a continual dialogue with the organisations in 
order to find funds for the local NGOs’ work, which would then again be evaluated.
Department of International Organisations and Human Rights (IOHR)
The department’s activity is included because it is the representative of the MFA in UN- 
and EU-based human rights bodies and forums, which - according to the head of the 
department - is often one way to keep a foot in the door for some kind of democratic 
activity to start at a later stage. 
In 2008, the department’s activities were expanded and, more importantly, moulded into 
a Human Rights concept, which makes this particular section of democracy assistance one 
of its most active and innovative components in terms of low-budget advocacy and NGO 
involvement. This experience could serve as a model for democracy assistance policy in 
general.
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Hungarian Human Rights Concept Paper
A new Human Rights section was set up within IOHR in 2008. The human rights concept 
paper, drafted by this group, builds on the existing priorities and formulates new fields 
of action, where Hungary could contribute to democratisation in third countries through 
human rights issues. The paper emphasizes that a major challenge is to make Hungarian 
human rights policy more visible, in addition to the challenge of expanding its scope. 
It also asserts that both of these objectives require an increase in financing and human 
resources.
Current	human	rights	priorities
a) Human rights policy dialogue
Hungary has a special relationship with China on human rights issues. China has seen 
Hungary as a good example of democratic transition since the 1968 economic reforms 
of the then socialist regime in Hungary. In April 2000, a Human Rights dialogue was 
launched in Beijing between Hungary and China, on the request of the latter. A second 
round took place the following year in 2001, a third in 2004, and subsequent rounds in 
2005 and in August 2007. The Hungarian contribution to the dialogue was to present the 
evolution and functioning of key democratic institutions, such as the Constitutional Court 
or the Ombudsman’s Office. 
Hungary is the only country in the region to be conducting such bilateral exchanges with 
China, while in the EU it is one of the five countries in attendance at the sessions with 
China formerly known as the Bern Process. 
The same human rights dialogue developed with China has been initiated with Vietnam, 
which is also an important target country for Hungary’s IDC. The first round of talks with 
Vietnam is scheduled for 2009.
b) Relations with international organisations
Hungary is handling two resolutions within the UN Human Rights Council: one related to 
the independence of the judiciary and another dealing with the protection of human rights 
defenders co-operating with UN human rights bodies.
Besides supporting UNDEF with an annual US$ 25,000, IOHR is also planning to con-
tribute GBP 10,000 to the Minority Rights Group in 2008, which intends to establish a 
position in Geneva to lobby the international community to keep minority rights issues on 
the agenda. It is also noteworthy that the first international visit of Gay McDougal, the 
UN’s Independent Expert on minority issues, was to Hungary, concentrating primarily on 
Roma issues. 
c) Intergovernmental co-operation on minority issues
Hungary played a major role in the 2005 resurrection of the minority expert group within 
the Council of Europe (DH-MIN). Currently, a Hungarian expert is presiding over the 
working group, and the concept underlines Hungary’s interest in ensuring the group’s 
sustainability, which may require additional financial resources.
Proposed	future	fields	of	action
Active involvement in the work of the UN Minority Forum (set up on 8 September 2007) • 
by delegation of a Hungarian expert to the list of experts, who may take on the pres-
idency role of the forum. 
Concrete steps towards the implementation of Human Rights Mainstreaming in line • 
with the EU’s Guidelines on Human Rights Dialogues (2001) within the MFA (cross-
 departmental workgroup) and foreign service (human rights training for heads of 
missions to improve reporting towards the EU).
Establishment of a governmental Human Rights Commission to co-ordinate the drafting • 
of reports and relations with Hungarian human rights NGOs and experts in an instit-
utional format. 
Proposed	priorities	of	Hungarian	human	rights	policy
Establish representation of Roma minority integration issue within the EU (international • 
and domestic negotiations are underway)
Greater involvement in the work of the EU European Council’s working party on human • 
rights (COHOM), especially in the taskforce dealing with human rights defenders
Make use of Hungarian good practices in the field of institutionalised freedom of inform-• 
ation and protection of personal data; draw together Hungarian governmental and 
non-governmental experts for international advocacy (forthcoming Council of Europe 
convention, OSCE, EU).
Relations	with	NGOs
The IOHR set up a working group of NGOs dealing with human rights and ministry 
representatives in April 2008, which was initiated at the ministerial level. Among others, 
HAND, Freedom House, Amnesty International and the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union 
are members of this group. 
Financing
The Human Rights section of the department has no separate budget, and it is financed 
from the Promotion of Democratic Transition appropriation. 
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Relations	with	NGOs
Since democracy assistance does not yet exist as a separate international affairs pol-
icy area in Hungary, institutional relations with NGOs could not be assessed within the 
framework of this research. However, it is worth taking a look at how the relations of non-
governmental development organisations (NGDOs) and DIDC evolved through the span 
of one year. This is an important precedent for democracy assistance for two reasons: cur-
rently, democracy assistance is subsumed institutionally under DIDC, and the experience 
indicates that if civil sector relations are high on the list of priorities, a great deal can be 
achieved in a short space of time.
Issues of contention
At the beginning of this research in the summer of 2007, HAND, the Hungarian NGDO 
association, had a list of complaints towards the MFA in general and DIDC in particular. 
These were as follows:
involvement of NGos was not real, but superficial
In the last five years, bilateral consultations with the NGDO platform were not regular, • 
but haphazard. An initiative was launched in 2004 in order to bring the NGOs and 
DIDC closer to each other and allow for real strategic co-operation. After the initial 
positive outcome of talks between DIDC and HAND (detailed in HAND’s public benefit 
report of 2004) concerning the acceptance of certain recommendations by the MFA, in 
2007 most of the points requested in the document were not solved.
The only forum where the NGOs could express their comments and recommendations • 
pertaining to IDC activities was the Social Advisory Body (TTT) of DIDC, which HAND 
considers a weak institution lacking substantial leverage and meeting only once a 
year.
Co-operation took the form of the platform receiving strategic documents to comment on • 
ex-post, or at very short notice, hindering any effective involvement.
The government distrusted the civil sector in general
The government’s distrust was observable in the above-mentioned exchange between 
HAND and DIDC, but also in the administrative requirements established for tendering 
for grants - which remain a problem to this day. For each application, the organisation 
has to provide proof of registration, operations, etc., instead of having to provide all 
these once annually to become an accredited organisation eligible to apply for grants. 
The back-payment scheme of grants and the 10% co-financing contribution required from 
each organisation, plus the requirement of a number of years’ operation in the field of 
development co-operation, also make it more difficult to become eligible for funding. The 
latter condition, combined with the lack of capacity-building grants, places NGOs in a 
vicious circle: limited capacities will not allow them to apply for grants, which would be 
one of the main sources for funding capacity-building. In 2006, no tender for NGDOs 
was issued by DIDC. 
DIDC commented that the tender procedures were centralised in the Law on Public Fin-
ances; hence, DIDC was only implementing the law. Different procedures could be put in 
place only by a law on IDC, which the head of the department was anticipating to submit 
to Parliament by the end of 2008.
The perspective of the government is that the capacity-building of NGOs should be under-
taken by their international umbrella organisations, which is actually happening, and not 
from the IDC appropriation, which is receding further each fiscal year. The choice of MFA 
officials, explained the Head of DIDC, is between dedicating funds to NGO and other 
capacity-building efforts and doing some project work, or funnelling all funds into estab-
lishing projects that would at least have the chance to show Hungary’s strategic choices 
and comparative advantages. Doing both overly fragments the budget and achieves less 
on both fronts. 
DIDC believes that the strategic work should be done by the government and its enti-
ties, while the NGOs are there to comment on the choices and decisions made. This is 
 reflected in the practice of the department criticised by the civil sector. 
The information-sharing practices of the government and DiDc were rhapsodic 
and incoherent
NGOs and researchers alike complained of DIDC’s slow reaction to data requests on IDC 
and on future plans (on tenders and strategy in general), which is key for NGOs to be 
able to count on governmental funds in their programming and monitoring activities. 
Incoherence of data and information is evident when looking at the DIDC section on the 
MFA website: calls for applications, winners of grants, reports and other documents are 
badly structured, do not follow the same pattern of reporting, and data sheets are missing 
for some years, while provided for others.
The incoherence of data could be the result of human neglect and also of organisational 
issues, such as the obligation of DIDC to hand in their annual report on IDC already in 
February, which does not leave too much time for proper reflection (in contrast, the OECD 
requires ODA reporting much later during the year); or the human resources policy of 
the MFA, where above a certain level officials are also part of the foreign service corps 
and have to leave for mission after a certain number of years, making it difficult to ensure 
continued and efficient oversight of information and data. 
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The reaction of the department to the data provision anomalies was that Hungary - not 
being a member of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) - was required 
only to provide simplified ODA data, thus it could not make detailed filtering according 
to different requirements. The head of the department also admitted that DIDC did not 
have an efficient project database from where to pull up reports quickly and easily. This 
database was foreseen for the end of 2007, but in June 2008 the expected launch was 
postponed until September 2008. 
inclusion of certain embassies into iDc activity is not well communicated to the NGos, 
which fear this may be a step to exclude them from the mFa’s funding circle 
There are fears within the civil society sector that the government would like to enlist the 
embassies as on-the-ground implementers of IDC. Decentralisation within IDC implement-
ation is a trend that the government has been keen on advancing since 2003 (IDC report, 
2004), although it is not portrayed as a measure to substitute the involvement of NGOs, 
but as a tool of rendering IDC more effective. Decentralisation of IDC tasks is a strategic 
focus of the EU as well (since the 2000 reform of external assistance), which makes it a 
normal path for Hungarian IDC. 
Criticism was formulated in connection to the expertise of the local personnel: an NGO 
representative, who claimed to have visited embassies in Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, had the impression that the diplomats lacked the necessary training, 
infor mation, human resources and mindset to be effective agents of Hungarian IDC pol-
icy. 
According to DIDC, this implementation line is drawn into Hungarian IDC practice in 
order to allow for greater speed and flexibility in responding to local needs and con-
tingencies - which would not be the case if each project reported by the embassy would 
be published as a tender for Hungarian organisations. The first initiative in this regard was 
a pilot project where DIDC assigned the implementation of micro-projects to five foreign 
missions (Belgrade, Chisinau, Hanoi, Nairobi and Pretoria). These embassies have to 
implement these projects themselves, and hiring local partners is obligatory. The financial 
resources of the ‘Foreign Delegation’s micro-projects’ pool can amount to no more than 
10% of the annual IDC appropriation: in 2006, € 84,000 was available. The department 
is undertaking the development of its personnel’s capacities with written materials, while 
the ultimate objective is to establish a development attaché network at the Hungarian 
embassies in IDC priority countries.
Against this background, the co-operation between DIDC and HAND has improved one 
year after the above-mentioned criticisms were assessed:
DIDC and HAND hold bi-monthly meetings • 
HAND is consulted whenever new development policy issues are implemented or • 
planned, e.g. HAND commented on the IDC law in preparation, which was appreci-
ated by DIDC
DIDC leaves time for quality reaction on drafts sent to HAND• 
DIDC is open to sign a co-operation agreement with HAND• 
DIDC is making visible efforts to comply with data requests on time• 
HAND’s thematic workgroups meet with DIDC outside the regular time interval• 
On request, HAND is allowed to attend government commission sessions with observer • 
status.
Some issues advanced by the NGDO community, however, remain unsolved:
HAND’s inclusion into decision-making bodies is not supported• 
The Social Advisory Body, where HAND is represented, still remains weak• 
Data provided on request remain unstructured and difficult to process.• 
Civil society organisations active in democracy assistance:
Foundation for Development of Democratic Rights (DemNet Hungary) -  • 
www.demnet.org.hu
Association of Central and Eastern European Election Officials (ACEEEO) -  • 
www.aceeeo.org
Hungarian Interchurch Aid (HIA) - www.hia.hu  • 
This organisation, although focusing strictly on humanitarian aid, is also active in 
longer-term international development activities with the objective of social and comm-
unity development, which may have democracy assistance content.
European Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL) - www.ecnl.org.hu• 
Freedom House Europe - www.freedomhouse.hu and other human rights organisations • 
(e.g. Amnesty International)
Civil Development Foundation - www.ctf.hu• 
Hungarian	Government	Financing	for	
Democracy	Assistance6
Publicly available financial data from DIDC’s website is very fragmented, inconsistent 
and incomplete, and throughout the research the department failed to provide a straight-
forward list of projects that would allow meticulous assessment of the financial contribution 
of the government to democracy assistance. 
Reports for the periods 2003-04, 2005 and 2006 have been published, but only the 
appendix of the 2003-04 report includes a table with a detailed breakdown of disburse-
ments. A detailed project list containing the name of the projects, the corresponding 
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implementers and costs containing all on-going and completed projects for the period 
2003-04, and all the projects planned and under preparation for 2005, can also be 
downloaded from the DIDC website, but such a report is lacking for 2006. 
On the basis of the information published in the reports and data published on the DIDC 
website and information gathered in interviews, Hungarian financing of democracy assist-
ance activities between 2004-06 can be presented as follows:
Governmental	sources	(Hungary)	of	democracy	assistance		(€)	
 
2003-
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2003-
2006
IDC 3,948,000 2,800,000 1,552,000 1,080,000 1,200,000  
of	which	democracy	
assistance 835,060 771,840 325,920* 208,000 200,000 1,932,820
democracy	assistance	
as	%	of	IDC 21% 28% 21%* 19% 17%  
ICDT  N/A 280,000 300,000 320,000 200,000 580,000
International	
Organisation	
membership	fees	
corresponding	to	
democracy	assistance 40,069 N/A 20,000 20,000 32,000 60,069
Promotion	of	
Democratic	Transition	
fund  N/A  N/A N/A 200,000 400,000  
Afghanistan		
(special	appropriation	
created	by	the	
government	to		
finance	the		
Hungarian	Provincial		
Reconstruction	Team)**  N/A N/A N/A 2,000,000 2,000,000  
of	which		
democracy	assistance  N/A N/A N/A 500,000 500,000  
Total 875,129 1,051,840 645,920 1,248,000 1,332,000 2,572,889
* Estimate based on average democracy assistance/IDC percentage (21%)
** Breakdown of grants is necessary to select projects with democracy assistance elements
ODA 81.9m 87.5m 114.6m 284m
According to official answers by the MFA to questions in May 2008, government spend-
ing on democracy assistance was of the order of:
€ 408,000 (HUF 102m), comprising HUF 50m (Promotion of Democratic Transition App-• 
ropriation) + HUF 52m (democracy assistance projects within IDC activity) in 2007
€ 600,000 EUR (HUF 150m), comprising HUF 100m (Promotion of Democratic Trans-• 
ition Appropriation) + HUF 50m (democracy assistance projects within IDC activity) in 
2008.
Most probably these figures do not include the budget of either the Nyíregyháza Init iative 
or the Szeged Process7, which is surprising as these activities were communicated as 
components of democracy assistance by MFA officials in July 2007, and were not denied 
their role as such at the PASOS roundtable on Hungarian democracy assistance policy, 
held in Budapest in May 2008. The democracy assistance component of the Hungarian 
mission in Afghanistan is also missing: according to the head of DIDC, one-quarter of 
the special appropriation created by the government to finance the Hungarian Provincial 
Reconstruction Team was spent on local capacity-building, which could be considered as 
democracy assistance. This means that in 2007 and 2008, each year HUF 125 million 
(€ 500,000) was directed to Baghlan in Afghanistan, which is again a substantial contri-
bution compared with all other democracy assistance components.
One important observation to make is the fact that the dedicated budget for democracy 
assistance (the Promotion of Democratic Transition Appropriation) increased 100% from 
2007 to 2008, which is a remarkable tendency amidst general fiscal cutbacks in the 
same period. The head of DIDC also asserted at the PASOS roundtable in Budapest that 
in the 300 IDC projects implemented so far, one-third accounted for good governance. 
Grants to NGOs and private-sector organisations have been distributed annually since 
2003, with the exception of 2006. The grants’ total sum changed considerably as the 
appropriation itself fluctuated (see below). DIDC’s website contained information on the 
winners of the tenders, based on which it has been possible to prepare a calculation of the 
percentage of projects with democracy assistance content of the total amount of grants.
DIDC	publicly	tendered	grants	(NGO	&	private	sector)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total	(€) 1,247,555 1,746,767 839,272 no tender 560,000
Democracy	assistance	
(author’s	calculations) 78,000 337,896 175,267 212,008
Democracy	assistance	
as	%	of	total 6.25% 19.34% 20.88% 37.86%
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In sum, the MFA is not reporting on annual democracy assistance spending and, when 
asked to do so, is rather confused as to what components to qualify as such. The eventual 
arrival of a  democracy assistance strategy should solve this problem.
Conclusions
Democracy assistance was always “in the air” after Hungary’s own democratic transition. 
Many sources confirmed that the rather smooth transition of Hungary made it a poster-
child of the process. However, the right personalities and circumstances have to emerge in 
the right constellation to result in a more systematic approach enshrined in a democracy 
assistance concept and strategy - which are still to be expected. 
The personality of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kinga Göncz, and her past experience 
in democracy education at an NGO, are definitely one factor in bringing about such a 
change, but the international agenda is also very favourable to Hungary’s involvement 
on this front, not only within the EU, but also within the UN in general and in the US in 
particular. 
The first revision of IDC is imminent in 2008. The period from 2003 to 2007 was the 
learning phase when the international principles and practices had to be adopted by 
the government and other practitioners, and the actors had to be drawn together and 
moulded into a working policy area. According to DIDC, Hungary has only now ident-
ified its fields of strength and will tailor the new IDC policy to reflect this learning period. 
However, the small Hungarian NGDO community does not seem to be satisfied, and 
continues to lobby for more involvement in the implementation of IDC. One not irrelevant 
government reaction to this is that the finances assigned to the activity are way too low to 
finance all the stakeholders, and for the reasons cited above it seems that the government 
is keener to spend the little money it has on projects that have higher visibility within the 
international community than on lower-key community projects. 
Democracy assistance is going through the same learning curve as IDC with regard to 
financing, relations with NGOs, project planning and implementation issues. One chall-
enge that democracy assistance has to confront within the MFA is its relevance as a 
distinct policy area. Although democracy assistance is supported on a ministerial level, 
and steps have been taken to approach it more systematically, it is still not clear how much 
priority will be given to carry through the steps needed to make democracy assistance a 
clear, coherent and institutionally functional policy area. 
To date, it seems that democracy assistance as a whole is not high on the agenda, since 
the Democracy Workgroup is not a strong player, project decisions reside within the 
individual departments and DIDC, and the drafting of a democracy assistance concept is 
continuously postponed - the latest forecast was for October 2008. 
There are, however, processes that reveal slightly changing approaches: more assertive 
actions towards Cuba, IOHR’s conceptual work, improving relations between NGOs and 
both DIDC and IOHR. Provided a policy window opens on democracy assistance, these 
instruments could be leveraged as good practices. Nonetheless, insofar as the MFA per-
ceives its donor activities as a contest with other Visegrad countries, where it is paramount 
to implement visible, well-communicable projects out of limited funds, support for the under-
ground democratisation of fervently undemocratic regimes will be close to impossible.
The recommendations set out at the beginning of the chapter aim at launching a more 
systematic, more accentuated, approach towards a democracy assistance policy. 
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2 Based on the intervention of Norbert Konkoly, Deputy Head, Department for the Americas in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, at the roundtable meeting in Budapest on 15 May 2008.
3 The World Bank’s regional office was present from 1992 to 2002, while currently several other 
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1993), Open Society Institute (OSI) (since 1993), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) (since 
1997), International Organization for Migration (IOM) (since 2000), United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) (since 2000), United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) Global 
Service Centre (since 2008). The establishment of a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO) regional centre is also now the subject of negotiations. 
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8 Amount communicated by the secretary of the Democracy Workgroup in May 2008.
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Eastern	Promises	
and	Achievements
Poland’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities
Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz
Institute of Public Affairs, Poland
Since accession to the European Union, Poland has faced the challenging task of transforming itself from a beneficiary of assistance to an agent and donor transferring 
expertise, skills and resources to countries in transition to the south and east of the en-
larged EU. The challenge has been compounded by a lack of tradition, shortage of staff, 
and limited finances; however, the country can rely on its intangible assets - Poland’s own 
experience of transition, commitment to sharing the democratic ethos, and cultural and 
social affinity with the target countries. 
Five years since the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) set out the principles, priorities and 
criteria of Poland’s foreign assistance in the first strategic document, and after the imple-
mentation by Polish NGOs of nearly 300 MFA-funded projects supporting democracy, 
civil society and human rights, it is an appropriate time to take stock of the effectiveness 
and impact of Polish aid. This study considers grants funded by Polish governmental and 
non-governmental donors and implemented by Polish NGOs in several locations, paying 
particular attention to activities implemented in Belarus and Ukraine. The point of depar-
ture for the analysis is the framework of Polish assistance, presented in the current and 
draft strategies of the MFA.
The premise of this study is that a coherent and transparent process of planning, design, 
implementation and evaluation of Polish assistance is needed, particularly at the early 
stage of development of state aid policy. However ambitious and desirable the vision 
of democratisation and support to civil society and human rights, successful outcomes 
are not likely to be brought about without proper targeting, awareness of beneficiaries’ 
needs, and application of adequate measures. Therefore, vital components of an effective 
national assistance policy include a strong institutional framework, mechanism of comm-
unication with agents and beneficiaries, involvement of non-governmental actors, and 
consistent application of well-defined principles of assistance.
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KEy	CONCLUSIONS
Strengths	of	Polish	democracy
assistance
Commitment and experience of NGOs • 
in Poland’s eastern neighbours. The big-
gest asset of Polish pro-democracy efforts 
in the East is the community of NGOs. A 
large number of Polish NGOs have succ-
essfully implemented assistance projects 
in Ukraine and Belarus, and recently have 
expanded their activities to Georgia, 
Moldova, and Central Asia. This could 
serve as the basis for the greater involve-
ment of NGOs in the process of planning 
and evaluating Poland’s national demo-
cracy assistance.
Transnationalisation of democracy ass-• 
istance efforts of Polish NGOs through 
participation in European networks. Mem-
bers of Grupa Zagranica (an association 
of Polish NGOs working abroad in co-
 operation with, and for the benefit of, 
foreign partners) have become involved in 
several pan-European networks, including 
CONCORD (European NGO Confed-
eration for Relief and Development) and 
PASOS. 
More explicit democratisation component • 
of assistance. Since the Orange Revol ution 
of November 2004 to January 2005, 
which demonstrated the possibilities for 
democratic change in the post-Soviet 
area, the Polish government and NGOs 
have been more outspoken about the rel-
ationship between technical assistance 
and democratic outcomes. The draft Strat-
egy of Polish Development Assistance 
reflects this shift of focus, devoting an en-
tire chapter to democracy promotion. 
Broadening of geographic focus and • 
linkage to EU priorities. Since EU access-
ion, successive Polish governments and 
presidents have supported a wider appli-
cation of Polish assistance, with countries 
such as Georgia and Moldova becoming 
prominent beneficiaries. While the choice 
of some post-Soviet states appears to be 
driven by foreign policy considerations 
(stepping up relations with the countries of 
the Caucasus or Central Asia), Poland has 
also aligned some of its priorities to the 
EU’s key priority areas, such as the West-
ern Balkans, or European Neighbourhood 
Policy countries (e.g. Palestine Authority).
Weaknesses
Priorities of assistance still selected and • 
defined by officials. The Polish imple-
menting NGOs and their partners in the 
beneficiary locations are presented with 
the agenda for assistance to the countries 
in question, rather than being included 
in the process of shaping the agenda for 
the target countries. The current formula 
of consultations between the MFA and a 
group of Polish NGOs is limited to tech-
nical questions, while the beneficiaries 
are not consulted at all. This is clearly a 
problem, especially in new areas of Polish 
assistance or where Polish diplomacy 
does not have sufficient on-the-ground 
exp erience. 
No multi-year planning for either the • 
government or NGOs. Most government 
projects with a democratisation component 
are commissioned through annual tenders 
for projects, involving Polish NGOs. While 
these tenders are announced regularly, 
they do not envisage explicit follow-up 
funding, and projects cannot span suc-
cessive years. This discourages strategic 
planning on the part of Polish NGOs, and 
fails to promote lasting partnerships with 
beneficiaries in target countries.  
Low level of expenditure and uncertain • 
financing. Although Poland has pledged 
to increase its ODA spending over the 
next couple of years, the absolute values 
of assistance have been modest. Even the 
limited funds available to NGOs are not 
guaranteed, as the funds are allocated in 
a general government reserve fund, and 
are potentially at risk if other spending is 
given greater priority.  
Lack of general framework for democracy • 
promotion efforts. In contrast to the rhetoric 
of successive governments about the high 
priority of democracy assistance in Polish 
foreign policy, the draft of the Strategy of 
Development Assistance for 2007-2015 
has not yet been adopted. The Strat-
egy, providing a clear framework for all 
 government-sponsored democracy assist-
ance, could be a reference point, which is 
currently missing, leaving this component 
of aid “invisible” in many cases.
Opportunities
Development of stable relationships with • 
partners from beneficiary countries. Polish 
NGOs have depended on the expertise 
and capacity of their counterparts in the 
area of operation. The development of 
procedures allowing joint applications for 
funding by Polish and counterpart NGOs, 
and the establishment of a category of 
“trustworthy” partners in beneficiary 
countries, could help capitalise on the suc-
cessful co-operation so far.
Empowerment of beneficiary NGOs and • 
building their capacity for independent 
act ivities. Partners from beneficiary coun-
tries may soon follow the path of Polish 
NGOs, which once were the implement-
ing agents of assistance projects and have 
over time become intermediaries and co-
ordinators of activities in other geographic 
areas.
Alignment of donors’ priorities.•  Many 
Polish NGOs work in the East through a va-
riety of sources of funding including, apart 
from the Polish government, American 
and West European donors. The impact of 
the all-too-frequently diff used efforts could 
be increased through exchange of inform-
ation among donors about their agendas 
for assistance involv ing Polish NGOs, 
consultation with NGOs themselves on 
best practices for implementation, and 
cross-dissemination of information on opp-
ortunities in beneficiary countries.
Greater use of the extensive Polish consu-• 
lar network in the East. Polish embassies 
and consulates in the Western Balkans or 
CIS could be involved in the definition of 
priorities, and provision of on-the-ground 
support (including funding) and monitor-
ing of projects implemented by Polish 
NGOs. Even more importantly, they could 
serve as sources of information on various 
sources in Poland of support available to 
local civil society organisations.
Following up on the Eastern Partnership • 
proposal. The Czech Presidency of the EU 
in the first half of 2009 could provide Pol-
and with an opportunity to launch several 
initiatives that would stress the democracy 
promotion component of the Eastern Part-
nership. The Polish government should 
build on its recent intensification of rel-
ations with the Belarusian government 
by proposing areas where EU member 
states could take common positions vis-à-
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vis Belarus. The first half of 2009 is also 
a crucial period for rallying for opening 
up concrete measures advancing the 
progress of Georgia and Ukraine towards 
an EU accession perspective.
The reformed European Instrument for • 
Demo cracy and Human Rights (EIDHR II), 
as well as the establishment of the Euro-
pean Partnership for Democracy (EPD) in 
2008, provide an opportunity to further 
the co-operation between NGOs from 
Poland and other EU member states in 
democracy assistance activities in their 
target countries.
Threats
Multiplication of initiatives and compe-• 
tition between various schemes could 
confuse the target audience. In some 
countries, such as Belarus, the Polish gov-
ernment has pursued several initiatives, 
some dir ectly managed, others imple-
mented by NGOs. If the various schemes 
are programmed separately, there is a risk 
that the target audience is not going to 
receive a clear message about the overall 
objectives of Polish activities.
The democracy component might be • 
downplayed in the face of strong opp-
osition from authoritarian governments. 
While undemocratic governments might 
prefer Poland to focus on infrastructure 
or technical projects, the Polish govern-
ment should insist on the presence of the 
democracy assistance aspect and the in-
volvement of independent local actors.
If the partner from a target country is not • 
consulted about the focus and communic-
ation of the project message, it may 
emerge as less credible at home, and 
the message itself might not be suited to 
the circumstances of the target country. 
Particular care must be taken to avoid 
entangling NGOs from authoritarian 
countries in political conflict and exposing 
them to retaliatory government actions.
Requirements of transparency and good • 
management practices may at times ex-
pose local partners to potential backlash 
from authorities. The experience of Polish 
NGOs working in Belarus confirms the 
importance of mutual trust between them 
and the local partners. While all efforts 
must be made to ensure that the resources 
are spent towards achieving the objec-
tives of the project, confidentiality may be 
needed in the case of projects with overtly 
political goals, so that the local NGOs are 
not endangered.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS
Government
Consensus is needed between the main • 
actors of Polish foreign policy on the prior-
ity of the democracy agenda in relations 
with undemocratic states or countries with 
a democratic deficit (such as Belarus, Rus-
sia, or Central Asian states). It is essential 
that the Prime Minister’s Office, the Office 
of the President and the Foreign Ministry 
present a consistent message in official 
contacts with the governments and diplo-
mats of these states.
Completion of the work on the Law on • 
Foreign Assistance is urgently needed, as 
the passage of the law is a prerequisite 
for the establishment of a dedicated aid 
budget and increased public funding for 
development and democracy assistance. 
Once passed, the law will enable state 
agencies to develop multi-annual aid per-
spectives.
Follow-up and multi-year initiatives should • 
be encouraged by pre-announcing the 
government’s financial commitments with 
regard to specific countries and issue 
 areas that are defined as part of country 
strategies. The announcement of priorities 
should be reflected in higher budgetary 
outlays for matching activities, while the 
share of non-priority activities should 
 decrease.
Closer co-ordination is needed to identify • 
and oversee the activities of all ministries in 
the field of external aid, and to ensure that 
the various initiatives comply with Polish 
foreign policy priorities in bi lateral rel-
ations as well as on the regional level, and 
that the democracy assistance component 
is taken into account when prog ramming, 
implementing and monitoring assistance 
schemes towards undemocratic states or 
states in transition. 
The Polish government’s annual tenders • 
and assistance programmes ought to be 
based on the comprehensive Strategy of 
Development Assistance that should reflect 
the changing needs of beneficiaries, and 
match the Polish vision for democratis ation 
in the strategic region of the western CIS. 
The Strategy adopted must clearly distin-
guish democracy-assistance objectives 
from the more general development aims.
In the medium- to long-term, it is worth • 
considering establishing a dedicated imp-
lementation agency for the management 
of official assistance programmes. The 
agency should build on the staff and exper-
ience of the Department of Development 
Co-operation of the MFA. The draft Strat-
egy of Development Assistance should 
outline a roadmap for establishment of the 
agency.
Polish	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
An urgent task for Polish diplomacy is the • 
presentation of flagship initiatives within 
the framework of the Eastern Partner-
ship, building on the successful national 
initiatives (support to media freedom in 
Belarus, development of local govern-
ment in Ukraine). The Partnership ought 
to stress the link between democratisation, 
human rights, and the perspective of EU 
accession.
Democracy assistance should become • 
one of the key objectives of co-operation 
within the Visegrad Group. The Inter-
national Visegrad Fund should become 
a major donor supporting pro-democracy 
projects in Eastern Europe and the Bal-
kans. This would allow Polish NGOs to 
conduct pro-democracy activities together 
with experienced partners from other 
Cent ral European countries, as well as to 
build partnerships in the target countries.
In particular, Polish assistance to Bela-• 
rus could be partly channelled through 
the international umbrella of Visegrad 
co- operation, which could be less con-
troversial than activities funded by one 
particular country, especially Poland, 
and thus make the democracy assistance 
activities less susceptible to the hostile 
propaganda of the Lukashenko regime.
Poland ought to collaborate on the • 
develop ment of joint positions of the EU 
towards Belarus within the framework of 
the Czech EU Presidency. 
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The MFA is the key institution overseeing Polish state development and democracy 
ass istance activities. The organisation of assistance within the ministry was gradually 
determined as the volume of assistance grew. In 1998-2002, the level of assistance was 
minimal (with fewer than 20 projects annually), so two officials at the Department of the 
United Nations System handled all the work, which consisted mainly of servicing Poland’s 
obligations as part of multilateral assistance and maintaining contacts with the Organis-
ation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank. 
The scope of responsibilities of the MFA in this regard was spelled out for the first time 
in the Strategy of 2003. The MFA was assigned a key role in planning, co-ordinating 
and supervising the implementation of development assistance.3 Its planning role was 
defined broadly, including: devising general guidelines for aid policy and more spec-
ific annual assistance plans, laying down priorities by sector and geographical area, 
drafting framework regional and country assistance programmes, as well as concluding 
bilateral agreements with priority beneficiary countries. The ministry was entrusted with 
Conceptual	and	Institutional	Framework
The official document outlining the principles, directions and priorities of Polish development 
assistance, as currently applied, is the Strategy of Polish Co-operation for Development of 
2003 (henceforth referred to as the Strategy).1 This was the first document of its kind, and 
its adoption was necessary prior to Poland’s accession to the EU, as the country had made 
specific commitments to increasing the volume of its development assistance. The Strategy 
covered in very broad terms both multilateral and bilateral assistance, and outlined the 
institutional and financial framework for the emerging Polish development aid system. The 
details were left to be worked out later, which was understandable considering the very 
low assistance levels and the almost total lack of experience in building a national system 
of assistance.
Polish development aid, including democracy assistance, is planned annually on the basis 
of yearly operational documents. Following the guidelines of the Strategy of 2003, these 
plans are developed by the MFA with the Ministry of Finance, and contribution is also 
made by other line ministries as part of inter-ministerial consultations.2
The small-grant programmes of Polish em-• 
bassies should be significantly expanded 
to provide direct funding for selected civil 
society organisations in target countries.
Poland’s MFA ought to publish an annual • 
review of the situation in the countries of 
priority importance, which should identify 
the activities of the Polish government and 
NGOs, outline the priorities for further 
democracy-promotion activities, and iden-
tify the associated risks and opportunities. 
An analysis of country needs ought to take 
into account the state of development of 
civil society and current threats to demo-
cracy. Such a review should incorporate 
consultations with both selected benefic-
iaries and Polish NGOs.
Dedicated funds are needed for develop-• 
ing partnerships between Polish and local 
NGOs. Future grant competitions should 
place stronger emphasis on pre-project 
activities that would invest in establish-
ing trust-based, long-term relationships, 
thus resulting in recurrent partnerships. It 
is also recommended that the projects led 
by Polish NGOs should be designed in 
such a way as to provide for some flex-
ibility as to the type of activities and forms 
of co-operation by making provision for 
incorporating the feedback from organis-
ations from target countries.
Development education could be • 
broadened to include funding for the pres-
entation of Polish NGOs’ best practices of 
work in priority countries. Dissemination 
of the practical experience, and practical 
advice on strategies for managing risk 
and solving problems, should target other 
Polish NGOs that might be considering 
activities in some of the new target count-
ries of Polish assistance for the first time.
Polish	NGOs
Grupa Zagranica should continue to moni-• 
tor the assistance programmes of the Polish 
government, as well as publish annual 
statements on the recommended priorities 
for Polish (and European) assistance. 
While applying for assistance, Polish org-• 
anisations might consider setting aside in 
their budgets and project plans a section 
devoted to dialogue with foreign partners 
on desired follow-up activities and ass-
essment of needs. The conclusions of the 
consultations could provide the basis for 
fut ure applications for funds. Such a prac-
tice and communication of it to existing 
and potential donors should be made a 
priority. 
Clear terms of reference stipulating the • 
role of a foreign partner at all the stages 
of the project are needed to ensure trans-
parency and good project governance. 
The terms of reference should indicate the 
financial and human resources required of 
the partner, as well as place responsibility 
for concrete deliverables.
A shift could be made towards projects • 
in which Polish NGOs concentrate on 
building the institutional capacity of their 
partners in target countries. Their assets in-
clude the shared heritage of authorit arian 
political systems, skills developed in an 
uncertain and fast-changing environ ment, 
and experience of establishing and sus-
taining relationships with Western don ors.
Polish NGOs working in the field of • 
democracy assistance abroad, both 
individ ually and as a group, could 
broaden their appeal by more frequently 
relating their activities to larger EU and 
regional init iatives, for instance the East-
ern Partnership. In addition, reports on the 
activities of Polish NGOs abroad could 
increasingly emphasize the regional and 
European dimension of these efforts.
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could not take over a co-ordinating function, as in the period prior to and directly follow-
ing the approval of the Strategy another ministry was overseeing a much larger share of 
development aid: the Ministry of Finance was in charge of the terms of extension of, and 
payment of, credits to developing countries, which represented the lion’s share of Poland’s 
contribution at the time.
The growth in the volume of assistance and number of projects called for a separate unit 
to be set up at the MFA. Both planning and implementation of assistance were assigned 
to the Department of Development Assistance, which was set up in September 2005. The 
department is composed of two divisions (Development Policy and Programming, and 
Implementation of the Development Assistance programme) and a unit (Team for Support-
ing Democracy). 
Democracy assistance has not been accorded a particularly prominent place in the ins-
titutional structure of the MFA. The Democracy Assistance Team is a recent, relatively 
low-level part of the Department of Development Assistance at the ministry. The depart-
ment’s responsibilities cover a whole range of activities, and much of the work is of a 
rather technical nature. It is the body responsible for developing co-operation with priority 
countries, listed by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, for representing 
Poland at the OECD, EU and UN development policy fora, and for servicing Poland’s 
multilateral assistance contribution to international institutions (the World Bank, UN, EU). 
In addition, the Department is the co-ordinating, planning and implementing body for the 
national assistance policy and for the disbursement of bilateral funds both directly and 
through other government agencies, diplomatic establishments, and NGOs.
“Support to democracy, transformation and development of civil society” is a component 
of the department’s mission of growing importance. 
While the department plays a central role, other ministries co-operate in the implement-
ation of development assistance. The Ministry of Finance disburses financial assistance, 
assists in debt reduction and offers preferential credits while, through its Office of Educa-
tional Qualifications and International Co-operation, the Ministry of Science and Higher 
Education organises stipend programmes.
The need for taking a more systemic approach was recognised during the work on the 
revision of the Strategy that started in 2005 and resulted in the dissemination of the draft 
in spring 2007. The Department of Development Assistance of the MFA drafted Solidarity, 
Development and Freedom: Strategy of Polish Foreign Assistance for 2007-2015, which 
is currently at the stage of interministerial consultations.5 The new Strategy considered the 
establishment of a dedicated government agency in the future: “An optimal institutional 
solution for implementing the Polish programme of foreign assistance would be the estab-
lishment of a separate implementing office (bureau or agency to be determined through a 
parliamentary act), supervised by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.” 
co-ordinating the development assistance activities of other ministries, and the identif-
ication and alignment of the target-country governments’ priorities for external assistance. 
Its supervisory role was limited to ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of operations of 
multilateral assistance funds and programmes, and ongoing monitoring of the operation 
of the implementing agency (instytucja wykonawcza).
The scheme outlined in the Strategy had the dual advantage of establishing the MFA 
as a clear co-ordination centre for Polish development assistance at the same time as 
separating the functions of strategic planning (allocated in the Ministry’s Department of 
International Development Assistance) from project management (outsourced to an imp-
lementation agency). This clear division would have helped concentrate the ministry’s 
resources on development and fine-tuning of the policy, and as a side-effect would have 
made it a key stakeholder interested in raising the profile of development assistance 
among the priorities of the Polish state. 
From the commencement of work on the strategy of assistance (2000-2002), officials 
planned to divide the planning and implementation aspects of management, leaving the 
latter in the hands of the Polish Agency for Co-operation and Development. In their view, 
the Austrian model, entrusting the political and strategic aspects, as well as choice of 
priorities, to a department at the Foreign Ministry, while externalising the management to 
a separate agency, was preferred to the Irish model that combines the two aspects in a 
large assistance department. 
However, the Strategy’s vision was not fully realised. The ministry failed to co-ordinate 
the activities of other ministries, and was only informed of their priorities and initiatives 
post factum. Neither was a separate implementing agency created, which meant that all 
the central project management activities were undertaken by the ministry’s staff. As a 
result of these two shortcomings, a complete system of assistance management did not 
come about, which limited the Polish state’s capacity for devising and running a consistent 
policy.
A decision was made against setting up a dedicated government agency. Instead, the 
Strategy envisaged that the operational management of assistance would be undertaken 
by an external implementing agency, selected in a bid. Subject to ongoing supervision 
and periodical controls by the ministry, the agency would be responsible for executing 
a whole range of project implementation activities - launching tenders, participating in 
the selection of contractors, concluding contracts, monitoring on an ongoing basis and 
eval uation of projects, collecting and assessing applications for co-funding, running a 
database of NGO partners, organising training events, and promotional activities.4
The rationale for charging the ministry’s staff with operational issues was economic - the 
level of assistance appeared insufficient to warrant outsourcing these functions to an ex-
ternal institution, let alone setting up a dedicated government agency. In turn, the ministry 
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groups of applicants. The projects are proposed and, if successful, implemented by either 
NGOs, central or local government units, or Polish diplomatic representations. Generally, 
the choice of the implementing unit depends on the type of project. Large infrastructure or 
transfer-of-experience projects are undertaken by central or local government offices, and 
people-to-people actions by NGOs, while the Small Grant Fund is used by Polish repre-
sentations in Africa and Asia for small development aid projects. According to the MFA, 
there are plans to engage research institutes and businesses in future implem entation.
All tenders follow comparable project cycles. First, the Division for Development Assistance 
and Programming at the Department of Development Assistance announces a competition 
(for Polish NGOs), or notifies Polish central and local government bodies, and diplomatic 
representations, of the possibility to submit project proposals. The proposals are submitted 
either by individual organisations or consortia (as in the case of diplomatic representa-
tions that typically co-operate with church charities or missionary establishments in Poland 
for tasks to be completed in developing countries). 
The applications are reviewed by two MFA officials: a person from the respective territ-
orial department (e.g. Eastern Policy) makes sure that the project corresponds to Poland’s 
foreign policy objectives in the given country, while a person from the Department of De-
velopment Assistance checks the technical feasibility of the project, and the capacity of the 
applicant. The results of the NGO competition are announced publicly (at a conference) 
and on the central website www.polskapomoc.gov.pl, run by the MFA. The government 
offices and embassies are contacted directly by the MFA. 
The officials of the Division for Implementing the Programme of Development Assistance 
monitor the financial and content aspects of implementation of the project. Finally, the 
implementing organisations submit official reports on the implementation of the project.
NGOs taking part in the MFA tenders have criticised some aspects of the organisation of 
the process. Firstly, the timing of the announcement of results (spring or even summer) left 
the successful applicants with only half a year for the implementation - as all the projects 
had to be completed by the end of the given year. Secondly, in the absence of multi-year 
planning or of calls for follow-up projects, the organisations lacked incentives for more 
sustainable processes or for building lasting partnerships. Finally, strict division of tenders 
by geographical regions prevented organisations that were even capable of undertaking 
multi-country projects from launching such initiatives. On a number of occasions, budget 
limitations produced paradoxical situations when similar projects proposed by the same 
organisation to be implemented in different countries were not all approved.
Changes are envisaged in the management of assistance. Officials at the Department of 
Development Assistance have realised that neither the NGOs nor local or central govern-
ment agencies are going to provide enough projects to spend all the money resulting from 
the planned increase of the budget. They are certain that at some point (possibly from 
Officials point out that such an agency, modelled on the United Sates Agency for Inter-
national Development (USAID), could help disassociate Polish democracy assistance from 
Polish foreign policy proper, which would be especially welcome in countries such as 
Belarus, where the authorities are particularly suspicious of Polish activities on political 
grounds. However, to date, this idea has not been well received by the other ministries, 
especially the Finance Ministry, which argues that the level of assistance is too small to 
warrant the establishment of a separate agency.
The establishment of a separate government co-ordination centre appears to be inevitable 
in the light of the increasing volume of Polish official assistance and the growing priority 
of foreign aid in successive governments’ concepts of foreign policy. In the short run, ex-
pansion of the staff of the Department of Development Co-operation should be sought, as 
recommended in the two evaluations of Polish foreign assistance made by Polish NGOs. 
However, the co-ordination centre should be strategically placed as an independent 
agency so as to be able to oversee and align the various initiatives of ministries and 
government institutions. The allocation of a separate budget to the agency would be the 
first step towards the development of multi-annual financial perspectives and the adoption 
of a programme-based approach that are needed if Poland is to meet its commitment to 
increase ODA as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP).    
Although there is political consensus as to the need for highlighting democracy support 
in Poland’s assistance to the countries of Eastern Europe, to date little actual progress has 
been made to translate these proposals into action. New initiatives were established dur-
ing the tenure of the Law and Justice government and the presidency of Lech Kaczyński. 
The Interministerial Unit for Supporting Democratic Changes in Central and Eastern Eur-
ope (Międzyresortowy Zespół ds. Wspierania Przemian Demokratycznych w Europie 
Środkowowschodniej) was established in the Prime Minister’s Office, and is headed by 
the former Polish Ambassador to Belarus, Mariusz Maszkiewicz. The division of respons-
ibilities between this unit and the MFA is not clear. In particular, it is not clear whether the 
Prime Minister’s Office is going to establish another fund or seek to influence the policy of 
disbursement of funds by the MFA. 
Planning	and	Implementing	
Democracy	Assistance
MFA tenders
Development aid, including democracy assistance, is generally disbursed through annual 
tenders that are launched, managed and monitored by the Department of Development 
Assistance of the MFA. Three types of tender are run every year, separately for different 
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Belarus and Ukraine) in response to the draft of the government plan for international 
assistance in 2006.8
The activities of Grupa Zagranica in the field of evaluation of Polish official aid were 
stepped up in the subsequent years, when members established a team monitoring Polish 
foreign assistance. The team produced two annual reports in 2007 and 2008, containing 
recommendations in the areas of legislation, institutional set-up, planning, evaluation, and 
partnership. 
The second report took stock of the degree to which the previous report’s recommenda-
tions were realised, and came up with a set of new prescriptions. 
The one recommendation followed by moderate progress was the call for increased trans-
parency on the side of the MFA in the provision of information about Polish development 
assistance. However, five out of six recommendations had not been implemented: 
The MFA’s co-ordinating role was not strengthened; 1. 
Less concentration on priorities was observed; 2. 
Contrary to the recommendation, new obligations going beyond those indicated in the 3. 
Strategy were undertaken by ministries; 
No limits were placed on the use of tied aid; and 4. 
No obligation was introduced for consultations on assistance with the beneficiaries so 5. 
as to consider their needs.9
Although the Polish NGOs are given an opportunity to oversee the tender process (through 
close collaboration with the responsible MFA officials), Grupa Zagranica has repeatedly 
raised the problem of insufficient consultation on the priorities of country assistance with 
NGOs with experience in the respective geographic areas.10 
The two monitoring reports criticise the MFA for non-transparent and unclear choice of 
priorities, and concerns have been raised as to funding of non-priority items. Although 
the amount of publicly available information is increasing, the data presented are often 
fragmentary and incomplete, making evaluation difficult.
Consultations with NGOs are still irregular and are rarely concerned with the choice of 
priorities or strategic questions. An exception was the survey sent by the Prime Minister’s 
chief of staff, Adam Lipiński, to Grupa Zagranica in December 2006. 
In conjunction with the establishment of an advisory body to the Prime Minister’s Office, 
the Interministerial Unit for Supporting Democratic Changes in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (Międzyresortowy Zespół ds. Wspierania Przemian Demokratycznych w Europie 
Środkowowschodniej), NGOs were asked for feedback on current and future democracy 
assistance activities.
2010, and certainly not later than 2015) a programmatic approach is going to be app-
lied. This is reflected in the draft Strategy, which states that “it is essential to introduce a 
system of planning assistance through mid-term programming, based on the guidelines of 
the Polish assistance strategy for individual partner countries and agreements between the 
Polish government and authorities of those countries”.
The Strategy streamlines the cycle of management of foreign assistance, explicitly aiming 
to base Polish practice on the OECD and EU standards. The new model is going to consist 
of six distinct stages:
programming• , where general guidelines and agreements are formulated for the areas 
where intervention is going to be needed;
identification• , applying programming guidelines to analyse the needs of the partner 
countries;
preliminary assessment• , checking the logic of assistance and compliance with the des-
ignated intervention area as well as financial rationale;
financing• , aligning the programme with multi-year framework financial perspectives for 
the assistance;
implementation• , during which projects would be monitored and adjusted if new cir-
cumstances arise;
evaluation• , consisting of “systematic and objective assessment of assistance activities, 
aiming at determining whether they are appropriate and whether the objectives have 
been reached as well as establishing their efficiency and effectiveness, measured as the 
relation between the resources and development effect, and assessing the lasting effect 
of the activities and the impact of the results on the beneficiaries”.
Consultations with NGOs
The role of NGOs is increasing. In 2004, 30 Polish civil society organisations received 
funds amounting to PLN 1.5m (€ 330,000). The following year, the number of recipient 
organisations rose to 48, and the sum reached over PLN 10m (€ 2.48m). In 2007, Polish 
NGOs received PLN 25.5m (€ 6.77m) for 110 projects, out of which 37 were allocated 
to Ukraine, 12 to Belarus, 12 to Moldova, and 10 to Georgia.6
Polish NGOs implementing development and democracy assistance are associated 
 together in Grupa Zagranica. This network, which currently includes 49 organisations,7 
began operations in 2001, and was formally established three years later. Its original 
priorities were the promotion of high standards in aid and the representation of NGOs’ 
interests vis-à-vis the Polish government institutions involved in assistance. The group main-
tains a website www.zagranica.org.pl, which serves as a resource, including analytical 
reports, declarations, guides for NGOs’ work abroad, and contact information of all 
the members. Grupa Zagranica took positions on existing government programmes and 
ident ified priority areas for Polish assistance in a number of countries  (in particular, 
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Volume	of	Poland’s	bilateral	development	assistance,	2000-2006	(millions	€)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Official	Development	Assistance	
(bilateral	only) 13.4 36.3 9.0 16.6 20.4 38.4 92.2
out of which: Europe 3.5 1.6 0.9 10.5 7.4 23.7 11.7
Official	Assistance	(OA) 11.4 11 15.2 19.7 16.4 N/A* N/A*
European	ODA	and	total	OA 14.9 12.6 16.1 30.2 23.8 N/A N/A
Total	bilateral	assistance 24.8 47.3 24.2 36.3 36.8 N/A N/A
Source: Author’s calculations based on the annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polska 
współpraca na rzecz rozwoju, for the years 2004, 2005 and 2006. Exchange rates: EUR/PLN for 
mid-year.
*Since 2005, only ODA figures are given in the MFA materials.
Starting in 2002, Poland raised the amount allocated to non-ODA funding, and a year 
later more ODA funds were concentrated in Europe, as some projects supporting trans-
ition could be accounted as part of Poland’s ODA commitment.
The value of Poland’s official development assistance (ODA) grew from US$ 137.6m in 
2004 to nearly US$ 205m in 2005 and US$ 309m in 200612. This constituted 0.068% 
of the country’s GDP in 2005 and 0.1% the following year. The government committed 
itself to raise the level of ODA to the EU targets for new member states of 0.11% in 2007, 
0.17% in 2010, and 0.33% in 2015.
Democracy assistance is a minor item in the development assistance budget. It features 
both as part of EU aid, which is financed with Polish contributions, and of bilateral pro-
grammes. In 2005, US$ 145m out of US$ 205m of Poland’s ODA was managed by the 
EU. Of that sum, US$ 3.28m (or around 2%) was allocated to democracy and human 
rights, US$ 10.03m to the Western Balkans (around 6%), and US$ 5.3m to Eastern Eur-
ope and Central Asia. Only 23% of overall Polish ODA (or US$ 48m) was bilateral and 
managed by the Polish state. However, it is clear that the geographical priorities of the EU 
and Poland in development assistance differ: US$ 29.7m (61.7%) of Poland’s bilateral 
ODA was allocated to European states.
The volume and share of funds in the hands of the MFA grew from PLN 18m (or US$ 
6.5m) in 2005 to PLN 85m (US$ 30m) in 2006. The bilateral assistance to the countries 
supported in 2005 was increased fourfold in 2006.
The survey sought NGOs’ opinions on: 
priority political and geographic areas of assistance• 
most effective and efficient instruments and forms of assistance in the fields of:• 
free media .
civil society .
humanitarian assistance (including aid to persecuted individuals) .
European or Euro-Atlantic choice .
support to Good Neighbourhood . 11
supporting economic reforms and political and systemic transformation • 
negative or positive assessments of the distribution of development assistance funds in • 
2006
choice of other effective instruments (e.g. legal changes) in implementation of prog-• 
rammes to support democratic changes in Poland’s eastern neighbourhood.
Volume	of	Democracy	Assistance
Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA bilateral assistance
Prior to EU accession, Poland did not distinguish between democracy assistance and 
development assistance. Thus the volume of the funds for promotion of democracy, hu-
man rights and good governance cannot be easily ascertained for the early years. The 
two relevant budget lines are Poland’s bilateral official development assistance (ODA) 
(excl uding contributions to international organisations), and non-ODA official assistance, 
which was also bilateral (see table). The breakdown by country is not available for the 
period until 2004.
The fact that Poland increased the level of its bilateral assistance did not necessarily trans-
late into a rise in funding for democracy assistance or human rights. In fact, as is evident 
from the priorities of development assistance, almost no ODA funds to non-European 
states were devoted to these “soft” issues; instead, emphasis was on restructuring overdue 
debt or infrastructure schemes. On this basis, it is fair to assume that democracy assistance 
existed exclusively within ODA to European countries (and Central Asia) and non-ODA 
official assistance, where Poland was not bound by the strict rules of ODA definitions.
Until 2002, the volume of bilateral assistance that involved democracy aid was very low, 
and the share of European states in bilateral ODA actually declined from 2000 to 2002. 
The level of ODA varied widely from year to year, as the small total amount was sensitive 
to single settlements on credit restructuring (see high variation in total bilateral ODA). 
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However, even discounting the interest in Polish culture and language, large numbers 
of students come from countries that are the targets of Polish efforts in democracy assist-
ance (Ukraine and Belarus). These two states recorded dynamic growth in the number of 
students coming to Poland - three-quarters more students from Ukraine came to Poland in 
2006 than six years earlier, and 70% more Belarusians studied in Poland in 2006 than 
in 2000. Even higher rates of growth (although from a low base) were noted with regard 
to students from Albania, Armenia, and Uzbekistan.
Few larger public-funded grant programmes have been extended to students from count ries 
with a democratic deficit. An exception is the flagship official Konstanty Kalinowski Fel-
lowship Programme, developed for Belarus. In 2006, the Polish Prime Minister, Kazi mierz 
Marcinkiewicz, Belarusian opposition presidential candidate Aliaksandr Milinkievich, 
and representatives of Polish universities signed an agreement to launch a scholarship 
programme for Belarusian students. Nearly 300 participants were chosen who had been 
expelled from schools in their home country as a result of pro-democracy activities. The 
programme covers tuition, housing and stipends, and included language and cultural 
courses. The programme is co-ordinated by the Eastern Europe Studies Centre at the 
Warsaw University.
Bilateral	Democracy	Assistance	
to	Selected	Countries
Priorities and trends, 2003-2006
In 2003-2006, democracy assistance remained a minor budget item in Poland’s total 
bilateral assistance, which focused on debt reduction, preferential credits for Polish export-
ers, and technical assistance. It is interesting to note that in 2005 nine out of ten leading 
countries benefiting from Polish assistance were post-communist (Serbia and Montenegro, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Georgia) or communist coun-
tries (China, Vietnam). The exception was Iraq, where Polish troops were present.
In 2005, three countries received the bulk of all bilateral assistance in the form of financial 
assistance (mainly debt reduction and preferential credits): Serbia and Montenegro, Uz-
bekistan, and China received PLN 117.1m, or 75% of bilateral aid (out of which Serbia 
and Montenegro was granted PLN 60.5m). 
Poland’s eastern neighbours are covered largely as part of the bilateral assistance man-
aged directly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, however, accounts for only 11.5% 
Educational exchange 
The Ministry of Education and Science co-ordinates the studies, training, and visits of 
foreign students and academics at Polish universities. This form of support may be termed 
part of democracy assistance with regard to the states from South-Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. 
The table (below) presents the numbers of students (excluding trainees) from selected 
countries in 2004-2005.
The top four countries of origin of foreign students in Poland (accounting for almost 44% of 
the total) comprise the three Slavonic-speaking states of the western CIS (Ukraine, Belarus, 
and Russia) and Kazakhstan, which is home to a significant Polish diaspora. In fact, as 
many as 30-40% of all foreign students, and the majority of those originating from the 
former USSR, declare Polish origins. 
Students	at	Polish	universities	and	colleges	from	selected	states	
of	South-Eastern	Europe	and	CIS13
Country/region 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 TOTAL
%	
TOTAL
All	states 6,653 7,380 7,608 8,106 8,829 10,092 11,752 60,420 100
Former	USSR 3,692 4,393 4,542 4,616 4,787 4,903 5,394 32,327 53.5
Ukraine 1,272 1,693 1,809 1,880 1,965 1,989 2,224 12,835 21.2
Belarus 909 1,002 1,088 1,171 1,211 1,305 1,544 8,230 13.6
Kazakhstan 409 411 430 422 421 436 431 2,960 4.9
Russia 289 291 346 381 388 393 427 2,515 4.2
Moldova 45 55 64 70 79 77 73 540 0.9
Albania 42 50 59 69 77 78 84 459 0.8
Armenia 26 24 28 43 60 83 89 353 0.6
Uzbekistan 14 21 23 35 48 53 56 250 0.4
Serbia	and	
Montenegro 33 40 33 33 34 33 29 235 0.4
Georgia 10 0 21 30 39 42 31 173 0.3
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was to be strengthened through assisting public administrators in setting up state struc-
tures. Moldova was unique in being targeted with aid towards European integration.14 
Bids for implementing the assistance were organised for these four countries (the ministry 
did not run competitions for Angola or Vietnam due to low NGO interest). Projects with 
governance- or democracy-related content were awarded only in Georgia and Moldova, 
while all funds in Afghanistan and Iraq were spent on infrastructure schemes. Two out of 
five projects for Georgia (the total aid level of € 86,000) dealt with the development of 
local government, while two out of four projects implemented in Moldova (total funding of 
€ 81,900) contained references to the European integration objective.15
However, due to the restrictions on ODA funding, a number of countries that represented 
priorities in Polish foreign policy in general were not named as such officially (in particular 
Ukraine and Belarus, but to a lesser extent also some countries in Central Asia, Azer-
baijan, and three Balkan states - Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, and 
Macedonia). Thus, in 2005, for procedural reasons, much of democracy assistance was 
couched as non-ODA official bilateral assistance. A separate tender was announced for 
“countries in transition” (the bulk of which went to Belarus and Ukraine), with 27 projects 
awarded at a cost of around € 234,000. An additional € 21,800 was granted for the 
observation of elections in Belarus and Ukraine.16
In 2005-2006, the focus of the Polish MFA shifted to some overt democratisation efforts, 
involving not only NGOs, but also state-run initiatives. The priority country in this regard 
became Belarus, whose priority in Polish assistance was highlighted by the fact that it be-
came a recipient of Polish ODA in 2006. In 2005, 13 state-funded development projects 
were used for assisting democracy in Belarus, and the number reached 25 in 2006 (totall-
ing PLN 5.6m or € 1.4m). In addition to the aid granted as part of ODA, two separate 
lines were earmarked specifically for Belarus - supporting independent information (one 
project at a value of PLN 3.2m, or ca € 800,000), and internet and media initiatives (nine 
projects for a total of PLN 880,000 or € 220,000).
Multi-country initiatives launched more recently by the MFA in the democratisation area 
include the Strategic Economic Needs and Security Exercise (S.E.N.S.E) and Young Dip-
lomats’ Training. S.E.N.S.E. is a simulation game modelling complex decision-making, 
developed originally by the U.S. Institute for Defense Analyses. The Polish rounds of 
the exercise, implemented by the Warsaw University and Poland’s Ministry of Defence, 
targeted, inter alia, national and local government officials from Moldova and Ukraine, 
and NGO activists from Belarus. The strategic games served to highlight the relation-
ships  between security, economic growth and democracy-building. The young Diplomats’ 
Training brought together Ukrainian, Moldovan and Georgian MFA officials who had 
the chance to learn about the Polish experience in international security and European 
integration.17
of total Polish bilateral assistance. This fund was divided into three main baskets:
technical assistance to countries in transition • 
development assistance for priority countries• 
Small Grant Fund.• 
Technical assistance has been targeted at European and Central Asian post-communist 
countries, while development assistance was allocated to seven poor countries, qualifying 
for ODA (in 2005 those were Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, Palestin-
ian Authority, and Vietnam), while Small Grants were allocated to sub-Saharan Africa, 
Cambodia, and Mongolia.
The MFA-managed assistance targeted two main groups of countries in 2005 and 2006. 
Over half of the aid went to Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia - up from PLN 10m 
in 2005 to PLN 43.5m in 2006. The clear leader in both years among East European 
states was Ukraine, which received three-quarters of the funds allocated to these four 
states. Around 10% was allocated to the priority countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Vietnam, Angola, and the Palestinian Authority - where funding grew from PLN 2.1m in 
2005 to PLN 8.3m in 2006. The rest of the funds in 2006 were allocated to other CIS 
states (PLN 3.5m), and other Asian and African states (PLN 2.5m). The MFA also commit-
ted nearly PLN 20m to multilateral, humanitarian, and food assistance. 
The criteria for the selection of the beneficiary states of Polish bilateral assistance were 
announced in the Strategy adopted in 2003. The promotion of democracy was implied 
in only one of the three criteria, covering countries “undergoing political transformation”, 
most notably in South-Eastern Europe and the western CIS. Two other priorities dealt with 
the existing ties between Poland and the given country, including “strong political, eco-
nomic and cultural relations” and the presence of the Polish diaspora. The stated criteria 
placed an emphasis on the symbolic and cultural affinity with the target countries rather 
than on the values that Poland would like to promote in its assistance. 
The priority countries for Polish bilateral assistance were first selected in 2004. They were 
Afghanistan, Angola, Georgia, Iraq, Moldova, and Vietnam, complemented by the Pal-
estinian Authority in 2005. Five of these territories were chosen in fulfilment of Poland’s 
obligation to extend the strong focus on development assistance. The other two states, 
Georgia and Moldova, qualified as states “undergoing political transformation”.
Even in those cases where technical support was provided to the more distant states, it 
included elements of democracy assistance. The objectives of assistance to several count -
ries contained references to good governance as early as 2004. Technical assistance to 
Afghanistan was supposed to bring about the “reconstruction” and “rehabilitation” of 
central and local government structures. Aid to Georgia was planned to help establish 
“stable” government institutions (including local government). On the other hand, Iraq 
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Breakdown	of	Polish	Foreign	Ministry-funded	NGO	democracy	assistance	projects	
by	issue	area/sector	(percentage	of	number	of	projects)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Local	government 22 23 20 21
NGOs,	civil	society 38 29 14 18
Education,	youth 24 20 26 30
Media,	information 8 13 12 13
EU	integration 5 11 14 13
Other 3 7 12 5
Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of the announcements of annual MFA grant competitions for 
NGOs
The analysis of recent annual MFA grant competitions for NGOs indicates a shift in the 
strategy of distributing resources. Most funds targeting Belarus were allocated to media 
organisations established by the Polish government (Belsat TV, Radio Racja). As a result, 
the number of MFA-funded projects implemented in Belarus by Polish NGOs declined (in 
2005, 27% of all tendered democratisation projects by Polish NGOs took place in Bela-
rus, but the share declined to 16% in 2007 before rising to 20% in 2008). The absolute 
value of funds for NGO-run projects in Belarus dropped too - from over PLN 4m (€ 1m) in 
2006 to PLN 2.5m (around € 660,000) a year later.
A shift in geographical priorities was noted, too. On the one hand, the pool of projects 
was lower for the countries of the South Caucasus (from 19% in 2005 to 12% in 2007). 
This was accompanied on the other hand by the rising share of projects for two states 
neighbouring the enlarged EU - Ukraine (up from 41% in 2005 to 46% in 2007) and 
Moldova (up from 3% to 9%).
Poland has begun to differentiate between priorities for assistance in the light of acknowl-
edged needs. Belarus is a stark example of this approach. Over 80% of MFA resources 
for that country were invested in the establishment and maintenance of alternative me-
dia. Two government projects, Belsat TV station and Radio Racja, consumed PLN 20m 
(€ 5.26m) in 2007, more funding than allocated to all MFA-funded projects for Ukraine 
and Georgia combined. Moreover, the value of all the other media projects for Bela-
rus implemented by Polish NGOs (PLN 1.34m or € 350,000) outweighed the value of 
the funding allocated to projects in the fields of support to NGOs (PLN 980,000 or € 
258,000) and education (PLN 150,000 or € 39,500). 
While still few in number, these initiatives testify to the willingness and readiness of the 
Polish MFA to spread the experience of Polish transition to nearby countries. As in country-
specific programmes (see Belarus), the Ministry chooses implementing partners among 
other government agencies, local government, academic institutions or experienced 
NGOs with proven expertise and skills.
Recent trends in MFA-sponsored democracy assistance
Support to democratic change became a more prominent part of the strategy of assist-
ance of the Polish Foreign Ministry in 2007. Alongside socio-economic development, the 
objectives of promoting “democracy, development of civil society, free media and human 
rights” featured in the annual Programme of Polish Foreign Assistance for 2007. Refer-
ences to democracy were explicitly given in the cases of Belarus and three other priority 
states (Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia). The three latter states were to be also the targets 
of assistance towards European integration.
Pro-democracy activities were given high priority in the planned MFA-administered assist-
ance budget for 2007. Over half of the Ministry’s aid reserve (PLN 49m out of PLN 90m, 
or ca € 13m out of € 24m) was committed to fund activities in the four countries towards 
which clear priorities of support to democracy, human rights and good governance were 
defined - Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The lion’s share of the funds went to 
Belarus (PLN 26m (€ 6.8m) or nearly 29% of the reserve), followed by Ukraine (PLN 15m 
or € 3.95m).
 
Breakdown	of	Polish	Foreign	Ministry-funded	NGO	democracy	assistance	
projects	by	country/region	(percentage	of	number	of	projects)
2005 2006 2007 2008
Ukraine 41 40 46 44
Belarus 27 24 16 20
Caucasus 19 11 12 12
Moldova 3 9 9 8
Balkans 5 4 7 2
Other 5 11 9 13
Source: Author’s analysis on the basis of the announcements of annual MFA grant competitions for NGOs
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insofar as the Ministry proposes to focus state activities on undemocratic states that are 
geographically close or states where pro-democratic stakeholders have expressed interest 
in Polish lessons in transition or European integration.
These declarations indicate an awareness among the MFA’s officials of several principles 
that should guide state assistance efforts if the aid is to be effective. Firstly, assistance 
needs to be suited to the country’s needs and to respond to a broad array of threats to 
democracy and civil society - of a political, economic and social nature. Secondly, the 
timing of intervention should take into account the maturity of democratic forces, the level 
of development of the civil society sector, and the access to independent information. 
 Finally, the limited MFA budget requires concentration on actions with the highest potential 
impact, thus calling for the best use of Poland’s comparative advantage.  
Officials from the MFA’s Department of Development Co-operation indicated that they 
were already being guided in their choices of objectives for the annual aid tenders by 
concerns to secure the greatest impact for assistance activities.18 They admitted to adjust-
ing priorities and modus operandi for individual countries within the various geographical 
regions. A good case is Eastern Europe. An official from the Democracy Assistance Team 
at the MFA stressed that the communications and forms of co-operation are strategically 
decided for each country so as to maximise the entry points and stimulate long-term co-
operation. 
Ukraine is the country where democratic institutions and processes are in place, and 
European orientation declared, so that Poland may transfer a whole range of experience, 
including institution-building. Moldova is, like the countries of the South Caucasus, eligible 
for poverty-reduction ODA. In turn, the low level of EU and Polish relations with Belarus, 
the presence of the significant Polish minority, and the continued violation of democratic 
and human rights standards in Belarus allows Poland to focus on strict democracy assist-
ance. 
This, in turn, is not the approach taken towards Russia, with which Poland is engaged on 
a variety of levels - such as economic relations, cross-border co-operation, and security 
policy. To maximise impact, the projects are framed in such a manner as to be acceptable 
to the Russian stakeholders (local government) - stressing technical capacity-building while 
seeking to feature a democracy-building content in the background.
However, the ministry’s staff members are aware of the limitations of the current set-up of 
the process by which priorities are selected, and suggest that a differentiated approach is 
going to be elaborated in the near future. Officials from the Department of Development 
Assistance have expressed an interest in moving from application-driven programming 
to programmed assistance. The ministry outlines the new decision-making paradigm in 
a relevant section of the Strategy: considering the likelihood of limited political dialogue 
with a partner country that could otherwise help define the needs in a precise manner, the 
Shifts between sectors were observed, too. In 2007, the value of funding for projects 
supporting the development of Belarusian NGOs increased by over 35%. In turn, far less 
emphasis was placed on the issues of education and youth (five projects at a cost of PLN 
682,000 or € 180,000 in 2006, then only one for PLN 150,000 or € 39,500 a year 
later). No funds were spent on projects on local government or European integration in 
Belarus in 2007, which set a precedent in funding for this country.
Significant shifts were noticeable in the priorities of Polish assistance towards other count-
ries. A drop in the numbers of projects supporting the development of the NGO sector 
was evident in the grant competitions for Ukraine (decline from nine to five projects) 
and Moldova (none in 2007 compared with four the year before). A significant share 
of projects was devoted to education (from eight to ten) and, unlike Belarus, European 
integration projects were still funded in both countries.
Outlook for the future of MFA-funded assistance
The role of democracy assistance is likely to grow in the medium- to long-term as the draft 
of the new Strategy for 2007-2015 devoted a separate chapter to it, making it an area 
equal in importance to classic development and humanitarian assistance. This trend is 
highlighted by the statement in the introduction that “Polish foreign assistance ought to 
overcome the past dichotomy between development aid and assistance to democracy and 
development of civil society”. The new document envisages that all development assist-
ance projects should “acknowledge” the “democracy-building component”.
The draft Strategy contains the first reference in MFA documents to a common set of prior-
ities for funding activities in various undemocratic states. The list of priorities included in 
the draft document of 2007 is more extensive and specific (containing seven categories), 
indicating higher awareness of the overall weight of pro-democracy issues. The list also 
implies the ministry’s willingness to fund specific types of activities in response to “various 
forms of democratic deficit”. 
Examples include promotion of independent media in count ries lacking alternative sources 
of information, support to political and economic change in states that are either undemo-
cratic or with “low democracy standards”, promotion of human rights and civil rights 
where violations are reported, and assistance to individuals persecuted for their convic-
tions and to members of their families.
The MFA also defined the conditions under which official Polish democracy assistance 
would be offered in the long term. The choice takes into account firstly the needs of the 
target country, expressed in the depth of its democratic deficit - the level of state repress-
ion and human rights violations as well as societal challenges, including “corruption, 
organised crime, oligarchisation, absence of free media” - and in the emergence of demo-
cratic movements. Secondly, Poland’s comparative advantage is taken into consideration 
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sharing with government, academic and cultural elites the Polish experience of demo-• 
cracy, respect for human rights and minority rights, European integration, market 
reforms, and social policy;
support to independent social, educational, media, and cultural initiatives;• 
sharing knowledge and experience in the development of the civil society sector, cross-• 
border co-operation, education, and SMEs.19
To meet these various objectives, cross-cutting programmes have been developed. Some 
of them (such as the radio or TV broadcasts) realise an explicit pro-democratisation miss-
ion; others aim at achieving change without concentration on overt political content (such 
as scholarships programmes, usually not limited only to dissidents, or support to regional 
press). Belarus is the only country towards which the Polish state has adopted a consist-
ent assistance strategy that can be identified by reviewing recent trends. Considering the 
limited general budget for democracy assistance, Belarus receives a high share of Polish 
state funding in this area, and the funding has been flowing for several years. It is the 
only state where Poland has funded in parallel large overtly political projects, undertaken 
by dedicated Polish state-run institutions (such as media outlets), and smaller undertakings 
carried out by NGOs. 
These trends suggest an interest of the MFA in adopting a more programmatic approach. 
Firstly, a relatively small number of larger Polish NGOs channel most of the funds - this 
may be justified by the fact that they often have to actually run the projects on the ground, 
handling complex accounting as well as the greater difficulties of operating in a hostile 
environment. Secondly, continuity of support is evident: five out of the 12 largest projects 
in 2007 were in fact follow-up activities on projects from 2006.
In 2007, the total value of the MFA assistance to Polish NGOs working in Belarus was 
PLN 2.6m, making it the second most important destination after Ukraine. Out of the 12 
projects granted in 2007, two referred to pro-democratic movements and political rights, 
four initiatives concentrated on the development of civil society and activism, three aimed 
at improving access to information and the protection of historical memory and identity, 
and two intended to strengthen the NGO sector in Belarus. In 2006-2007, ten out of the 
12 largest MFA-supported projects by NGOs working directly or indirectly in Belarus fell 
within the scope of democracy assistance. 
Several Polish NGOs have been engaged in projects run in Belarus for several years. 
Among them are the East European Democratic Centre, Centre for Civic Education 
 Poland-Belarus Foundation, the Foundation Education for Democracy, the Stefan Batory 
Foundation, and the Polish Helsinki Human Rights Foundation. Earlier, the CASE Founda-
tion maintained long-term operations. Larger projects have recently been organised by 
the School of Leaders Association, European Meeting House - Nowy Staw Foundation, 
Christian Culture Association ZNAK, Fala Foundation, Eastern Europe College, the Borus-
sia Cultural Association, and St. Maximilian Kolbe Reconciliation and Meeting House. 21
programmatic assistance would be designed based on “a situation assessment provided 
by the pro-democratic civil-society groups in the partner country and on [the Polish govern-
ment’s] own analyses and those prepared by specialised international institutions”.  
Differentiation between target countries would also entail the adoption of different long-
term strategies towards various countries. The revised Strategy identifies three groups of 
countries, according to the type of policy package offered. These packages arrange three 
“concentric circles” of assistance targets, depending on the priority level and intensity of 
bilateral relations. The first circle will include priority countries for which multi-year democ-
ratisation strategies will be developed. The middle ring will comprise countries where the 
needs identified closely match those areas where Polish aid might be most effective. The 
outer ring consists of all the states to which Poland could transfer general experience.
As the Strategy indicates, this does not mean a major shift in geographical priorities, as Po-
land intends to continue to place emphasis on its immediate eastern neighbours (esp ecially 
Belarus and Ukraine) as well as on Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In line with cur-
rent trends, more funds will be allocated to South-Eastern Europe, and selected countries 
will be targeted in Central America, the Middle East (especially Iraq and Afghan istan) and 
sub-Saharan Africa (mainly countries where Polish Catholic missions are present).
Polish	NGOs’	Democracy	Assistance	Projects	
Belarus
Belarus meets several of the criteria listed in the strategic documents of the Polish MFA that 
qualify it as a target country for democracy assistance. On the one hand, it is a neigh-
bouring state and homeland to a significant Polish minority, which highlights the need for 
development of cross-border technical and business co-operation, and maintenance of 
people-to-people contacts (e.g. through a liberal visa policy). On the other hand, Poland 
has on many occasions raised the issue of human rights violations, political repression and 
insufficient access to independent media, supporting activities aiming at the strengthening 
of institutions of civil society, increasing access to alternative information and promotion of 
the Belarusian identity, language and culture, as well as support to the Polish minority.  
The official priorities for Polish assistance to Belarus list a number of areas, all falling 
within the definition of democracy assistance. Four major segments of activities are supp-
orted by the MFA:
improving access to objective information on history, cultural identity and contempo-• 
rary life in Belarus, and strengthening the Belarusian language;
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Ukraine
Ukraine comes second after Belarus in the value of democracy assistance funding com-
mitted by Poland’s MFA (largely due to the heavy funding of media initiatives targeting 
Belarus), but has consistently occupied the first position in the number of projects imple-
mented by NGOs. In 2004-2008, as many as 116 projects (out of a total of 282) were 
implemented in Ukraine, involving a far larger number of Polish NGOs than in the case 
of assistance to any other beneficiary country of Polish aid. 
The high number of NGOs involved reflects on the one hand the expertise and experience 
of many Polish organisations in working with their partners in this “strategic neighbour” 
of Poland. On the other hand, assistance to Ukraine has been much more varied in terms 
of issue areas and sectors. Four out of five key areas of assistance received high attent-
ion, as is evident in the numbers of projects (around five or more a year in each area), 
thus allowing greater diversity of NGOs working in these areas and possibly leading to 
improved quality of the projects themselves due to higher competition.
Comparison of the priorities for projects targeting Belarus and Ukraine indicates some 
crucial differences, which imply a different focus of assistance, which in turn might con-
firm the application of differentiated country strategies by the Polish MFA. Unlike Belarus, 
where the majority of both directly funded and NGO-implemented projects seek to pro-
mote alternative access to information and strengthen independent media, this area is the 
least likely to receive MFA funding when it comes to Ukraine. This, of course, stems from 
the conclusion that the Ukrainian media do enjoy relative freedom and are in less need of 
funding or transfer of management skills. 
Breakdown	of	MFA-commissioned	NGO	democracy	assistance	projects	by	sector	(%),	
Ukraine,	2004-2008
Sector 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2004-2008
Local	government	and	regional	
development 50 33 25 18 22 24
NGO	and	civil	society 25 33 25 15 19 22
Education	and	youth 25 27 22 29 30 27
Media	and	access	to	information 0 0 6 3 0 3
EU	integration 0 7 19 15 22 16
Other 0 0 3 21 4 8
Source: Author’s analysis of the results of MFA-funded NGO project competitions 
Currently, most Polish NGO projects focus on building the institutional capacity of 
Bela rusian NGOs. According to Joanna Horozińska, until recently co-ordinator of the 
Belarusian support programme at the largest Polish NGO in the field, the areas of con-
centration for the future are: transfer of know-how, consultancy, exchange of information, 
monitoring, development of NGO databases, individual grants, youth exchange, and 
activities on the revival of historical memory and national identity. 
Largest	MFA-funded	projects	for	Polish	NGOs	working	in	Belarus,	2006-2007	(by	value)20
NGO Projects year
Value	 (PLN	
thousands)
1
Center for Civic 
Education Poland-
Belarus
Support of independent information in the 
Republic of Belarus (radio broadcast)
2006 3,272
2
European Institute for 
Democracy
Development of centres fostering local 
democracy in Belarus; Centres of Civic 
Activity - road towards building civil 
society in Belarus 2006-2007 995
3
J.N. Jezioranski Eastern 
Europe College
Belarusian Publication Programme
2006-2007 785
4
Center for International 
Relations
Belarus School of Journalism (training 
press officers); Belarus Live (improving 
public access to information, increasing 
awareness of situation in Belarus globally) 2006-2007 608
5
East European 
Democratic Centre
Support to independent regional press
2006 462
6
Finance and 
Administration Private 
University
Setting up a system of business education 
and credit associations to support SME 
development 2006 440
7
CASE - Center for 
Social and Economic 
Research Foundation
Supporting the development of Belarusian 
small business and preparation for market 
reforms 2007 420
8
Freedom and 
Democracy Foundation
Information centre for documentation and 
support to victims of political repression 2006-2007 383
9
Belarusian Robert 
Schuman Association
Support to independent publishing in 
Belarus 2006 356
10
East European 
Democratic Centre
Civic Belarus - strengthening civil society 
through local activity 2006 279
11
Catholic Intellectual 
Club
Weekend study visits for Belarusian youth 
in Poland 2006 265
12
School of Leaders 
Association
Belarusian School of Local Leaders: 
Together for Local Communities 2006-2007 264
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collaboration with the Czech People in Need (PIN), an event drawing attention to human 
rights abuses in Cuba. In February-March 2003, a photo exhibition of Czech photo-
grapher Pavel Hroch, entitled “The Sea is our Freedom and our Prison”, featured a cycle 
of pictures of political prisoners’ families. During the exhibition, hosted at the Warsaw 
University Library, signatures were collected to nominate Osvaldo José Payá Sardiñas, 
the founder and leader of the Movement for the Liberation of Christians in Cuba, for the 
Nobel Peace Prize.
Selected	Non-Governmental	Donors
Three Polish organisations (as set out below) were launched by foreign donors in the 
1990s to promote democratisation and the development of civil society in Poland. It soon 
became clear that Polish lessons of transition could serve as an inspiration for Poland’s 
eastern neighbours, and the organisations set out to achieve this purpose through a com-
bination of granting and operational programmes. It is important to note that while the 
funding was of foreign origin, the process of selecting the priorities was autonomous. 
From the perspective of the foreign donors, Poland’s experience of co-operation with its 
eastern neighbours and the lessons of Poland’s own transition positioned the country as 
a good location for local co-operation initiatives that could continue the work and realise 
the values envisaged by the original foreign donors.
Stefan Batory Foundation
Established by George Soros in 1988, the Warsaw-based Stefan Batory Foundation is 
the largest non-governmental domestic grantor in the field of democratic assistance. Its 
mission is to “support the development of an open, democratic society in Poland and 
other Central and East European countries” with three priorities - increasing the role and 
involvement of civil society, upholding civil liberties and the rule of law, and promotion of 
international co-operation and solidarity. It runs both grantmaking and operational prog-
rammes, targeting activities in Poland and throughout the region of Central and Eastern 
Europe, most prominently in the direct eastern neighbourhood of Poland, Belarus, the Ka-
liningrad region of Russia, and Ukraine. Its programmes in the East are funded, inter alia, 
by the Ford Foundation, Robert Bosch Foundation, and the Polish Foreign Ministry. 
The Foundation offers three grantmaking programmes focusing on the CIS. East-East: 
Partnership Beyond Borders (run in conjunction with Open Society Institute (OSI) part-
ners in different countries) supports international projects implemented in the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Citizens in Action assists NGOs in Belarus 
and Ukraine engaged in building and developing civil society in these countries, and the 
Comm unity Initiatives Partnership. 
The perception that Ukrainian civil society has matured enough to be involved in partner-
ships rather than in projects aiming to support its survival, and that government institutions 
(and local government structures) could be its allies, underlies some other trends in Polish 
assistance to NGO work in Ukraine. The projects strengthening NGOs and civil society 
institutions are becoming lesser priorities - while in 2005, every third project fell into this 
category, only one in six projects did so in 2007. The maturity of the local government 
structures was taken into account, as the share of projects supporting decentralisation or 
local government reforms dropped from 33% to 18% of the number of projects in that 
period. 
The more advanced stage of Polish-Ukrainian relations has shifted emphasis from strict 
democracy assistance to transfer of Poland’s experience in specific public policy areas - 
focusing increasingly on EU integration, education and youth exchange, which together 
accounted for the majority of projects allocated in 2008. While the share of funds going 
to different priorities is not yet stable, the case of Ukraine shows that with the rise in the 
number of projects and the wider-ranging presence of NGOs, some stability is a natural 
evolution, leading to sustained forms of assistance. 
Western Balkans
Few conclusions can be drawn about Polish priorities of assistance in the Western Bal-
kans. In 2004 and 2008, only one democracy-related project per year was granted to 
NGOs, while the number rose to two in 2005. The region took on greater importance in 
2006 and 2007, when respectively four, then five, projects were allocated that could be 
considered to have an impact on the development of democracy and civil society. 
In the years 2004-2008, a total of 13 democracy assistance projects (accounting for 
4.6% of all projects) were allocated, the majority of which (eight) concerned EU integ-
ration, followed by three projects serving the development of local government and 
regional planning. 
These issues largely matched the priorities announced by the MFA, such as the support to 
social transformation, promotion of the EU integration idea, and the development of local 
government. In 2006, the latest year for which overall data are available, a total of PLN 
1,435,000 (or € 357,000) was spent on seven projects implemented by NGOs and one 
project undertaken by the Polish government. No projects were undertaken by the Polish 
embassies in the region in that year.22
Cuba
Cuba is not listed as one of the priority countries for Polish development assistance. 
The few initiatives involving Polish NGOs have been carried out with foreign partners. 
For instance, the East European Democratic Centre (http://eedc.org.pl) organised, in 
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After the EU accession of Poland, the Stefan Batory Foundation established a new grant-
making programme, offering support of up to € 12,000 for trilateral co-operation projects 
of NGOs from Poland and Germany and from Ukraine, Belarus and the Kaliningrad 
region. The Community Initiatives Partnership programme encourages civic education and 
activism through projects focusing on European integration, environmental protection, 
civil rights and freedoms, and common history, as well as national and cultural heritage. 
Project activities should primarily benefit recipients in Belarus and Ukraine. The value of 
the grant from the Robert Bosch Foundation for the programme in 2007 is € 192,594.
The Stefan Batory Foundation also implements projects in Ukraine (as well as in Belarus 
and other CIS states) through its operational International Co-operation Programme. The 
projects undertaken under the programme concentrate on the implications of the EU’s poli-
cies towards its eastern neighbours. Projects, such as “Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New 
Relations”, “European Choice for Belarus”, and “More than Neighbours”23, articulated 
independent ideas promoting the European integration of countries covered by the Euro-
pean Neighbourhood Policy, as well as Belarus. The projects incorporated the input of 
Belarusian and Ukrainian NGOs, as well as highlighting the need for internal EU reforms 
and changes in the perception of the eastern neighbourhood in EU member states. 
As part of the project targeting Ukraine in 2005-2006, activities were undertaken aimed 
at the dissemination of information on European integration. The project targeted individ-
uals and groups involved in informing the Ukrainian public on EU issues. An important 
element included a three-day seminar in Kyiv and a week-long study visit to three Polish 
cities for 30 representatives of regional European information centres from Ukraine who 
acquainted themselves with the best Ukrainian, Polish and European practices in launch-
ing information campaigns on European integration. Study visits to three Polish cities were 
offered to 27 representatives of Ukrainian authorities, universities and NGOs from nine 
regional centres, where seminars were later held on the Polish experience of EU acces-
sion, and practical implications of EU membership for various aspects of local government 
and regional policy were presented. 
An academic workshop, drawing researchers from regions of Ukraine, Poland and Russia, 
was held to discuss Ukrainian-Russian relations in light of EU integration. Two seminars 
and a roundtable attracted in turn diplomats, think-tanks and the media to the discussions 
of the impact of the Orange Revolution on EU-Ukrainian relations. The activities were 
conducted in co-operation with several Ukrainian partners, including the Foreign Ministry, 
the International Renaissance Foundation, the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign 
Policy of Ukraine, and Europe XXI Foundation.
Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation – PAUCI24
Founded in 1999, The Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI) was a tri-
lateral initiative of Poland, Ukraine, and the US, whose objective was to provide impetus 
to collaboration between Ukraine and Poland, and to share the lessons of Poland’s demo-
cratic transition. Thus, the Initiative’s mission highlighted Poland’s Euro-Atlantic integration 
as a role model for Ukraine’s own development, while stressing the value of the estab-
lished bilateral ties. Relying on USAID funding and administered by Freedom House, 
PAUCI extended 185 partnership grants to 424 organisations in Ukraine and Poland at a 
total value of over US$ 4.3m. PAUCI also arranged technical assistance visits of US and 
Polish experts through its American and Polish Volunteers for International Development 
Programmes (AVID and PVID).  
In 2005, the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation was established in Warsaw, and 
this Poland-based entity has continued the mission of its predecessor. Greater emphasis 
was placed on targeting assistance to building the capacity of Ukraine for integration into 
Euro-Atlantic structures. In addition, the new mission, reflecting the post-Orange Revolution 
landscape, envisaged Ukraine’s involvement in “active support of democratic processes in 
the region”, in particular Belarus, Moldova, and Russia. The Foundation set out to support 
activities in the fields of: (a) advocacy for closer integration with Euro-Atlantic structures, 
(b) administrative and local government reform, (c) international and EU business stand-
ards, (d) ethical standards in public life, and (e) youth empowerment. 
Polish American Freedom Foundation 
(Polsko-Amerykańska Fundacja Wolności)
The Polish American Freedom Foundation was set up in 2000 as a follow-up to the 
Polish-American Enterprise Fund, which had earlier funded Polish SMEs. The Foundation’s 
mission had a strong pro-democratisation content, aiming to “advance democracy, civil 
society, economic development and equal opportunity in Poland and, ultimately, in other 
Central and Eastern European countries”. While it funds Polish NGOs in several domestic 
public policy areas, it also runs initiatives that serve to spread the lessons of Polish reforms 
to other countries in transition. Two dedicated programmes realise this objective: the Lane 
Kirkland Grant programme, and cross-border initiatives under the RITA-Transition in the 
Region scheme.
Between 2000-2007, 223 grantees from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Lithua-
nia, Moldova, Russia, and Slovakia benefited from the Lane Kirkland Grant programme. 
They were able to study at Polish universities subjects crucial to effective economic and 
political transformation. Study tours to Poland were in turn organised as part of the RITA 
programme for academics, social activists and businesspeople - 686 participants used 
this opportunity to meet their Polish counterparts between 2003 and 2007. Since 2005, 
the formula has also included the visits of Ukrainian officials willing to learn from Poland’s 
experience in various aspects of EU integration. 
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2 See section 5.1 (p. 14) of Strategia polskiej współpracy…, op.cit.
3 Strategia polskiej współpracy …, op.cit., pp. 15-16.
4 Strategia, op.cit., p. 17.
5 The text has not been made public. General reference to the work on the draft Strategy can be found 
at: http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Nowa,strategia,polskiej,pomocy,172.html
6 For each year, the Polish Central Bank mid-year exchange rate (30 June) was used to calculated the 
figures in euros.
7 The full list of members is available at: http://www.zagranica.org.pl/index.php?option=com_content
&task=blogsection&id=4&Itemid=27
8 The texts of all positions can be found at:
http://www.zagranica.org.pl/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogsection&id=6&Itemid=46
9 Polska pomoc zagraniczna 2007: raport z monitoringu przeprowadzonego przez organizacje 
pozarządowe, Grupa Zagranica/Polska Zielona Sieć: Warsaw/Szczecin 2008, Annex 1, p. 42. 
10 Interview with Marta Pejda, Secretary of Grupa Zagranica (September 2007).
11 The term “Good Neighbourhood” refers to the countries and territories adjacent to Poland in the east 
- the Kaliningrad region (Russia), Belarus, and Ukraine
12 For earlier years (2004-2005), the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs published figures only in USD 
(not even in PLN)
13 E. Kępińska, Recent Trends in International Migration: The 2007 Sopemi Report for Poland, Warsaw 
2007, Table 27, p. 78, available at: http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/obm/pix/029_87.pdf 
14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju: raport roczny 2004, Warsaw 
2005, pp. 15-18.
15 Ibid.
16 Polska współpraca, op.cit., p. 21.
17 Polska współpraca z partnerami z Europy Wschodniej, Kaukazu Południowego i Azji Środkowej, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 3
18 Interviews were held at the Department of Development Assistance in August 2007.
19 “Belarus” in the portal of Polish MFA development assistance, http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl
20 Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Development Co-operation 
http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl
21 The list follows that given by Joanna Rohozińska, the co-ordinator until mid-2008 of the programme of 
support for Belarus at the East European Democratic Centre, in an interview, included in the fifth edition 
of the Aktywność polskich organizacji pozarządowych zagranicą (Activity of Polish NGOs Abroad) CD-
ROM. See http://www.zagranica.org.pl
22 Polska współpraca na rzecz rozwoju. Raport roczny 2006, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2007, p. 
60.
23 http://www.batory.org.pl/english/intl/neighbour.htm
24 http://pauci.org/en/
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Exporting	Democracy	
(not	only	Democracy...)
Slovakia’s Democracy Assistance Policies and Priorities
Grigorij Mesežnikov
Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Slovak Republic
Before we set out to evaluate the issue of democracy assistance in Slovakia, it is im-portant to note the following facts:
The Slovak Republic is a consolidated democracy with a stable institutional system, • 
effective system of human and minority rights protection, functioning market economy 
and developed civil society;
The Slovak Republic joined the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Develop-• 
ment (OECD) in 2000 and the European Union (EU) in 2004, which effectively turned 
it into an active donor in the field of development assistance aimed at other countries;
In 2003, the Slovak Republic established an institutionalised system of Official • 
Develop ment Assistance (ODA), which provides a mechanism for interaction between 
government institutions and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) when implement-
ing various projects abroad, including democracy assistance projects;
In the mid-1990s, Slovakia went through a period of internal democratic deficits• 1 that 
were eliminated following a high degree of civic mobilisation and assistance provided 
to pro-democratic forces by democratic players in the international community. As a 
result of this struggle, the country developed an ethos of resistance against authoritarian 
practices and solidarity with nations that are oppressed by undemocratic regimes; in 
other words, it developed an ethos of supporting democratic values;
During the process of overcoming democratic deficits, civil society actors and rep-• 
resentatives of NGOs gained experience that could be used in the implementation of 
democracy assistance projects abroad;
Between 1998 and 2006, the country was ruled by political forces that unambiguously • 
supported the democratisation process in other countries;
As a full-fledged EU and NATO member, the Slovak Republic promotes an “open door” • 
policy regarding both organisations’ future enlargement, which is the cornerstone of 
its pro-active approach to helping potential candidate countries increase their level of 
preparedness.
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Between 2004 and 2007, Slovakia’s activities implemented in the field of democracy 
ass istance took the following forms: 
Projects implemented within the framework of government-financed ODA/Official  1. 
Ass istance (OA), including projects implemented by NGOs
Projects implemented by Slovak NGOs with the support of international donors  2. 
(i.e. foundations, funds, endowments, NGOs)
Projects implemented by Slovak NGOs that were supported by the special grant 3. 
scheme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
Activities of Slovak NGOs funded from donations by Slovak citizens. 4. 
The Slovak government’s support of democratic development in other countries was impl-
emented almost exclusively through a specifically created mechanism provided by ODA.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are intended 
to foster debate with a view to strengthening 
democracy assistance policies in Slovakia: 
General political framework of 
democracy assistance
State institutions and politicians in Slovakia • 
should consistently and continually dem-
onstrate the political will for support of 
democratisation processes in transition or 
pre-transition countries;
Peer pressure should continue to be • 
exerted towards countries with demo-
cratic regimes (Ukraine, Bosnia and 
Herz egovina) in supp ort of their imple-
mentation of necessary reforms, while 
any steps and statements that could put 
in doubt Slovakia’s commitment to proc-
esses of democratisation in countries with 
undemocratic regimes must be avoided; 
Any improvement in the international sta-• 
tus of countries with undemocratic regimes 
(Belarus, Cuba), and their membership in 
international organisations, must be strictly 
conditional on tangible improvements in 
the field of human rights;
Politicians should refrain from misleading • 
public opinion by statements implying that 
there is a contradiction between ODA 
(including democracy assistance) and the 
national interests of the Slovak Republic.
ODA policies (priorities, 
grant-making procedures, etc.)
Funds allocated for ODA should be in-• 
creased in absolute and relative numbers 
in order to meet the international comm-
itments officially agreed by the Slovak 
Republic;
Democracy assistance should be sustained • 
as a key priority of the country’s ODA;
Financial allocations for different categ-• 
ories of projects should be clearly 
specified and ring-fenced over multi-year 
periods. This can help to prevent a pro-
nounced shift from democracy assistance 
projects to infrastructural ones and to keep 
a more balanced proportion between sec-
toral priorities. 
Although ODA and democracy assistance • 
can to a certain degree serve as tools for 
the country’s “soft-power diplomacy”, it 
would be wrong to consider ODA as a 
systematic entry-point for Slovak business 
into local markets. Such an approach 
could lead to the commercialisation of 
ODA and the total neglect of democracy 
assistance; 
ODA (including democracy assistance) • 
is essentially a pro bono non-profit activ-
ity, which justifies the preferential choice 
(where the process is made public, includ-
ing where appropriate the use of public 
tenders) of implementers that correspond 
to this principle in the following order: 
NGOs, academic institutions (universities, 
research and scientific institutes), public 
administration institutions (local govern-
ment, state organs), and private-sector 
companies;
A permanent mechanism of consultation • 
and co-operation between govern mental 
agencies (MFA, Slovak Agency for Inter-
national Development Co-operation 
- SAMRS) and NGOs working on demo-
cracy assistance (members of the Platform 
of Non-Governmental Development 
Organ isations - PMVRO - and others) 
should be established;
The functional micro-grant schemes ad-• 
ministered by embassies in the recipient 
countries of Slovakia’s ODA should be 
continued and the funds for such schemes 
increased; implementation of small grants 
should be flexible and adjusted to local 
conditions (e.g. in terms of accountancy 
rules, matching funds requirements, etc)
Support should be continued for long-• 
term partnerships between Slovak and 
recipient- country NGOs; 
The trend of increasing project cover-• 
age in the recipient countries should be 
continued, not necessarily by seeking 
KEy	CONCLUSIONS	
In recent years, Slovakia has become an imp-
ortant actor in democracy assistance in the 
region of eastern and south-eastern Europe 
with relatively diverse geographical cover-
age. While the main actors in this field are 
NGOs, many of their activities in the recipient 
countries would not be possible without finan-
cial support from the state, mostly through 
the country’s ODA mechanism. On the other 
hand, NGOs are the main generators of 
ideas in the field of democracy assistance 
(topics, issues, methodology), and they serve 
as the engine of the whole endeavour. 
Domestic political conditions (the stances 
of the dominant political actors) still infl-
uence the shaping of democracy assistance 
policies, but pressure from the community of 
independent implementers (NGOs) is becom-
ing an ever more important, if not crucial, 
factor. This pressure can serve to disable or 
partially impede possible negative changes 
connected with political developments (for 
example, the “commercialisation” of ODA, 
i.e. the replacement of democracy assistance 
with support for commercial/trade relations 
with the countries in question, and the dec-
line of political will to support groups and 
individuals working for democracy and 
 human rights).
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Institutional,	Political	and	Financial	Framework
The broader social framework for the Slovak Republic’s ODA/OA (including democracy 
assistance), as well as the means of its implementation, is determined by the following 
factors:
general priorities of the country’s foreign policy• 
declared importance of development assistance in the context of foreign policy • 
 priorities
character of relations between Slovakia and other countries• 
total volume of funds allocated to ODA/OA• 
commitment of ruling political forces to democratic values, and their endeavours • 
aimed at promoting democratic values in other countries
character of government’s relations with domestic civil society actors.• 
Concrete goals in the field of development assistance were set by the Slovak govern-
ment’s programme manifestos of 1998 and 2006. The documents formulated intentions 
to “prepare a strategy of foreign development assistance in order to contribute to the 
endeavour of developed countries to mitigate the problems of hunger and poverty in the 
least developed countries” (1998) and to create “the necessary financial, legislative and 
organisational conditions for effective provision of development assistance in compliance 
with foreign policy objectives” (2006). The issue of development assistance forms an 
integral part of several strategic documents elaborated by the MFA. 
The institutional system of ODA/OA in Slovakia
Building the foundation of Slovakia’s development assistance mechanism began with the 
Strategy of Development Assistance provided by the Slovak Republic, which the cab-
inet approved in July 1999. Subsequently, in December 1999, the cabinet adopted the 
Charter of Active Development Assistance and Co-operation that defined the core goals, 
principles, forms and means of development co-operation. The document defined act ive 
development assistance along with humanitarian aid as an “integral part of Slovakia’s for-
eign policy”, and identified three areas of active development assistance - socio- economic, 
cultural-historical, and political. The latter area included a commitment to promote “peace, 
equality, democratic institutions and respect for human rights and freedoms in recipient 
countries”. 
In 2001, the cabinet approved the Mechanism of Providing Government Development 
Ass istance of the Slovak Republic. A special resolution adopted in 2002 stipulated the 
MFA as the principal co-ordinator of development assistance; within the ministry, this 
issue was entrusted to the Department of International Economic Co-operation (OMES). 
In 2001, the ministry set up the ODA Co-ordination Committee as an expert advisory 
body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The committee comprises representatives of select 
new partners in new localities, but where 
possible by building sustainable local 
partnerships with the capacity to spread 
know-how throughout the recipient coun-
try. For instance, local NGOs/partners 
in central cities should be encouraged to 
form project networks (or to use existing 
networks or coalitions) for the implement-
ation of projects;
Slovak implementers should be encour-• 
aged to involve partners in the recipient 
countries in the preparation of projects in 
order to strengthen local ownership and to 
better meet local needs;
Implementers (both Slovak and recip-• 
ient-country actors) should improve the 
transparency of their activities by publicis-
ing widely information about their projects 
and about their results, and making them 
available for other actors in order to fac-
ilitate the sharing of good practices and 
avoidance of bad practices. It should 
become a codified requirement for all rec-
ipients of ODA to inform the public about 
their work within the approved projects. 
(Exceptions to this requirement can be 
justified only in the case of autocratic, un-
democratic regimes where such dis closure 
might endanger the implementers, and 
where more underground survival tactics 
require a greater degree of confidentiality 
concerning their activities.)
Priority content recommended for 
ODA/democracy assistance projects
in•	  Ukraine: 
Euro-Atlantic integration .
socio-economic and political reform,  .
especially parliamentary procedures 
and law-making process
public accountability and  .
 transparency
in	Belarus:•	
civil society development .
fostering expert community and   .
academic co-operation
support for independent cultural and  .
educational initiatives
support for independent media and  .
channels of communication
in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina:•	
EU integration .
 democratic transition (political   .
parties, parliament, local democracy)
civil society development .
public accountability .
assistance in inter-ethnic communic- .
ations/community development
in	Cuba:•	
human rights (and humanitarian  .
assistance for victims of political 
repression)
civic education .
expert and academic training and  .
co-operation
independent media .
support for independent cultural and  .
educational initiatives.
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central state administration organs and organisations operating in the field of develop-
ment assistance. The committee issues recommendations for the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
regarding current ODA issues, submits information on assistance provided, and partici-
pates in preparing fundamental strategic documents regarding ODA. The plenipotentiary 
for ODA and the chairman of the ODA Co-ordination Committee is the state secretary of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; until 2006, it was József Berényi, who was replaced by 
Oľga Algayerová after the 2006 parliamentary elections.
Currently, the Department of Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Aid (OPRO) 
in the MFA’s Section of International Organisations and Development Assistance is prima-
rily responsible for development assistance. Besides the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
ministries of interior, environment, agriculture and education participate in ODA admin-
istration.
In 2003, the cabinet adopted the Mid-Term Strategy of Official Development Assistance 
for 2003-2008, a strategic document that defined basic goals, motivations and prin ciples, 
as well as the sectoral and territorial priorities of Slovakia’s development assistance. Ac-
cording to the document, basic motivations for Slovakia’s development assistance include: 
co-responsibility for global development, moral commitments and obligations ensuing from 
the country’s membership in international organisations and initiatives, and its interest in 
becoming part of the donor community. 
The strategy document also set five core goals. The most important was “transfer of Slov-
akia’s experience and know-how”, followed by the “engagement of Slovak experts in 
international development activities and mechanisms; engagement of Slovak subjects in 
international development projects; strengthening economic co-operation with developing 
countries; and helping communities of expatriate Slovaks abroad”. 
The importance of democracy assistance in the overall concept of development assistance 
may be documented not only by placing the “transfer of Slovakia’s experience and know-
how” at the top of the hierarchy of goals, but also by its official justification: “The Slovak 
Republic has a particular experience that is not shared by traditional donors. Within this 
transformation, Slovakia underwent changes in all sectors of society (politics, economy, 
social sphere, etc). The transfer of this experience to countries currently undergoing the 
process will consolidate Slovakia’s political and economic ties with these countries.” 
This importance was manifested even more strongly in defining sectoral priorities stemm-
ing from Slovakia’s comparative advantages over other donor countries. The document 
defined three priorities, including “developing democracy institutions and market environ-
ment” as the top priority; the remaining two were “infrastructure” and “landscaping, 
environmental protection, agriculture, food safety, and use of raw materials”. The docu-
ment specified that in the area of building democracy institutions “the comparative 
advantages of the Slovak Republic result mainly from the unique experience the Slovak 
Republic has acquired since 1989. This know-how could be passed on to countries that 
are currently undergoing similar development. More specifically, it is about developing a 
market economy, changing ownership structures, creating a business environment, and 
reforming the public sector (i.e. managing public finances, reforming public administr-
ation and public service)”.
The Mid-Term Strategy of Official Development Assistance for 2003-2008 suggested that 
a broad spectrum of institutions and organisations from Slovakia should take part in the 
process of outlining and implementing development assistance; the document paid par-
ticular attention to NGOs, describing co-operation with them as “indispensable”. Besides 
their political independence that allows NGOs to enter territories that are politically too 
sensitive or even undesirable to enter for government institutions, the document spelled out 
other important arguments in favour of their participation in development assistance: well-
developed networks of international partners, previous experience with similar activities in 
Slovakia, and the ability to pool together governmental and non-governmental funds.
Based on this principal strategic document, the cabinet annually elaborates the National 
Programme of Development Assistance that outlines specific activities for each year. 
The Mid-Term Strategy of Official Development Assistance for 2003-2008 defined 13 
countries that would be the principal focus of Slovakia’s development assistance. One of 
them - namely Serbia and Montenegro - was defined as the so-called programme country 
with which the Slovak Republic signed a Memorandum of Understanding; subsequently, 
in 2003, the MFA elaborated the Country Strategy Paper on Slovak Official Development 
Assistance to the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2007, the Slovak Republic 
concluded two separate agreements on development co-operation with Serbia and Monte-
negro. The list of countries covered by Slovak ODA included Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
In 2003, Ukraine and Belarus did not rank among the territorial priorities of Slovakia’s 
ODA because aiding these countries could not be qualified as development assistance. 
Therefore, both countries were placed under the category of official assistance (OA). In 
2004, the government allocated SKK 10m (€ 0.26m) from the National ODA Project to 
OA projects in both countries. This model was repeatedly used in 2005; the assistance 
was aimed primarily at developing democracy institutions and civil society.
In 2003, the government set up two special implementation units entrusted with admin-
istering Slovakia’s development assistance: 
1. The Bratislava-Belgrade Fund (BBF) for implementation of projects in the prog ramme 
country of Serbia and Montenegro. 
2. The slovak-UNDp Trust Fund, established by a joint memorandum with the United Na-
tions Development Programme (UNDP) that has its regional centre for Europe and the CIS 
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in Bratislava, for implementation of projects in all other countries. Founding the Slovak-
UNDP Trust Fund effectively laid the institutional groundwork for Slovakia’s ODA.
The Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund administered ODA projects in 12 countries as well as OA 
projects in Ukraine and Belarus; the Administrative and Contracting Unit (ACU) was set 
up at the UNDP regional centre. Administration of projects implemented by the BBF was 
entrusted to the Civil Society Development Foundation (NPOA) that won the public tender 
to set up the ACU for Serbia and Montenegro. 
These two funds administered all of Slovakia’s ODA and OA projects between 2004 and 
2006, and BBF and the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund were responsible for the completion of 
these projects until the end of their duration (2007-2008).
On 1 January 2007, the Slovak Agency for International Development Co-operation 
(SAMRS) launched its operations; the agency was established by the Slovak government 
resolution from September 2006 as a budgetary organisation of the MFA: the agency’s 
director is appointed and removed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. While programme 
management of development assistance was entrusted to the MFA, the agency will take 
care of project management. The agency started its grant-making activities in August 
2007, and administers projects in all recipient countries of Slovakia’s development assist-
ance, previously covered by the BBF and the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund.
In December 2007, the Slovak parliament approved the Law on Official Development 
Assistance. The bill proceeds from priorities defined in the European Consensus on 
Develop ment. It introduces the definition of ODA as “activities and measures undertaken 
to support sustainable development in developing countries”. It states that “the Slovak 
Republic offers its ODA on the basis of the principles of international development policy, 
including the development policy of the EU, and it is guided by the obligations ensuing 
from international treaties and agreements on ODA as well as by obligations adopted by 
international organisations”. 
The law refers to the following goals of Slovak ODA implemented in developing countries: 
poverty and hunger reduction, support for sustainable economic, social and environ-
mental development, keeping peace and security in the world through the strengthening 
of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance, support for universal 
access to education, improvement of basic healthcare services, and support for economic 
co-operation. According to the law, the MFA is responsible for “co-ordination and harmon-
isation of national ODA with the ODA of EU member states and with the ODA of the EU”. 
The document mentions the five-year mid-term strategy as the main planning instrument 
of ODA.
The political framework of Slovakia’s ODA/OA
Slovakia’s foreign policy activities aimed at supporting democracy were defined by the 
Mid-Term Strategy of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic until 2015 that was approved 
in November 2004. The document states that “the axioms of foreign policy of the Slovak 
Republic include respect for international law, extending space for democracy, freedom, 
peace, stability and prosperity, and promoting fundamental human rights and solidarity 
among nations”. According to the document, “the programme of development assist-
ance, SlovakAid, supports the development of relations with recipient countries to which 
Slovakia may offer material aid and transfer its experience of the process of democratic 
transition”.
In November 2005, State Secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Magda Vašáryová 
declared that ODA was “an effective tool of promoting democracy and stability”.
The socio-political framework for partnership between government institutions and NGOs 
in the field of development assistance was outlined by objectives formulated in govern-
ment programme manifestos from 1998 (“the government shall further the establishment 
of partnership relations with the civic sector at all levels of public affairs administration”) 
and 2002 (“the government views the non-governmental sector as an important pillar 
and part of free civil society, which is why it continues to be open to a partnership dia-
logue”). These objectives were endorsed by the current administration whose programme 
manifesto from 2006 states that “the Slovak government considers the third sector an 
important pillar of society and part of a free civil society. Being fully aware of the impor-
tance of developing civil society, it shall conduct a partnership dialogue with particular 
constituents and platforms of civil society in order to create a quality economic and legal 
environment.”2
The Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2007, elaborated by the MFA, states: 
“Foreign policy priorities of the Slovak Republic clearly include an active policy in the 
field of human rights and individual freedoms, including rights of minority groups. The 
Slovak Republic intends to maintain this principal course while holding chairmanship of 
the Council of Europe between November 2007 and May 2008. The Slovak Republic 
shall continue to further this aspect of its foreign policy in co-operation with the non-
governmental sector.”
In Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2008, it is stated that the basic framework 
of Slovakia’s foreign policy is determined by its membership in the Euro-Atlantic community 
and by its long-term national interests. Development assistance is defined as “Slovakia’s 
duty”, and as an expression of solidarity with those who are poorer and weaker. 
The document argues that ODA can also be an efficient tool for presenting and reaching 
the goals of foreign policy and national interests; it also refers to the human rights aspect 
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of Slovakia’s foreign policy in the context of the country’s responsibility as the presiding 
state of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. 
There is a separate chapter about ODA. It states that the amount of funds available for 
ODA (the document refers to 0.10% - 0.12% of GDP; however, according to the official 
data of the MFA, in reality in 2007 it was only 0.093% of GDP) does not enable the 
Slovak Republic to fulfil its agreed international obligations (for ODA spending to reach 
0.17% of GDP in 2010 and 0.33% of GDP in 2015). That is why, it continues, it is nec-
essary to intensify domestic efforts to increase the amount of funds. 
According to the document, the Slovak Republic will continue to concentrate its develop-
ment activities in several countries and sectors, and in the new strategy for 2009-2013 
that should be elaborated in 2008 it will consider orientation to maximum two-to-three 
sectors of co-operation in the partner states (however, these sectors are not clarified). The 
current sectoral orientation of Slovak ODA is defined in the document as “substantially 
dispersed”, and the solution, it is cited, lies in “implementing the economic dimension of 
development projects”, emphasizing that through ODA projects the possibility arises to 
involve Slovak businesses in development co-operation which can make possible the entry 
of Slovak small and medium-sized companies into local markets. 
Slovak NGOs operating in the field of development assistance strive to co-ordinate their 
activities. In September 2002, they established PMVRO as an informal association of 
NGOs operating in this field. In 2003, PMVRO was officially registered as an association 
of legal persons; currently, it associates 33 organisations (25 full-fledged members and 
8 observers). 
PMVRO is represented in the ODA Co-ordination Committee that acts as an expert adv-
isory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; its representatives also sit on the executive 
boards of the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund and the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund. A representative 
of the platform is a member of the project commission of SAMRS.
Representatives of the platform held three meetings with MFA high officials - two meet-
ings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ján Kubiš, in 2007 and one meeting with state 
secretary Oľga Algayerová in 2008. Both officials confirmed that they recognise NGOs 
as “important partners helping to make Slovak ODA more efficient”. The platform has 
elaborated and submitted to the MFA its evaluation of the current mid-term strategy of 
Slovak ODA and made suggestions for the elaboration of a new strategy.
As regards relations between government officials and NGOs involved in the implement-
ation of development projects, including democracy assistance ones, certain concerns 
arose in the country’s non-governmental sector after Zdenko Cho, the newly appointed 
director of SAMRS, defined the situation in the area of development assistance in Slovakia 
at the conference “Trilateral Co-operation and Civil Society”, organised by the Czech and 
Dutch ministries of foreign affairs in Prague in October 2007, in the following way: 
“We see now very problematic developments in some segments of the non- governmental 
sector, when something like a ‘non-governmental industry’ is being established here. 
Some NGOs in my country have developed into huge corporations with really comm-
ercial customs and practices. We consider this a problem, because co-operation with 
these kinds of organisations, especially in the field of development assistance, is quite 
critical. They simply do not have enough resources of their own for their functioning after 
having become accustomed in the past to the support of huge international donors, for 
instance USAID, or Canadian and other partners. Now they are concentrating on Slovak 
governmental sources. Of course, we have these big capitalists among NGOs within the 
entire non-governmental community in Slovakia”. 
Cho’s remarks provoked a critical response from the NGO community. They were per-
ceived as a signal about ongoing changes in the government’s approach to priorities 
and partnerships in implementation of ODA. Further developments confirmed the NGOs’ 
concerns in their entirety. 
In May 2008, the chairman of PMVRO, Marián Čaučík, criticised SAMRS’s perform-
ance, especially the lack of transparency in the grant-making process, as well as the 
general situation with Slovak ODA (namely insufficient financial support for bilateral 
projects). Cho immediately responded in a very strong manner. He categorically rejected 
PMVRO’s allegations. He argued that the “professionalised” Slovak NGOs with their 
“sophisticated structures” were trying to “privatise” the country’s development assistance. 
Symptomatically enough, he used the quotation marks in an ironic manner for the word 
democratisation when he described the activities of NGOs in the past (“idyllic times when 
the primary goal was “democratisation”). These public polemics revealed the continued 
tense relations between PMVRO and SAMRS, but it is too early to predict how damaging 
such tensions might be for co-operation between the government and NGOs in ODA im-
plementation, and what effect it will have on the grant-making policies of SAMRS.
Cho was dismissed in July 2008 due to “unsatisfactory managerial performance”. Reports 
appeared in the Slovak media that during the grant-making process at SAMRS favouritism 
was being exercised towards certain business interests. His dismissal opens up the pos-
sibility for an improvement in relations between SAMRS and Slovak NGOs, as well as for 
a decrease in the level of commercialisation of ODA. In September 2008, Ivan Surkoš, 
Slovakia’s former general consul to the US, was named as the new director.
Financial framework of Slovakia’s ODA/OA
In financial terms, total development assistance provided by the Slovak Republic amounted 
to SKK 910.5m (€ 23.47m) in 2004 (0.072% of GDP), SKK 1,739.6m (€ 45.96m) in 
2005 (0.120% of GDP), SKK 1,638m (€ 47.38m) in 2006 (0.103% of GDP), and SKK 
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1,652m (€ 49.16m) in 2007 (0.093% of GDP). Development assistance includes projects 
implemented via the MFA (so-called bilateral assistance that consumes approximately 
10% of total funds allocated to ODA), humanitarian aid abroad, Slovakia’s contributions 
to international organisations and programmes, studies of foreign students at Slovak uni-
versities, and remittance of debt to developing countries.
Financial aspects of ODA provided via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2004-2006
Between 2004 and 2006, the government earmarked a total of sKK 312.371m 
for the slovak-UNDp Trust Fund: SKK 100m in 2004, SKK 102.661m in 2005, and 
SKK 109.710m in 2006. Of that total, SKK 30m was allocated to Ukraine and Belarus 
as OA in 2004-2005 and as ODA since 2006. In 2005, the government launched a 
model of providing micro-grants allocated via the Slovak Republic’s embassies in two 
countries - Ukraine (SKK 1m for projects not exceeding SKK 200,000 administered by 
the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in Ukraine) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (SKK 1m for 
projects not exceeding SKK 200,000 administered by the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Over the same period, the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund that administered development 
assistance in the ‘programme’ country of Serbia and Montenegro was supported by 
sKK 168.776m: SKK 60.776m in 2004, SKK 58m in 2005, and SKK 50m in 2006.3 
Overall, Slovakia allocated sKK 481.147m to official development assistance provided 
via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2004 and 2006.
2007
In 2007, ODA administered by the newly created samrs was funded to the tune of 
sKK 168.744m (including SKK 101m for Serbia and Montenegro, and SKK 65m for other 
countries). 
The total amount of Slovakia’s ODA provided via the MFA in 2004-2007 was 
sKK 649.891m.
Democracy assistance projects supported by the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund 
(2004-2006)
In four grant rounds between 2004 and 2006, the BBF supported 65 projects in Ser-
bia and Montenegro to a total amount of SKK 168.776m.4 Of these projects, 20 fit 
the description of democracy assistance projects (i.e. building democratic institutions, 
improving public administration, supporting civil society, increasing public participation 
in the political process, protecting human and minority rights and rights of disadvan-
taged population groups, promoting interethnic dialogue and education, encouraging 
development of independent media, promoting EU integration, etc). In addition, the BBF 
supported eight projects aimed at forming a market environment in local conditions (i.e. 
regional development, business activities, participation of certain population groups in 
market rel ations or adaptation to market conditions, etc), which may also be viewed as 
contributions to deepening the democratisation process in Serbia and Montenegro.
Of the 20 projects explicitly aimed at the democratisation of society, 17 were imple-
mented by NGOs, two by academic institutions, and one by an association of local and 
regional government bodies. 
Of eight projects aimed at the development of a market environment in local conditions, 
three projects were implemented by NGOs and five projects were implemented by govern-
ment institutions and by businesses and business associations. 
The 20 projects that directly supported democratic development received SKK 57.943m, 
which amounts to 34% of the total sum allocated to development assistance provided 
via the BBF. The eight projects that supported the introduction of market mechanisms and 
adapt ation to market conditions received SKK 23.765m, which amounts to 14% of the 
total sum. Overall, the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund channelled 48% of the total allocated 
funds to democracy assistance.
Democracy assistance projects supported by the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund 
(2004-2006)
Between 2004 and 2006, the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund supported 94 projects, 20 of 
which fit the description of democracy assistance projects (i.e. building democratic 
instit utions and civil society, protecting human rights, encouraging development of inde-
pendent media, promoting EU integration). Ten projects were aimed at supporting market 
develop ment and forming a market environment, particularly introducing market elements 
to individual economic sectors.
A special category is represented by two projects administered by the Slovak embassies 
in Ukraine and Bosnia and Herzegovina (micro-grant schemes).
Of 20 projects aimed at supporting democratisation, 18 were implemented by NGOs 
and two by businesses. Of ten projects aimed at developing market mechanisms in indi-
vidual economic sectors, two were implemented by NGOs, six by businesses, and two by 
state institutions. The 20 projects that directly supported democratic development received 
US$ 1,763,626 (SKK 49.98m), which amounts to 16% of the total sum allocated to 
development assistance provided via the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund. The ten projects that 
supported the introduction of market mechanisms to individual sectors of the economy 
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received US$ 1,104,446, which amounts to 10% of the total sum. Overall, the slovak-
UNDp Trust Fund channelled 26% of total allocated funds to democracy assistance.
Total share of democracy assistance on ODA/OA provided via
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004-2006
Overall, 34% of total funds allocated to ODA/OA schemes administered by the MFA (i.e. 
the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund and the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund) were channelled to democ-
racy assistance projects in 2004-2006. 
Democracy assistance projects supported by Slovak Agency for 
International Development Co-operation (SAMRS) in 2007
In 2007, the newly established SAMRS commenced operations. It supported 52 projects, 
comprising 38 projects implemented in the target countries of Slovakia’s ODA and 14 
projects focused on Slovak ODA capacity-building, development education, and public 
awareness of ODA. 
Two of the 17 projects approved for Serbia (the so-called “programme country”) can be 
defined as projects in the field of democracy assistance (European integration,  media), 
both of which were implemented by NGOs. Two of the three projects approved for 
Montenegro (the other so-called “programme country”) can be defined as democracy 
ass istance projects (European integration, development of local government): one of these 
projects is implemented by an NGO, and the second is implemented by a corporate entity 
(chamber of commerce). In total, out of 20 projects in Serbia and Montenegro, there are 
four democracy assistance projects. 
The share of funds for democracy assistance projects in the two “programme countries” 
(serbia and montenegro) amounts to 14% of total allocated funds administered by samrs 
in 2007.
For all other countries covered by Slovak ODA (the so-called “project countries”), includ-
ing Ukraine, Belarus, and Bosnia and Herzegovina, SAMRS approved 18 projects. Of 
these projects, seven can be considered to be oriented to democracy assistance (six of 
these projects were implemented by NGOs, and one project was implemented by an 
academic institution). Three democracy assistance projects were implemented in Ukraine 
(development of market economy, corporate social responsibility, principles of civil society 
in schools), three projects in Belarus (economic reforms, development of local civil society, 
democratic principles in schools), and one project in Kazakhstan (political dialogue on 
transformation experience). In Bosnia and Herzegovina, no democracy assistance project 
was approved (one project was approved in the area of social-technical infrastructure). 
Overall, samrs channelled 32% of total allocated funds to democracy assistance in the 
“project countries”. In total, 27% of funds allocated to all target countries by samrs in 
2007 were allocated to democracy assistance projects. 
Total	share	of	democracy	assistance	project	in	2004-2007
The total share of funds for all democracy assistance projects in all countries covered by 
Slovakia’s ODA in 2004-2007 supported by BBF, slovak-UNDp Trust Fund and samrs, 
was 32% of allocated ODA funds. 
Distribution of democracy assistance projects provided via the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Slovak ODA) in particular countries
In 2004-2007, democracy assistance projects were implemented in the following 
 countries: 
Country Number	of	projects
Serbia	(including	Kosovo) 27  (76)*
Ukraine	 11  (11)*
Belarus	 8     (8)*
Montenegro	 5     (9)*
Afghanistan	 4     (9)*
Kazakhstan	 4     (14)*
Kenya	 3     (8)*
Kyrgyzstan	 3     (13)*
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina	 1      (8)*
Sudan	 1      (8)*
Macedonia	 1      (6)*
Total 68			(198)**
*   overall number of ODA projects for given country
** overall number of Slovakia’s ODA projects 
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It is very important that the Slovak Republic, as a full-fledged EU and NATO member, 
pursues an “open door” policy with respect to new candidates; the already mentioned 
Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2007 reads: “The Slovak Republic shall 
continue to support further enlargement of the EU because it significantly contributes to 
extending the zone of democracy, stability and prosperity in Europe.” This foreign policy 
priority in general creates favourable conditions for the continuation of democracy assist-
ance via supporting projects aimed at helping potential candidate countries prepare to 
join the EU and NATO. 
The chapter on ODA in the same document did not explicitly describe activities aimed at 
strengthening democratic principles; it stated only that “Slovakia’s development assistance 
in priority countries should focus more narrowly on particular sectors,” without further 
specification. 
The Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2008 speaks about the necessity to 
co- ordinate the MFA’s ODA activities with other ministries and “Slovak implementing 
agencies”, and to involve the “widest possible spectrum of Slovak society” in these act-
ivities. However, in its chapter on ODA, the document contains neither any reference to 
NGOs nor any references to democracy assistance as one of the sectoral priorities of 
Slovak ODA. In its chapter on human rights, the document emphasizes the need for the 
co-participation of NGOs and civil society in the activities of the Council of Europe, and 
contains the promise that Slovakia will openly reveal any cases of violation of human 
rights in EC member states and will demand their resolution.
The document characterises one of the aims of Slovak foreign policy as “strengthening the 
overall authority of the EU as a space of freedom, democracy, solidarity, rule of law, and 
respect for human rights”. It declares support for the policy of EU enlargement and NATO 
“open doors”, which could have an impact on the orientation and character of activities 
in the field of democracy assistance in relation to some recipient countries. 
Between 2004 and 2006, an essential part of democracy assistance provided within the 
ODA framework focused on carrying out necessary structural reforms and strengthening 
civil society. The ‘reform’ drive stemmed from the experience accumulated while carrying 
out a number of structural reforms in Slovakia after 1998, but especially between 2002 
and 2006. 
The focus on supporting civil society ensued largely from the fact that NGOs played a vital 
role in pursuing activities aimed at democracy assistance; in fact, most of such projects in 
Slovakia were implemented by local NGOs, which subsequently helped form partnerships 
between the government and the non-governmental sector. 
A crucial part of activities pursued within the framework of democracy assistance projects 
represented educational projects and events for professionals and experts such as various 
One joint project was implemented in several countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (not included in 
the table). 
In addition, four micro-projects in Ukraine and nine micro-projects in Bosnia and Herz-
egovina were implemented by the Slovak embassies through the special grant scheme.
A group of seven election observers was sent to monitor elections in Belarus and Ukraine 
(within Slovak OA).
Democracy assistance projects funded via special grant scheme 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
In 2005-2007, the MFA, in the framework of its own special grant scheme, approved 60 
projects in the area of international relations, foreign and security policy. Four of these 
projects can be included in the category of democracy assistance. All four projects were 
focused on Ukraine and granted to NGOs. All these projects were focused on the transfer 
of Slovakia’s experience of accession to NATO. The total amount of funds allocated to 
these projects was sKK 1.322m.
Democracy	Assistance:	Approaches,	
Priorities,	Focus,	Partners,	Donors	
Activities related to democracy assistance hold an important place in Slovakia’s system of 
bilateral assistance. Although there is no specific strategic document that deals exclusively 
with democracy assistance, the strategic document that outlines the country’s position 
in the field of development assistance defines furthering democracy as a number-one 
priority. Its importance can be illustrated by the share of funds earmarked for democracy 
assistance projects from the total volume of funds allocated to Slovakia’s development 
assistance.  
In Slovakia, development assistance is viewed as an integral part of the country’s foreign 
policy and is closely interconnected to its declared priorities, which is reflected in the ter-
ritorial focus of Slovakia’s democracy assistance. In a way, Slovakia replicates the model 
applied by the EU when furthering democratisation and reforms in candidate countries 
during the accession process; by leading them through this process, the EU helped itself 
by promoting in these countries the system of values on which the EU is built. Similarly, 
Slovakia considers the countries of the Western Balkans, Ukraine and potentially Belarus 
as future participants in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration, and therefore it strives to 
help them approximate to EU (and NATO) standards and practice. 
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participation of NGOs still remains substantial (for example, in the context of almost all 
projects implemented in Ukraine and Belarus, as before).
The diminishing share of ODA funds spent on democracy assistance projects is a con-
sequence of the huge prevalence of infrastructure projects implemented in Serbia. Only 
the continuing prioritisation of democracy assistance projects in Ukraine and Belarus 
prevented a dramatic decline. 
Serbia as a programme country is currently the main recipient of Slovakia’s ODA, both 
in total funds allocated and in the number of democracy assistance projects supported. 
 Serbia’s exclusive position and therefore its high ranking in democracy assistance statis-
tics has so far been related to two main factors:
Slovakia’s strong advocacy for Serbia’s ambitions to be included in the EU integration • 
process
The prevailing liberal-democratic orientation of ruling cabinets in Belgrade in recent • 
years and their pro-European course.
Domestic and international turbulence over Kosovo’s status issue could change the sit-
uation, although the formation of a new pro-EU government after the 2008 parliamentary 
elections in Serbia has lessened the tension. On the other hand, PMVRO, in its recomm-
endations to the Slovak government about ODA, demanded the outright exclusion of 
Serbia from the list of recipient countries because Serbia is not a developing country 
(however, it is not realistic to expect that such a proposal will be implemented).
As regards continuity in co-operation between the government and the most experienced 
Slovak NGOs, the most substantial changes touched the projects approved by SAMRS 
for Serbia in September 2007, when only one organisation, known as one of the most 
skilful actors of ODA/democracy assistance, was successful. However, in further calls 
for proposals for projects in the so-called “project countries”, almost all other “big fish” 
NGOs (with few exceptions), considered to be the most professional and efficient actors 
in the field of democracy assistance, were supported by SAMRS. 
When pursuing activities in the field of development assistance, the MFA co-operates 
closely, in particular, with two foreign development agencies, namely the Canadian Inter-
national Development Agency (CIDA) and the Austrian Development Agency (ADA). 
Between 2004 and 2006, CIDA co-financed 30 development projects supported via the 
Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund and the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund: eight of these projects focused 
on democracy assistance, but none of them was implemented in countries included in 
the current survey. Over the same period, ADA co-financed three development projects 
supported via the two funds: one of them focused on democracy assistance, but was not 
implemented in countries included in this survey. 
seminars, workshops, conferences, training events, and study visits. This was largely re-
lated to the fact that think-tanks and other NGOs with ample experience in the field of 
analytical work played an active role in implementing these projects. 
In the publicised conditions for project applicants, in 2007 SAMRS defined the sectoral 
priorities of Slovak ODA. 
 
For the so-called project countries, the priorities are as follows: 
building democratic institutions and market environment• 
reconstruction of local infrastructure (including social) and its development • 
landscaping, environmental protection, agriculture, food safety and use of raw  • 
materials. 
For the so called programme countries (Serbia and Montenegro), the priorities are: 
development of civil society, social renovation and regional development • 
reconstruction of local infrastructure and its development• 
assistance with integration into international organisations, such as the World Trade • 
Organization (WTO) and EU. 
Democracy assistance activities still feature among the priorities of Slovakia’s ODA (they 
include the first priority for both the project countries and programme countries, and 
partially the third priority for programme countries), but the different financial allocations 
for the projects, supported within all the stated priorities, reveals the general preference 
for infra structure projects. These projects can be funded up to a maximum of SKK 7m, 
while all other projects (including democracy assistance) are subject to a maximum of 
SKK 3.5m. 
A preliminary analysis of the grant-making operations of SAMRS in 2007, and a com-
parison with the operation of the BBF in 2004-2006, shows that support for democracy 
assistance projects in the programme countries (Serbia and Montenegro) substantially 
decreased - from 48% (BBF) to 14% (SAMRS) of all allocated funds. 
However, a co mparison of the grant-making operations of SAMRS and the Slovak-UNDP 
Trust Fund shows a slight increase in the share of support for democracy assistance projects 
in the “project countries” - from 26% (Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund) to 32% (SAMRS) of the 
allocated funds. But, overall, the share of support for democracy assistance projects within 
Slovakia’s bilateral ODA decreased from 34% in 2004-2006 to 27% in 2007.
As far as the project implementers are concerned, in the case of Serbia and Montenegro, 
a decrease in the number of democracy assistance projects automatically led to a reduc-
tion in the number of NGOs supported by SAMRS. In the case of “project” countries, the 
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according to geographical allocations. Currently, Slovakia’s official position is that it is 
important to focus on amending the contents of EIDHR strategic documents and enhancing 
their subsequent practical implementation.
Ukraine
Official MFA documents justified the decision to include Ukraine in the list of target coun-
tries for official assistance projects by arguing that relations with Ukraine ranked among 
the priorities of the country’s foreign policy. Slovakia’s largest neighbour, Ukraine is cur-
rently undergoing a crucial process of internal reforms and is striving to become part of 
Euro-Atlantic groupings, which is why Slovakia deems it important to assist it in this proc-
ess, particularly by sharing its own experience with transformation, democratis ation and 
Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Other important factors affecting the decision to place Ukraine on the list of countries 
eligible to receive assistance included cultural and linguistic proximity, the clearly pro-
reform and pro-democratic orientation of the previous Slovak administration and its open 
sympathies towards similarly oriented political forces in Ukraine and the personal com-
mitment of some government officials, including former prime minister Mikuláš Dzurinda, 
who repeatedly emphasized the necessity to help strengthen democratisation and pro-
integration trends in Ukraine. 
In recent years, Slovakia’s foreign policy has begun to perceive Ukraine through the eyes 
of a full-fledged EU and NATO member, and with regard to Ukraine’s relations with these 
organisations. The Orientation of Foreign Policy for 2007 states: “Stability and prosperity 
on the European continent largely depends on the situation in Eastern Europe. Slovakia 
is an immediate neighbour of this region, which is why it intends to continue playing an 
active role in shaping the eastward policies of both the EU and NATO. Ukraine’s Euro-
Atlantic orientation is in Slovakia’s best interests… The Slovak Republic intends to support 
the development of Ukraine, its democratic institutions and good neighbourly relations… 
It is in the strategic interest of the Slovak Republic that Ukraine continues in its European 
and Euro-Atlantic orientation and in the pro-integration course of its foreign policy. The 
Slovak Republic shall assist Ukraine in implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and 
the Annual Plan of Goals for 2007 with respect to NATO.”
The MFA’s Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2008 emphasizes the continuity 
of intensive political dialogue, economic co-operation and development of cross-border 
co-operation. The document refers to Slovakia’s Embassy in Kyiv, the contact embassy of 
NATO in Ukraine, as a tool for transfer of Slovakia’s pre-accession Euro-Atlantic integra-
tion experience, including the experience of NGOs. 
The activities of Slovak NGOs in the field of democracy assistance were financed also 
by several grant-making organisations from the United States and Europe, one Slovak 
foundation, and one foreign embassy in Slovakia, namely:
US National Endowment for Democracy (projects in Belarus, Ukraine, Cuba, Afghani-• 
stan and Kosovo; recipients: Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), Pontis Foundation, People 
in Peril Association) 
German Marshall Fund of the United States (projects in Belarus and in Ukraine;  • 
recipient: IVO)
International Republican Institute (projects in Iraq; recipients: IVO, Pontis Foundation)• 
European Commission/European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (project • 
in Belarus; recipient: Pontis Foundation)
Center for a Free Cuba (projects in Cuba; recipient: People in Peril Association)• 
US Embassy in Slovakia (project in Serbia, recipient: Pontis Foundation)• 
Open Society Foundation in Slovakia (project in Serbia, recipient: Centre for Euro-• 
pean and North Atlantic Affairs).
In 2004-2006, the Open Society Foundation in Slovakia supported several projects within 
the framework of the East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders programme, which promotes 
“international exchanges that bring together civil society activists to share ideas, infor-
mation, knowledge, experience and expertise, and supports practical action resulting 
from that networking” (this programme is one of the initiatives implemented by the Open 
Soc iety Foundation (OSF) in London. It operates in all countries of Eastern and Central 
Europe, Turkey, Central Asia and Mongolia, responding to the needs of people in many 
diverse societies). The sub-programme for European integration prioritises co-operation 
among new EU member states, candidate and potential candidate countries, and the 
EU’s eastern neighbours. OSF supported Slovak NGOs implementing projects in Serbia 
(including Kosovo), Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Moldova, and organised study trips to 
Slovakia for experts from Kazakhstan and Mongolia.
The Slovak Republic’s official position on the European Instrument for Democracy and 
 Human Rights (EIDHR II) is that this instrument of furthering democracy is sufficiently eff-
ective and flexible. After EIDHR I expired, the Slovak Republic endorsed a compromise 
version of a directive proposed by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers 
in order to ensure continuity of financing projects to promote democracy and human rights 
in the world.
During the process of amending EIDHR, the Slovak Republic - along with other EU member 
states - supported a proposal seeking to limit the maximum amount of funds allocated to 
despatching election observation missions, which would free up extra funds for a broader 
spectrum of activities. Slovakia also advocated the idea that the instrument’s new model 
should allow civil society subjects to operate on a broader scale and be more flexible 
in reacting to changing circumstances, as opposed to the model of long-term planning 
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The purpose of the project, Transfer of Slovak Economic Reform Know-How to Ukrain-
ian Pre- and Post-Elections Debates (carried out by the Institute for Economic and Social 
Reforms - INEKO - and approved in 2004), was to help accelerate economic growth and 
reduce poverty in Ukraine through improving economic reform and policy-making. The 
project strove to enrich pre-election debates by sharing the experience of Slovakia and 
other transition countries, and analysing the programmes of individual candidates and 
initial measures of the new administration in the field of socio-economic reforms.
The basic intention of the project, Stronger Civil Society in Ukraine - Better Wider EU 
Neighbourhood (carried out by Academia Istropolitana Nova, and approved in 2004) 
was to strengthen the capacities of civil society as the government’s partner in shaping 
public policies and accelerating Ukraine’s EU integration through training experts operat-
ing within the country’s NGO sector.
Citizens for Transparent Elections (carried out by the Občianske oko - Civic Eye, and 
app roved in 2005) focused on monitoring preparations and the course of elections in the 
region of Transcarpathian Ukraine. An integral part of the project comprised the activities 
of election observers and meetings of experts dedicated to the electoral process.
Support to Building of Local Democracy in Ukraine (carried out by the Centre for Macro-
economic and Social Analyses - MESA10, and approved in 2005) was designed to help 
share the experience with public administration reform and other structural reforms carr-
ied out in Slovakia in the public discourse about reforms in Ukraine. 
Strengthening the Capacities of Civil Society in Eastern Regions of Ukraine (carried out 
by People in Peril Association, and approved in 2005) focused on improving the profes-
sional skills of activists of Ukrainian NGOs and transferring the experience of Slovak 
NGOs to their Ukrainian partners. The project included study trips and trainings.
School and Civil Society (carried out by the Centre for European Policy, and approved in 
2007) focused on increasing the knowledge about political, economic and legal aspects 
of building civil society and EU integration processes among teachers and school curri-
culum developers in the Poltava region. The project included seminars in Slovakia and 
Ukraine as well as study trips of experts.
Support of Competitiveness of Cross-Border Regions in Ukraine under the Conditions of a 
Market Economy (carried out by MESA10, and approved in 2007) focused on strength-
ening the capacities of local public administration institutions in marginal, depressed or 
otherwise complicated regions. The project includes elaboration of analysis and policy 
recommendations, study trips and workshops. 
Increasing the Social Responsibilities of Companies, carried out by the Slovak Center for 
Communication and Development, was approved in 2007.
Between 2004 and 2007, the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund and SAMRS supported 11 OA/
ODA projects implemented in Ukraine. All these projects were aimed at strengthening the 
capacities of civil society, improving the performance of democratic institutions and the 
market economy, enhancing the quality of public administration and regional develop-
ment, intensifying the process of Ukraine’s approximation to the EU, strengthening the 
general reform course, and monitoring the electoral process. All projects were carried 
out by NGOs. 
Through the model of micro-grants allocated by the Slovak Republic’s embassy in Ukraine, 
Slovakia also supported four projects of “democracy assistance” carried out by Ukrainian 
partner organisations on the local level (overall, Slovakia supported six projects, two of 
which were rather educational in nature).
Financially, Ukraine’s share of the overall amount of funds allocated by Slovakia for ODA 
via the MFA in 2004-2007 was 3.00% (SKK 19.347m out of SKK 649.891m.)5
Ukraine is ranked as the second country - after Serbia - in terms of the number of demo-
cracy assistance projects supported within Slovakia’s ODA. All the approved projects in 
Ukraine are democracy assistance ones. Among them, there was a preponderance of 
projects dealing with the transfer of Slovakia’s experience with accession to the EU and 
socio-economic reforms (almost all of ODA projects in Ukraine - 10 of the 11 - are run by 
NGOs). 
All other democracy assistance projects in Ukraine, implemented by Slovak NGOs out-
side of ODA (supported either by the MFA from its special grant scheme or by foreign 
donors), deal with the issue of Euro-Atlanticism (NATO, transatlantic co-operation, support 
for Atlanticist directions in foreign and security policy among Ukrainian population, etc).
Projects financed within the framework of Slovakia’s OA/ODA
The project, Citizens for Fair Elections (carried out by Občianske oko - Civic Eye - and 
approved in 2004), focused on monitoring preparations and the course of elections in 
the region of Transcarpathian Ukraine. Its purpose was to increase local inhabitants’ 
confidence in the electoral process and reduce the risk of manipulations when processing 
election results. 
The core goal of the project, Partnership for European Integration of Ukraine: Strengthen-
ing Public Debate on EU (carried out by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA), and 
approved in 2004), was to strengthen Ukraine’s capacities in the process of its EU integra-
tion, help make the public debate on Ukraine’s foreign policy part of the broader public 
discourse on its democratic development, and transfer the knowledge and experience of 
Slovak think-tanks and NGOs to their Ukrainian partners. 
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Slovakia was IVO. IVO helped to share Slovakia’s experience in the country’s preparation 
for membership of NATO, specifically activities focused on increasing public support for 
membership.
Endorsing the Transatlantic Debate, Promoting Transatlantic Values, and Strengthening the 
Euro-Atlantic Vector in Ukraine, supported by the German Marshall Fund of the US, was 
implemented in 2008 by IVO. The main goal of the project was to assist Ukrainian NGO 
representatives, as well as other public and independent actors (journalists, experts, teach-
ers, etc.), in promoting a national debate on the future orientation of Ukraine. 
Belarus
The Slovak Republic initially provided OA to Belarus, but after the OECD Development Ass-
istance Committee in 2006 re-evaluated the status of Belarus and Ukraine, both countries 
became eligible to receive ODA. Belarus was included in the programme of Slovakia’s 
development assistance because it is officially considered one of Slovakia’s foreign policy 
priorities. During the period under examination, Belarus held presidential elections that 
were crucial from the viewpoint of the country’s future development. The Slovak Republic’s 
highest officials, including Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and representatives of the 
 Slovak Parliament, repeatedly criticised the situation in the field of human rights protec-
tion in Belarus and expressed unambiguous support for democratisation. This attitude 
signalled the existence of a favourable political environment for the implementation of 
projects aimed at democratisation and the development of civil society in Belarus. 
In previous years, several Slovak NGOs had gained ample experience of co-operating 
with civil society representatives in Belarus, and had carried out their own projects there, 
which also served as an important factor in favour of including the country in the list of 
recipients of Slovakia’s ODA. 
The Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2007 states: “The Slovak Republic shall 
continue to support democratic forces in Belarus in their endeavour to uphold human and 
political rights, and simultaneously develop bilateral relations within the framework of EU 
policies … The Slovak Republic shall continue to pursue a balanced policy of reacting to 
[Belarus’s] internal political situation, which suffers from a deficit of democratic principles 
and international isolation of the country. The Slovak Republic shall continue to lead a 
restricted dialogue with the government and support development of democracy and civil 
society.”
In Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2008, it is mentioned that the Slovak Rep-
ublic wants to continue to participate actively in the formation and implementation of EU 
Projects implemented in the framework of the Slovak Fund for 
Local Initiatives in Ukraine (micro-grants)
The Slovak Republic’s embassy in Kyiv supported within the scheme of micro-grants the 
following projects: Ukraine on its Way to the Euro-Atlantic Community (Institute for Soc-
ial Transformation, Kyiv), Establishing NATO Information Points in Regional Universities’ 
Libraries (Democracy Action/Citizens’ League Ukraine-NATO, Kyiv), International Com-
petition of Pupils’ and Student Works on Human Rights (Ukrainian Section of International 
Organization of Human Rights, Kyiv), Slovak Reforms in the Eyes of Ukrainian Youth (Ass-
ociation to Support International Co-operation, Kremenchug). 
Projects supported via special grant scheme of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The project, Analysis of Public Opinion Polls Conducted in Ukraine about NATO, For-
eign Policy and Security Issues (carried out by the Institute for Public Affairs (IVO), and 
approved in 2005), included analysis of opinion polls conducted in Ukraine by IVO’s 
partner organisation. The results of the analysis were used by Ukrainian experts and activ-
ists engaged in activities to raise awareness about NATO among the Ukrainian public.
 
Support for Raising Public Awareness about NATO in Ukraine: Slovakia’s Experience, 
approved in 2007, is a joint project of IVO (leading organisation), SFPA, and the Centre 
for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA). The project included seminars and 
training events about NATO and Slovakia’s accession to NATO, conducted for Ukrainian 
experts in three Ukrainian cities. 
The aim of Slovakia to Ukraine: Building Bridges to Future Generations (carried out by the 
Euro-Atlantic Center, and approved in 2007) was to increase the level of public knowl-
edge about NATO in Ukraine. 
NATO and Security as a Necessary Part of Slovak and Ukrainian Academic Studies (carr-
ied out by the Euro-Atlantic Center, and approved in 2007), sought to initiate and design 
a system of co-operation between Slovak and Ukrainian academic institutions in order to 
modernise university curricula and include security issues into the teaching process and 
research work. 
Projects implemented by Slovak NGOs outside the framework of Slovak 
OA/ODA, with support from external donors and in co-operation with 
Ukrainian partners
Ukrainians Stand Behind Euro-Atlantic Values: Ignorance is not Bliss, supported by the 
National Endowment for Democracy (USA) and implemented in 2006-2007. The lead-
ing organisation was the Democratic Initiatives Foundation (Ukraine), and the partner in 
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Your Svetlogorsk - Sustainable Development in Rural Belarus (carried out by ETP Slovakia 
- Center for Sustainable Development, approved in 2006). The purpose of the project 
was support for community development in south-eastern Belarus using the experience of 
similar projects implemented in Slovakia, creating the conditions for sustainable economic 
activities at the local level, and strengthening local civil society actors. 
NGO Capacity-Building (carried out by the Civic Communication and Conflict Resol-
ution Group, approved in 2006). The goal was to strengthen the capacities of local civil 
society, and to promote dialogue with citizens on the regional and local level before the 
municipal elections. 
Renewing the Svetlogorsk Sea Region through the Engagement of Local Inhabitants for its 
Protection (carried out by ETP Slovakia - Center for Sustainable Development, approved in 
2007) focused on the creation of better conditions for local development in south-eastern 
Belarus (environment protection, tourism) through increasing citizens’ participation. 
Development of University Education on the Basis of Democratic Principles and Values 
(carried out by the Institute for International Relations and Approximation of Law at the 
Faculty of Law of Comenius University, Bratislava, approved in 2007) focused on the 
transfer to Belarusian students of Slovakia’s experience of EU integration. Projects in-
cluded trips to Slovakia by Belarusian students, lectures by Slovak university teachers in 
Belarus, and publication of a book resulting from the project. 
Support for Public Dialogue about Reforms (carried out by Pontis Foundation, approved 
in 2007).
Projects implemented by Slovak NGOs outside the framework of Slovak 
OA/ODA, with support from external donors and in co-operation with 
Belarusian partners
Support for Civic Campaign before Presidential Elections in Belarus, implemented by IVO 
in co-operation with Pontis Foundation and supported by the National Endowment for 
Democracy, USA, in 2005-2006. The aim of the project was to improve the sociological 
expertise of activists of a civic campaign focused on reaching high civic mobilisation. 
Belarus after Presidential Election: Policy Alternatives for a New Era, implemented by IVO 
in 2005-2006 and supported by the German Marshall Fund of the US. The purpose was 
to help share the experience of Slovakia’s democratic transformation with the Belarusian 
public.
Building Capacity of Youth Analytical Community in Belarus, implemented by the Pontis 
Foundation in co-operation with Belarusian partner organisation, Third Way, and supp-
orted by the European Commission through the European Initiative for Democracy and 
policy toward Belarus, and that a core starting point in this will be “a balanced policy to-
ward individual sections of Belarusian society”. Efforts to bring Belarus closer to European 
values will belong to Slovakia’s priorities in 2008. The document emphasizes the special 
interest of the Slovak Republic, as the country holding the Presidency of the Council of Eu-
rope in 2008, in activities that would help to “change Belarus’s stances towards fulfilment 
of the criteria for its membership in the Council of Europe”. 
Between 2004 and 2007, the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund and SAMRS supported eight 
projects implemented in Belarus. All of them focused on developing civil society and 
democracy, strengthening the capacities of Belarus’s independent expert community, 
and preparing strategies for socio-economic reform. Seven projects were carried out by 
NGOs; one project was implemented by an academic institution.
Financially, Belarus’s share of the overall amount of funds allocated by Slovakia for ODA 
via the MFA in 2004-2007 was 2.14% (SKK 13.956m out of SKK 649.891m.)6 
Belarus ranks third place in the list of countries by number of democracy assistance projects 
supported within Slovakia’s ODA. Seven of the eight projects in Belarus were implemented 
by NGOs, and civil society development and expert co-operation in the preparation of 
socio-economic reforms were the dominant thematic orientation of the projects.
Projects financed within the framework of Slovakia’s OA/ODA
Slovak-Belarus Task Force on Economic Reform (carried out by the Pontis Foundation, app-
roved in 2004). The goal was to strengthen the links among independent think-tanks and 
civil society in order to define viable economic reform strategies for the post-Lukashenko 
era. The intention was to establish a new channel for closer co-operation between Slov-
akia, a new EU member state, and Belarusian democratic forces to transfer policy reform 
know-how from Slovakia to Belarus and to share experience between civil society groups 
in both countries.
Trainer Capacity Building (carried out by the Forum Information Center/Forum Institute, 
approved in 2004). The objective of the project was to increase democratic political com-
petition in Belarus through the promotion of a democratic alternative - young political elite. 
The intention was to create a team of professional trainers who would be able to help in 
preparing young political leaders (specifically in the area of communications).
Building Capacities of Analytical Community in Belarus (carried out by the Pontis Found-
ation, approved in 2006). The goal was to address the identified needs for capacity 
building of the analytical sector in Belarus by creating a flexible grant support scheme for 
making possible the work of independent young researchers, scholars and outstanding 
students in Belarus. Via provision of travel grants, the project should enable the message 
of alternative reform policies to reach civil society in Belarus.
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From the point of view of the significance of support for democracy assist-
ance projects, Bosnia and Herzegovina is in a de facto marginal position. 
Fin ancially, Bosnia and Herzegovina’s share of the overall amount of funds allocated 
by Slovakia for ODA via the MFA in 2004-2007 was 2.65% (SKK 16.9m out of 
SKK 649.891m.)7
Projects financed within the framework of Slovakia’s ODA
Bridges to Balkans (carried out by the Center for European Policy, approved in 2004). 
The aim of the project was to facilitate reforms in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and EU-
BiH relations by creating an EU experts’ network, consisting of public sector officials and 
NGO representatives.
How to be a Better Policy Adviser (carried out by NISPAcee - Network of Institutes and 
Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe - and implemented as a 
common project in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrg-
yzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and approved in 2004). The aim of the project was 
to increase the professional skills of public administration representatives and employees 
through training provided by Slovak experts. 
Projects implemented in the framework of the Slovak Fund for 
Local Initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina (micro-grants)
Within the scheme of micro-grants, the Slovak Republic’s embassy in Sarajevo supported 
the following projects focused on development of civil society, democratisation, intereth-
nic dialogue and European integration: The Life of Youth in a Country that Becomes an 
EU Member (“Education Builds Bosnia and Herzegovina” Association), Day of Europe - 
 Bosnia and Herzegovina for Europe (European Movement in Bosnia and Herzegovina), 
The Richness of Difference in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Capital and Investment for Com-
mon European Future (European Unit in Bosnia and Herzegovina), Why I am Going to 
Vote in the Coming Elections (MOZAIK Foundation), Half-Way House (Cantonal Centre 
for Social Work), Let Us Make Their Dreams Come True (Women Association Viktorija 
99), Happy Gipsy Fair with A Few Tears and Rain Drops (City Library), International Fes-
tival of Folk Music and Dance (KUD Kolovit), Communication Bonton (“Education Builds 
Bosnia and Herzegovina” Association).
Cuba
Cuba was not included in the list of countries that can benefit from Slovakia’s ODA, 
so when implementing projects of democracy assistance in Cuba, Slovak NGOs have 
to rely exclusively on their own resources or financial support from their international 
Human Rights in 2006. The goal of the project was to contribute to the transformation 
of society via the creation of a community of young experts using the method of virtual 
discussion forum and uncensored analysis.
Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
The region of the Western Balkans is one of the priority areas of Slovakia’s foreign policy. 
The importance of the Western Balkans to Slovakia’s diplomacy ensues from the fact that 
the situation in this region has an “essential impact on the stability and future development 
of Central Europe” and that there are historical ties between Slovakia and this region that 
take many forms, including the form of “traditionally good bilateral relations”. Accord-
ing to Orientation of Foreign Policy for 2007, the Slovak Republic intends to support the 
“Euro-Atlantic ambitions of Western Balkan [countries]”.
The main beneficiary of Slovakia’s development assistance in the region has been Ser-
bia and Montenegro (and the two successor states), which was defined as the so-called 
“programme” country to which development assistance was channelled via a special 
institution, namely the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund. 
Western Balkans countries defined as so-called “project” countries for Slovakia’s develop-
ment assistance include Bosnia and Herzegovina, along with Macedonia and Albania. 
The Orientation of Foreign Policy for 2007 declares that “the Slovak Republic shall con-
tinue to support the integration ambitions of Bosnia and Herzegovina with respect to the 
EU, whose fulfilment depends on adopting constitutional changes and other reforms”. Acc-
ording to the document, “the main goal of supporting the integration ambitions of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina is the stability of the entire Western Balkans region where Bosnia and 
Herzegovina will play a pivotal role once a major step towards solving the Kosovo issue 
is taken… Slovak diplomacy shall continue to co-operate with the non-governmental sector 
[in the country] in order to strengthen democratic institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
which, in combination with diplomatic stabilisation efforts, provides a significant guaran-
tee of the European development of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.
Overall, eight projects were carried out in Bosnia and Herzegovina within the framework 
of Slovakia’s ODA; one of them can be described as a democracy assistance project 
(another project related to Bosnia and Herzegovina was a joint project covering several 
countries). Besides, the Slovak Republic’s Embassy in Bosnia and Herzegovina supported 
12 projects through micro-grants channelled via the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; nine of them fit the description of democracy assistance projects, 
i.e. democratisation, Euro-Atlantic integration. 
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with the regime’s official propaganda, the Cuban Ambassador accused Slovak NGOs of 
subversive activities that are allegedly a part of “the American war against Cuba” and fin-
anced from US funds. He argued that the Cuban authorities “would extradite from Cuba 
any person who comes to Cuba to introduce American interests regardless of whether 
[Minister of Foreign Affairs] Mr Kubiš will like it or not”. 
People in Peril Association released its own statement in which it refused any accusation 
of being a tool of US foreign policy and mentioned that the revenues of the organisation 
are predominantly domestic (78% of all funds, comprising 28% from citizens and 50% 
from Slovak ODA), while 6% came from the EU and 11% from USA (NED and Center 
for a Free Cuba). In a joint statement, Pontis Foundation and People in Peril Association 
condemned the participation of Prime Minister Fico at the Cuban reception, labelling it 
as offensive to the democracy activities of Slovak NGOs in Cuba and disrespectful of the 
solidarity displayed by Slovak citizens with persecuted individuals in Cuba. 
In Slovakia, there are two NGOs that specifically focus on projects and activities in Cuba, 
namely People in Peril Association and Pontis Foundation.
Projects and activities implemented by People in Peril Association
Since 2002, People in Peril Association (PIPA) has pursued various activities aimed at 
supporting political prisoners and independent intellectuals in Cuba. Its projects focus on 
supporting families of political prisoners, distributing books to independent libraries, and 
circulating expert materials on Slovakia’s transformation among independent intellect-
uals. PIPA sends out journalists and transformation experts to Cuba, and co-operates with 
independent Cuban teachers, economists, and informal educational centres. Donors supp-
orting PIPA’s activities in Cuba include the Center for a Free Cuba, a US-based NGO.
Distribution of humanitarian aid, prisoners of conscience adoptions, 
politicians’ trips to Cuba
Between 2003 and the end of May 2006, PIPA sent 20 representatives and external 
coll aborators to distribute financial aid raised during public collections to help families of 
prisoners of conscience. A total of 27 families have been supported financially through 
the distribution of more than SKK 430,000 (data at the beginning of January 2007 
showed that more than 30 families had been supported to the tune of SKK 734,000 coll-
ected in co-operation with Pontis Foundation). 
During each journey, representatives of PIPA collected information about the health and 
physical condition of the arrested persons, as well as the situation of their families. They 
also observed the work and needs of opp osition groups - outlawed political parties and 
movements, independent unions, libraries, and journalist organisations. These groups 
were supported materially with professional literature and technical equipment. 
partners. Between 2002 and 2006, Slovakia’s top officials (including former parliament 
chairman Pavol Hrušovský, former chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Human 
Rights László Nagy and others), as well as representatives of the MFA, frequently criticised 
the situation in the field of human rights protection in Cuba and condemned repressive 
measures adopted by the Cuban regime with respect to civil rights activists and political 
dissidents. During this period, Slovakia was visited by a number of leading Cuban diss-
idents at the invitation of Slovak NGOs. 
Generally speaking, Slovak NGOs specialising on Cuba could rely on a very friendly 
political environment for their activities between 2002 and 2006; many of them contrib-
uted to creating such an environment by demanding that the Slovak government adopt a 
stricter stance with respect to the undemocratic regime in Havana. For the Slovak Repub-
lic’s unambiguously negative position on human rights violations in Cuba and maintaining 
contacts with Cuban dissidents, Cuban officials “punished” the Slovak Republic’s Embassy 
in Havana by reducing the level of diplomatic contacts. 
After the incumbent administration’s inauguration in July 2006, some Slovak constitutional 
officials apparently began to deviate from the previously pursued foreign policy line of 
unambiguously criticising the undemocratic practices of the Cuban regime. First, Prime 
Minister Robert Fico attended a reception at the Cuban embassy in Bratislava on the oc-
casion of the Revolution Day anniversary; later, President Ivan Gašparovič rec eived the 
Cuban Ambassador despite the fact that the Slovak Republic’s Ambassador in Hav ana 
is virtually ignored by the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as by top Cuban of-
ficials. 
These measures were openly condemned by representatives of NGOs that specialise 
in democracy assistance to Cuba. Although the Slovak government has not adopted 
any measures designed to prevent the activities of Slovak NGOs in Cuba, the politically 
friendly environment from the period of 2002-2006 is gone.
This trend was confirmed by developments in 2007. Prime Minister Fico and Minister of 
Culture, Marek Maďarič, accepted the invitation of the Cuban Ambassador in Bratislava 
to a reception on the occasion of the Day of Cuban Revolution. This took place just a few 
days after two activists from Slovak NGOs - People in Peril Association and Civic Eye - 
were prevented from visiting Cuba (one of them was detained, and one was not allowed 
to leave Havana airport after arrival and was sent back to Europe). The Slovak MFA criti-
cised the Cuban authorities, but the Prime Minister nevertheless accepted the invitation, 
rejecting the argument that by his personal presence at the reception he was supporting 
the undemocratic regime of Fidel Castro. 
The attendance of high Slovak officials at the Cuban reception then encouraged the Cuban 
Ambassador to make extremely aggressive statements about the two above-mentioned 
cases, as well as generally about the activities of Slovak NGOs in Cuba. Fully in keeping 
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Activities of Pontis Foundation
The activities of the Pontis Foundation in Cuba are aimed at supporting the dissident move-
ment and helping the families of imprisoned dissidents. The foundation closely co-operates 
with PIPA. It supplies forbidden literature and material aid to dissidents and organises coll-
ections in Slovakia to support civic activists and political prisoners’ wives, particularly in 
the poorest regions of Cuba. The foundation initiated protest letters addressed to  Cuban 
officials, co-organised visits of Cuban dissidents to Slovakia, and organised various events 
and happenings in support of persecuted dissidents. In 2005, it joined an international 
campaign in Europe and Latin America for democracy in Cuba. Owing to concerns about 
the safety of those concerned, the Pontis Foundation refuses to publish certain information 
on its activities in Cuba. In October 2007, Pontis announced that it collected (in co-
 operation with PIPA) SKK 704,000 for the support of political prisoners’ families.
Leading Slovak NGOs Operating in the Field of Democracy Assistance
Pontis Foundation• 
People in Peril Association (PIPA)• 
Institute for Public Affairs (IVO)• 
Občianske oko (Civic Eye) Civic Association• 
Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA)• 
INEKO (Institute for Economic and Social Reforms)• 
MESA10 - Center for Economic and Social Analyses• 
Endnotes
1  The Slovak Republic was the only Visegrad country that had to undergo a new struggle for democracy 
and over the fundamental character of its political regime after the collapse in 1989 of communist rule. 
Due to its troubled domestic development between 1994 and 1998, Slovakia failed to comply with 
political criteria for EU membership and was excluded from the first tier (the so-called Luxembourg group) 
of EU candidate countries. In Slovakia, the fundamental issue became the struggle for the character of 
the political regime. This struggle was characterised by the strong conflict between top state institutions, 
fierce confrontation between the governing coalition and the opposition, preparation, adoption and 
implementation of legislative and administrative initiatives designed to create an environment amenable to 
the concentration of political power in the hands of dominant political forces, the aggravation of conflicts 
between state institutions and civil society, tensions between official state power and ethnic minorities, 
and the abuse of organs of state power for the benefit of party interests and goals. It was not a standard 
political struggle between government and opposition conducted in compliance with generally accepted 
principles, but a struggle over the very nature of these principles. In 1994-1998, the EU several times 
warned the Slovak government that the country had demonstrated serious violations of the rule of law 
and signs of institutional instability as a result of practical steps by the cabinet and the ruling majority 
in the parliament. These steps included undemocratic methods in the creation of parliamentary organs, 
the abduction of the president’s son, and the failed investigation of the state organs’ involvement in the 
Since the beginning of 2005, PIPA - in co-operation with Pontis Foundation - has launched 
a programme of adoption of prisoners of conscience and their families by Slovak politi-
cians, firms, organisations or individuals. The families have been supported regularly by 
symbolic sums of money and essential medications. The health conditions of imprisoned 
dissidents have been monitored, as well as the way they are treated in prison. PIPA and 
Pontis Foundation have in this manner supported ten prisoners of conscience and their 
families.
Since 2004, PIPA has co-ordinated the visits of Slovak politicians to Cuba. Slovak visitors 
have met with representatives of Cuban dissident groups and independent democratic 
activists, expressing their support to them. 
Supporting Cuba’s independent expert community
In 2005, PIPA carried out a project called Supporting Representatives of Independent 
Think-Tanks in Cuba. The project’s goal was to support the development of non-ideological 
research teams, stimulate critical thinking, create space for an open dialogue and free 
exchange of opinions, and initiate transfer of know-how from post-socialist Slovakia to 
socialist Cuba. As part of the project, two research groups - educational and economic - 
were formed; during weekend meetings with people from around the country that showed 
interest in specific areas, they collected views on issues defined in advance. The most 
tang ible output of these meetings was the elaboration of two papers that featured propos-
als for changes in the field of education and economy. Commentaries on both papers 
were written by Slovak experts specialising in education and economy. 
In 2006, PIPA implemented a project called the Preparation of Independent Think-Tanks’ 
Representatives for Cuba’s Future Transition. The project’s main goal was to provide a 
platform for direct interaction between independent Cuban teachers and economists and 
Slovak experts in these areas. As part of the project, two Slovak experts in the field of 
education and economy travelled to Cuba where they lectured groups of independent 
intellectuals on the transformation of the education system and economy in Slovakia after 
1989. Upon their return to Slovakia, the experts wrote studies on the current conditions 
in Cuba’s education system and economy. Overall, 15 Cuban teachers and nine Cuban 
economists took part in the project. The outputs of their co-operation were published in the 
MONITOR Internet magazine. 
In 2007, PIPA planned to prepare and distribute to informal educational centres and in-
dependent libraries in Cuba an educational publication called Let’s Discuss Global Issues! 
The handbook that was designed primarily for independent Cuban teachers presented six 
universal issues: Poverty, Education, Health, Human Rights, Media, and the Environment. 
The goal of the project is to strengthen informal education in Cuba, broaden knowledge 
of young Cubans and, most importantly, support and encourage their capacity to think 
critically.
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crime, the expulsion of deputies from parliament, the obstruction of a referendum on direct presidential 
elections, disregard for rulings of the Constitutional Court, and the granting of amnesties (when the prime 
minister assumed the powers of the president due to the failure of parliament to elect a new president) for 
perpetrators of criminal acts politically connected to the government, etc.
2  Mutual relations between the current administration and the third sector began to deteriorate in autumn 
2006 due to an attempt by the ruling three-party coalition to abolish the mechanism of tax assignation 
that allowed individuals as well as corporations to assign 2% of their income tax to NGOs of their 
choice. In reaction, Slovak NGOs launched a massive campaign called People to People. Eventually, 
the tax assignation mechanism as such was not abolished; however, NGOs specialising in human rights 
protection were excluded from the mechanism and then, under the continuing pressure of civil society 
actors, included again into the list of eligible NGOs by an amendment of the same law in November 
2007. 
3  In its project documentation, the BBF presented financial data in Slovak crowns (SKK), therefore in this 
report data about the projects financed by the BBF are mentioned in SKK. The exchange rate of SKK 
toward the Euro in 2004-2007 varied from ca. 33.00 to 41.00 SKK/EUR.
4  These projects included activities in different sectors. Besides democracy assistance projects, there were 
projects in building infrastructure (including road and bridge construction), running water and sewerage, 
gas equipment installation, alternative energy systems, agriculture, forestry, scientific research, education, 
etc.   
5  According to official data, two sets of figures exist, one in US dollars and one in Slovak crowns, 
which need to be combined to reach the total figure. The amount of ODA allocated to Ukraine via 
the MFA in 2004-2007 amounted to US$ 490,000 out of US$ 11.05m plus SKK 6.143m out of 
SKK 352.135m.
6  According to official data, two sets of figures exist, one in US dollars and one in Slovak crowns, 
which need to be combined to reach the total figure. The amount of ODA allocated to Belarus via the 
MFA in 2004-2007 amounted to US$ 222,783 out of US$ 11.05m plus SKK 7.953m of a total 
SKK 352.135m.
7  According to official data, two sets of figures exist, one in US dollars and one in Slovak crowns, which 
need to be combined to reach the total figure. The amount of ODA allocated to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
via the MFA in 2004-2007 amounted to US$ 505,509 out of US$ 11.05m plus SKK 3.368m of a total 
SKK 352.135m.
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European	Union:	
Democracy	versus	Bureaucracy
An Assessment of the Reform of the EU’s 
External Assistance Instruments
Věra Řiháčková
EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, Czech Republic
“Democracy assistance” is not a mainstream term in EU discourse, and no Com-munity definition or concept of a democratisation strategy is envisaged1. On the 
other hand, the “promotion of human rights and democracy” has become a well estab-
lished element of EU external policy, with multiple references to it at various institutional 
levels and financial instruments. For the purpose of this research, democracy assistance 
is defined as the policy aimed at helping third countries build institutions of democratic 
governance, foster public participation in democratic governance, support pluralism in the 
shape of multiparty politics, freedom of expression and independent media, promote and 
protect human rights, and work towards establishing the rule of law.
Framework	of	Reform	
The draft reform of the EU external assistance instruments, linked to the Financial Per-
spective 2007-2013, was presented by the European Commission in September 2004. 
Originally, the Communication envisaged four instruments: three with a geographical 
scope, although containing thematic programmes - Instrument of Pre-Accession Assistance 
(IPA), European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), and Development Co-
operation and Economic Co-operation Instrument (DCECI); the fourth was the horizontal 
Instrument for Stability aimed at reacting to imminent crisis situations. 
The programming of the geographical instruments should have been “comprehensive in 
order to incorporate all relevant policy objectives and ensure mainstreaming of cross-cut-
ting issues, such as democracy and human rights…”2. Later on, the Commission identified 
seven thematic programmes, one of which should have focused on human rights and 
democracy promotion. 
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As a replacement for the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR I), 
a separate facility was proposed that would have been common to all four instruments, 
with a separate budget line (funds allocated from four budget allocations of the financial 
instruments) but without a specific legal basis3. Suggestions were made to narrow down 
EIDHR I and to limit the action of the draft thematic programme to countries where human 
rights and fundamental freedoms were particularly at risk. In countries where co-operation 
between civil society and government could be established, the support for civil society 
and non-state actors in terms of democracy assistance would have fallen under develop-
ment co-operation, and support to networking and civil society dialogue at national and 
regional level4. 
The negotiations on the four instruments (IPA, ENPI, DCECI (later DCI), and the Instrument 
for Stability) continued, following the co-decision procedure. After adoption of the respec-
tive regulations, the negotiation and adoption of implementing measures (usually Strategy 
Papers)5 began in a so-called Democratic Scrutiny Process, arranging for a fast-track ap-
proval procedure between the Commission and the European Parliament (and the Council 
management committees)6. 
However, the most challenging issue proved to be the clash over keeping a separate demo-
cracy and human rights instrument. Besides the EU institutions (European Commission, 
European Parliament, Council and the member states), civil society groups in Brussels and 
in the member states were involved in the debate on wider reform of the external action 
financial instruments, including also the reform of Financial Regulation and Implementing 
Rules. The Commission was quite open when drafting the proposals and invited several 
NGOs to consultations, from which an informal network of NGOs emerged, pushing for a 
separate democracy and human rights instrument (but differing substantially in their views 
on its objectives, implementation, and specific initiatives that emerged during this debate 
- such as the European Partnership for Democracy, EPD). 
In the course of the debate, a crucial element was the strong partnership between civil 
society actors and the democracy caucus in the European Parliament, which was estab-
lished by the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET)7. With the involvement of 
several member states, the idea attained critical mass support, and the establishment of 
the new European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR II) was agreed in 
June 2006. 
The regulation was adopted in December 2006 and, consequently, the drafting and nego-
tiating stages of the EIDHR II Strategy Paper 2007-2010 were launched. Overall, the very 
continuation of the independent democracy and human rights instrument was considered 
to be a significant achievement by civil society.8
The reform of the external assistance financial instruments aims at a more flexible approach 
in terms of delivery. However, any change takes place in given boundaries: Community 
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS:	
EUROPEAN	UNION
The new European Instrument for Demo-• 
cracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) will 
become an effective tool of democracy 
assistance only if its reform is followed 
by  substantive changes in the civil serv-
ice culture. The European Commission 
should reform the staff rules, so that EU 
civil servants responsible for grants alloca-
tion are not forced to choose between the 
competing goals of budget transparency 
and flexibility, especially in support to hu-
man rights activists working in conditions 
where strict confidentiality is required.
Visegrad and other like-minded govern-• 
ments should work closely with the 
European Parliament, particularly with 
its democracy caucus, to ensure that the 
Parliament conducts a mid-term evaluation 
of the effectiveness and utility of the new 
EIDHR, with a focus on a qualitative rather 
than purely financial evaluation, comple-
mentary to the evaluation scheduled to 
be undertaken by the European Commis-
sion in 2009. An independent evaluator 
should focus on potential loopholes of 
the EIDHR, especially in those countries 
where human rights are most at risk and 
where the effectiveness and utility of the 
EU instrument can prove problematic, for 
instance in Cuba or Belarus.
The Czech and Swedish EU presidencies • 
should set as a priority the completion of 
the above monitoring process, and also 
the development and implementation of 
the new Polish-Swedish initiative for a 
new “eastern partnership” calling for, 
inter alia, the establishment of visa-free rel-
ations with Western Balkans countries and 
Eastern ENP neighbours, and strengthen-
ing the democracy assistance focus on 
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, 
and Azerbaijan.
Visegrad governments should sup-• 
port flexible funding initiatives, 
including the Euro pean Partnership for 
Democracy (EPD), and opt for more flex-
ible, less bureaucratic and more hands-on 
European- level approaches to democracy 
assistance; the Visegrad governments 
should then engage in coalition-building 
among EU member states, EU institutions, 
and other key stakeholders (including po-
litical foundations) to ensure EU funding 
reaches civil society groups working for 
democracy and human rights in high-risk 
situations, where flexibility, quick deci-
sions and confidentiality are required.
assistance will always display a certain degree of rigidity in terms of programming cycle 
and budgeting, given the nature of the EU and its internal procedures. Coherence of ap-
proaches and programming of the Community instruments and complementarities with 
the member states’ and other donor institutions’ programmes is thus very important. Not 
least in the context of the mid-term evaluation of the instruments and possible changes in 
the EU institutional structure (creation of the EU External Action Service or an EU High 
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy), further reform of the external assistance 
can be envisaged.  
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Amendment	of	Financial	Regulation	
and	Implementing	Rules	
The Financial Regulation (FR) applicable to the general budget of the European Communities 
was, together with the Implementing Rules (IR), criticised in several studies9 commissioned 
by civil society as the source of Commission inflexibility in managing (demo cracy assist-
ance) projects. The Regulation was amended and the changes went into effect as of 1 
May 200710; together with the regulation, the Implementing Rules were also modified. 
These rules apply generally to all EU external assistance financial instruments drawing on 
the Community budget lines - i.e. EIDHR, ENPI, IPA, DCI, and the Instrument for Stability 
(the European Development Fund is not financed from the Community budget). 
Overall, several steps forward have been taken, and some of the obstacles to flexible 
project management, identified by civil society and NGOs working in challenging coun-
tries, were removed. As argued elsewhere11, the change of the regulations was crucial 
but a change in the Commission’s management culture should follow suit. The Commis-
sion has adopted several measures aiming at facilitating such a change so far: there was 
a poster campaign in the Commission buildings, pointing to the fact that the Financial 
Regulation had been amended; seminars for the officials, elaborating on the adopted 
amendments, have been conducted, although it has not been possible to find out what 
kind of message the officials are being given (most probably, the stress on the potentially 
competing priorities of “transparency” and “flexibility” is prevalent). Only the Commis-
sion’s future practice will show if and how the management culture, namely in terms of 
flexibility, has improved.  
 
Main issues
Current amendments provide for • funding for non-registered organisations in duly justi-
fied cases12, provided that their representatives have the capacity to undertake legal 
obligations on their behalf and assume financial liability (FR/Art. 114b); however, 
it is unclear how precisely the representatives of such entities will prove they have 
such a capacity. The Financial Regulation amendments allow for certain exemptions 
from eligibility conditions in case of a non-registered organisation (FR/Art. 45): the 
authorising officer can, for example, refrain from requiring the documents proving an 
applicant is not subject to a conflict of interest, has made false declarations or substan-
tial errors, committed irregularities or fraud, or is subject to an administrative penalty, 
etc13. The particular demands and conditions placed upon an individual representing a 
non-registered organisation are not specified. It will be possible to assess the scope of 
the simplification and flexibility only when the first projects are implemented under the 
amended regulation and implementing rules.
Re-granting•  is allowed for (within a grant contract), although the rules are quite re-
strictive; it is not possible to re-grant more than 50% of the grant, not more then 
€ 10,000 per organisation, and not more then € 100,000 per total budget14, i.e. 
a maximum of ten re-granting contracts is allowed within one grant. The re-granting 
should be part of a bigger operational project (not exclusively re-granting)15.
Financial guarantees provided by NGOs:•  there are some improvements in terms of 
required compulsory financial guarantees; the provisions allow large margins of dis-
cretion for Commission officials when asking for guarantees (depending on their risk 
assessment). For a grant, the requirement of 80% pre-financing is now limited to cases 
when the grant exceeds € 60,000 (IR/Art. 29); for grants of less than or equal to 
€ 10,000 (IR/Art. 182), the financial guarantee rule shall be applied only in duly 
substantiated cases. There is also a possibility of substituting payments in several instal-
ments in place of financial guarantees (IR/Art. 182). A condition that a guarantee is 
required in return for the payment of pre-financing exceeding € 150,000 has been 
kept (IR/Art. 152). Although the possibility of waiving guarantees for NGOs was not 
attained (it applies only for public bodies, international organisations and beneficiaries 
that have concluded a framework partnership), in many cases a guarantee requirement 
is subject to the assessment of the authorising officer. Still, most probably, rather well-
established NGOs with a track record of co-operation with EU Delegations and the 
Commission will enjoy the possibility of guarantee-waiving. 
The implementation of the Lisbon Treaty • 
presents the French-Czech-Swedish EU 
presidency with an opportunity to make 
democracy promotion a pillar of a com-
mon EU foreign policy, and for this to be 
reflected in the priorities of the new EU 
High Representative for Foreign and Secu-
rity Policy and the new EU External Action 
Service. 
The idea that the EU should provide • 
development assistance only to govern-
ments that demonstrate political will and 
a measurable commitment in the field of 
democracy and human rights should be 
adopted and consistently implemented 
within the new external action agenda. 
The ‘poverty reduction first’ approach 
is based on a fallacious concept that 
significant and sustainable progress in 
poverty reduction can be achieved with-
out improvements in good governance 
and accountability.
Non-governmental organisations from • 
the EU’s new member states should be 
given greater visibility in Brussels, and 
groups with recent transition experience, 
but limited financial capacity, should 
be encouraged to apply for EU funding 
under the European Instrument for Demo-
cracy and Human Rights. V4 governments 
should assist their NGOs to participate 
in EU democracy projects through the 
provision of matching funds within the 
framework of their own democracy assist-
ance programmes.
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For newly defined “grants of small amount” (less than or equal to € 25,00016), the docu-
mentation (administrative) burden diminishes significantly (FR/Art. 93). 
For beneficiary organisations, the grant threshold for which an external audit is req-• 
uired has been increased from € 300,000 to € 500,000 for grants related to spec ific 
projects, and from € 75,000 to € 100,000 for grants to finance the operational costs 
of the organisations. 
Financial liability of officials:•  The Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules clarify 
the personal financial liability provisions (If the authorising officer acts intentionally, 
he/she shall be liable for the entire loss suffered. In cases of gross negligence, it is 
limited to one year’s salary, FR/Art. 6617. This rule applies to all financial actors and 
any other persons involved in Community budget implementation), and thus psycho-
logically should allow for more flexibility on the desk officers’ side. However, in the 
previous budgeting period under the 2002 Financial Regulation, the problem was not 
so much the lack of clarity of the regulation itself but the Commission administration 
and management culture and mentality, which applies too much pressure on the desk 
officers (also in terms of administrative burden). Furthermore, the financial liability 
of an official is part of the Staff Regulation, so the extent of liability is not resolved 
exclusively by the Financial Regulation. Owing to this uncertainty, the atmosphere of 
full liability could persist. Pushing for looser regulation on this point from the NGOs’ 
side is understandable, but at the same time it is important to note that there are cases 
of mismanagement and that the Commission follows a certain logic (and is also often 
challenged by the member states on the budget management issues)18. Transparency 
and anti-fraud control measures have to be retained, but it remains to be seen whether 
the right balance has been struck between flexibility and transparency. 
A trend towards reinforcement of transparency (reporting and full public disclosure • 
of the projects and fund recipients) versus the safety of the beneficiaries, namely in 
countries where the beneficiaries are most at risk (namely non-registered NGOs and 
natural persons in countries such as Cuba and Belarus). Since the former Commission 
policy did not allow for non-registered organisations to apply for grants (or for re-
granting), the EC money was not involved in operations of this kind and thus public 
disclosure had not been widely discussed. Although the amended FR/IR display a 
trend towards reinforced transparency19, the amended Article 53 of the Financial 
Regulation states: “ensure, with due observance of the requirements of confidentiality 
and security, adequate annual ex post publication of beneficiaries of funds deriv-
ing from the budget”. This provision is intended to be sufficient to guarantee that all 
 actors (Commission, member states, and international organisations), involved in the 
“specific” distribution of the Community funding, can keep the information on the 
beneficiary confidential. In the EIDHR II regulation itself, there is no provision in terms 
of confidentiality of data due to safety reasons, but Article 28 of the EIDHR Strat-
egy paper 2007-2010 (“Where specially justified, the usual practice of publishing 
information about EU-sponsored activities may be modified”) gives the European Com-
mission an instrument to protect some of the beneficiaries in the countries where their 
lives could be at risk. Even if there is no established practice, it might be assumed that 
given the nature of the cases a strict confidentiality policy will be followed since the 
actions would otherwise be counterproductive. 
The exception from a rule that grants may not produce a profit for the beneficiary • 
applies also for actions aimed at the reinforcement of the financial capacity of a benefi-
ciary or at the generation of income in the framework of external actions (FR/Art. 109). 
It is possible for a natural person to receive funding through re-granting (or through an 
EIDHR II ad hoc measure), which might in fact serve as a financial support for living 
expenses.  
Although the principle “rules first, quality second” is generally perceived as an informal 
guideline for Commission staff, there are signs that the current atmosphere in the Com-
mission points to a potentially changing milieu. Generally, the current FR/IR amendments 
provide for more flexibility, and a larger portion of discretion is assigned to the authoris-
ing individuals. 
The Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules are general principles that should be 
followed when dealing with Community budget lines. All specificities cannot be reflected 
fully in these general purposes serving as legal bases20.
On the other hand, there are several issues connected to general project management that 
have not been tackled in the amendments, like the very principle of calls for proposals 
(”guided by impartiality and competitiveness”) when an offer/proposal can be only acc-
epted or rejected and no further communication with the applicant officially takes place, 
or another issue of easing the possibility to make changes once the project is approved 
while keeping its objectives21; NGOs also complain about insufficient dissemination of 
call for proposals in target countries, resulting in a lack of awareness by local civil society 
actors of the EU assistance projects.  
European	Instrument	for	Democracy	and	
Human	Rights	(EIDHR	II)
The European Parliament conceived the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EIDHR I) in 1994 by suggesting the re-grouping of nine budget lines under Chapter 
19.04 in order to promote the rule of law and human rights worldwide, together with the 
recognition of civil society as key actors in the process and accordingly making NGOs 
eligible as applicants for funding within this scheme. The Initiative was intended to boost 
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the capacity of NGOs and to provide democracy assistance through NGOs. Based on 
two regulations, its key strength was the possibility to operate without the need for the 
consent of the host government. A programme with not only development goals but with 
policy and political reach was established22. 
Together with the preparations for the new Financial Perspective 2007-2013, the reform 
of the external assistance instruments was launched. In June 2006, the establishment of 
the separate financial instrument was agreed23, and the EIDHR II24 regulation was app-
roved in December 2006.25 The key features of the instrument, including the principle of 
operating without the need of host government consent, were retained and enhanced.26 
The deliberations on the EIDHR II Strategy Paper 2007-2010 followed. The Commission 
Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) drafted the document, suggesting 
originally six objectives for the given period, including EU election observation missions 
(EOMs).27 The respective management committee was established, and consultations with 
Brussels NGOs took place (civil society groups in the member states usually tried to influ-
ence the government position in the management committee). Since the decision on the 
separate instrument was taken only in June 2006 and the Regulation adopted only in 
December 200628, the preparations of the Strategy Paper were delayed in DG RELEX, 
where staff turnover and other practical issues contributed to the hold-up. Within the man-
agement committee, the most active member states were France, UK, Finland, Sweden, 
the Netherlands, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Lithuania and Germany (then holding the 
Presidency).29 
Overall, the Regulation and Strategy Paper negotiations showed the differing attitudes of 
the European Commission and civil society (NGOs in Brussels) towards the “philosophy” 
of democracy assistance. The Commission’s standpoint distinguishes between human 
rights financing and democracy assistance (understood rather as “democracy promotion”) 
financing, within which specific democracy-related objectives need to be financed, i.e. 
EOMs and actions strengthening the capacity of regional organisations. 
The NGOs, on the other hand, have been pushing for the removal of EOMs from EIDHR 
II and for the instrument to focus rather on strengthening the capacity of civil society and 
delivering democracy assistance through civil society organisations. Furthermore, within 
the Commission the notion prevails that a country cannot be changed when its politicians 
are not involved, and thus the measures targeting civil society or implemented through 
civil society are perceived rather as a complementary element within the overall strategy 
of democracy promotion in a third country. 
The Strategy Paper was also discussed with civil society groups. The list of civil society 
actors through which the EIDHR II would operate (including non-registered organisations 
and political parties - only possible as part of a multiparty proposal) was already agreed 
when negotiating the regulation; the European Commission wanted then to establish a list 
of possible recipient organisations but the idea was abandoned due to the potential rigid-
ity of such a list and the boosting of an effect known as “donor’s darlings”. 
Generally30, civil society lobbied for an annual increase of the EIDHR II budget and the 
possibility to re-allocate the EIDHR II overheads according to the demand, for enhanced 
support for human rights defenders (part of Objective 3), and more specifically for the 
option to channel financial support (ad hoc measures) through EU-based NGOs that know 
the situation on the ground and have the means to deliver funding; and for local civil soc-
iety actors active in election-monitoring in third countries to be eligible for funding under 
Objective 5 (EOMs).31 
In some respects, the civil society priorities have been accommodated; for example, in 
the case of human rights defenders, the possibility to channel ad hoc measures through 
NGOs is now explicitly stated in Article 54 of the Strategy Paper. Moreover, the eligibility 
of local civil society actors involved in election observations was one of the last-minute 
changes made to the Strategy Paper 2007-2010 (Article 65).32 Although the principle of 
an annual increase in the EIDHR II budget was adopted at the end, civil society lost the 
battle over the EOMs allocations, which will consume a large share (on average 25%) 
of its annual budgets33, and were disappointed also over the flexibility in dealing with 
budget overheads. 
EIDHR system and rules evolution
It is generally agreed that the main problem surrounding the European Initiative for De-
mocracy and Human Rights (EIDHR I) was the incapacity of the European Commission to 
manage, fund and co-ordinate projects in a fast and flexible way - in particular, the cen-
tralised calls for proposals with long project-evaluation periods were strongly criticised. 
The number of rules to be followed by EC officials made the whole system too slow and in-
effective. The Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules, established in order to avoid 
mismanagement of EU resources, did not allow the Commission to work effectively. 
NGOs and other civil society actors managing projects in countries where the conditions 
had (and might have) been changing rapidly needed funding fast, but the procedures 
took normally about two to three years34. These organisations, working at national or 
local level, criticised both the speed of the grant-awarding system and the strict financial 
control, which did not allow for certain types of operations. The EC financial control was 
perceived to be much stricter than normal controls in the public and private sector, and 
the obligation of delivering regular reports was considered a major burden, overloading 
the capacity of the NGOs. 
According to the civil society criticism, EIDHR I failed to have real impact, supporting 
largely ad hoc initiatives, not applying resources strategically, and often losing momentum 
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to support locally driven processes of change. Criticism also focused on the lack of intra-
EU co-ordination (i.e. between various instruments and the respective actions), intra-EU 
impact assessment and project evaluation, and co-ordination with other donors. Another 
point of criticism was that the resources had been spread too thinly due to the expanding 
list of beneficiary countries and thematic priorities. Furthermore, the complexity of the ap-
plication process and reporting requirements needed an almost expert knowledge of EC 
systems and, as a result, European NGOs and Brussels-based local “donor’s darlings” 
had been the main beneficiaries. 
The amendments of the Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules, and the resulting 
opportunities and pitfalls in terms of EC flexibility and effectiveness, are tackled else-
where. The EIDHR II Regulation and Strategy Paper 2007-2010 introduced the following 
improvements:
Making the system faster and more flexible:•  the Commission has the possibility to adopt 
Special and Ad hoc measures in case of urgent need35 (without calls for proposals): 
4.3% of the budget of EIDHR II is reserved for these measures, in comparison with 4% 
within the period 2002-2006.36 The EIDHR II Regulation also enlarges the number of 
persons or bodies eligible for funding - “entities that do not have legal personality under 
the applicable national law” (Art. 19) and “groups of natural persons without a legal 
personality and civil society organisations” (Art. 41 of the Strategy Paper) are eligi-
ble.37 New kinds of ”out of country” operations are introduced (Art. 27 of the Strategy 
Paper), allowing NGOs to work not only in a country concerned by the project, but 
also “in neighbouring countries, with the diaspora or refugee committee”. Finally, a 
few derogations from rules of origin concerning the purchase and use of supplies and 
materials were introduced.38
Enhancing co-ordination:•  EIDHR II continues to be a complementary instrument of EU 
democracy assistance worldwide (including IPA, ENPI, DCI, etc.), used in synergy with 
other EC actions. In order to improve the effectiveness of the whole system of EU exter-
nal aid, it is necessary to ensure good co-ordination of all the instruments concerned. 
As mentioned in the Strategy Paper 2007-2010 (Annex III, point 8), “efforts to explore 
complementarity with other EC actions” have to be increased. The Commission declares 
that it sees the legislation covering external spending in 2007-2010 as a “package”, 
and the package approach is the only sure way to guarantee the consistency and 
coherence of the instruments. The wording of the EIDHR II Strategy Paper 2007-2010 
also puts emphasis on the necessity of “more systematic monitoring” by the EC of the 
projects; how this will translate into impact assessment and project evaluation is rather 
unclear. Furthermore, it is important that the EC and also the member states co-ordinate 
better their work with other donors, providing support to various entities fighting for hu-
man rights and democracy. The EIDHR II Regulation (Art. 15) states the following: “The 
Commission and member states should seek closer co-ordination with other donors.” 
Generally, the emphasis is put on a greater need for co-ordination of aid and support 
between the EC, member states and other bodies - this includes “regular consultations 
and frequent exchanges of relevant information”39 and an “increased dialogue with 
implementing partners and increased sharing of lessons learned between delegations 
and with headquarters”.40 How this wording will translate into systematic co-ordination 
between the EU institutions (and also within the Commission Units) of actions, impact ass-
essments and evaluations, and better co-ordination with other donors, is not specified. 
Transfer of competences to EC Delegations (and to independent foundation/agency): • 
critics generally agree that the centralised EC management of EIDHR is not flexible 
enough to be effective. The discussion on delegating powers and resources, either by 
reinforcing EC Delegations or by establishing an independent foundation or agency 
to manage at least a part of EIDHR II projects, was underway.41 The idea of the EPD 
was discussed, but in the end it was decided that no direct EIDHR II funding would be 
allocated to the foundation budget (EPD can apply for EIDHR II money through calls 
for proposals). A solution of reinforcing EC Delegations in third countries will prob-
ably prevail. The amount of funding managed by EC Delegations has been constantly 
increasing over the past five years; in 2002, EC Delegations were managing 8% of 
funding used through the calls for proposals, and in 2004 it amounted to 14%, reach-
ing a 25% share in 2006. Even if the corresponding data are not yet available for the 
EIDHR II, this trend is likely to continue. However, delegating a larger part of EIDHR 
II management to EC Delegations without reinforcing their capacities could bring ad-
ditional administrative burden to the staff, and in the end make the EC Delegations less 
effective and unable to implement their tasks and deliver results. That is why the Strat-
egy Paper 2007-2010 (Annex III, point 4) states that “Delegations need to be equipped 
for the task, politically as well as logistically”.
Evolution of the EIDHR Objectives 
Except for the minor changes mentioned below, the objectives of EIDHR II are mostly in 
line with those of the EIDHR I. The progress is more in the way they are formulated and 
arranged into groups than in the objectives themselves. According to the Strategy Paper 
2007-2010, key EIDHR II objectives are:
Objective 1) Enhancing respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in countries 
and regions where they are most at risk: on average, 10.1% of the EIDHR II 2007-2010 
budget is dedicated to this objective. 
Objective 2) Strengthening the role of civil society in promoting human rights and demo-
cratic reform, in supporting conflict prevention and in consolidating political participation 
and representation: on average, 37.6% of the EIDHR II 2007-2010 budget is dedicated 
to this objective. 
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Objective 3) Supporting actions on human rights and democracy issues in areas covered 
by EU Guidelines, including on human rights dialogues, on human rights defenders, on 
the death penalty, on torture, and on children and armed conflict; on average, 14.1% of 
the EIDHR II 2007-2010 budget is dedicated to this objective. 
Objective 4) Supporting and strengthening the international and regional framework for 
the protection of human rights, justice, the rule of law, and the promotion of democracy; 
on average, 10.5 % of the EIDHR II 2007-2010 budget is dedicated to this objective. 
 
Objective 5) Building confidence in, and enhancing the reliability and transparency of, 
democratic electoral processes, in particular through election observation; on average, 
23.7% of the EIDHR II 2007-2010 budget is dedicated to this objective.42 
Within these five points, most of the EIDHR I objectives can be identified. However, there 
is a difference between EIDHR I and EIDHR II in terms of prioritisation - some of the objec-
tives mentioned above have greater importance than before; others are not followed as 
intensively as under EIDHR I. EIDHR II puts more emphasis on civil society as the basic 
element of the Instrument’s implementation. 
Even if civil society was considered the most important element of the democratisation 
effort since the introduction of the EIDHR I, this fact is now expressed more explicitly; the 
notion that civil society is not only the ultimate beneficiary of EIDHR II projects, but also an 
active actor in the democratisation process and human rights promotion in third countries, 
is enhanced - EIDHR II puts more stress on the “active role” that civil society has to play 
in these processes.43 Although EIDHR I prioritised co-ordination with civil society, EIDHR II 
pays even more attention to that point. Civil society is the base for the EIDHR II response 
strategy: “Work with, for, and through civil society organisations will give the response 
strategy its critical profile.”44 
One of the main trends of EIDHR I that needs to be maintained and reinforced (it has 
greater priority than before) is the pursuit of a concise thematic approach within grant-
awarding and funding. As explained in the Strategy Paper 2007-2010 (Annex III, point 
2), this dimension of EIDHR II has to be supported more than before: “In order to enhance 
impact and achieve greater strategic focus, there have been attempts to integrate themes 
in a limited number of campaigns as for 2005-2006 programming. This process needs 
to go further. In order to streamline and reduce fragmentation, the general balance of 
opinion has been to maintain a broad geographic focus, whilst tightening and integrating 
further the thematic approach.” The number of countries eligible for EIDHR is constantly 
growing45 and so, according to the Commission, the thematic approach is an even greater 
necessity to ensure effective work and results delivery.
As for other changes, the introduction of the EU Guidelines on Human Rights (the Strategy 
Paper 2007-2010 mentions explicitly the EU Guidelines on Human Rights as a part of 
the EIDHR II, Objective 3), stronger support for human rights defenders (the budget line 
for supporting human rights defenders worldwide amounts to only € 4 million per year 
and it is questionable whether this amount is sufficient), and more emphasis on the rights 
of women and children should be mentioned.46 Gender equality and the fight against 
all forms of discrimination are underlined47, together with the “promotion of core labour 
standards and corporate social responsibility”.48 
A number of objectives maintained the same level of importance, i.e. promoting jus-
tice, supporting the International Criminal Court and other criminal tribunals, promoting 
accountability and the fight against corruption, torture and the death penalty. The in-
dependence of action from the consent of third-country governments and other public 
authorities, fundamental to EC action in countries such as Belarus or Cuba, was also kept. 
Further conclusions on the evolution of the thematic priorities of the EIDHR can be made 
on the basis of the EIDHR II budget.
Evolution of the EIDHR budget 
Within the period of 2002-2010, the EIDHR budget is scheduled to increase from about 
€ 100 million in 2002 to € 145.8 million in 2010. 
EIDHR	financial	allocations	2002-2010	(€)
year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Total	
budget
100,459,322 100,746,534 124,957,135 128,470,130 122,437,792
year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2002	-	2010
Total	
budget
130,000,000 137,000,000 141,600,000 145,800,000 1,131,670,917
Geographical reach 
Concerning the evolution of the EIDHR budget, the number of “focus countries” (micro-
projects) had been continually increasing during the previous period from initially 29 
countries in 2002 to 68 countries in 2006. The range of countries eligible for EIDHR II 
funding could increase even further in the course of 2007-2013, although for the per-
iod 2007-2010 it is envisaged that 64 countries will be targeted for funding under the 
Country-Based Support Scheme (CBSS). 
164
DEMOCRACy'S  NEW CHAMPIONS
Part I
165
Democracy Assistance Policies - Trends and Approaches 
European Union: Democracy versus Bureaucracy - Věra Řiháčková
Jacek Kucharczyk and Jeff Lovitt (editors)
Any substantive “widening” trend could endanger the effectiveness of EIDHR II, provid-
ing each third country with a decreasing amount of resources, as the budget itself is not 
supposed to grow rapidly under the next financial period (it increased by 22% within 
the period 2002-2006, while the range of countries concerned has increased by about 
135% since 2002). In order to maintain the effectiveness of the whole system, the 2007-
2010 Strategy Paper proposes “tightening and integrating further the thematic approach” 
(Annex III, point 2). The Commission sees this as a way to “enhance impact and achieve 
greater strategic focus [of the EIDHR]”. Moreover, not all focus countries are eligible for 
funding every year and, when eligible, most often not under all five Objectives (and 
priorities).
The issue of the criteria for selection of the eligible countries is also important. In the 
Strategy Paper 2007-2010, the following identification criteria are set: 1) Country has a 
relatively open society allowing for the development and activities of civil society organ-
isations (including human rights and democracy advocacy bodies), but where the latter 
may be without much organisational capacity, influence and cohesion; 2) Well-founded 
need for more effective action by civil society organisations in the fields of human rights 
and democratisation for civil society becoming a substantial force for positive change 
and reform; 3) Specific priority established on the basis of EU policy considerations. The 
EIDHR II target countries are selected every year, the list is drafted by DG RELEX and DG 
AIDCO (EuropeAid) and approved by the member states in the Council, where political 
influences naturally play a role. 
The NGOs themselves were not able to arrive at agreed criteria as to how the countries 
should be selected. It was assumed that EIDHR II should be accessible globally and that 
project funding should be made available solely on a competitive basis, but the Com-
mission continued with the regional division of funding (at least for Objectives 1 and 2). 
Some NGOs, for instance the International Federation of Human Rights Organisations 
(FIDH), came up with their own criteria as to how the countries should be selected, specifi-
cally when it comes to countries with a hostile environment, and they tabled these criteria 
to the Commission. The overall notion is that an ambition to cover everyone and every-
thing would be counterproductive; otherwise it is rather a difficult topic for agreement to 
be reached among the civil society organisations that were consulted. 
Evolution of financial allocations by type of procedure
Concerning the types of procedure under EIDHR I (which is only moderately modified  under 
EIDHR II), it is possible to compare the evolution of financial allocations spent through calls 
for proposals (managed either by the EC in Brussels or by local EC Delegations - both 
macro-projects and micro-projects), Grants awarded without calls for proposals (including 
Specific and Ad hoc measures under EIDHR II) and EOMs. 
As for the calls for proposals, the part of the budget spent on these measures remained 
almost the same throughout the 2002-2006 period; except for 2004 (when 74% of the 
budget was spent on calls for proposals), about 60% of the total EIDHR budget was 
reserved for calls for proposals (59% of the budget in 2002, 59% in 2003, 58% in 
2005, and 61% in 2006). An increasingly large part of this funding is managed by the 
EC Delegations at local level, and the importance of EC Delegations in managing EIDHR 
funding has been increasing since 2002. In 2002, only 8% of the total EIDHR budget was 
managed by EC Delegations (and 51% by the EC in Brussels). Within the period 2003-
2004, the Delegations’ portion reached 14% of the total budget, and amounted to 28% 
and 25% of the EIDHR I budget in 2005 and 2006 respectively. 
EC Delegations have become a key player in managing EIDHR funds, being deemed 
more flexible in awarding grants and funding, and better informed about the situation on 
the ground. This trend of delegating competencies from central to local level is likely to 
continue as increased flexibility in managing and funding projects is a major priority of 
EIDHR II. The portion of funding allocated for EC Delegations is subject to the DG AIDCO-
EC Delegations’ annual dialogue on budgeting, when the EC Delegations are invited to 
estimate the amount they can award through the calls for proposals in a given country. 
As for Grants awarded without calls for proposals, the portion of the budget spent on 
these measures remained largely unchanged until 2006, when the amount of resources 
allocated through these grants decreased from an average of 20% (21% in 2002, 19% 
in 2003, 18% in 2004, and 20% in 2005) to only 11%. This change was caused by an 
increase of funding spent on EOMs - the budget allocation on EOMs had been growing 
from an initial 15% in 2002 and 2003 to 21% in 2005 and 25% in 2006. Even if the 
maximum share of the EIDHR II budget spent on EOMs has been set at 25%49, the amount 
of money spent on this objective is likely to stay near 25% as the EC (and the member 
states) still gives a high priority to election observation. If almost 5% of the budget is res-
erved each year for the contingency fund (overheads), there will probably be no more 
than about 12% of the budget remaining for Grants awarded without calls for proposals 
under the next financial period. 
Evolution of financial allocations for micro projects - 
regional breakdown
A comparison of financial allocations for micro-projects by geographic regions follows in 
order to describe the evolution of the geographical priorities of EIDHR I from 2002-2006. 
As micro-projects are a key element of EIDHR, a comparison based on financial allocations 
for micro-projects seems relevant for such an analysis. For EIDHR II, only the indicative 
regional shares (in percentage) are known at the moment, not specifying micro- projects 
allocations but assuming that the micro-projects will fall under Objective 2, the Country-
Based Support Schemes (CBSS); however, not all CBSS allocations will be dedicated to 
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micro-projects, so a direct comparison with EIDHR I is not possible. The geographical 
breakdown of the budget lines will apply only to Objective 1 and Objective 2, since the 
remaining three objectives are global, with a specification of the geographical focus of 
each priority in the Strategy Paper 2007-2010.50
Western Balkans and EU candidate countries:•  The part of the EIDHR I budget spent on 
micro-projects in this region (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, (then) Ser-
bia and Montenegro, and Turkey) decreased over the years - from 20.4% in 2002 to 
7.3% in 2006. The steady decrease of EIDHR I funding is explained by the deployment 
of other EU instruments (and EU pre-accession assistance) in this region. Within EIDHR 
II (2007-2010), Western Balkans and candidate countries are eligible under Objec-
tive 2 for 25% of the CBSS allocation, amounting to € 7.5 million in 2007, € 9.25m, 
€ 11.15m and € 12.45m respectively in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The group of eli-
gible countries was enlarged to include Croatia for 2007, as well as Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia (including Kosovo), Turkey, and Macedonia.
Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus:•  The amount of EIDHR I funding reserved for 
this region (Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine, Russia) did not change in a significant 
way over the period 2002-2006, reaching usually about 15% of the micro-projects fund-
ing. For EIDHR II, the region was re-defined as European Neighbourhood Policy and 
East of Jordan countries, enlarging the original Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus 
group to include Moldova and Azerbaijan, and adding the EIDHR I Mediterranean 
and Middle East region, excluding Tunisia and Syria for the time being, and including 
yemen. Not all countries in the group were eligible for CBSS already in 2007; the total 
CBSS amount for the enlarged region is €10 million in 2007, € 12.3m, € 14.7m and 
€ 16.6m respectively in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The countries concerned are to a 
large extent eligible for funds under the new ENPI. 
Mediterranean and Middle East:•  Most of the countries of this region were not eligible 
for EIDHR I funding until the year 2004; in 2002-2003, only about 10% of the EIDHR 
I micro-project funding was spent there (Algeria, Gaza/West Bank, Israel, Tunisia). 
Since 2004, the region has been given greater priority, and about 20% of the EIDHR 
I micro-project budget was spent there (significantly, Morocco and Egypt have been 
the biggest beneficiaries since 2004). Under EIDHR II, the region is unified within one 
heading with Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus (see above).
Asia and Central Asia:•  As for Asian countries, the trend of a geographic widening 
and its consequences can be observed. The part of the EIDHR I budget spent in this 
region on micro-projects, i.e. about 15% of the total budget, remained relatively sta-
ble over the whole period; minor changes in both directions are observable (17% in 
2002, 18.5% in 2003, 13.3% in 2004, 16.7% in 2005, and 13% in 2006). With 
the widening range of “focus countries” (from initially two countries in 2002 to nine 
countries in 2006) and the relatively stable budget, the amount of funding spent in 
each country decreased instead of regularly increasing (this is the case in all countries 
concerned). Concerning Central Asia, this region played an increasingly important role 
in the  EIDHR geographical focus (one reason for this tendency is that it was not covered 
by any other EU democracy promotion instruments). EIDHR funding increased from 
5.12% in 2004 (the first time Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were eligible for 
EIDHR) to 7.1% in 2006. The trend of reinforcing EIDHR II funding for Central Asia is 
likely to continue. A total of 13 countries of Asia and Central Asia51 are eligible for the 
total CBSS funds of € 4.5 million in 2007, € 5.6m, € 6.7m and € 7.5m respectively 
in 2008, 2009 and 2010.
Sub-Saharan Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP):•  Since 2003, when most 
of the countries concerned became eligible for EIDHR I funding, there has been no 
significant change concerning the part of the EIDHR I budget reserved for this region; 
about 26% of the EIDHR I micro-project funding was allocated to the region every year 
(except for 2003 when it represented almost 37% of the total micro-project budget). 
The number of countries covered by EIDHR I micro-projects (16) is probably going to 
decrease to 11 under EIDHR II, with Cuba eligible for CBSS only from 2008. The CBSS 
budget shares are equal to those of Asia and Central Asia.
Latin America:•  Most countries in the region did not take part in EIDHR micro-projects 
until the year 2005. At the same time, there was a steady decrease in EIDHR I funding 
going to this region: from 16.6% in 2002 (concerning only three countries - Colombia, 
Guatemala. and Mexico) to 13.9% in 2005 and 11.6% in 2006 (concerning already 
8 countries). As in Asia, the proportional part of the EIDHR I budget per country was 
decreasing. Under the EIDHR II CBSS scheme, the number of countries eligible from this 
region is going to increase to 17 (Central and Latin American countries), nine of which 
are eligible only from 2008; the CBSS budget shares are equal to those of Asia and 
Central Asia and of ACP countries.
As to the target countries of this research project, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Cuba, both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Ukraine have been eligible for 
 EIDHR I micro-project funding since 2002, and the amount spent on local micro-projects 
increased over the period 2002-2005 (from € 0.5 million in 2002 to € 0.855 million in 
2005 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from € 0.6 million in 2002 to € 1.025 million in 
2005 in Ukraine). Nonetheless, in 2006 a slight decrease of funding can be observed; 
there were only € 0.615 million for Bosnia and Herzegovina and € 0.95 million for 
Ukraine. The decrease has two main reasons. First, the total EIDHR I micro-projects budget 
in 2006 was lower than in 2005 (from € 35.5 million in 2005 to € 30 million in 2006), 
and accordingly all country allocations were cut. Secondly, in both cases, the decrease 
concerned Campaign 2 (Fostering a Culture of Human Rights), which seemed to be less 
important in the given circumstances as both countries were assessed to be making signifi-
cant progress in this area. Resources for Campaign 4 (Advancing Equality, Tolerance and 
Peace) remained the same or received even more funding than in 2005. 
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Concerning Belarus and Cuba, neither country was eligible for EIDHR I micro-projects 
funding until 2005. The amount of EIDHR I resources reserved for micro-projects in these 
countries was lower in 2006 than in 2005. In the case of Belarus, the allocation rem-
ained rather stable (decreasing from € 0.42m in 2005 to € 0.4m in 2006) despite 
the fact that there was globally less funding for micro-projects in 2006 than in 2005. 
Less priority was given to Campaign 2 in 2006 than in 2005 (with funding falling from 
€ 0.22m to € 0.15m), while the majority of the country micro-projects allocation was 
channelled to projects under Campaign 4 (an increase from € 0.2m to € 0.25m in 
2006). In the case of Cuba, the decrease in micro-projects funding is evident, falling from 
€ 0.235m in 2005 to € 0.15m in 2006 (only under Campaign 2) owing to difficulties 
on the ground in finding credible local NGOs and to the delicate political situation of the 
EC Delegation in Cuba.52 With the facilities and measures introduced under EIDHR II, an 
increase of micro-projects funding is likely to both Belarus and Cuba (under CBSS, both 
are eligible only from 2008).
European	Partnership	for	Democracy	(EPD)
The idea53 to establish a foundation through which a part of EU democracy assistance 
would be granted to civil society organisations emerged in connection with the debate 
on EIDHR I reform with the direct involvement of the European Parliament democracy 
caucus54, the NGOs, and some of the member states. 
Several foundation initiatives were originally tabled. The issues in the debate were at the 
beginning namely of what type of organisation the foundation should be, its geograph-
ical focus and balance. Open Society Institute (OSI) Brussels at first came up with its 
own initiative but gradually focused rather on the Financial Regulation and Implementing 
Rules amendments and EIDHR II legal basis55. The Policy Association for an Open Society 
(PASOS) promoted a grant-making foundation model. An initiative was tabled by the 
Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy (NIMD), backed by the Westminster Foun-
dation for Democracy (WFD)56. At a meeting with the representatives of European political 
foundations on 7 February 2006, the European Parliament’s democracy caucus invited 
NIMD and the WFD to submit a proposal for establishing the European Foundation for 
Democracy through Partnership (later re-named European Partnership for Democracy, or 
EPD, to avoid confusion with the already existing European Foundation for Democracy). 
An informal group of like-minded countries emerged in the Council in order to promote 
the foundation idea, which was supported by several high-profile personalities including 
Václav Havel, Jacques Delors and Richard von Weizsäcker. The impulse came from the 
Czech Republic, which supported the idea of a grant-making foundation, and the group 
consisted of the Czech Republic, Sweden, UK, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovakia 
(within the V4 countries, Hungary adopted a different approach). The idea was to pro-
vide the foundation with a direct allocation from Objective 3 of EIDHR II (promoted by 
the Dutch). The member states involved originally agreed to contribute to the foundation’s 
budget, and € 2 million from a Dutch lottery company should have been allocated into 
its budget as well. 
David French of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy and Roel von Meijenfeldt of 
the Netherlands Institute for Multi-party Democracy argued that a new foundation “would 
establish an operational facility at arm’s length from the institutions of the EU, capable of 
timely responses to demands where and when they are most needed”, and “should provide 
a flexible funding instrument to support democratic reform processes and prog rammes, 
capable of operating at a greater level of suppleness, responsiveness and risk”.57 
However, the idea of direct funding from EIDHR II was scrapped in the Council (and opp-
osed by the Commission, too). The member states dissenting from the idea pointed to the 
fact that the funding could be obtained through the regular grants and tenders (macro-
projects, operational costs grants). When EIDHR II regulation was adopted, the informal 
group supporting the EPD idea shrunk to the Czech Republic and Poland.58 Further on, the 
group of supporting member states increased to include Latvia. Nevertheless, the neces-
sary critical mass of supporting member states was not achieved; another complication 
in the deliberations was that all the “old” member states originally involved in the like-
minded group gradually backed away. With the support of only “new” member states, 
combined with pressure against it from the German EU Presidency, the initiative lost its 
attraction to the hesitant member states. 
Despite the presence of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso at the launch 
ceremony of EPD on 15 April 2008, the EU has not committed to financing the foundation. 
Some ague that this is due to the EU’s tendency to assign less importance to democracy 
promotion than to development aid, a tendency evident in the speech of Barroso at the 
launch ceremony: “However, [political pluralism, social justice and respect for human 
dignity] will be achieved only if we first succeed in reducing poverty and injustice.”59 
EPD had been pushed forward by several MEPs (Edward McMillan-Scott, Janusz Onyszk-
iewicz, Jan Marinus Wiersma), some of the member states, and several influential NGOs. 
The situation changed in the European Parliament during the course of 2006, and the 
window of opportunity closed60. The informal democracy caucus proved to be politically 
overstretched. The political foundations, especially the German foundations, mainly the 
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, have continuously been lob-
bying MEPs (and some of the member states) both for inclusion of political parties and 
political foundations into the definition of civil society61 within the EIDHR II Regulation62 
and against the idea of supporting EPD.63 
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In October 2006, the political foundations also established a formal network registered 
in Belgium - European Network of Political Foundations (ENOP) - aiming at better and 
concerted representation in Brussels and using this legal body to become an important 
partner for the Commission in civil society dialogue, as well as to achieve the possibility 
to apply for funding.
The German political foundations won support for their cause from a number of MEPs, 
including very influential ones such as German Christian Democrat Michael Gahler and 
Dutch socialist Jan Marinus Wiersma, a previous supporter of the EDP idea. The German 
government, reluctant towards EPD from the very beginning, finally proved - for obvious 
reasons - to be the main motor behind the gradual disappearance of the general support 
for EPD. 
Nevertheless, representatives of EPD and supporters of the cause must share part of the 
responsibility, too, for this failure. As one MEP involved in the process of setting up EPD 
put it, the proponents of EPD totally underestimated the influence of the political founda-
tions. They were confident about the support for the initiative from the relevant European 
political bodies and neglected dialogue with the political foundations. EPD representatives 
did not enter into complex negotiations with the political foundations while assuming they 
would automatically perceive EPD as a competitor. The EPD protagonists also underesti-
mated the importance of Germany in relation to any debate concerning the spending of 
EU money. Talks should have been held with the German government in the early stages, 
especially in light of the fact that it was preparing to hold the EU presidency in 2007.    
There is allegedly an ongoing debate within the (still active) European Parliament de-
mocracy caucus about the possibility of setting up a European Democracy Fund64, which 
would be partly run by the European Parliament and which would also act as a clearing 
house for other institutions and foundations; but the democracy assistance agenda has 
lost momentum in the European Parliament, and the MEPs engaged in the initiative were 
called upon to respect party discipline and interests65. The European Parliament is also 
setting up an independent instrument for training of third countries’ parliamentarians, 
focusing mainly on the Western Balkans, reviving a similar programme previously run 
together with the Council of Europe.66 The competition in the field of foundations is also 
growing; this year all the political families in the European Parliament should receive 
funding to set up their own political foundations, which will not be directly involved in 
democracy assistance but might get involved in the future. 
Despite all the obstacles, EPD was established in Brussels on 15 April 2008 with the sup-
port of former Czech President Václav Havel and European Commission President José 
Manuel Barroso. The new foundation includes board members from Finland, the Nether-
lands, France, Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Portugal, combining 
old and new, and large and small, eastern and southern EU members. 
The foundation contains a grant-making element and mechanism, and it has opted for a 
multi-annual programming dialogue. EPD shall be fully operational in 200967, when it can 
also start competing for EU grants and tenders.
Is there a future for the “foundation idea”?
Some argue68 that the idea of a foundation (or the very European Partnership for Demo-
cracy) managing part of the EU democracy assistance budget can be revived in connection 
with the mid-term evaluation of the EIDHR II, which is envisaged for 2009 (the EIDHR II 
Strategy Paper runs until 2010). In the light of the mid-term evaluation findings, the EIDHR 
II Regulation could be modified. 
A foundation supporting analysis and evaluation of use of funds would not fall on deaf 
ears if the Commission should prove slow or rigid in delivering the assistance, and in 
availing itself fully of the flexibility provided for by the amended Financial Regulation and 
Implementing Rules, as well as the EIDHR II legislation. If a crisis situation, or other urgent 
need for action, were not managed well, it could substantiate perception that the Com-
mission staff is unable to deliver assistance under such circumstances and strengthen the 
case for a more flexible body, either a foundation or an agency, from the perspective of 
the member states. However, it seems highly unlikely that the idea would rise to the top of 
the agenda before the mid-term evaluation is completed69.
Arguments	concerning	a	re-launch	scenario
It is quite likely that any efforts to empower EPD in connection with the mid-term evalua-• 
tion will meet resistance from the side of the political foundations again, and that in the 
light of the emergence of the foundations linked to the European Parliament’s political 
fractions, the Parliament (or a group of MEPs) will be less willing to support the idea 
than in 2006.  
It is questionable whether the mid-term evaluation in 2009-2010 will provide much • 
room for change since the Commission will be very hesitant to deal with the whole ass-
istance structure again; generally no systemic changes are expected - only adjustments 
or amendments of existing documents. Due to delays in launching EIDHR II calls for ap-
plications, the number of projects and outcomes to evaluate will also be limited.
The arguments for a foundation using as a template the US-based National Endowment • 
for Democracy, tabled by the Czech representatives, might be counterproductive since 
anti-American feelings are quite common in the European Parliament (and elsewhere). 
In this light, the recent debates on the US radar and missile bases in the Czech Republic 
and Poland did not add credibility to the position of these two member states that were 
supporting the EPD (although the conflict between Russia and Georgia that commenced 
in August 2008 looks set to turn public opinion in both countries in favour of the bases, 
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and may have an impact on other countries’ stances towards the USA, not least with a 
new President entering the White House in January 2009). At least until the Georgia 
crisis, it was observable that the agenda connected to human rights and democracy 
promotion had gradually receded from the priorities of the Czech Presidency of the EU 
(January-June 2009), and that the Czech government was adopting a general attitude 
of “wait and see” until the mid-term evaluation.  
In 2009, a new European Commission will be appointed and elections will be held • 
for a new European Parliament; the Parliament election campaign will run through the 
spring of 2009 and it is rather unlikely that substantial support will be generated for 
the EPD during this period.  
The European Commission will not be willing to give up control of funding (a more • 
elaborated oversight mechanism can be proposed, for instance). 
A foundation financed overwhelmingly by the EU would be perceived as an actor simi-• 
lar to the European Commission in third countries; in the discussion, the value added of 
such a setting would have to be emphasized. 
Democracy assistance and civil society support are a political issue: it is unlikely that • 
no conditions would be imposed on the foundation ex ante by the Commission and the 
member states. Member states want to control allocations for democratic assistance to 
respective countries according to their diverse strategic preferences (e.g. the difference 
between the Czech Republic and Spain regarding the need to provide democratic ass-
istance in Cuba).   
Member states’ support - a critical mass of member states supporting the idea would • 
have to be created.
Political foundations (and major political groups) have to be involved in any attempt to • 
revive EPD as a pan-European body financed directly both from governments’ and EU 
money. EPD should embrace dialogue with the political foundations.  
The independent mid-term EIDHR II assessment should focus on:  
Practical issues with the focus on flexibility at the centre (ability to act effectively in countries 
like Belarus or Cuba): calls for proposals are not being translated into local languages, 
which substantially affects the access of grassroots NGOs to the funding; the number and 
size of grants awarded - support should aim at grassroots initiatives rather than at instit-
utionalised NGOs; it is necessary to administer, as provided for by the new implementing 
rules and financial regulations, small grants (€ 10,000-25,000), and the progress should 
be monitored to identify whether the number of these type of projects is increasing (small 
grants represent the same workload as big grants, so the Commission logic usually prefers 
bigger grants).
Division of labour within the EC Delegations and staffing (the Commission has limited 
capacity to provide for the small grants - one EC delegation desk officer usually deals with 
calls, evaluation and reporting, and the situation concerning the number of staff will not 
improve in the near future70).
Cost-effectiveness of establishing a new body: a study comparing the costs of a foundation 
versus increasing the number of Commission staff; for many member state governments, 
cost-effectiveness is the key issue in deciding on lobbying for one or the other option (cost-
effectiveness can be a dilemma even for the governments that have already lobbied for 
EPD). 
Foundation versus agency discussion: is a Commission agency with purely executive tasks 
a better solution? Since democracy assistance is a political issue and every member state 
has stakes there, the political say on programming documents would stay largely with the 
Council if an agency were established71; no independent body (foundation board) would 
be involved in programming. Discussion on different models would be necessary - for 
instance, on whether DE AIDCO or DG RELEX would exercise oversight.
Co-operation among the Visegrad Four governments
According to the interviews conducted for this research72, any interaction or possible co-
operation among the Visegrad Four countries in “shaping EU policies and instruments” 
- more specifically within negotiations on both EIDHR II and EPD in this case - seems to 
have been very limited. First, no system of sharing information was created that would 
have allowed the V4 governments to co-ordinate their efforts during the negotiations. 
Secondly, no special working group that would have had the same purpose as an infor-
mation-sharing system was established. Thirdly, and most importantly, the V4 governments 
did not have common objectives or priorities. However, there were certain overlaps: for 
example, in pushing ahead the idea of EPD when Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Repub-
lic were co-operating - these countries had been leading supporters of EPD, contrary to 
Hungary. This specific case represents rather an exception than a standard interaction or 
co-operation on the level of the V4 governments.
Generally, all four countries stressed the need for a faster and more flexible system of 
funding (as did almost all other member states); each of the four governments had its 
own individual priorities. The Czech government stressed the importance of faster and 
more precise granting in the frame of Objective 1 and promoted greater support for 
individuals elected to national parliaments, including in those cases where they are not 
prevented from exercising their mandate. The Slovak government proposed to limit the 
part of the  EIDHR II budget spent on EOMs and pushed for increasing the contingency 
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fund allocation in order to enhance the capacity of the European Commission to deal with 
unexpected and crisis situations. 
The Czech and Slovak governments also called for extending the EIDHR II funding to 
include persons or bodies without registered legal status. Concerning geographical con-
siderations, the Czech Republic does not have any high-priority region for which it sought 
direct disproportional allocations. On the contrary, the Slovak government emphasized 
that the EIDHR II should pay more attention to the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe and 
countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy. 
Both governments, as well as many other member states, had been continuously consult-
ing their own national NGOs before defining their own position for the negotiations on 
EIDHR II and the Strategy Paper 2007-2010. Some civil society proposals were incorpo-
rated into their respective negot iating positions, such as the possibility (included by the 
Czech Republic) for local NGOs specialising in election observation to draw funding 
under objective 5 of the EIDHR II. 
Concerning the EPD issue, it seems at the moment that no significant support can be ex-
pected in the near future from the Czech or Slovak government for re-launching the idea of 
funding EPD from EIDHR II. Although both countries were strong proponents of the idea of 
a new independent foundation dealing with part of the EIDHR II funding, they now prefer 
to wait and see and evaluate the first results of new EIDHR II implementation (perhaps 
even until the first mid-term evaluation in 2010) before returning to the idea. In addition, 
they consider that the concept of how the foundation would function has not been clearly 
defined. In short, the idea has not been abandoned yet, but any further support is cur-
rently off the agenda. 
Democratic	Scrutiny	Process	
The EIDHR II Regulation was adopted within the co-decision procedure allowing the Euro-
pean Parliament to pass a resolution to the effect that the Commission has exceeded the 
implementing powers conferred on it, once the commitology process is concluded and 
the final text submitted to the Parliament. Owing to the delay caused by the negotiations 
on the very existence of the instrument and the concerns about the timely adoption of the 
implementing documents and possibility to draw funding in 2007, the EIDHR II Strategy 
Paper 2007-2010 (similarly the ENPI implementing documents, IPA or Instrument for Stab-
ility implementing documents) was adopted through the “Democratic scrutiny process”, a 
fast-track procedure allowing for a parallel process of implementing legislation oversight. 
The European Parliament revoked its right to take part in the annual programming of 
the new instruments: the Inter-institutional agreement adopted in 2006 was the basis for 
the “droit de regarde”, which takes place in parallel with the commitology procedure 
(management committees - on EIDHR II Strategy Paper 2007-2010 or ENPI implementing 
documents). Parliament committees received all strategy papers at the same time as they 
were transmitted to the member states and within 30 days from their entry in the commi-
tology register could express objections. In the meantime, consultations with the relevant 
Commission’s DGs were taking place (DG RELEX and DG AIDCO) in parallel with the 
commitology: a soft “structured dialogue” between the Parliament and the Commission 
was taking place.73 
Working groups for democratic scrutiny were established within the relevant Parliament 
(AFET) Committees (EIDHR II - Human Rights Sub-committee)74, such that the deliberations 
were underway before the Committee (AFET) meeting took place. When the soft dialogue 
was over, the letter with the conclusions of the working group was sent by the AFET 
chairman to the Commissioner for External Relations (Benita Ferrero-Waldner) and/or to 
the Development and Humanitarian Aid Commissioner (Louis Michel); the letter from the 
Commission followed. 
When discussing EIDHR II Strategy Paper 2007-2010, the key concern of MEPs was that 
EIDHR II should not be deployed extensively in those countries where co-operation with 
the governments has been established, since in such cases other EU instruments, such as 
ENPI, can be deployed for supporting civil society whereas EIDHR II should focus on cases 
such as Cuba or Belarus. 
Summary 
The reform of the financial instrument and legal basis (FR/IR) of EIDHR II allows for the im-
proved flexibility and effectiveness of EU democracy assistance, but the real impact of the 
reform will be clear only when an evaluation is made of the implementation of EIDHR II. 
The key strengths of the new framework include: 
keeping the principle that provision of assistance should be independent of the consent • 
of third-country governments and other public authorities; 
new forms of assistance - support to • non-registered entities, re-granting possibility, lower 
threshold for grants of small amounts, which allows for reduced administrative burden 
for civil society organisations; 
specific and especially • ad hoc measures, which allow for supporting human rights 
defenders directly (together with a derogation from the rule that Community assistance 
cannot constitute profit to the recipients); 
projects may include • operations “out of country” - in neighbouring countries; 
projects may use other “entry points”, such as social, economic and cultural issues, • 
so long as the aim and the impact of the project relate to fundamental freedoms and 
 human rights (an important provision in the case of Cuba); 
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the condition of • EU visibility might be modified if specifically justified and thus assure 
the safety of the beneficiaries and their families in countries where human rights are 
at risk;
human rights defenders can be supported through the NGOs that know the situation on • 
the ground better (although € 16 million for 2007-2010 for human rights defenders, 
including ad hoc measures, applicable worldwide, is not very ambitious); 
local civil society actors can be funded from Objective 5 (EOMs) when implementing • 
electoral observations; 
the flexibility of the responsible officials is also enhanced in setting the eligibility criteria • 
of local civil society actors.
Some questions and key criticisms remain unresolved: 
distribution of resources - further enlargement of geographical scope could be counter-• 
productive; 
making EC Delegations directly responsible for management of a larger portion of • 
EIDHR II projects - such a delegation of power could help to improve the quality of 
EU democracy assistance delivery, but the EC Delegations would have to be better 
equipped for these tasks;
strengthened intra-and inter-EU institutional co-operation, and co-operation with • 
other donors, for which corresponding implementing mechanisms are in some cases 
 missing; 
the long evaluation process in centralised schemes (macro-projects) will most probably • 
not change, which means loss of operational and quick-reaction abilities; 
EOMs - the EU sends missions only to countries where they are invited, so the whole • 
EIDHR II idea that the action does not require government consent is denied within this 
priority, and the EOMs allocation consumes almost 25% of the total EIDHR II budget; 
synergy is not assured between EIDHR micro- and macro-projects, or with other EU-• 
funded projects (in the social sector, for instance) - it would require not only co-operation 
when the programming of the instruments is taking place, but also during the project-
monitoring phase;
possibility to waive co-financing requirement in duly justified cases was not agreed; • 
the role of the EC Delegations is not clearly defined in the programming and imple-• 
mentation of the EIDHR II (the EC Delegations report to Brussels the estimates for the 
micro-project allocations every year). It is also not clear how local consultation with civil 
society will be organised; 
generally, competitive procedures when awarding funding have to be maintained, so • 
a significant increase in direct granting cannot be envisaged.
Target	countries
(a) Belarus
Under ENPI, Belarus was allocated only € 20 million in 2007-2010, and funding must be 
agreed with the Belarusian government. Under EIDHR II, a country allocation is not known 
for Country-Based Support Schemes (CBSS) - starting only in 2008 - and other activities 
will be financed through special and ad hoc measures. Belarus could also be eligible 
under DCI (Thematic programmes) where an annual proposal without an overall strategy 
is made and the list of eligible countries is prepared by the DG DEV and consulted with 
the member states and the European Parliament.
For Belarus, a donor co-ordination mechanism has been put in place: co-ordination meet-
ings with the USA, Canada and Norway take place very three-to-four months, when the 
“division of labour” is decided.75 Even after the FR/IR reform and the new EIDHR II Regula-
tion, the effectiveness of the Commission in awarding small grants is disputable; likewise, 
the funding of the running costs of Belarusian NGOs will most probably remain rather 
difficult - the Commission wants to co-ordinate activities with the member states (Poland, 
Lithuania, Germany and Sweden were very active in this sense in the past) in terms of 
small grants and with the US donors in the field of running costs. 
(b) Bosnia and Herzegovina
The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) 2007 Project List for Bosnia and Herz-
egovina was adopted in July 2007 with a total budget of € 49.7 million; for Axis 5 - Civil 
Society Dialogue, € 4.3 million has been allocated, with the actual allocation for civil 
society actors narrowed down to € 3 million. Civil society organisations can be eligible 
under some budget lines of Axis 1 and 2; however, this is not specified at the moment. 
Besides IPA, Bosnia and Herzegovina civil society will probably also be eligible under 
ENPI (cross-border issues) and EIDHR II (CBSS only from 2008).  
 
(c) Cuba
The political background is important in the case of Cuba (on Belarus, the member 
states’ positions do not differ substantially). The EU Council carries out an evaluation 
of the situation on the island every June in connection with the partial embargo (put in 
place in June 2004 in response to the repression of opposition representatives, but lifted 
in June 2008). However, Cuba is not a great priority for member states other than Spain 
and the Czech Republic, which have adopted completely opposite stances76, with Spain 
opposing even the partial sanctions and the Czech Republic arguing that the embargo 
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should not be lifted without improvement in the human-rights situation in Cuba.
According to the EC Delegation in Havana77, keeping a low political profile is crucial for 
being operational on the spot. Furthermore, there is only limited absorption capacity on 
the part of civil society on the island (and failed US initiatives are testimony to the lack of 
a demand side). EC officials complain about the lack of eligible macro-projects tabled by 
EU-based NGOs under EIDHR I (lack of interest and lack of quality); in their opinion, Euro-
pean NGOs are not innovative enough in terms of strategies78 and, in the case of NGOs 
from the “new” member states, there is a perception that the experience of the transition 
process in central and eastern Europe is not applicable to Cuba and the templates of civil 
society assistance are not transferable.79 
Under EIDHR I, it was impossible to give direct grants to human rights defenders and to 
provide funding to non-registered entities. Generally, two schemes were in place (not 
political by definition); under decentralised co-operation (in order to avoid politics), a 
sustainable “culture” environment was promoted and supported. The promotion of social 
cohesion was funded from the EIDHR micro-project facility, although the instrument was 
not mentioned explicitly. 
Civil society organisations were rather critical towards the EC Delegation in Cuba  owing 
to the perceived lack of impact of the projects implemented through the micro-project 
grant applications administered in Havana. With the new rules, more flexibility should 
be achieved. Elites, which can assist in the transition to democracy, are key: EU-funded 
supp ort should be available under EIDHR II (namely ad hoc measures and re-granting) 
and a trend to award grants without calls for proposal can be expected. EIDHR II will be 
the crucial instrument for operations in Cuba (the CBSS will be launched only in 2008); 
the country will also be eligible for funding under DCI. 
(d) Ukraine
Ukraine is eligible under ENPI: the National Indicative Programme 2007-2010 is based 
on the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) and EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan, and reflects the national priorities of the Ukrainian government (of the time of sign-
ing). Preferences were given to direct contributions to the country’s budget (no EU control 
of the actual spending). € 494 million is allocated until 2010 under ENPI, the Democratic 
Development and Good Governance priority area is allocated € 148.2 million; out of 
its four sub-priorities only priority iii) Human rights, civil society development and local 
government is relevant to civil society organisations. Ukrainian NGOs can also be eligi-
ble under DCI Thematic programmes (Non-state Actors and Local Authorities) and will be 
eligible under EIDHR II (CBSS will be launched in 2007). The EU is the largest donor in 
Ukraine. 
Note on Interviews
For the purpose of this paper, 20 interviews were conducted with officials and representatives of EU institutions 
(EU Council, European Commission and European Parliament), NGO representatives and member states’ 
officials. The policy of confidentiality was followed. The author would like to thank all persons interviewed for 
their time and help. Any mistakes of analysis or interpretation of the facts are the author’s sole responsibility. 
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Endnotes
1  Unlike in the USA
2 (European Commission 2004) 
3 The External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was not in favour of keeping a separate 
instrument for democracy and human rights support. 
4 The draft Commission reform also contained support to the specific international instruments of human 
rights, justice and democracy, and retained embedded in the reform the funding of electoral observation 
missions (EOMs).  
5 The competence to draft the implementing measures is conferred to the Commission by the Council 
(commitology). According to the Inter-institutional agreement, concluded in June 2006, the European 
Parliament received a power to control (and block) the implementing measures (when the co-decision 
procedure was in place when adopting the legislation); before the agreement, only the Council had the 
power to control the Commission when adopting the implementing measures. However, the agreement is 
quite fresh, so a standard procedure (how to exercise this new competence) has not been established yet 
in the European Parliament.
6 See below  
7 The democracy caucus consisted of the MEPs of different political affiliations who were willing to pick 
up and promote the issue of democracy and human rights support embodied in the new independent 
instrument. The group was informally headed by British MEP Edward McMillan-Scott (EPP-ED), Vice-
President of the European Parliament. 
8 During the discussions on the reform of the financial instruments, consultations with civil society were 
conducted on several levels, however not on a regular basis; consultations were held in Brussels on the 
Regulations and Strategy Papers and within the EC Delegations on the programming itself. The European 
Commission follows the “not everyone can be consulted” policy, which means that the EC Delegations 
usually consult their “usual suspect” civil society partners with a project implementation track record or ask 
big international NGOs, active in the given country, for recommendations. Although the Commission’s 
approach is understandable, in some cases it can narrow the access to the emerging or (to Commission) 
unknown grassroots NGOs or civil society organisations since the consultation invitations are usually 
dependent on personal contacts. 
9 The case studies from NGOs focused on different complaints (difficult procedures, reporting, application 
process, funds transfer, etc.) made by local NGOs, and mainly referred to EIDHR I spending (F.M. Partners 
Limited 2005), (Soto 2005).
10 (European Commission 2006a)
11 (F.M. Partners Limited 2005)
12 An important achievement allowing for the funding of civil society organisations in countries such as 
Cuba or Belarus, where it is largely organisations conforming to the regime that are registered (or allowed 
to register). 
13 See FR/Art. 93, 94, 96a
14 FR/Art. 120/2 “Where implementation of the action requires financial support to be given to third 
parties, the beneficiary of a Community grant may give such financial support provided that the following 
conditions are met: (a) the financial support is not the primary aim of the action; (b) the conditions for 
the giving of such support are strictly defined in the grant decision or agreement between the beneficiary 
and the Commission, with no margin for discretion; (c) the amounts concerned are small.” The maximum 
amounts are defined in the Implementing Rules, Art. 184a.
15 (Ursu, 2006) 
16 Where a single beneficiary is awarded several grants in a financial year, the threshold of € 25,000 
applies to the total of those grants.
17 FR/Art. 66, 1 c: “In keeping with the principle of proportionality, the level of liability of the authorising 
officer shall be assessed primarily on the basis of the degree of his serious misconduct. If the authorising 
officer acts intentionally he shall be liable for the entire loss suffered. If the authorising officer has committed 
gross negligence, the liability shall be limited to a maximum of 12 months’ basic salary.” Article 66 of 
the Financial Regulation clarifies further other ways that can result in holding the official liable for any 
damage. 
18 In the context of the FR/IR amendments negotiation, at the time of the hearing where FR/IR amendments 
were discussed in the European Parliament in January 2007, a discussion of the Budget Committee 
on budget control, elaborating on a case of apparently vast financial mismanagement of an NGO, 
took place simultaneously. The EP Budget Committee was discussing how to enforce the liability of the 
Commission staff in this particular case and asked the Commission to toughen the rules; this case made 
the calls for further flexibility of officials more difficult to argue.
19 FR/Art. 1: “Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No. 1605/20024, hereinafter “the Financial 
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Regulation”, lays down the legal foundations of the financial management reform. As such, its essential 
elements should be maintained and strengthened. Transparency, in particular, has to be reinforced by 
providing for information on beneficiaries of Community funds…”
20 For example, the issue of listing NGOs closed down by their governments for political reasons in order 
to allow them to bid for EU funding as an exception.
21 The desk officer can propose changes but the number of signatures that must approve these suggestions 
is still “frustrating”.    
22 In 2005-2006, EIDHR I covered projects in 68 countries (not all EIDHR I priorities were implemented 
in all countries, and the same principle applies for EIDHR II); in 54 of them, the micro-project facility was 
introduced.
23 Further details (political foundations, idea of budget allocation for European Partnership for Democracy 
(EPD) on the negotiations can be found below. 
24 Regulation (EC) No. 1889/2006.  
25 In the EU Council, the EIDHR II Regulation and definition of the broad guidelines were discussed 
in the geographical Council Working Groups like CODEV, COEAST, or COLAT (Cuba). The Working 
group on human rights (COHOM) cannot overrule the other working groups since there is formally no 
hierarchy among them. The policies according to which human rights are mainstreamed in the EU depend 
on Council Presidencies; in this sense, the Finnish and Austrian were the most active recent Presidencies. 
Allegedly, the situation in Belarus was the main argument in the Council for prolonging the EIDHR as a 
separate instrument.
26 The wording is such that host government’s and other public authorities’ consent is not necessarily 
required for implementing the actions under EIDHR II, or that the possibility to support non-registered 
organisations is included. 
27 Out of the five objectives finally agreed, the first four display democracy promotion as the main focus, 
and the fifth objective covers EOMs. See the details below.
28 During the deliberation on the EIDHR II regulation, including the discussions by the management 
committee on the Strategy paper, the political interests of the member states had to be accommodated. 
29 The Czech Republic and Lithuania were, for example, emphasising the issue of spending the funds 
allocated for 2007 in 2008 and the idea of democracy assistance co-ordination with other donors.
30 A unified civil society standpoint was hard to achieve within the informal network since there were many 
divisive issues (such as the geographical focus) where some NGOs were not able to reach a consensus 
even among themselves. Some NGOs lobbied solely for adjustments to priorities and objectives, others for 
budget allocations. The Human rights and democracy network established an EIDHR working group and 
tried to negotiate joint positions. The working group included organisations such as Amnesty International 
or Human Rights Watch, as well as conflict-prevention and child-protection organisations - basically 
anyone could join and lobby for their own issues. The working group managed to come up with very 
general recommendations, and each organisation subsequently lobbied for its priority issues on its own. 
31 The general interest of the (otherwise rather fragmented) civil society groups in Brussels was to lobby 
against the inclusion of the EOMs in EIDHR II; it was proposed that the funding for the election missions 
should come from other country allocations (such as ENPI) where a third-country government consent is 
assured and a prerequisite of any Community-funded action (the EU does not send electoral missions 
without government consent anyway, so including EOMs under EIDHR is somehow not in line with its 
logic). When the battle was lost and the EOMs were kept under the EIDHR roof, the lobbying focused on 
a decrease in the EOMs’ allocations (Objective 5). 
32 Under EIDHR II, it will thus be possible to finance the activities of, and contribute more directly to the 
capacity-building of, local civil society actors, as these organisations know better the milieu and the ways 
whereby election results can be distorted than an international organisation such as the Organization for 
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), argued civil society groups during the negotiations. 
33 For details on the EIDHR budgets, see below. 
34 (Raik 2006)
35 Art. 7 and 9 of Regulation no. 1889/2006.
36 Targeted projects, which might have been implemented without calls for proposals under EIDHR I. 
The EIDHR allows for using the new measures for civil society actors’ support (human rights defenders) 
explicitly; meanwhile the targeted projects were rather implemented by international organisations or 
regional organisations (i.e. grants of big amounts)
37 In addition, Article 28 of the Strategy Paper 2007-2010 gives to the EC an instrument to protect 
some of the beneficiaries of the EIDHR II and their families in countries where their lives could be at risk 
(”Where specially justified, the usual practice of publishing information about EU-sponsored activities may 
be modified”).
38 Art. 14 of the Regulation no. 1889/2006
39 Art. 3, Point 3 of the Regulation no.1889/2006; in this sense, for example, the very co-ordination 
of calls for proposals between the EC and member states’ schemes is important due to the co-financing 
requirements (especially for macro-projects).
40 Strategy Paper 2007-2010, Annex III, point 8
41 See the details below in the section on EPD
42 The remainder of the budget represents the allocations for the contingency fund.
43 Regulation no.1889/2006 mentions several times the importance of “strengthening civil society 
activity” (Art. 1, point 2.a) and “reinforcing an active role for civil society within” (Art. 1, point 2.b), 
“mainly through support for civil society organisations” (Art. 1, point 2.a or point 1.a and the whole article 
2, point 1.c.ii). Also, according to the Strategy Paper 2007-2010, civil society “has clear priority” (Art. 
6), and “has to be supported” (Art. 11)
44 Art. 17 of the Strategy Paper 2007-2010: the funding of non-registered organisations and natural 
persons shows that declarations of the importance of civil society are taken seriously.
45 See details below
46 The EU Guidelines on human rights defenders were introduced in 2004. Regulation no.1889/2006 
affirms that “EC assistance shall aim in particular at…providing support and solidarity to human rights 
defenders” (Art. 1, point 2.a, same for Art. 2, point 1.b.ii).
47 Comparison with Regulations no. 975/1999 and 976/1999 on the development and consolidation 
of democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, basic documents 
for EIDHR I. These issues are mentioned several times in both Regulation no. 1889/2006 (Art. 2, point 
1.a.vi and point 1.b.v concerning gender equality and women rights; Art. 2, point 1.b.iii concerning the 
fight against all forms of racism, xenophobia and discrimination; Art. 2, point 1.b.vi concerning the rights 
of children and in 2007-2010 Strategy Paper (Art. 22).
48 Regulation no. 1889/2006 (Art. 2, point 1.b.viii)
49 This commitment is mentioned in the Strategy Paper 2007-2010 (Art. 63); however, 25% represents 
a large portion of the EIDHR II budget envelope.
50 For example, the priority strengthening the civil society involvement in human rights dialogue will focus 
on countries engaged in human rights dialogue with the EU (Objective 3, Art. 53 of the Strategy Paper 
2007-2010). 
51 The new country eligible for EIDHR II from 2008 is the Philippines.
52 For more details on Cuba (and the criticism of the EC Delegation by European civil society groups), 
see below.  
53 The idea was not new. The foundation of EuropeAid in 2001 helped to make the system faster and 
more flexible. Many argued for the importance of such a foundation to improve the EIDHR system: “The 
establishment of a European foundation(s) to support democratisation and civil society is worth serious 
consideration as an opportunity to step up EU activity in this field. International practice suggests that 
private foundations that receive public funding are one of the best ways of supporting civil society in 
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and the European Parliament’s positions are prepared instead by its Secretariat.
75 In the EU, the co-ordination with other donors, i.e. international organisations or the governments 
of third countries (USA, Canada, Japan) is in the competence of DG RELEX, for example within UN 
Democracy Fund - one donor co-ordination meeting per year takes place, or the “Paris agenda” (OECD-
DAC); this type of co-ordination tackles only broader guidelines of assistance delivery. 
76 Before reaching the high political level, negotiations take place namely within the Council working 
groups COLAT and COHOM.
77 Often criticised by the EU-based NGOs active on the island
78 According to this official, NGOs could even ask for derogations from the rules that applied on EIDHR 
I projects, especially in terms of registration of the potential benefiting partner organisations in Cuba.  
79 “Former communist countries do not understand that it is not desirable to talk about civil society 
development, not to shout loudly. EIDHR should not be mentioned - not be made the key instrument.”
foreign countries.” (Raik, 2006)
54 An informal pressure group consisting of several MEPs of different political affiliations; its main figure 
has been Edward McMillan-Scott, the current Vice-President of the European Parliament.
55 They perceived a window of opportunity was closing down and that it was not constructive to lobby 
for a separate foundation when pushing for several issues within the EIDHR II legislation (like lowering the 
minimum grant amount). Furthermore, OSI did not have a unified position on the foundation initiative.
56 Later on, WFD removed its support, possibly owing to the pressure from other political party 
foundations.
57 A European Foundation for Democracy through Partnership, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty 
Democracy, March 2006
58 What kind of deal was struck was not possible to find out: the German Presidency, lobbied heavily by 
the German political foundations, played a crucial role in the decision.
59 J.M. Barroso, Speech at the launch ceremony of the EPD in Brussels, 15 April 2008. 
60 The European Commission also opposed the idea of financing directly an institution/foundation from 
the EIDHR budget. Furthermore, the Commission has to take into account the interest of the Council in 
programming the EIDHR, and if EPD were funded directly (with the oversight partly by the European 
Parliament, which can operate more politically), the Commission would have lost control over the 
expenditure. The Commission and the Council were in the end allies in blocking this mechanism. 
61 For example, the speech of Elmar Brok (EPP-ED, CSU, Germany) at the AFET meeting on 13 September 
2006
62 On both points successfully
63 Besides the Germans, also the British and the Dutch supported the arguments of the political foundations 
and withdrew their support for EPD. 
64 The reasoning behind the idea of establishing a clearing house and to develop the expertise to work 
with the Commission is again the need for flexibility of funding in order to facilitate the use of money in 
political hotspots (the European Parliament by its nature takes a more political approach to solving crisis 
situations or tackling regimes of all kinds), and to make possible the allocation of small grants. Such a 
clearing house (co-ordination institution) would help to tackle issues quicker and try to get the status of 
privileged partner of the Commission. 
65 For example, one of the democracy caucus members is involved in the European Foundation for 
Democracy and Solidarity steering committee, a co-ordination platform for social democratic parties in 
Europe interested in democracy development (political foundations of this political orientation are also 
members).
66 Edward McMillan-Scott MEP should be in charge of the new programme. 
67 As to the geographical focus of its activities, the principle “who provides funds, sets priorities” will most 
probably be applied, which can be seen as problematic. 
68 For example by Edward McMillan-Scott MEP, an influential member of the democracy caucus in the 
European Parliament and a heavyweight figure behind the establishment of the European Instrument for 
Democracy and Human Rights.
69 See also the following section. 
70 See EuropeAid Co-operation office Indicators 2007
71 Depending on the type of agency, of course; if a “classical” agency were established then yes; on the 
other hand, in the case of an executive agency of the Commission, it is not usually the case.  
72 The following part is based on interviews. 
73 Draft strategy documents go to the European Parliament at the same time as they reach the management 
committees.
74 The disadvantage of this system is that the MEPs are rather reluctant to take part in these deliberations, 
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Next	Generation	Democracy
Democracy Assistance Policies of the Visegrad Four 
Countries: Belarus
Marian Kowalski
Since Belarus is a consolidated authoritarian regime, it is not possible to talk about the democracy-building process, but rather about particular activities aimed at democ-
racy promotion or democracy assistance. Belarus is an authoritarian post-Soviet regime, 
where limited competition is allowed in political contests. The government has been led by 
President Aleksandr Lukashenko since 1994. Although the political opposition and several 
independent NGOs are not banned and they are allowed to work in a legal way, their 
space to influence public life is limited by legal obstacles, as well as by the limited space 
for independent media. 
The period since 2004 has been marked by increasing authoritarianism in the official 
policies of the Belarusian government, particularly in terms of the conduct of the state 
authorities towards non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and opposition political par-
ties. On the other hand, positive economic developments, the deep internal crisis within 
the opposition and the lack of a perspective for integration into the European Union (EU) 
have contributed to the consolidation of popular support for Lukashenko’s regime. 
A certain degree of political competition was preserved during the presidential elections 
of 2006, where opposition and independent candidates were allowed to run, but on the 
other hand they were accorded very limited access to the wider public. Participation in the 
electoral campaign in favour of opposition candidates was accompanied by persecution 
in the workplace, in particular at the local and regional level. As well as the opposition 
parties, inter national observer missions, organised by the Organization for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe and the EU, judged the elections to have 
been unfair, and criticised serious violations of human rights and democratic principles. 
The regime has refrained from mass persecutions, but did arrest the main opposition 
leaders who were considered to be the most dangerous, such as the presidential can-
didate Aleksandr Kozulin (not released until 16 August 2008). Those regarded by the 
regime as its most dangerous enemies comprise former members of the establishment and 
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negative social developments and extreme inequality in Russia and Ukraine. In both these 
countries, this perception has been exacerbated by the emergence of oligarchical systems 
and the accompanying close ties between organised crime and political elites. 
Furthermore, in recent years Lukashenko’s regime has refrained from the most odious 
manifestations of authoritarianism (the persecution of large sectors of the population, mass 
arrests, killing of dissidents, banning of political parties), unlike the totalitarian regimes 
in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. The stability of Lukashenko’s regime, especially since 
2001, has been based on a “social contract” with the population: the regime offered the 
people a guaranteed level of social welfare in return for their political loyalty.
 
On the other hand, the opposition has not managed to offer the citizens an alternative 
programme of political and social development. Its leaders have gradually lost touch with 
the citizens, partly through insufficient efforts on their part, but also owing to restricted 
access to the public. Meanwhile, the opposition leaders have been struggling to preserve 
their own political positions in the face of a decline in popular support for their parties, 
and for the opposition as a whole. 
The political opposition in Belarus is built on political party lines, and the traditional 
divisions between the parties have been ideological in character (left-wing: Party of 
Communists of Belarus, PCB; social democratic parties, Labour Party; national demo-
cratic opposition: Belarusian Popular Front Party, BPF; liberal democratic: United Civic 
Party of Belarus, UCPB). The other dividing line cuts through their different visions of the 
geo political future of the country. Whereas BPF is openly in favour of the Euro-Atlantic 
integration of Belarus, PCB and partially UCPB have opted for close co-operation with the 
Russian Federation.
There is also a cultural cleavage since BPF promotes the prevalence of the Belarusian 
language in society, whereas other political parties prefer a more pragmatic approach, 
reflecting the current situation in society. Such dividing lines within the opposition hamper 
the integration of opposition forces, and are very often exploited by the current regime to 
weaken the opposition. 
In addition, a new conflict emerged within the opposition after the 2006 presidential elec-
tions, namely between Aliaksandr Milinkievich, the 2006 presidential candidate of the 
United Democratic Forces (which brought together the majority of the opposition), and the 
leaders of the individual opposition parties. Milinkievich and his movement, For Freedom 
(Za svabodu), embarked upon an overhaul of the current structure of the opposition, which 
- in his view - no longer meets the needs of Belarusian society. Milinkievich proposed to 
build a non-partisan movement through close co-operation with the NGO sector. This led 
to the removal of Milinkievich from the position of the leader of the United Democratic 
Forces in 2007, and the failure of the two opposition factions to establish a common plat-
form ahead of the parliamentary elections of 28 September 2008. 
representatives of the opposition who have, or are suspected of having, close ties to pro-
Kremlin politicians from Russia. 
Legislative changes adopted after the presidential elections of 2001, and later after the 
“Orange revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, made the scope for the development in a stand-
ard, legal manner of formal co-operation between local NGOs and their partners abroad 
almost impossible. Even those organisations that can still work within the legal frame-
work in Belarus are not allowed to receive financial support from abroad or to organise 
events with international participation on the territory of Belarus. Instead, many NGOs 
lost their legal status and were forced to register abroad. Due to state control over small 
and  medium-sized private businesses, the NGO sector in Belarus is highly dependent on 
foreign donors, which very often are their only source of financing. Private local business-
men supporting the opposition or NGOs are exposed to persecution. After 2004, youth 
exchange activities and international scientific co-operation also faced harsh restrictions. 
Since the 2006 presidential elections, restrictions have been imposed on several NGOs, 
mainly think-tanks, and also on independent media. Even media that are still allowed to 
be published in Belarus (Narodnaya Volya, Nasha Niva) are not allowed to be publicly 
distributed. 
Under these circumstances, democracy assistance based on partnership between official 
institutions and NGOs is almost impossible. Dialogue between official institutions and the 
NGO sector is conducted only in an informal way, particularly in the case of preparations 
for economic reforms, where some representatives of official institutions do take part in 
events organised by the opposition, and vice-versa. On the other hand, such dialogue 
does not take place in a systematic way, and can hardly be considered as an indicator 
of regime liberalisation. 
In the absence of the free exchange of information and a de facto lack of public debate 
in Belarus, it is hard to estimate the real direct influence of NGOs on Belarusian society.	
A large number of democracy assistance projects have to be conducted outside the terri-
tory of Belarus or underground in conspiratorial fashion. Thus their impact on the public 
is questionable. Due to the persistent high level of popular support for the regime, civil 
society operates in relative isolation, and it is vulnerable to the leakage of its own activists 
either into the private business sector, the official sphere or abroad.
Moreover, the political opposition in Belarus is facing the deepest crisis since Lukashenko 
came to power in 1994. There are several reasons why the political opposition in the 
country is marginalised. On the one hand, Belarus has experienced a relatively long 
period of economic growth since 2003. The economic policies of the regime have been 
focused on the development of mass consumption, so society has not felt the need for radi-
cal economic change. In fact, Belarus has been perceived as a success story not only by 
Belarusians themselves, but even by some in other post-Soviet countries in the context of 
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Personal disputes, combined with the discontent with the existing political party leaders 
felt by ordinary members and lower-level activists, heightened the conflicts within the par-
ties. One example was the conflict within BPF, resulting in the expulsion from the party of 
the former deputy chairman, Ales Michalevic.
Meanwhile, the changes in political and economic relations between Minsk and the Rus-
sian Federation signal an imminent revision of the current social contract. The regime is 
planning to introduce moderate economic reforms based on the commercialisation of the 
state-owned enterprises and “nomenclature privatisation”, the beneficiaries of which are 
state officials and the management of state companies. These changes to the social con-
tract are taking place against a background of conflicts among the ruling elites, where the 
“siloviki” (representatives of the KGB) have lost ground to the more pragmatic represent-
atives of the management of the state enterprises. These conflicts surrounded the removal 
of Viktor Sheiman from the position of Secretary of the Security Council after around 50 
people were injured by a bomb explosion at a concert on “official” Independence Day, 3 
July 2008. However, these changes are also accompanied by the intensification of polit-
ical persecution against the opposition and NGOs. 
KEy	CONCLUSIONS
Although the Belarusian regime can be des-
cribed as “soft authoritarian” compared with 
the likes of Turkmenistan, opposition and 
NGO activists in Belarus face intimidation 
on a daily basis. Internal conflicts among 
the governing elites in the country, and 
the launch of the process of “nomenclature 
privat isation”, are being accompanied by an 
intensification of political persecution in Bela-
rus. At the same time, the regime is seeking 
an improvement of relations with the EU in 
order to decrease its dependence on Russia. 
Democratisation is an important potential lev-
erage the EU can deploy as a condition of 
any EU-Belarus rapprochement and the acc-
ession of Belarus to the Council of Europe. 
In spite of the deterioration of the social and 
economic situation, the influence of the oppo-
sition is decreasing due to the fragmentation 
and deep crisis within the opposition - which 
seems out of tune with the concerns of Bela-
rusian society.
   
Although the financial contribution of the 
Visegrad Four (V4) countries to democracy 
assistance programmes in Belarus remains 
relatively modest, albeit increasing, the 
NGOs and governments from the V4 enjoy a 
good reputation among Belarusian civil soci-
ety due to their understanding of the current 
situation facing their Belarusian counterparts. 
The overall impact of V4 countries’ democ-
racy assistance in Belarus is considerable, 
mainly in terms of the change of the percep-
tion of the “Belarusian issue” within the EU. 
The EU accession in 2004 of some post-
communist countries (in particular Poland, 
Lithuania, Latvia, the Slovak Republic, and 
the Czech Republic) contributed to a substan-
tially improved co-ordination in EU relations 
towards Belarus. 
The co-ordination among the V4 coun-
tries of policies towards Belarus, including 
demo cracy assistance, is still in its infancy, 
however. There is room for improvement, 
principally at the level of Visegrad structures, 
governmental officials, ministers of foreign af-
fairs and ambassadors. Better co-ordination 
and co-operation will increase the profile of 
the Visegrad group and its individual mem-
bers in Belarus, and further development of 
the Eastern Partnership as a modification 
of the European Neighbourhood Policy will 
present a new challenge to test the ability of 
the V4 states to act together. 
The worst examples of donors’ practices - 
like the requirement to interact with state 
authorities or to have an official bank acc-
ount, which cannot be met under the current 
situation - have already been abandoned. At 
the same time, problems persist concerning 
the security of the Belarusian participants 
and organisations implementing democracy 
assistance projects. Another problem is the 
lack of continuity in the financing of partic-
ular projects. 
The implementation of democracy assistance 
projects should be the subject of regular in-
dependent monitoring. On many occasions, 
local needs are not adequately acknowledged 
since Belarusian organisations play only a sec-
ondary, service role in the projects. Generally, 
the Belarusian NGOs are keen for the projects 
to be well designed, and for their role to be 
recognised as genuine partners. In their view, 
greater engagement of Belarusian NGOs is 
needed at the stage of discussions on the ass-
istance priorities of the V4 countries. 
Although contacts with the highest repre-
sentatives of the Belarusian government are 
not recommended considering the regime’s 
widespread violations of human rights and 
democratic principles, the presence of the 
EU in terms of cross-border co-operation, as 
well as economic and cultural co-operation, 
should be increased in order to prevent the 
isolation of the country and a further increase 
in the influence of the Russian Federation. 
A persistent problem in the practices of sev-
eral donors, e.g. the Swedish International 
Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) or 
the European Commission, has been the req-
uirement for co-financing, even though this 
requirement now appears less frequently than 
in the past. This is a case of double standards 
by donors, which encourages “creative acc-
ounting” and other dubious practices. Other 
obstacles are posed by excessive red tape. 
Larger organisations are able to ensure 
their own contribution through their offices 
or personnel, including volunteers, but the 
requirement excludes smaller organisations 
from obtaining a grant. The European Radio 
for Belarus broadcasting project is a special 
case, because the donors’ project-financing 
structure often meets the needs of the given 
project in a very limited way, as more than 
50% of the budget comprises rental costs 
of sound-broadcasting transmitters on the 
territory of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, and 
Latvia. 
In addition to the “traditional” NGOs foc-
used on human rights protection, Belarusian 
society needs alternative projects focusing on 
the country’s future - a necessary condition 
of which would be the creation of a counter-
elite prepared for a change in the political 
constellation.
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POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS
Taking into account the factors cited above, 
and the current state of democracy and civil 
society in Belarus, the following policy steps 
can be recommended:
Continue the pressure on Belarus for • 
democratisation at the bilateral and multi-
lateral level, including the EU, OSCE and 
Council of Europe. Such pressure should 
be accompanied by positive incentives 
to Belarus, including the prospects of EU 
membership on the condition that Belarus 
fulfils the respective criteria and that a 
membership application is in line with the 
wishes of the Belarusian people. 
Closer co-operation with the current Bela-• 
rusian authorities should be developed 
only after a significant improvement of the 
situation in the field of human rights. As 
recent developments show, the minimum 
requirements of the international commu-
nity should not be limited to the release 
of political prisoners, but should extend 
also to tangible steps towards improved 
civil liberties and freedom of associa-
tion, including at least the abolition of the 
so-called “counter-revolutionary laws”, 
adopted in 2005.
An enhanced V4 co-operation could be • 
formalised in Belarus. In order to avoid 
duplication and inadvertent competition 
among them, the V4 countries should 
co-ordinate their policies as well as pool 
resources by setting up a special fund for 
Belarus. In effect, the activities of such a 
fund could be less politically controversial 
in Belarus than the activities of national 
governments, especially Poland. The fund 
would be less vulnerable to propaganda 
attacks by the Lukashenko regime. It should 
not be a replacement for national priorities 
or national funding by the individual V4 
governments, but supplementary to them, 
and a forum for knowledge exchange and 
co-ordination.
It is necessary to increase co-operation • 
between the V4 states and other donors in 
information exchange and co-ordination 
of donor policies towards Belarus. On the 
political level, their natural partners are 
Lithuania, Latvia, and the Scandinavian 
states, and the Visegrad states should try 
to establish at least a consultative forum 
on donor policy together with German 
donors as well. Such an approach would 
increase the “European” dimension of the 
V4 donor policy towards Belarus and in-
crease the EU presence in the country.
There is a need for increased co-operation • 
at the level of the heads of the V4 diplo-
matic missions in Belarus. This would raise 
the profile of the V4 countries in Belarus, 
contributing to the more effective co-
ordination of their democracy assistance 
policies and policies towards the Bela-
rusian authorities. 
The dialogue with civil society in Belarus • 
should be continued. This dialogue is a 
very important contribution on the part 
of the V4 countries in the context of EU 
policy towards Belarus and should be 
taken to an EU-wide level, not limited to 
the European Parliament, as has been the 
case to date. Representatives of civil soc-
iety from Belarus should be viewed not 
only as the recipients of democracy assist-
ance, but as partners of the EU. The V4 
countries could actively promote the idea 
of introducing the model of a standing 
consultative platform between the EU and 
civil society from Belarus. This approach 
would help the recently fragmented and 
marginalised Belarusian opposition to 
reach agreement, and even consolid-
ation, and it would send a strong signal to 
the people of Belarus that their country’s 
democratic future is one of the priorities of 
EU foreign policy. 
A higher profile for the EU in Belarus • 
should be encouraged by the V4 coun-
tries, e.g. by supporting the development 
of cultural and economic co-operation bet-
ween the EU and Belarus. The experience 
of the V4, especially in the case of Poland 
and Hungary, has already demonstrated 
how the increasing economic and cultural 
presence of the West in the 1980s con-
tributed to the erosion of the authoritarian 
regimes. 
The V4 countries should actively support • 
the EU Eastern Partnership proposal, 
which was adopted by the European 
Council in June 2008. The new EU policy 
towards Belarus will be developed in the 
framework of this programme, and its suc-
cess will depend to a large extent on the 
activities of the EU member states inter-
ested in the strengthening of EU relations 
with its eastern neighbours. 
Stronger co-operation on the level of the • 
V4 countries will be almost impossible 
without encouraging Hungarian partners 
to engage more deeply in democracy 
assistance to Belarus. A first step might in-
volve some Hungarian NGOs in common 
projects with other V4 partners focusing 
on Belarus; a second stage could be the 
involvement of the Hungarian govern-
ment. Hungarian NGOs could identify 
some niches, such as the support of small 
and medium-sized enterprises in Belarus, 
local and community-centred initiatives, 
capacity building of NGOs (where the 
International Centre for Democratic Trans-
ition - ICDT - a Hungarian NGO, has 
begun activities in Belarus), and the sup-
port of independent publishing activities. 
The V4 countries should make use of the • 
comparative advantage of V4 NGOs 
owing to the fact that they come from tran-
sition countries and can better appreciate 
the conditions of working in a country 
like Belarus, with an autocratic regime 
not dissimilar to the communist regimes of 
Central Europe in the 1980s. In particular, 
the “negotiated transitions” to democracy 
in 1989 should provide lessons and  offer 
inspiration for democratic change in Bela-
rus. Democracy assistance should be 
focused on long-term activities and, in the 
current political situation in the country, on 
a process of gradual change of the polit-
ical and economic climate in Belarus.
A democratic elite should be fostered in • 
Belarus, a group of professionals able to 
lead the country in the event of a change 
of regime. Towards this goal, scholarship 
programmes should be made an even 
greater priority for V4 democracy ass-
istance, and where possible this should 
include study in Belarus. This could be 
handled either by a dedicated V4 Fund 
for Belarus or through the International 
Visegrad Fund (which launched a Belarus 
Scholarship programme in the summer of 
2008, with the intention of funding 80 
semesters of study annually). Scholarship 
programmes should be prioritised: law, 
sociology, political science, EU studies, 
international relations, public administ-
ration, law, economics and public policy 
should be the priorities. In addition, long-
term internships with V4 NGOs should be 
supported.
In the face of the current isolation of civil • 
society in Belarus, efforts to turn the situ-
ation around must be intensified. New 
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International	Democracy	Assistance	
Programmes	in	Belarus
The United States is the biggest supporter of democracy assistance programmes in Bela-
rus. The current US democracy assistance policy is based on the Belarus Democracy Act, 
adopted by the House of Representatives on 4 October 2004. The act authorised assist-
ance not only for the NGO sector and independent media, but also for political parties. 
From an initial amount of US$ 5 million in 2005, official support for the democracy ass-
istance programme in Belarus increased to US$ 24m for the period of 2006-2007. On 
6 May 2008, a bill extending the Belarus Democracy Act for two more years was intro-
duced for consideration by the US Congress. 
In 2007, the total amount of the Foreign Operations Appropriated Assistance to Belarus 
reached US$ 11.34m, 90% of which (US$ 8.95m) was allocated to the area “Govern-
ing Justly and Democratically”, with the main focus on: building the capacity of NGOs 
in Belarus to increase public participation and act as agents for change; strengthening 
independent media outlets and journalists inside and outside of Belarus to increase acc-
ess to independent information; and building the capacity of democratic parties to unify, 
strategise, organise, and connect with constituents. 
Another 7% of the total assistance (US$ 1.55m) was earmarked for the area, “Investing 
in People”, where in addition to some humanitarian activities (combating HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis, combating human trafficking, and help to the people living in Chernobyl-
affected regions) the allocation supported the study of 900 students from Belarus at the 
European Humanities University in Vilnius. Although the estimated amount of the For-
eign Operations Appropriated Assistance to Belarus for the year 2008 was reduced to 
US$ 10.19m, the share for democracy assistance programmes remained more or less 
the same. 
The United States prefers a direct approach, with its democracy assistance almost excl-
usively focused on the NGO sector and on the independent media. The US applies a 
tough approach towards the official Belarusian authorities. In the words of US Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice, the Lukashenko regime is “the last true dictatorship in the 
centre of Europe”.1 This prompted negative reactions from the regime and escalating ten-
sions between the US and Belarus, which resulted in the diplomatic conflict in spring 2008 
when the US considered the closing of their embassy in Minsk. The US declared its sup-
port for economic sanctions against the Belarusian regime, which were applied against 
the state oil and chemical corporation, Belneftekhim. 
The EU takes a different approach in its policies towards Belarus. Although the role of 
demo cracy assistance programmes in Belarus has been increasing in EU policy, especially 
target groups should be identified, above 
all by the Belarusian opposition, by do-
nors and by local NGO stakeholders, in 
particular groups and individuals poten-
tially interested in political and economical 
changes, e.g. small and medium-sized 
entre preneurs, young urban professionals, 
environmental activists, etc.
A wider spectrum of Belarusian NGOs • 
should be involved in discussions about 
future policies on democracy promotion in 
Belarus, including cultural or community 
initiatives. Another priority field identified 
by this study’s research was the support of 
free information exchange, i.e. independ-
ent media available to a larger share of 
the Belarusian population.
Consultation on the V4 level between the • 
officers responsible for democracy assist-
ance policy and the representatives of V4 
and Belarusian NGOs would contribute to 
improved needs assessments in the area 
of democracy assistance, and increased 
transparency of donors’ policies towards 
Belarus. 
Study the possibility to enable Belarusian • 
NGOs to apply directly for Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) funds in particular 
V4 countries, conditional on accountabil-
ity and responsibility being borne by the 
Belarusian NGOs. This should also be 
explored within the context of the Inter-
national Visegrad Fund, so that Belarusian 
NGOs could more easily be the lead ap-
plicants. Where possible, an increased 
share of the financial resources designed 
for Belarus projects should go directly to 
the Belarusian partners. 
Establish mechanisms for quick funding • 
decisions or more flexible institutional 
and project funding - so that projects can 
be put into action quickly (in particular, 
ahead of parliamentary and presidential 
elections)
Co-ordination to meet the need for under-• 
ground survival training, for instance 
on individual security, and protection of 
sensitive computer data from raids by the 
authorities.
Strike a balance between financing project • 
implementation and the institutional 
develop ment of NGOs. Donors should 
abandon the requirement that recipients 
must provide their own financial contribu-
tion towards individual projects - in order 
to avoid “creative accounting” and dis-
crimination against smaller organisations.
The continuity of successful projects sup-• 
ported in the framework of democracy 
assistance should be given priority. This 
will also improve the credibility of the 
Bela rusian NGO sector and the reputa-
tion of the western donors’ community.
The accountability of the recipient NGOs • 
and the professional skills of their staff 
should be increased to equip them to be 
more competitive in grant application 
procedures, especially in applying for 
EU grants. In the case of newly estab-
lished  organisations without experience 
in project management, some “positive 
discrimination” could be allowed for a 
first project, if combined with project 
management training for subsequent ap-
plications. 
Where possible, donors should conduct • 
regular independent project monitoring 
and evaluation in order to increase the 
transparency of democracy assistance 
provided to Belarus.
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In 2007, in co-operation with the Nordic Council of Ministers, the European Commission 
launched an additional programme to provide support for 300 students - victims of politi-
cal persecution in Belarus - to continue their studies at EHU (200 students) and in Ukraine 
(100 students). In the course of 2005-2007, the European Commission supported EHU 
and Belarusian students to the tune of € 7.7m, and it became the largest donor to EHU. In 
April 2008, the Commission allocated another € 1m to support EHU. In order to ensure 
transparent and consistent support to EHU, the Nordic Council of Ministers was setting up 
a Trust Fund in 2008, intended to pool the financial support of the Commission and other 
donors, including the bilateral contributions of EU member states.
Since 2007, the Commission has also provided scholarships for Belarusian students within 
the framework of the Erasmus Mundus Programme. Participation in the Erasmus Mundus 
External Co-operation Window (EMECW) enables Belarusian students to study abroad at 
an EU university of their choice.
While the contribution of the EU to dialogue with Belarusian citizens is relatively high, 
its communication with Belarusian civil society is still relatively low. Applicants for grants 
complain about the difficulties and the huge administrative requirements. At the same 
time, some projects, such as the EU-funded “Support to capacity building and networking 
of Belarusian NGOs and local authorities”, are in fact providing support to pro-govern-
mental NGOs as co-operation between independent NGOs and local authorities is hardly 
possible under the conditions of an authoritarian regime.
Another reason why the Belarus-focused policies of the EU are only in their infancy is the 
fact that the enlarged EU lacks experience in working with civil society on the European 
level. This creates difficulties in building a “European network” of NGOs, research insti-
tutions and other organisations that would help to develop the EU’s “soft power” under 
the current conditions in Belarus, where state officials, and probably even the majority of 
citizens, are not open to the promotion of European values.
For this reason, the most important sources for financing democracy assistance towards 
civil society in Belarus remain individual country donors, namely the US and individual 
EU member states.
Even if we assume that the main principles and the institutional basis of EU policy towards 
Belarus are more or less adequate to the needs of the country, and that the EU is starting 
to extend dialogue beyond the official establishment in Belarus, reaching Belarusian citi-
zens, there remains the problem of the inconsistency of its policies regarding Belarus. 
One example was the lack of a clear message to Belarusian elites and citizens at the time 
of the opening of the Delegation of the European Commission in Minsk on 7 March 2008. 
Moreover, the EU adopts a routine approach even on the occasion of events such as 
 Human Rights Day or Press Freedom Day, when only general declarations are issued, and 
since the presidential elections of 2006, the European approach is more moderate than 
that of the US. The EU combines sanctions with limited dialogue, but many EU representa-
tives are not convinced about the efficiency of sanctions. (After the release of political 
prisoners in August 2008, the Polish Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, proposed a 
lifting of sanctions, on the basis that Cuba had been given a reprieve, so Belarus should 
be treated similarly. The call also coincided with pressure from Russia on the Belarusian 
leadership to support the Kremlin’s policies towards Georgia, including recognition of the 
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, so an opportunity was deemed to have 
emerged to strengthen the EU orientation of the regime in the face of Russian pressure.)
EU assistance to Belarus is divided into two categories: 70% of the funds are set aside 
for “the needs of population”, and the rest allocated for direct support to democratis-
ation and civil society. This distribution is maintained in the new Belarus Country Strategy 
 Paper for 2007-2013. The EU assistance for the support of the needs of the population is 
focused on areas where co-operation with the Belarusian authorities is inevitable, such as 
combating the negative effects of the Chernobyl disaster, human trafficking, support for 
border management, and environmental and sustainable development projects. The EU is 
also involved in the project, “Promotion of wider application of international human rights 
standards in the administration of justice in Belarus”.
After the EU enlargement of 2004, assistance from the EU members states and NGOs 
increased from € 10m to around € 12m for 2005 and 2006. In 2006, the EU intro-
duced for Belarus the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), 
which aimed to support civil society in the promotion of human rights, political pluralism 
and democratic participation and representation, and the so-called Decentralised Co-
operation Budget Line, operating independently from the Belarusian authorities. In the 
years 2005-2006, EIDHR assistance amounted to ca € 5m. The EU is actively involved 
in support for independent media (radio and TV broadcasting to Belarus by European 
Radio for Belarus and TV RTVi), mainly through the support of the programme, “Window 
to Europe”, implemented by Media Consulta. The aim of the media projects is to raise 
awareness of the EU among Belarusian citizens and to communicate the challenges and 
opportunities that exist in Europe.
The support for education programmes has had a significant impact on Belarusian society. 
The EU is supporting the European Humanities University (EHU), which was forced to move 
to Vilnius, Lithuania, in 2004. In October 2006, the EU launched a major programme to 
support scholarships for 350 Belarusian students wishing to study abroad. Scholarships 
are granted to students who have been penalised by the Belarus regime and who have 
been denied access to local universities as a result of their political activities during and 
since the presidential elections of March 2006. The EU is financing these scholarships 
jointly with the Nordic Council of Ministers (NCM) - approximately 85% of the funds come 
from the EU and 15% from NCM. The programme was launched in October 2006. 
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Visegrad	Four	Democracy	
Promotion	Programmes
The V4 NGOs have a long tradition of co-operation with Belarusian organisations. This is 
particularly true of Poland, yet NGOs from the Czech Republic and Slovakia also started 
to promote joint activities with their Belarusian partners prior to their integration into the 
EU, usually with the financial assistance of foreign donors.
A relatively recent phenomenon is financial assistance from the side of the V4 govern-
ments for the promotion of democratic activities. This assistance also takes the EU into 
new territory, previously explored only by Denmark, Sweden and partially Germany. 
The distinctive features of the V4 countries’ “democracy promotion” programmes can be 
identified in their interest in democratising Belarus and bringing it closer to the EU, in the 
inclusion in the foreign policy agenda of the new EU member states of a determination to 
increase the EU’s involvement in the post-Soviet region. These activities of the V4 countries 
represent new ground for the EU as a whole.
The V4 countries, however, differ significantly in the level of priority they give to the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood Policy and to democracy assistance - and this is reflected in the 
degree of their involvement in supporting Belarusian NGOs (for instance, with the recent 
exception of ICDT, the absence of Hungarian partner organisations from supporting the 
non-governmental sector in Belarus, whereas for the other V4 countries and Lithuania, Be-
larus ranks as one of the priority post-Soviet countries in terms of democracy assistance). 
Likewise, the motivation of the individual V4 member states in providing democracy ass-
istance to Belarus is different. On the one hand, for Poland, Belarus is a neighbouring 
country. Poland’s “Eastern” policy, especially towards Ukraine and Belarus, was con-
ceptualised even before 1989 by Jerzy Giedroyc and Juliusz Mieroszewski in terms of 
the support for their independence in order to guarantee Polish security. On the other 
hand, for the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the democracy assistance provided to Belarus 
means above all a moral duty to offer help to people suffering under an undemocratic 
regime, while also signalling their new identity as recognised, consolidated democracies 
- and new members of the EU. Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Poland consider Belarus 
to be a potential future participant in the process of Euro-Atlantic integration. 
The reason for the Hungarian “absence” from the democracy assistance provided to Be-
larus lies in the fact that the priorities of Hungarian foreign policy in terms of democracy 
assistance have been focused on the region of the Western Balkans, above all Serbia, 
and on the neighbouring states, particularly on minority issues or on regions inhabited 
by Hungarian minorities. More recently, signs of greater interest have become evident. In 
the beginning of 2008, Hungary decided to open its embassy in Minsk, and to donate 
€ 50,000 to EHU.
are not accompanied by declarations or events focused on Belarus, despite its proximity 
as the EU’s immediate neighbour.  
Within the EU, the degree of attention to Belarus varies significantly among EU members. 
There has been a visible increase in the EU’s interest towards Belarus since the EU en-
largement in 2004 and the Belarus presidential elections of 2006. The opening of the 
Delegation of the European Commission to Belarus marked a significant step, but on the 
other hand as of 2007 only 11 EU countries had embassies in Belarus. (In 2008, Hungary 
announced the opening of its embassy in Minsk.) 
Individual EU member states also provide a different level of assistance to Belarus. Coun-
tries such as Belgium, Spain, Luxembourg and Portugal have not provided any assistance 
to Belarus. Other countries, such as Austria, Greece (in the period 1997-2002), Ireland 
and Italy, provide mainly humanitarian aid to Belarus, while France is focused on the 
support of activities in the areas of cultural, education, university, scientific and technical 
co-operation. 
On the other hand, the United Kingdom, Germany, Netherlands, the V4 countries, as 
well as the Baltic and Scandinavian states, are actively involved in democracy assistance 
towards Belarus. The Scandinavian states support EHU, and the UK provides democracy 
assistance to Belarus directly through the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 
The largest international donor in Belarus is Germany, although much of its support for 
NGOs acting in Belarus does not concentrate on democracy assistance. Particularly signif-
icant is the contribution of Denmark and Sweden. Both countries used to act through their 
governmental programmes and agencies. Denmark provides support for the strengthening 
of civil society and independent media in the framework of the Danish Neighbourhood 
Programme, and in 2006 the Danish MFA financed a project focused on the promotion 
of free and fair elections. The project, financed by the Danish government, used to be 
implemented by NGOs, such as International Media Support or SILBA. The latter project 
was implemented by SILBA in co-operation with the Social Democratic youth of Denmark. 
Denmark provides democracy assistance through its civil society programme as well. Swe-
den provides democracy assistance programmes via the governmental agency SIDA. 
The Norwegian Helsinki Committee and Human Rights House Foundation are present in 
Belarus, and the Netherlands supports Belarusian NGOs through a small grant scheme 
in the framework of the Matra KAP programme run by the embassy in Warsaw. Among 
the Baltic states, Lithuania provides the most active contribution to democracy assistance 
in Belarus. Its capital, Vilnius, is host to a number of Belarusian NGOs whose registra-
tion was withdrawn in Belarus, and it hosts both EHU and Human Rights House. Belarus 
belongs to the top priorities of Lithuanian official development assistance (attracting 23% 
of total funds), second only to Afghanistan (47%)
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largest non-state grantor based in the V4 countries, but its programmes for Belarus are 
financed by other sponsors, thus the Batory Foundation is in effect re-granting the funds. 
Due to the relatively small amount of financing from the state budget, as well as the long 
traditions and good reputation of V4 NGOs in Belarus, their projects are very often fin-
anced or co-financed by foreign donors. The most active in co-operation with V4 NGOs 
are donors from the US, namely the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). The projects of some Visegrad-
based NGOs are financed by European donors, such as the Westminster Foundation for 
Democracy, the Norwegian Human Rights House Foundation, and Radio Free Europe/
Radio Liberty. 
Other donors supporting democracy assistance projects implemented by V4 NGOs in-
clude the Open Society Institute (OSI) and the European Commission, but their visibility is 
lower than in the case of the American donors. As a result, those NGOs from V4 countries 
focused on democracy assistance in Belarus sometimes attract criticism within Belarus that 
they represent US interests. 
The co-ordination of policies towards Belarus at the Visegrad Group level remains at an 
early stage of development. The V4 countries have to date developed democracy assist-
ance programmes principally at the national level. The first major joint activity was the 
participation of representatives of Belarusian NGOs at the 15th meeting of V4 culture min-
isters in Cracow (3-5 September 2006), which proclaimed a more active participation of 
Belarusian partners at events financed by the International Visegrad Fund. The promotion 
of joint activities towards Belarus was also the objective of the Slovak presidency of the V4 
(July 2006 - June 2007). Joint multilateral activities of the Visegrad Group towards Belarus 
are taking shape in the case of the International Visegrad Fund’s scholarship programme 
(In-Coming Scholarships): in the academic year 2007/2008, scholarships were granted 
to 12 Belarusian students to study in one of the V4 countries (three in the Czech Republic, 
three in Hungary, two in Poland, and four in Slovakia). 
On the national level, the scholarship policy for Belarusian students is different. To a 
large extent, it is developed in Poland within the framework of the dedicated Konstanty 
Kalinowski Scholarship Programme, directly targeting Belarusian students. Several schol-
arship programmes targeted at students from Belarus were implemented in the Czech 
Republic after the presidential elections of 2006. In the case of Slovakia, students from 
Belarus are eligible to apply for the National Scholarship programme under the same 
rules as the citizens of EU member states and other countries participating in the Bologna 
process.
Even though the NGOs from V4 countries have well-established partner contacts with 
other V4 NGOs, these contacts are seldom transformed into direct co-operation in imple-
menting joint projects for Belarus. One of the exceptions is the Belarus Public Policy Fund 
The different motivations for providing democracy assistance to Belarus, combined with 
different cultural traditions and historical experiences, play a part in determining the 
content of activities supported by the V4 countries. Thus, according to the Polish MFA, the 
priorities include “dissemination of objective information about the present day and his-
tory and Belarusian cultural identity, especially in the Belarusian language”. On the other 
hand, issues of identity do not play an important role in the donors’ policy of either the 
Czech Republic or Slovakia. Whereas the Czech MFA is predominantly focused on issues 
of human rights and - since 2006 - support for Belarusian students, Slovak NGOs and the 
Slovak MFA have been actively involved mainly in third-sector capacity-building projects, 
particularly in the training of NGO activists and in the development of an independent 
analytical community in the country. Nevertheless, in recent years partner organisations 
from the Czech Republic and Slovakia have realised the need for support for cultural 
projects in today’s Belarus as well. 
Poland’s long-standing experience and potential for co-operation with Belarus have nat-
urally affected the extent of co-operation with Belarusian partners. Polish NGOs are more 
actively involved in co-operation with Belarusian partners based outside the capital city, 
Minsk, than their Slovak and Czech counterparts.  
The institutional framework of democracy assistance policy provided by the individual V4 
governments is different as well. In Slovakia and in Poland, the official democracy assist-
ance policy is considered to be a part of ODA. In Poland, NGO projects in Belarus are 
selected by officials from the territorial unit of the MFA (responsible for Eastern Europe) 
and the Development Co-operation unit, overseeing the technical conditions of the bids. 
In the Czech Republic, the Transition Promotion programme concept was adopted in April 
2005 as the official strategy of Czech democracy assistance. It is managed by the Transi-
tion Promotion unit, an autonomous unit of the MFA with its own budget. In 2008, the unit 
merged with the Department of Human Rights into the new Human Rights and Transition 
Policy department (HRTP). 
Visegrad democracy assistance projects for Belarus are usually implemented by V4 
NGOs. In Slovakia, they have been performed exclusively by NGOs, whereas in the 
Czech Republic and in Poland the state institutions are directly involved in certain projects. 
For example, the Czech MFA published an unofficial translation into Belarusian of the 
resolution in 2005 of the UN Human Rights Council and the report of the Special Rap-
porteur, Adrian Severin. The Polish government provides funding for Polish government 
media initiatives, which currently take up a higher share of the budget than NGO projects. 
Warsaw is actively involved in support for “Radio Racyja” and the “Belsat” TV channel for 
Belarus. The Polish government was also an initiator of the Konstanty Kalinowski Scholar-
ship Programme. 
The funding for the activities of V4 NGOs comes from either national governments or 
foreign donors, both public and private. The Stefan Batory Foundation in Poland is the 
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The overall impact of the V4 countries’ democracy assistance in Belarus is considerable, 
mainly in terms of the change of the perception of the “Belarusian issue” in the EU. The EU 
accession of some post-communist countries in 2004 contributed to substantial changes in 
the EU policy towards Belarus. 
The interest of EU institutions in Belarus has increased, although the presence of the EU 
in Belarus is still not very visible. The “non-paper”, entitled “What the European Union 
could bring to Belarus”, published in November 2006, describing the benefits on offer to 
the country upon fulfilment of improvements in the field of human rights, remained largely 
unnoticed, as is the EU presence as a donor for Belarusian civil society. The European 
Commission is often criticised for a high degree of bureaucracy and an unwillingness to 
support projects that could become the subject of political confrontation with the Belaru-
sian government.
In spite of the relatively small amounts of funds that comprise V4 financial aid, Belarusian 
partners appreciate the co-operation with V4 partners - both NGOs and governments - as 
they can understand the current situation in Belarus, and their democratisation experience 
is partially applicable in Belarus. 
In many cases, the joint project implementation has emerged from the result of long-term of-
ficial or informal contacts between Belarusian NGOs and their V4 partner organisations, 
often having worked together on joint projects financed by donors from third countries. 
The majority of the Belarusian partners find the character of co-operation with the V4 
countries positive and a relationship based on equal partnership. 
From a technical point of view, the most negative examples of V4 donor policies, such as 
the requirements to interact with state authorities or to have an official bank account, have 
been abandoned. For security reasons, it is often impossible to meet the requirement of off-
icial accounting documents and invoices for some items (such as the purchase of printing 
paper or colour printing, etc). The requirement to keep project documentation for a period 
of three years also poses a security risk for NGOs, and jeopardises the safety of project 
participants under the current conditions. The lack of donors’ understanding of security 
issues is the main concern expressed by representatives of Belarusian NGOs.  
As for the donors’ requirements for project contents, objections are raised mainly to the 
donors from the US and to European donors who implement projects financed from the 
US; for example, there was a split in the NGO community prior to the 2001 presidential 
elections as a result of the donors’ policies and conflicts between the donor structures. 
Similar objections were raised to the donors’ requirement that vertical opposition struc-
tures should be formed. 
If there is a trend characterising the democracy assistance projects provided by V4 NGOs, 
it is their internationalisation. This is the case of TV Belsat that was initially launched as a 
programme of the Pontis Foundation in Slovakia, whose activities were co-financed by the 
Transition Promotion unit of the Czech MFA. Another example is the co-operation between 
People in Need (PIN), which is focused on supporting local activists, and Poland’s East 
European Democracy Center. Both organisations regularly arrange visits of Belarusian 
opposition activists to Poland and the Czech Republic.
There are several reasons why the V4 should increase their co-operation in promoting 
democracy in Belarus, including the history of the Visegrad Group itself and the group’s 
goals to reconstruct the region of Central and Eastern Europe, to establish democratic 
societies and to join Euro-Atlantic structures. The Visegrad Group is an intellectual project 
based on the historical experience of former dissidents, built upon the understanding that 
Central and Eastern European nations share a common fate. Currently, the key message 
of the Visegrad experience is the relatively successful model of transition that these coun-
tries have developed. 
On the other hand, there are also more pragmatic reasons why the Visegrad Group 
should help Belarus, which include the desire of all Visegrad Group members to have a 
stable and predictable partner with common political values on its eastern borders. The 
experiences with Ukraine are another reason why the V4 countries want to further develop 
their co-operation with Belarus. The developments after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine 
particularly reveal the need to build extensive alliances, especially in terms of promoting 
a country’s EU membership. To date, the V4 countries have not been highly influential in 
the EU, with the exception of Poland, but if co-ordinated they can provide Poland with the 
necessary support to push their common agenda. 
The recent changes in Hungarian policy provide an impetus for enhancing co-operation 
among the V4 countries. At the same time, Hungary is only now drafting its priorities 
regarding Belarus and looking to create its own Belarusian policy. According to the first 
statements of the new Hungarian Ambassador to Belarus, Ferenc Kontra, economic inter-
ests mainly underpinned the decision to open an embassy in Minsk. 
Nonetheless, Hungarian priorities in Belarus include strengthening co-operation in aca-
demic, cultural and student exchanges. If there is a need to build a pro-Belarusian alliance 
within the framework of the EU, then Hungary should be integrated into such an alliance. 
The Vise grad Group provides the best framework for Hungarian involvement.
There is great potential for co-operation in the framework of the Visegrad Group on the 
level of the heads of the V4 diplomatic missions in Minsk. There are no regular contacts or 
meetings of the heads of missions, yet there should be space for more informal discussion 
on forging common positions towards Belarusian authorities and for the co-ordination of 
democracy assistance policies towards Belarus, including the organisation of common 
events targeting Belarusian audiences. 
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PIN	has a long tradition of co-operation with Belarusian NGOs, and the Belarusian pro-
gramme of People in Need was founded in March 1998 with the principal objective of 
supporting the development of independent democratic initiatives and media in Belarus. 
PIN provides independent information on recent developments in Belarus and support for 
alternative culture in Belarus. PIN renders assistance to politically persecuted individuals, 
including direct financial aid. The organisation is actively involved in the development 
of a dialogue between Czech politicians and officials dealing with foreign affairs and 
representatives of Belarusian civil society. PIN also focuses on the sharing of the Czech 
experience of democratic transformation after 1990, and has organised study trips to the 
Czech Republic for lawyers, economists, teachers and ecologists from Belarus as well as 
the visits of Czech experts to Belarus. PIN was the initiator of scholarship programmes 
for Belarusian students expelled for political reasons from universities in Belarus. The pro-
gramme of support to the victims of political persecution and the discussions on the Czech 
transition were financed by the Czech MFA, while another programme, aimed at the edu-
cation of law students and support to local activists, was co-financed by the Westminster 
Foundation for Democracy and NED.
Polish national programme, but for which the Polish government is now seeking partners 
for co-financing of the project, for instance British and US donors. 
Examples of bad donor policies have included cases when the recipient organisations 
perceive their activities in the framework of an ambition to gain political control over the 
Belarusian non-governmental sector or when projects are performed without the active 
participation of Belarusian partners during the conceptual preparation and implementa-
tion. In turn, the greatest success has been achieved in the case of projects where the 
relations between Belarusian NGOs and their V4 partners has been based on equality, 
partnership and respect for the autonomous position of the Belarusian organisations. 
The policies of different donors have resulted in many instances in a lack of continuity 
in the financing of some particular projects. In such circumstances, the local NGOs can-
not develop its activities systematically, leading to wasted human potential and financial 
resources. 
There is a persistent dilemma between the distribution of financial sources on project im-
plementation and on the institutional development of the organisations. The majority of the 
projects financed by the V4 governments are focused on project implementation, yet the 
lack of resources for institutional development has a crippling effect on the NGOs’ ability 
to implement projects successfully.  
Czech	Republic
Values-oriented diplomacy plays a distinctive role in Czech foreign policy. The Czech 
MFA initiated very close co-operation with NGOs in the field of democracy assistance, 
and the majority of the projects it funds are implemented by NGOs. When the target 
countries of Czech democracy assistance policy were drawn up in 2005, the list was 
developed in consultation with the Czech NGO, People in Need (PIN). Since the Czech 
Republic’s democracy assistance budget is separate from ODA, the MFA can easily work 
without the permission of the host country, which is very important in the case of countries 
with undemocratic regimes. 
Belarus is regarded as one of the most important recipient countries of Czech democracy 
assistance - owing to the lobbying of PIN and the influence of former President Václav 
Havel. In 2006, the year of the presidential elections, Belarus occupied the top place as 
the target country of Czech democracy assistance.
CHANNELLING	INDEPENDENT	
NEWS	INTO	BELARUSIAN	HOMES
International	 Association	 Civic	
Belarus was established in 2004 
to support democratic initiatives and 
diverse ways of developing civil so-
ciety and free media in Belarus. The 
organisation is focused on assistance 
to Belarusian civil society, including 
organisations that are not allowed to 
work in Belarus legally. Together with 
other international partners, Civic Be-
larus supports the broadcasting of the 
European Radio for Belarus. The main 
impact of the project is the dissemina-
tion of independent information inside 
the country. 
Although the Radio is headquartered 
outside Belarus, the project is open to 
correspondents and authors from Be-
larus. The Radio targets mainly young 
people, combining news and enter-
tainment. According to public opinion 
polls conducted by IISEPS (Independent 
Institute of Socio-Economic and Politi-
cal Studies), the audience has grown 
to over 16% in the Brest region, while 
nationally the share of listeners stood 
at level 5.1 % in 2006. In September 
2007, it was the most popular external 
broadcast channel in Belarus (reaching 
a rating of 7.1%). 
The organisation is one of the inter-
national partners of the Human Rights 
House project in Vilnius, which provides 
institutional help to Belarusian NGOs 
that cannot develop their activities in Be-
larus. The programmes of Civic Belarus 
are financed partially by the Czech MFA 
of the Czech Republic, and co-financed 
by NED and the Norwegian Human 
Rights House Foundation. 
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projects. Financially, the share of the overall amount of Slovak ODA funding that was allo-
cated to Belarus in 2004-2007 was 2.14% (SKK 7.953m out of a total SKK 352.135m). 
Slovakia played an important role in Belarus in the second half of 2007 when the Portu-
guese EU Presidency was represented in Minsk by the Slovak Embassy. 
Pontis	Foundation is the most active Slovak organisation in Belarus. The organisation 
played a crucial role in lobbying for the inclusion of Belarus in Slovak OA (later ODA) 
in 2004. Pontis Foundation is distinguished by its innovative approach: after the first 
projects, focused on the development of civil society in Belarus and the electoral mobili-
sation of citizens - where Pontis shared its own experience of the mobilisation of Slovak 
citizens, especially the younger generation, before parliamentary elections in Slovakia in 
1998 - the organisation shifted its focus to strengthening links among independent think-
tanks and civil society in order to define viable reform strategies for the post-Lukashenko 
period. The further development of this idea after 2004 led in 2006 to the establishment 
of the Belarusian Public Policy Fund - a scheme of small grants for Belarusian researchers 
in the field of social and economic sciences. Other projects aimed at strengthening the 
capacity of the analytical community were financed from different sources. Besides the 
Slovak MFA, the donors included NED and the European Commission in the framework 
of EIDHR. 
The activities of the Institute	for	Public	Affairs	(IVO) were focused on the develop-
ment of alternative political and economic strategies for Belarus and on the transfer of the 
democracy know-how of Slovakia. The project, “Belarus After the Presidential Elections: 
Policy Alternatives for a New Era”, financed by GMF, contributed to the strengthening 
of co-operation between Slovak and Belarusian experts as well as to raising awareness 
among the Slovak wider public of the current situation in Belarus. One of the outcomes 
of this co-operation was the publication in Belarusian of the book, Slovak Hope: Lessons 
Learned from Democratic Transformation in Slovakia, which has been launched and dis-
tributed in Belarus. 
Poland
Belarus is one of the priority countries for Polish democracy assistance. Poland and Polish 
NGOs have a long tradition of co-operation with their Belarusian counterparts, and in 
2004-2008 the number of Polish MFA-commissioned NGO democracy assistance projects 
implemented in Belarus was second only to the number of projects in Ukraine (20% of the 
number of projects, compared with 44% in Ukraine). 
In 2007, Belarus was the single largest recipient of Polish MFA-funded assistance projects, 
with PLN 26m (or 28.9% of the total), followed by Ukraine, where PLN 15m was allocated. 
Association	 for	 International	Affairs	 (AMO) implemented in 2006 the project 
“Euro pean Alternative for Belarus” aimed at the promotion of European integration 
among Belarusian teachers and the younger generation. In the framework of the project, 
discussions and seminars with Czech experts were organised in Belarus. The project was 
co-financed by the Open Society Foundation in Prague. 
Slovak	Republic
Belarus was not mentioned in the first documents laying down the institutional framework 
for Slovak development assistance. Even in 2003, when the Mid-Term Strategy of Official 
Development Assistance for 2003-2008 was adopted, Ukraine and Belarus were not 
included as they were ineligible for ODA. Both countries were placed in the category 
of official assistance (OA), and in 2004 the government allocated SKK 10m from the 
national ODA budget to OA projects in both countries. 
Democracy assistance officially became an integral part of Slovak foreign policy in Nov-
ember 2004, when the Parliament approved the Mid-term Strategy of the Foreign Policy 
of the Slovak Republic until 2015. According to the Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign 
Policy for 2007, adopted by the Slovak MFA and Parliament, the priority of Slovak policy 
towards Belarus was “to support democratic forces in Belarus in their endeavour to up-
hold human and political rights and simultaneously develop bilateral relations within the 
framework of EU policies... The Slovak Republic shall continue to pursue a balanced 
policy of reacting to [Belarus’s] internal political situation, which suffers from a deficit of 
democratic principles and international isolation of the country. The Slovak Republic shall 
continue to lead a restricted dialogue with the government and support the development 
of democracy and civil society.” Efforts to bring Belarus closer to European values were 
also mentioned in the Orientation of Slovakia’s Foreign Policy for 2008. 
Belarus plays an important role in Slovak democracy assistance policy. In 2004-2007, 
eight Slovak democracy assistance projects were implemented in Belarus. In fact, demo-
cracy assistance projects were the only projects financed in Belarus in the framework of 
Slovak ODA, with no projects focused on either technical assistance or humanitarian aid. 
Seven of them were implemented by NGOs, one by a university. The only countries where 
more Slovak democracy assistance projects were implemented were Serbia, including 
Kosovo (27), which is considered as the top priority country, the so-called “programme 
country”, and Ukraine (11). 
In the case of Belarus, democracy assistance remained a priority of Slovak ODA even 
after its institutional reform and the establishment in 2007 of the Slovak Agency for Inter-
national Development Co-operation (SAMRS) with its preference for more infrastructure 
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society in Central and Eastern Europe, and initiate public discussion on EU international 
policy in Poland and in Europe. Several projects are aimed at Belarus, focusing on the 
promotion of cross-border contacts and facilitation of the EU visa regime. Besides its own 
operational programmes, the foundation re-grants funds as the administrator of the OSI 
East-East Partnership Beyond Borders Programme, and the Citizens in Action Programme 
funded by the Ford Foundation, which runs from 2003-2009, providing grants in support 
of democratic change and the development of civil society in Belarus and Ukraine. 
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A relatively small share of the total MFA assistance was assigned to Polish NGOs working 
in Belarus - a mere PLN 2.6m or 10% of the funds for projects in Belarus.
The largest number of projects was targeted at the development of independent media 
and the support of access to information (50% in 2008), followed by support for NGOs 
and civil society (25%), and support for education and youth projects (17%). Whereas 
co-operation with local government and projects aimed at regional development shaped 
67% of the projects supported in 2004, in the next year it was only 10%. Since 2007, the 
Polish MFA has not financed any projects developed with local government or dedicated 
to the promotion of European integration (which was a major item in the programmes for 
the other post-Soviet priority countries, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine). 
The overall amount of development assistance provided to Belarus in 2008 remained at 
the same level, standing at PLN 26m. This figure includes projects implemented by NGOs, 
as well as support for large projects implemented by the government, such as the Bela-
rusian Radio Racyja, broadcasting in Belarusian on the territory of Belarus from  Poland 
and Lithuania. Funding from the Polish state budget is also given to TV Belsat, which is 
managed by the public Polish TV. One of the most important programmes supported 
within the framework of Polish democracy assistance has been the Konstanty Kalinowski 
Scholarship Programme directed at students expelled from Belarusian universities due to 
their involvement in activities aimed at promoting democratic values. 
Poland is Belarus’s only neighbour among the V4 countries. Therefore it has the best devel-
oped network of co-operation with NGOs acting in the regions, particularly in the Grodno 
region in western Belarus. From the point of view of sustainability, it is worth singling out 
the unique project of the Belarus School of Journalism, implemented in co-operation with 
the Centre for Support and Development of Civic Initiatives Opus. The project has been 
underway for 11 years, focusing on the training of young journalists in the Grodno region 
and on the organisation of independent publishing activities. Its main impact can be 
measured in terms of the number of graduates working in local and regional media, while 
many of the graduates find work in NGOs. 
Among Polish NGOs, the largest amount of assistance to promote democracy in Belarus 
is provided by the East European Democratic Center, which is focused on the support of 
independent media and on the support of the publication and distribution of independent 
literature in Belarus. The Poland-Belarus Citizen Education Centre Association from Bia-
lystok has developed co-operation between Polish and Belarusian NGOs in the Grodno 
region.
The Stefan Batory Foundation, established by George Soros in 1998, is Poland’s largest 
non-governmental domestic grantmaker supporting democracy assistance programmes. 
The foundation implements its own “International Co-operation Programme”, whose ob-
jective is to support active EU policies towards the eastern neighbours, strengthen civil 
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A	Closely	Watched	Democracy
Democracy Assistance Policies of the Visegrad Four 
Countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina
Sanida Kikić
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is a country in transition from a communist legacy to a democratic as well as an open market system. The transition process in BiH is not 
unique, considering that since 1989 other post-communist states in Europe have under-
gone similar changes. However, unlike the vast majority of the transition countries, BiH 
was plagued by a tragic war from 1992-1995 that exacerbated and prolonged its transi-
tion process. Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-war recovery has been, and continues to be, 
a difficult process, which is greatly shaped by the international community. 
Since 1995, substantial amounts of money have been invested by various international 
actors with the aim of promoting BiH’s transition to a stable democracy and free-market 
economy. Understandably, international development assistance initially focused on secur-
ing and stabilising the country as well as on rebuilding its war-torn infrastructure. Part of 
the international funding was also used for democracy assistance. 
Namely, various international actors have supported, and continue to support, “policies 
and projects aimed at helping [BiH] build institutions of democratic governance, foster 
public participation in democratic governance, support pluralism in the shape of multi-
party politics, freedom of expression and independent media, promote and protect human 
rights, and work towards establishing the rule of law”. 
Traditionally, the biggest international donors in BiH have been governmental, inter-
governmental and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) associated with the United 
States and Western Europe, yet in recent years some countries from Central Europe have 
become more involved in the field of general development assistance as well as democ-
racy assistance to BiH. 
Since the enlargement of the European Union (EU) in 2004, some of the new member 
states have increased their commitment to bringing about positive change in BiH.
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KEy	CONCLUSIONS
The democracy assistance programmes of 
the V4 countries are at a relatively early 
stage of formation. Notably, there is a limited 
amount of funding and number of projects 
coming from the V4 countries for demo-
cracy assistance in BiH. Moreover, the V4 
countries’ democracy assistance work is not 
very visible to the wider community beyond 
those who have directly participated in the 
V4 projects. 
This is first and foremost because most of the 
V4 democracy assistance projects donors 
are not large in scope, especially when com-
pared with other international donors active 
in this field, such as the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation 
in Europe (OSCE), and the Delegation of the 
European Commission to BiH. This relatively 
low visibility may also indicate that these 
projects are poorly targeted, and that they 
do not fill the gaps in democracy assistance 
projects sponsored by big donors.
The key conclusions resulting from the res-
earch, in particular from the interviews 
with various local actors working on demo-
cratisation issues in BiH relevant for the V4 
countries, are as follows:
The V4 countries are seen as very sup-• 
portive of BiH in general, and of BiH’s EU 
membership candidacy in particular. As 
such, they are highlighted as possible key 
actors in helping BiH with its EU integration 
process. Should the V4 countries decide 
to focus their democracy assistance work 
in this direction, this would undoubtedly 
be well received by local actors.
The work of the Slovak, Hungarian and • 
Czech embassies in the field of democracy 
assistance in BiH is regarded very posi-
tively. NGO recipients of project grants 
from the V4 embassies report fruitful co-
operation with the respective embassy 
representatives. Moreover, the Slovak, 
Hungarian and Czech Ambassadors have 
consistently been praised for their involve-
ment in issues related to demo cratisation 
in BiH. Their knowledge of the local lan-
guage also makes them stand out. The role 
of the Embassies in promoting democracy 
in BiH should be focused and strength-
ened with regard to V4 future democracy 
assistance policies, and there should be 
less reliance on the personal charisma of 
the ambassadors and more on systemic 
solutions.
There is a degree of skepticism towards • 
promoting regional co-operation among 
the V4 countries as a model for co-
operation between BiH and its Western 
Balkans neighbours. Any efforts towards 
transferring such a model of regional 
co-operation to the Western Balkans coun-
tries would need to take into account the 
regional co-operation bodies already 
established through the Stabilisation and 
Association process, such as the Regional 
Co-operation Council (RCC). Such efforts 
should be complementary to the work of 
the RCC, and would need to be pursued 
through high-level diplomatic channels.
One of the crucial issues for the develop-• 
ment of democracy in BiH is the 
strengthening of the civil society sector. 
This could prove to be an area where 
V4 countries could focus their democ-
racy assistance policies. However, since 
a plethora of international actors have 
been very active in addressing this par-
ticular issue, V4 activities would require 
substantial co-ordination with other inter-
national actors and should involve careful 
prioritisation in terms of the types of ass-
istance and organisations that should be 
supported.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS
Having an understanding of BiH’s pol itical, 
economic and social situation is essential 
to making quality recommendations for 
international actors wishing to engage in 
development assistance. There is a clear 
consensus that democracy in BiH needs to 
be strengthened. Given the number of both 
private and public donors addressing a fairly 
wide spectrum of issues, the V4 countries 
should narrow their focus to a specific set of 
issues where their contribution could provide 
most value-added to democracy building 
 efforts.
Thus, in strategising their democracy assist-
ance to BiH, the V4 countries should take into 
account the following factors: 
the level of financial commitment avail-• 
able for democracy assistance in BiH; 
the weak areas of BiH’s democracy, • 
where Central Europe’s transition expe-
rience would be useful for promoting 
change; and 
the activities of other international actors • 
in promoting change in particularly weak 
areas of BiH’s democracy in order to en-
sure that the efforts are complementary. 
The V4 countries should co-operate with local 
actors already active in democracy-building 
in order to better formulate an effective 
strategy for achieving the desired goals of 
democracy assistance policy.
 
Taking all the above factors into consid-
eration, the following course of action is 
recommended:
The V4 countries should significantly im-• 
prove the co-ordination of their democracy 
assistance programmes. Co-operation 
could take the form of setting up a per-
manent committee of ambassadors in BiH, 
which would meet regularly in order to 
exchange information and co-ordinate 
priorities in this area. A long-term and 
potentially more effective solution would 
be to set up a joint Visegrad Democracy 
Fund for BiH. Such a fund would sup-
port projects by BiH NGOs active in 
democracy building, implemented in co-
operation with V4 NGOs.
V4 democracy assistance programmes • 
should support the building of a vibrant 
and sustainable civil society in BiH. In 
order to achieve this aim, their funding 
should not be limited to support for indiv-
idual projects. An alternative approach 
would be to establish long-term partner-
ships with selected NGOs, which might 
then receive multi-year institutional fund-
ing, enabling institutional development 
of these NGOs as well as helping them 
to build the capacity, sustainability and 
co-funding in order to be able to bid succ-
essfully for grants from larger donors.
V4 democracy assistance programmes • 
should encourage co-operation between 
V4 civil society and BiH NGOs by funding 
projects that incorporate the participation 
of a V4 partner. Additionally, programmes 
could encourage regional co-operation in 
the Balkans by instituting trilateral projects, 
with the participation of at least one NGO 
from BiH, one from a V4 country, and one 
from another Balkan country. 
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Understanding	and	Evaluating	Democracy	in	
the	Context	of	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
 
BiH’s political arrangements
The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), negotiated in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 and 
signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, brought an end to the conflict in BiH by estab-
lishing a very fragmented and ethnically divided state. Two distinct and substantially 
autonomous entities were created - with the Federation of BiH (FBiH) comprising 51% of 
BiH’s territory and the Republika Srpska (RS) comprising the remaining 49%. While RS is 
fairly ethnically homogenous as the vast majority of its population are Bosnian Serbs, FBiH 
is ethnically heterogeneous - mostly populated by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. 
The latter point is significant as it helps to explain the further division of FBiH into 10 fairly 
autonomous cantons. Additionally, in March 1999, Brčko District (which straddles the two 
entities) was established as a self-governing administrative unit under the BiH state.
The extensive fragmentation of the BiH state means that this small country of approx-
imately four million inhabitants has 14 different constitutions and 14 distinct governments 
with their own legislative powers and a high degree of autonomy. The physical and 
political break-up of the state is based on the principle that the three constitutive peoples 
of BiH - Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks - should be represented in government, and their 
respective rights should be protected from infringement by the others. Notably, the DPA 
also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), authorised to oversee the 
implementation of the civilian aspects of the DPA. The Peace Implementation Council 
(PIC), consisting of 55 countries and agencies, finances and overviews the work of the 
OHR through its “executive arm”, known as the Steering Board (SB).1
Since its inception, the OHR has had substantial influence in shaping BiH’s reconstruction 
process, especially through the High Representative’s “Bonn powers”, which effectively 
all ow the High Representative (HR) to impose laws at any level of government and to 
dismiss any elected or appointed officials within BiH’s various administrative structures if 
they are deemed to have acted against the Dayton Peace Agreement.2 
While the OHR publicly maintains that enacting the Bonn powers is one of “the most 
important milestones in the peace implementation process”, it also stresses that “nonethe-
less, the governing principle of the OHR’s engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the 
concept of domestic responsibility… for the peace process and the problems that [the] 
country faces.”3 However, the strengthening of the HR’s mandate has created a political 
paradigm characterised by the powerful role of the international community in promoting 
reforms that by the early 2000s were indisputably coupled with the possibility of future 
EU membership for BiH. 
In order to better utilise their specific • 
know-how regarding the transition to 
demo cracy and the European integration 
processes, the V4 countries should help 
strengthen BiH think-tanks/policy research 
institutes. The emergence of effective in-
dependent think-tanks can provide an 
important stimulus to wider public debate 
and public participation in democratic 
 decision-making. BiH think-tanks should be 
encouraged (and supported financially) to 
act as watchdogs of policies implemented 
by the BiH administration. The manage-
ment and researchers of BiH think-tanks 
could be trained through study visits and 
internships with their V4 counterparts on 
future project work.
Scholarships and study visits to V4 coun-• 
tries should be supported for young 
democracy activists and academics, and 
programmes should be developed to ass-
ist the emergence of a new generation of 
democratically oriented citizens of BiH by 
supporting youth and NGOs engaged in 
activism for democracy. 
Through sharing their own experience, the • 
V4 countries could make a significant con-
tribution to the strengthening of dialogue 
between political actors and civil soci-
ety groups in BiH. Although substantial 
progress has been made on this issue with 
the adoption of the Agreement between 
the BiH Council of Ministers and the NGO 
sector, implementation of this agreement 
will be difficult. V4 NGOs could share 
their experience of establishing civic 
dialogue with the governments in their 
respective countries. This should include 
NGO/public administration co-operation 
on other levels of government, not just the 
central state level. 
The V4 countries are uniquely placed • 
to assist BiH in the process of European 
integration by sharing the know-how ac-
quired in their own EU accession. The 
BiH government receives a report on the 
country’s progress towards fulfilling EU 
requirements for the accession process, 
which, inter alia, addresses issues related 
to strengthening democracy. That report 
could be used as inspiration for the setting 
of the priorities of V4 democracy assist-
ance related to EU integration. 
V4 grants should also assist BiH author-• 
ities and NGOs in bidding for EU grants 
through advice and technical guidance 
about applying for EU funds for different 
sectors. Moreover, V4 countries could 
help secure EU funding by providing BiH 
NGOs with the required matching fund-
ing. Such funding could be used by BiH 
NGOs to seek the involvement and ex-
pertise of V4 NGOs as partners in such 
EU-funded projects. 
Finally, V4 countries should continue at • 
the EU level to support politically BiH’s bid 
for membership, and to press for liberali-
sation of the EU visa application regime 
for BiH citizens.
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and through the carrot of membership, the EU has the power to shape BiH’s current and 
future development, including progress in the field of democratisation. Furthermore, the 
ability of governmental and non-governmental organisations from the individual EU mem-
ber states to promote change in the field of democratisation in BiH is also affected by the 
EU’s policies and actions in this particular field.
Evaluating democracy in BiH
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political arrangements have profound implications for the 
develop ment of democracy and a democratic culture among the citizens of BiH. In theory, 
BiH has all the mechanisms associated with democracy, such as free and fair elections, 
a parliamentary system of government, the rule of law, respect for human rights and 
freedom of association, among others. Unfortunately, in practice, these mechanisms of 
democracy are not well developed and are open to abuse by various powerful actors. 
More alarmingly, even after almost 13 years have passed since the establishment of 
democracy in BiH, the democratic spirit of the citizenry is severely lacking - which dam-
ages the social, political and economic development of BiH, as well as the legitimacy of 
democracy itself.
The uniquely powerful role of the international community via the Office of the High Rep-
resentative/EU Special Representative and via the Bonn Powers reflects the most obvious 
shortcoming of democracy in BiH. The High Representative’s Bonn Powers have made 
BiH’s political leaders ultimately more accountable to the international community than to 
the citizens of BiH. Furthermore, the Bonn Powers devalue the role and effectiveness of the 
legislative and judicial bodies in BiH, so that citizens are certainly less likely to think their 
vote matters when the ultimate power lies with the High Representative.
The fragmented nature of the BiH state, as codified in the DPA and the BiH Constitution, 
which is set out in Annex 4 of the DPA, hinders the full development of democracy and 
a democratic culture in BiH. In order to broker a peace agreement, it was necessary to 
ensure a system of checks and balances so as to decrease the security threat posed to one 
another by each of the ethnic nationalities. This elaborate system of checks and balances 
created a bloated public administration structure that absorbs approximately 60% of the 
overall budget in BiH. Moreover, the elaborate system of checks and balances effectively 
prevents anyone other than the Croat, Serb, or Bosniak peoples from playing a part in 
the government and public administration, meaning that BiH cannot truly be considered a 
representative democracy when other minorities are de jure excluded from power. 
The fragmented composition of the BiH state and the BiH Constitution initially made the 
state very weak until 2000, when the OHR aggressively pursued reforms that helped 
build up the BiH state. For the purposes of EU integration, these reforms attempted to 
enlarge the state’s competencies and strengthen the state institutions, thus weakening the 
power of the entities. Notably, RS has in recent years taken great issue with the transfer of 
The evolving role of the EU
The break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of yugoslavia (SFRy) in 1991-1992 clearly 
illustrated the inability of the EU to effectively address the events unfolding on the Euro-
pean continent. Both academics and policymakers have asserted that the EU failed due 
to a lack of a coherent strategy among the member states towards the region, and also 
due to a lack of adequate capacity to address the escalating violence and brutality in the 
republics of the SFRy. 
While the EU’s efforts were inconsequential in bringing the war in BiH to an end, through 
its post-war involvement in the country, the EU has established a crucial role in politically, 
socially and economically reconstructing the BiH state. Notably, the growing EU commit-
ment to BiH’s future membership bid has predictably increased the prominence and the 
significance of the EU’s role within the post-war state. 
This commitment commenced in earnest in 1999 with the launch of the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe. The Stability Pact helped pave the way for the opening of negotia-
tions on the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) between the EU and BiH that 
ought to lead to candidacy for EU membership. The requirements articulated by the EU 
in such agreements as the EU Road Map and the 2003 European Commission Feasibility 
Study aimed to create a stable and viable BiH state through the implementation of EU 
norms in BiH. Thus, the Feasibility Study focused on reforms related to democracy and the 
rule of law, market and trade liberalisation, and justice and home affairs.4 
Even though certain conditions stipulated in the Feasibility Study had not been satisfactorily 
completed by the BiH officials, in October 2005 the European Commission’s Delegation 
to BiH recommended the opening of SAA negotiations with BiH. In December 2007, 
after the resolution of the political crisis that gripped BiH in October-November 2007, the 
EU Enlargement Commissioner, Ollie Rehn, initialled the SAA with the BiH government. 
The SAA was signed by the EU and BiH in June 2008. BiH still has to make progress on 
certain outstanding issues, such as police reform and reform of the public broadcasting 
system in FBiH in order to continue on the road towards EU membership.
Since the onset of the 21st century, the EU has increasingly committed itself to being the 
primary international actor, whose presence is meant to guarantee a stable, secure and 
viable BiH state. Subsequently, the role of the most powerful international actor within BiH, 
that of the High Representative, became related to the EU through an EU Council decision 
in February 2002. At that time, the Council made the decision that the next HR would also 
have the role of the European Union Special Representative in BiH (EUSR). 
The panoply of EU missions currently deployed in BiH includes the European Commission 
Delegation to BiH (Commission), European Union Force in BiH (EUFOR), European Union 
Police Mission (EUPM), and the double-hatted EUSR. Through these various organisations 
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suspicious of NGOs in BiH, and they tend to view the vast majority of them as serving 
their own self-interests instead of the interests of society in general.
These factors provide only a brief illustration of some of the main issues constraining the 
development of democracy and a democratic culture in BiH, given that evaluating the 
maturity of BiH’s democracy is a daunting task. In 2006, a fairly exhaustive study led by 
the Open Society Fund Bosnia & Herzegovina attempted to do just that in a 500-page 
report entitled Democracy Assessment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.9 The study focused 
on four specific spheres related to democracy: citizenship law and rights, representative 
and accountable government, civil society and popular participation, and international 
dimensions of democracy. Overall, the report found that substantial improvements will be 
needed in these various spheres if BiH is to become a true democracy. 
International	Democracy	Assistance	
in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
Once the DPA had been signed, substantial funds were invested in BiH’s post-war recov-
ery and re  construction effort, and a part of those funds were channelled into activities 
meant to democratise the country. 
Democracy assistance funding in BiH
Two major factors impede the analysis of international democracy assistance funding 
to BiH. Firstly, there is a lack of solid statistical data about the aggregate levels of inter-
national development funds that poured into BiH after the end of the war. Secondly, 
democracy assistance has generally not been clearly separated from official development 
assistance by international donors, so even if precise aggregate data about international 
assistance funds were available, actual data on democracy assistance would still be lack-
ing. Notably, many countries, including some of the V4, still do not make clear distinctions 
between democracy assistance and development assistance. 
As is evident from our definition of democracy assistance (see Introduction), the term is 
very broad and can encompass a variety of projects, ranging from those related to the 
strengthening of good governance of various government institutions to those related to 
improving the rights of minorities within a country. 
To a certain extent, it can be argued that in the BiH context even economic develop-
ment projects can be regarded as democracy assistance efforts, given that such projects 
often seek to change legislation or mobilise people from different ethnic groups to work 
together. This means that the vast majority of international aid that has flowed into BiH 
powers from the entity to state level, and its leaders have recently publicly questioned the 
long-term viability of the BiH state. As pointed out by Anna Jarstaad, writing about inter-
national assistance to democratisation, “when the legitimacy of the state is contested and 
the loyalty of citizens rests with sub-state entities or other states or political organis ations, 
the prospect for democracy is weak”.5
However, securing the support of the three main ethnic groups for amending the constit-
utional arrangement of BiH has proven to be an extremely difficult feat to achieve, and 
will likely remain so in the near future. Notably, a USAID Bosnia and Herzegovina Demo-
cracy and Governance Assessment, published in May 2007, analysed five key elements 
of democracy: consensus, governance, the rule of law, competition, and inclusion - and 
found that consensus is “the most serious obstacle to continued democratic development in 
BiH”, followed closely by poor governance.6 To put it more precisely, the lack of consensus 
among BiH politicians and citizens about their vision of the type of country where they live 
represents a huge impediment to substantial development of democracy in BiH. 
During interviews conducted with individuals from government institutions as well as from 
international organisations and local NGOs, agreement was evident around the view that 
BiH cannot be considered a successful democracy.7 Overall, government accountability 
and effectiveness are sorely lacking, which is explained in part by the above-mentioned 
factors. For example, Ivan Barbalić, President of the Alumni Association of the Centre for 
Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies (ACIPS), stated that in BiH civil society has failed to 
reach a threshold where it is able to punish or reward those in power at various levels of 
government, as it should be able to do in a true democracy. Instead, civil society’s poten-
tial goes to waste to the detriment of the country. 
It should be noted that in the context of BiH, the terms “civil society” and “NGOs” are used 
interchangeably, and that the term “civil society” does not encompass the ordinary citi-
zens of BiH. This distinction is important because civil society or NGOs have established 
themselves as actors promoting and strengthening democracy in BiH, while individual 
citizens of BiH are generally seen as lacking in “democratic spirit”, and tend not to be 
deeply involved in civic participation and in the democratisation of the country.
However, the most worrisome and “depressing” trend is the decreasing level of citizens’ 
involvement in BiH. According to polls conducted by the OSCE, BiH citizens harbour 
substantial mistrust towards the government and they do not believe that there is merit in 
getting engaged, as it is hard to change the situation in BiH.8 
Despite the efforts of organisations such as the OSCE, encouraging BiH citizens to get 
involved in any sort of political activity remains very difficult. This is troubling, not least 
in the light of the positive strides made by NGOs to become more involved in policy 
decision-making at all levels of government, because this was accomplished without the 
mobilisation or involvement of a critical mass of BiH citizens. Therefore, many citizens are 
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Another reason for the lack of figures is the reluctance of most NGOs in BiH to publish 
annual financial reports. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency in the way that gov-
ernments give funds to NGOs, which is often attributed to politicisation of this process 
whereby a government sponsors those NGOs it finds ideologically acceptable, which can 
be detrimental to the strengthening of democracy. Overall, there seems to be little incen-
tive for some of the NGOs to openly disclose their annual financial reports. Additionally, 
the development of a statistical framework in BiH for the various levels of government is 
still lacking, and has been identified by the EU as one area where progress must be made 
before BiH can be considered for EU membership candidacy.
   
General trends in international development assistance funding
Even though it is difficult to precisely determine the monetary amount of international 
demo cracy assistance funding to BiH, it is still beneficial to see at least certain data re-
lated to international development assistance inflows in order to examine general trends 
in donor funding. 
The following table shows the total official development assistance provided to BiH by 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from 
1997- 2006.
TOTAL	Official	Development	Assistance	(ODA)	
(net	disbursements	in	US$	million)
by	all	OECD	Donors	in	BiH
1997	 861.45
1998	 905.2
1999	 1,040.33
2000	 736.85
2001	 638.92
2002	 563.44
2003	 540.29
2004	 683.63
2005	 553.43
2006	 494.39
 Source: OECD website
- apart from physical reconstruction of post-war infrastructure - can in theory be defined as 
“democracy assistance”. Therefore, the general trends presented by the limited aggregate 
data related to development assistance can be considered applicable to democracy ass-
istance funding in BiH.
Limitations of statistical data
For various reasons, there is no concrete data on the total amount of international aid 
in general, or international democracy assistance in particular, that has flowed into the 
country since the end of the war. This fact was confirmed during the course of research 
and interviews with various representatives of national and international organisations 
active in democracy assistance, who made it clear that precise figures are simply not 
readily available. While there are pieces of information about certain types of assistance 
by various donors, it is difficult for anyone to aggregate this data, and to date no such 
attempt has been made. Since the end of the war, numerous donors have been involved 
in reconstruction and development efforts in BiH, at times without much co-ordination or 
awareness of one another’s activities, and have left behind insufficient data to speak with 
certainty about the amounts and type of development aid contributed by independent 
foreign actors or by the international community as a whole. 
The democracy assessment published in 2006 by the Open Society Fund BiH (OSF) sheds 
light on additional reasons why these statistics are not available. As noted in the assess-
ment, “the relations of the government of BiH with international donors are not based on a 
partnership, and the transparency of the relationships is very poor”. The lack of transpar-
ency is one major reason for the lack of data on the total funding to BiH. “For example, 
the UNDP-Newsletter Special Edition for 2005 stated that the total of UK donations in BiH 
for 2001-2005 were US$ 1,726,500. Fortunately, the amounts were substantially larger. 
The grounds for such assessment were based on the information that only two UK projects 
(UK Department for International Development - DFID), in the social sector, were financed 
by GBP 6 million, which is US$ 8,200,000.90.”10
This lack of transparency and lack of substantial partnership between international donors 
and the BiH government have recently prompted new attempts to tackle the problem. One 
example is a recent system created by the state Ministry of Finance and Treasury, through 
which they are trying to make sure that the BiH government is aware of the international 
economic aid (additional to EU aid) coming into the country. As was noted by an adviser 
within the Ministry, this push mainly came about because projects sponsored by inter-
national donors were carried out without the government’s knowledge. The creation of the 
Sector for International Aid Co-ordination in the ministry will work on co-ordination with 
and among donors, in particular regarding future trends and securing funds for develop-
ment projects and technical assistance financing. This is just one example of the type of 
activities that are finally being undertaken by the BiH government to address the lack of 
information regarding the inflow of foreign aid.
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diversification of the domestic funding base for NGOs as well as through promoting leg-
islation that supports public-private partnerships in this sector.
A recent success in the NGOs’ efforts to strengthen democracy and their influence within 
the BiH political scene was achieved with the signing of the Agreement on Co-operation 
between the Council of Ministers of BiH and the Non-Governmental Sector in BiH. The 
agreement is essentially an institutional strategy for co-operation between the govern-
mental and the non-governmental sector, based on European standards. It calls for the 
creation of a Civil Society Board and an Advisory Body for Civil Society to the BiH Coun-
cil of Ministers (CoM). 
The Civil Society Board was recently created - with 31 members representing different sec-
tors of civil society. The Board has a consultative role, but discussions are ongoing about 
making it a representative body for NGOs in BiH. Currently, its functions are the oversight 
of the implementation of the agreement, the strengthening of co-operation between civil 
society and CoM, the overview of laws related to the non-governmental sector, and the 
overview of the budget earmarked for NGOs in BiH. 
The institutional framework of the Advisory Body, consisting of government and NGO 
representatives, was scheduled to be established by mid-2008. The agreement and the 
proposed system of co-operation are closely based on the Croatian model. Moreover, the 
plan is to introduce this framework to other levels of government, giving civil society more 
leverage and power in policy decision-making through the various government institu-
tions. 
Notably, USAID/BiH, along with other donors, played a major role in this positive devel-
opment since they supported the project spearheaded by the NGO coalition “To Work 
and Succeed Together”. The project, “Sustainable Development of the Non-profit Sector 
in BiH through Partnership with Government and Business Sectors”, was crucial to the 
improvement of relations between the civil society sector and the government, and was 
sponsored by USAID/BiH and a number of other donors, such as the OSCE and OSF 
(BiH). Interestingly, at the request of USAID/BiH, the Hungarian NGO, European Center 
for Not-for-Profit Law, played a significant part in this project. 
The project helped bring about the previously mentioned agreement between the BiH 
CoM and the non-governmental sector in BiH and it also resulted in the creation of the fol-
lowing documents: Code of Conduct for Non-Governmental Sector in BiH; Co-operation 
Quality Standards between the Government and the Non-Governmental Sector in BiH; 
and Strategic Directions of Development for Non-Governmental Sector in BiH. 
The agreement between the CoM and the non-governmental sector is a significant 
achievement, given that prior to the agreement the relationship between the government 
institutions and the non-governmental sectors was not good. This was not a simple and 
These figures represent the official development assistance (ODA) from OECD donors, 
including the European Community. The official numbers include all types of develop-
ment assistance, with no breakdown of the amount of funds earmarked for democracy 
assistance activities. Nevertheless, these figures are useful for illustrating the fact that the 
amount of OECD funds earmarked for development in BiH has been decreasing overall 
since 1999. There is a sense among the individuals interviewed during the course of 
research for this study that international funding earmarked for BiH has been declining 
over time. This reflects the fact that BiH is no longer the priority country it once was in 
international affairs.
However, large amounts of aid did pour into a relatively small country. Given the con-
tinuous political and economic dependence of the country on international actors, even 
13 years after the end of the war, it can easily be argued that the substantial amount of 
international funds that have come into BiH over the years “proved to have small cost-
effective value.”11 
As indicated in the OSF democracy assessment report, closer partnerships between in-
ternational donors and local actors in creating and implementing development strategies 
are of utmost importance if the funds invested into these activities are to create substantial 
dividends in the form of impact on the strengthening of democracy in BiH. Ultimately, in or-
der to be effective, foreign assistance policies “must be based on an integrated approach, 
they must be co-ordinated, transparent, and be relevant for the beneficiaries”.12
Priority areas in democracy assistance
Even though the definition of democracy assistance is broad, certain areas have gar-
nered more attention than others from international donors. The area that has historically 
received a substantial amount of democracy assistance funds has been the civil society 
sector. As already noted, the terms “civil society” and “NGOs” are used interchangeably 
in the BiH context, and NGOs have established themselves as actors promoting and 
strengthening democracy in the country.
Supporting civil society/NGOs
The development of civil society and the donor community’s role in its development was 
evaluated in a 2004 study by the Mission of USAID in BiH entitled Civil Society Assess-
ment in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The study highlighted that the international community has a dominant role in the develop-
ment and shaping of civil society, noting that there are limited domestic funds available 
for the development of civil society/NGOs, and that the decrease in foreign funding 
will lead to the consolidation of the sector. Ultimately, the study recommends fostering 
local ownership of the development of the BiH civil society sector through supporting the 
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an effective way to strengthen democracy in BiH and as an area where the V4 countries 
could play an important role through democracy assistance funding.
Supporting local government
A number of major international donors also focus on improving the effectiveness of muni-
cipal governments as part of their democracy assistance work. The recent adoption and 
subsequent amendment of local government legislation in both FBiH and RS have been 
intensively supported by key international actors, such as the Office of the High Repre-
sentative. The OHR has pursued such reforms since the early years of the decade, despite 
strong domestic political opposition from certain political parties. The reforms are aimed 
at strengthening the level of government that is closest to the citizens and that should theo-
retically have the most immediate impact on their lives. 
The OSCE’s strategy for the democratisation of BiH focuses on the municipal level, in par-
ticular working in recent years towards the adoption of the new laws on local government 
and the improvement in resource allocations for municipalities. The OSCE’s extensive 
field presence allows them to implement projects aimed at strengthening municipalities 
across the country. Recently, the democratisation strategy of the OSCE has been modified 
so that from 2008 onwards it intends to move away from direct assistance and instead 
will aim to encourage municipalities to learn from each other. The OSCE will work on 
making municipalities feel the need to be accountable to citizens and not to the OSCE, 
which is what usually happened in the past when municipalities participated in OSCE 
democratisation projects.
Another donor involved in local government strengthening is USAID, which started work-
ing with municipalities from 2001 onwards. Since 2001, USAID has spent over US$ 40m 
to help strengthen and improve the functioning of selected BiH municipalities. Recently, 
USAID recruited other donors in their local government strengthening activities by co-
 sponsoring the high-profile Governance Accountability Project (GAP) from 2004 onwards. 
The purpose of GAP is to dramatically and visibly improve the ability of municipalities to 
serve their citizens better and to support a policy and fiscal framework conducive to ac-
countable democratic governance. 
The project has provided, and will continue to provide, demand-driven technical and mat-
erial assistance to approximately 70 BiH municipalities. The GAP initiative was initially a 
three-year activity worth US$ 20m. However, in 2008 it was extended an additional five 
years with a budget of US$ 30m. Currently, two other donors are involved in the activity: 
the Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA) and the Embassy of 
the Kingdom of Netherlands. The high levels of funding for municipalities indicate that 
- despite the reduction in international development assistance funds - the strengthening 
of local government in BiH remains a priority for certain high-profile donors and has pro-
duced tangible results.
organic process, given its duration, and the final impetus for execution came from the side 
of the CoM. The initiative began in 2002 with the creation of the coalition “To Work and 
Succeed Together”, comprising 350 NGOs. The agreement was accepted by the non-
governmental sector on 7 December 2004, and by the CoM two-and-a-half years later 
on 26 April 2007. However, the CoM only signed the Agreement because formalised co-
operation between the governmental and the non-governmental sector was a requirement 
for further European integration.
This agreement is not only an important success for the NGO community in BiH, but is 
also relevant for democracy assistance - because it opens up the possibility to make the 
government a counterpart in the strengthening of democracy through its partnership with 
the non-governmental sector. The agreement also addresses the issue of governmental 
financing of NGOs’ project work. 
Given the decrease in international funding for NGOs, there will be higher competition 
for funding, which could be good for weeding out ineffective NGOs, but also runs the 
risk, as was pointed out in the 2004 USAID Civil Society Assessment, that smaller NGOs 
that could positively contribute to society may have to close down. This problem could be 
eased if funds become available from the state budget. Moreover, international donors 
would also be able to contribute funds to such a government budget on the basis that the 
funds would be distributed transparently and impartially to local NGOs.
The EC Delegation has also invested in strengthening civil society and is planning two 
upcoming projects in this area. One project will focus on strengthening the co-operation 
between NGOs working in the same sectors and in general, while the other will focus on 
improving co-operation between the state government and NGOs. Both of these projects 
are based on two thorough analyses of the NGO sector in BiH, namely the USAID/
BiH Civil Society Assessment and the EC Delegation Mapping Study of Non-State Actors 
(NSA) in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
While recognising that the BiH constitution and the strict EU visa regime for BiH citizens 
pose an impediment to the development of democracy, the EC Delegation representatives 
noted that these issues can be changed only with the broad support of the international 
community. For example, in discussing its approach towards strengthening democracy in 
BiH, the Delegation focused on its assistance to civil society and noted that from 1996-
2006, the EU has provided in total € 13,738,750 in assistance to civil society through 
its various programmes, such as the PHARE and CARDS programmes, as well as the 
European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). 
For representatives of government institutions, international organisations and local 
NGOs, democracy assistance is tantamount to the strengthening of civil society, while 
improving the functioning of civil society/NGOs is understood as the primary way to 
help democratise BiH. Overall, assistance to civil society was consistently highlighted as 
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“developing countries in transition”. However, in practice, BiH was never a priority coun-
try for Poland’s development assistance, and will probably not be in the near future given 
the recent revision of the Strategy. 
The three groups of countries identified in the new Strategy 2007-2015 indicate that 
 Poland will choose priority countries based exclusively on its self-interest instead of a 
general set of criteria such as “developing countries” or “undemocratic countries”, which 
is the case with the other V4 countries and was so in the earlier Polish Strategy. The geo-
graphic location of Poland relative to BiH and other countries in the region is one of the 
reasons why the Balkan countries are a lower priority for Polish development assistance. 
Thus, the focus will primarily continue to be on Poland’s immediate eastern neighbours 
(especially Belarus and Ukraine), Central Asia, and the south Caucasus.
Still, due to certain historical links between Poland and BiH,13 some funds do flow into 
BiH. Poland supports progress in the political development of BiH and encourages BiH 
authorities to lead the political reform process. The focus of Poland’s relations with BiH is 
to ensure that BiH is a stable part of the wider region. Notably, within EUFOR the Polish 
military contingent of 200 troops is the fifth largest in the EUFOR mission. In addition, the 
Polish government encourages Polish foreign investment in BiH in order to help BiH’s ail-
ing economy. Overall, such involvement helps ensure stability in BiH and in the region. 
Similarly, the Polish Embassy has taken part in supporting political development in BiH 
since its opening in Sarajevo in 2004, but the embassy has not engaged in undertaking 
democracy assistance work - in part due to its limited human resources.14 Instead, the emb-
assy recently contributed € 10,000 to the International Commission for Missing Persons 
(ICMP) in BiH (the Embassy has daily contact with the ICMP) and € 25,000 to the Special 
Department for Investigation of War Crimes in Srebrenica within the BiH Prosecution Off-
ice. The primary aim of such funds is to help BiH deal with the consequences of the civil 
war. 
Even though the Polish government does not consider BiH a priority recipient country for 
development assistance, it has contributed monetary assistance to BiH over the years. For 
example, Poland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored projects in BiH in both 2006 
and 2007 (the monetary amount was not indicated for the 2006 project, but it was 
€ 26,000 for the 2007 project). In 2007, the Polish government supported a workshop 
org anised in Cracow for local youth NGOs from BiH, and another recent project pro-
posed by  Poland included a conference, internships in Poland’s government institutions, 
and specific courses for public administration officials from the Western Balkans countries, 
including BiH.15 
Additionally, even though the focus of the Polish Embassy in BiH is not democracy assist-
ance, the embassy is involved in activities that promote democratic values and specifically 
EU integration, such as a project launched in 2007 and organised by the European 
The scope of democracy assistance in BiH is much broader than the examples listed 
above. Nevertheless, these are the areas - above all, the strengthening of civil society 
and municipalities - that seem to have garnered the most attention and funding from inter-
national donors wishing to improve democracy in BiH. In addition, the encouragement of 
regional co-operation and support for projects related to EU integration receive support 
from international donors, and this is particularly relevant for the V4 countries.
Visegrad	Four	Democracy	Assistance	
in	Bosnia	and	Herzegovina
Democracy assistance has gained a prominent role in the framework of development ass-
istance provided by the V4 countries. Notably, the amount of funds earmarked by them 
for democracy assistance has been increasing over the years. Moreover, BiH is explicitly 
regarded as a priority country in terms of foreign policy focus and democracy assistance 
for three V4 countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia. Nevertheless, the 
practical and financial realities of their policies do not always reflect the fact that BiH is 
supposed to be a priority country. The following section evaluates the democracy assist-
ance policies in BiH for each V4 country based on the research undertaken in the V4 
countries within the framework of the PASOS research study, on information provided by 
the respective V4 embassies in BiH, and feedback from local recipients of V4 assistance.
 
Poland
In 2003, Poland’s government approved the Strategy of Polish Co-operation for Develop-
ment for 2004-2006, which indicated that Polish aid would focus on poverty reduction, 
humanitarian aid and technical assistance. Recently, the Department of Development 
Assistance of Poland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs drafted Solidarity, Development and 
Freedom: Strategy of Polish Foreign Assistance for 2007-2015 (Strategy 2007-2015), 
which is now under discussion at the inter-ministerial level. Democracy assistance is a 
relatively new policy area within the field of Polish development assistance, but its role 
will grow - given that the new draft Strategy 2007-2015 devotes a separate chapter to it 
and gives it a status of equal importance alongside classic development and humanitarian 
assistance.
The focus of the Polish government’s development assistance has primarily been post-
communist and communist countries (with the notable exception of Iraq). In 2005, for 
example, the top aid recipients were Serbia, Uzbekistan, and China. The 2003 Strat-
egy for 2004-2006 seemed to qualify BiH as a potential recipient country given that 
the priority countries were noted to be those “countries undergoing political transform-
ation, including in particular eastern and south-eastern European countries”, as well as 
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The projects are proposed by NGOs in the Czech Republic for the countries in question, 
and are selected based on their quality. In order to qualify for funds, applications must 
meet a general requirement that any projects implemented in countries receiving develop-
ment assistance must have the active involvement of partner organisations from the target 
country.
Of all the V4 embassies, the Czech Embassy is the most involved in democracy assistance 
activities in BiH. Despite the relatively small staff of four diplomats (including the Ambas-
sador), the embassy pursues a variety of activities that serve to strengthen democracy in 
BiH. Notably, the Czech Republic’s strategy for development assistance has shifted from 
prioritising the Czech Republic’s interests to now focusing on the needs of the countries 
where assistance is given by the Czech Republic. 
The Czech Embassy is primarily involved in democracy assistance activities in BiH through 
its small-grants programme and through its student scholarship programme. The small-
grants programme has been running for three years, with an annual budget of € 35,000. 
The number of projects sponsored per year ranges from four to ten, with the grant per 
project ranging from € 2,000-5,000. The projects are chosen, based on the quality of 
the proposals, by a five-person committee, and are sent to the Czech Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs for approval. As noted by the embassy’s representatives, during the three-year 
duration of the programme, the priority has been, and will continue to be, on youth and 
children in BiH. Overall, the importance of this programme is greater than indicated by 
the amount of funds dedicated to it, since the sponsorship of local NGOs by an embassy 
gives these NGOs credibility and often results in their further growth and strengthening.
The embassy also sponsors BiH students’ university and post-graduate studies in the Czech 
Republic. The programme is run by the Head of the Development Department in the 
embassy, who is responsible for choosing BiH students for scholarships, and helping 
them with all aspects of their studies in the Czech Republic. This programme has evolved 
from sponsoring one student three years ago to now sponsoring about 50 per year. The 
students’ tuition and living expenses are completely covered for the full duration of their 
studies. This scholarship programme is extremely beneficial as it gives BiH youth, some of 
whom have never been outside the country, the opportunity to explore life abroad. Such 
experiences are highly valuable, giving young people experience of living in a country 
that has been through the transition process, and mobilising them in their insistence on bet-
ter conditions in BiH, along with quicker progress on the path towards EU integration.
 
Based on the activities of the Czech government and its embassy in Sarajevo, it is clear 
that BiH is considered a priority country for the Czech Republic’s development aid, in-
cluding democracy assistance. While the funds dedicated to democracy assistance in 
particular may not be that large, they nonetheless show that the Czech Republic is inter-
ested in strengthening democracy in BiH, primarily by focusing on youth and education 
activities. Additionally, the creation of the 2006-2010 Development Strategy for BiH and 
Commission’s Delegation to BiH. The project’s aim is to present to BiH citizens the idea of 
a unified Europe by engaging ambassadors of EU member states represented in BiH to go 
to a municipality and speak on this theme.
Overall, for the above reasons, Poland has not contributed development assistance or 
democracy assistance to BiH in a systemic way, but it is engaged to some degree in aid-
ing BiH with dealing with the consequences of war, and with the transfer of knowledge 
related to the transition to democracy and to EU integration. 
Czech Republic
Since 2002, the Czech Republic has steadily increased the size of its total ODA, within 
which democracy assistance now features as one of the Czech Republic’s most important 
foreign policy priorities. Notably, in 2005, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the Tran-
sition Promotion programme concept specifically focused on official democracy assistance 
policy. The main goals of the strategy include democratisation and society transformation 
of the target countries in order to “enhance security, stability and prosperity”. 
The target countries of the Czech Republic’s democracy assistance are: 
developing countries and countries in transition, ranging from post-Soviet countries • 
(Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia) to the Balkans (Serbia, BiH) and Iraq; and 
countries with undemocratic regimes that undermine human rights (Cuba, Belarus, and • 
Burma). 
Overall, the target countries for the Czech government’s democracy assistance pro-
grammes correspond to the Czech Republic’s foreign policy priorities. 
The majority of the Czech Republic’s democracy assistance funding has gone to Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Iraq. For example, in 2006, most of the attention was focused on Belarus, 
in large part because of the presidential elections taking place that year. However, in 
subsequent years, the Czech Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sought to focus more 
on supporting project work in the countries of the Western Balkans, including BiH. 
While the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a Strategy for BiH Development for 
2006-2010, democracy assistance is not included as a priority area. The focus of the 
development is instead on three specific fields: agriculture, infrastructure related to travel, 
and the economy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsors large-scale projects related to 
these three fields, and the government has set aside approximately € 2m yearly for carry-
ing out the Strategy goals for BiH for the period 2006-2010.
Additionally, the Czech Republic has a fund that supports countries in transition - for which 
BiH qualifies. As part of that fund, the Czech government has set aside ca € 1m annually. 
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the evaluation of the projects. The embassy plans to continue sponsoring such projects in 
2008, with approximately the same budget as in 2007. 
In addition to the involvement of the Hungarian Embassy, other actors - including certain 
Hungarian NGOs and the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs - are also active in BiH 
as is evident from their project work. The specific projects in question were the “Viseg-
rad to Visegrad” programme, implemented by the International Centre for Democratic
of the Development Department in the Czech Embassy indicate that the country is comm-
itted to providing development and democracy assistance in a systemic and strategic 
manner.
Hungary
Hungary’s international development co-operation strategy includes BiH as a target coun-
try and defines it as a “strategic partner”. With regard to Hungary’s democracy assistance 
strategy, the target country selection process focuses on countries that are: 
in the geographical and political areas of interest for the Hungarian government; • 
in the process of democratic transition; • 
where Hungary has a comprehensive knowledge of the social and political landscape; • 
and 
where Hungary’s involvement is positively regarded. • 
BiH is one of the main priority countries for Hungary’s international development assist-
ance, along with Serbia and Vietnam. Currently, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
is for the first time working on a four-year country strategy for BiH. Such a strategy will 
be crucial to placing Hungarian development/democracy assistance for BiH on a more 
comprehensive and long-term footing.
Even though Hungary’s assistance budget is not as large as that of other donors in BiH, 
the Hungarian government is nevertheless involved in assisting BiH through various ways. 
Hungary invests funds in infrastructure projects, such as the building of water treatment 
plants in two municipalities16 and the reconstruction of the old city hall in Sarajevo.17 
Hungary is also actively involved in the field of justice and home affairs in BiH through the 
Budapest Forum. Furthermore, the Hungarian Embassy is directly involved in development 
assistance in BiH through the small-scale funding of local NGO projects.
The embassy undertook the small-scale funding of local NGO projects in 2007 with a 
budget of € 16,000, from which they sponsored five projects. This relatively recent under-
taking by the embassy has been, and continues to be, a learning process. Interestingly, the 
Hungarian Embassy received advice from the Czech Embassy, which has been running a 
small-grants programme for the past three years. 
Most of the five projects sponsored by the Hungarian Embassy in 2007 can be regarded 
as democracy assistance.18 The projects were submitted to the Hungarian Embassy by 
local NGOs, but the selection process is slow. Once the five projects were selected by 
the embassy, they were sent for approval to a co-ordinating body within the Hungarian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Upon approval of the requested funds by the Ministry, the 
embassy then works on monitoring and evaluating the projects and submitting reports 
to the Ministry. Currently, the embassy is working on finding a simplified mechanism for 
CALLED	TO	ACCOUNT:	
HUNGARIAN	LESSONS	IN	
NGOS’	SELF-REGULATION
The Hungarian organisation, the European 
Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), took part 
in a project meant to promote sustainable 
development of the non-profit sector in BiH. 
The project, “Sustainable Development of 
the Non-Profit Sector in BiH through Partner-
ship with Government and Business Sectors”, 
was crucial to the improvement of relations 
between the civil society sector and the gov-
ernment, and was sponsored by USAID/BiH 
and a number of other donors, such as the 
OSCE and the Open Society Fund of BiH. 
The project lasted from May 2004 to April 
2007, during which time BiH NGOs and 
representatives from other sectors worked to 
strengthen the self-regulation of the non-profit 
sector in BiH and the relationship between 
the non-profit sector and the government. 
The Civil Society Promotion Center (CSPC) in 
Sarajevo took the lead in implementing the 
project and worked with other local NGOs 
through the coalition “To Work and Succeed 
Together”, and their staff worked with ECNL 
on this important project. Notably, the ECNL 
representative participated in roundtables 
that discussed the main aspects of the project 
with local NGOs across BiH, as well as with 
business and government-sector participants. 
ECNL was instrumental in working on the 
four crucial documents that were produced 
during the course of the project: Agreement 
on Co-operation between the Council of 
Ministers of BiH and the Non-Governmental 
Sector in BiH, Code of Conduct for Non-
Governmental Sector in BiH, Co-operation 
Quality Standards between the Government 
and the Non-Governmental Sector in BiH, 
and the Strategic Directions of Development 
for the Non-Governmental Sector in BiH.
The ECNL has a very good working relation-
ship with CSPC, and they have co-written 
a number of brochures and laws on issues 
related to ECNL’s area of expertise. Interest-
ingly, ECNL has also trained one of the CSPC 
staffers in non-profit law, but that individual left 
the organisation to work in the United States. 
Such a development is not a great surprise 
given that many young, educated individ uals 
who receive opportunities to work abroad 
usually take them, contributing to a general 
brain-drain of BiH’s best and brightest minds. 
Still, the continued co-operation between CSPC 
and ECNL demonstrates how demo cracy ass-
istance can produce substantial results when 
it is demand-driven and when the transfer of 
knowledge takes place in a collegial and co-
operative environment. For example, ECNL 
has introduced Hungary as an example of 
how municipalities should work with NGOs, 
and CSPC has been able to learn from the 
Hungarian experience in this area and apply 
those lessons to BiH’s situation. 
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Transition and funded by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the “Sustainable 
Development of the Non-Profit Sector in BiH through Partnership with Government and 
Business Sectors”, supported in part by the European Center for Not-for-Profit Law.
Overall, the Hungarian government and NGOs have demonstrated that BiH is a priority 
country for their democracy assistance. The development strategy for BiH, currently being 
drafted by the Hungarian government, is am important step towards assuring the provi-
sion of quality democracy assistance. Based on the project work of the Hungarian NGOs 
researched for this study, it seems that the projects that respond to specific demands from 
the BiH counterparts end up being a lot more successful in bringing about change than 
those projects that do not adequately reflect the needs of the BiH counterparts. 
Slovak Republic
The Slovak Republic assigns high importance to development assistance in general, and 
to democracy assistance in particular. Slovak ODA was outlined in the Mid-Term Strategy 
of Official Development Assistance for 2003-2008. The most important goal outlined in 
this strategic document is the “transfer of Slovakia’s experience and know-how” in all 
sectors of society: political, economic, and social. The development assistance strategy 
targets 13 countries in particular, of which BiH is one. Between 2002-2004, Slovakia’s 
development assistance projects were administered by the Bratislava-Belgrade Fund and 
by the Slovak-UNDP Trust Fund. In 2007, the Slovak Agency for International Develop ment 
Co-operation (SAMRS) was established by the Slovak government to undertake project 
management of ODA and the administrative duties of previous funds. The grant round at 
the end of 2007 did not select any projects in BiH.
The top priority of the Slovak development assistance strategy is “developing democratic 
institutions and a market environment”, followed by infrastructure, environment, and food 
security. The Slovak development assistance funds cover bilateral assistance, humanitarian 
aid assistance, Slovakia’s contributions to international organisations and programmes, 
grants for foreign students at Slovak universities, and remittance of debt to developing 
countries. 
While there is no independent strategic document for democracy assistance, such as in 
the case of the Czech Republic, democracy assistance is listed as the number one priority 
of Slovak ODA. Overall, there has been a focus on structural reforms and civil society in 
the democracy assistance projects between 2004 and 2006. Additionally, a substantial 
number of projects are focused on workshops, conferences, seminars, training events and 
study visits, such as projects carried out by think-tanks and NGOs.
In general, Western Balkans countries are considered to be one of the priority targets 
for Slovakia’s foreign policy, as well as for its development assistance policy. Despite 
limited funds, the perception is that funds should be invested in Western Balkan countries 
MODELS	OF	REGIONAL		
CO-OPERATION:	A	WESTERN	
BALKANS	VISEGRAD	FUND?	
The “Visegrad to Visegrad” programme 
was formulated and carried out by the Inter-
national Centre for Democratic Transition 
in Budapest (ICDT), and was funded by the 
Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
objectives of the project were to “explore the 
possibilities of the adaptation and transfer of 
the political, institutional and, as and where 
applicable, sectoral experiences of Visegrad 
Four co-operation in the Western Balkans”. 
The project involved government and civil 
society representatives from the Western Bal-
kans countries (Albania, BiH, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, and Serbia).
The project lasted from June 2006 to March 
2007, during the course of which three ex-
pert meetings were organised in the form of 
workshops and conferences aiming to deter-
mine the regional needs and to facilitate 
interregional experience transfer. 
The Sarajevo meeting in June 2006 served 
as a forum for representatives from the Viseg-
rad Four and the Western Balkans countries 
to discuss ways in which Visegrad Four EU 
integ ration experience, as well as Visegrad 
Four regional co-operation, could be trans-
ferred to the Western Balkans. During the 
meeting, the idea of creating a “Western Bal-
kans Visegrad Fund” was introduced. 
During the Skopje meeting in March 2007, 
case studies and best practices from Vise grad 
Four experience in advancing local develop-
ment in rural areas in the Stabilisation and 
Association Process countries were pre-
sented. The idea of creating a LEADER-based 
capacity-building programme was introduced 
during this meeting. Sub sequently, ICDT is 
preparing a feasibility study regarding the 
operation of the “Western Balkans Visegrad 
Fund”, and is also preparing a proposal on 
launching a local development capacity-
building project based on the EU’s LEADER 
programme.
Representatives from the BiH Ministry of For-
eign Affairs and the Directorate of European 
Integration who participated in the Sara-
jevo conference were reluctant to endorse 
the idea of the “Western Balkans Visegrad 
Fund”. They noted that regional co-operation 
in the Balkans has been ongoing for some 
time now. For example, there is the GTZ19 
Regional Partnership Initiative - the so-called 
Budapest Forum - which is spearheaded by 
the Visegrad Four plus Austria and Slovenia, 
and which is meant to help transfer their ex-
perience to the Stabilisation and Association 
Process countries within six specific fields of 
co-ordination. Hungary was very active in 
launching the initiative and is heading the 
internal and justice affairs chapter. 
Additionally, the recently established Regional 
Co-operation Council (RCC) is expected soon 
to become the main focus for regional co-
operation, with its headquarters in Sarajevo. 
Notably, the RCC is strong politically, and 
has the full support of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process countries. 
The competencies of the RCC amount to six 
specific areas, some of which are relevant for 
strengthening democracy in the participating 
countries. Moreover, support for the “Western 
Balkans Visegrad Fund” would be essential 
on the part of major political leaders in all 
of the countries concerned. Given the fora 
for regional co-operation that already exist, 
it might be difficult to gather the necessary 
moment for the support for the “Western Bal-
kans Visegrad Fund”, unless the purpose of 
the Fund was substantially differentiated from 
the other fora for regional co-operation. 
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An example of V4 co-operation can be seen in the case of the “Europe Day 2007” 
event, the aim of which was to educate BiH citizens about the EU and to discuss themes 
related to European Integration. This event, and the work of the European Movement in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EMBiH) related to EU integration, provides a platform for V4 
co-operation. With the exception of Poland, all the V4 countries have supported the work 
of EMBiH, and have given financial and moral support for various projects.21 
Overall, Slovak democracy assistance represents an important part of Slovak ODA and, 
within that framework, the Western Balkans, especially Serbia, have received significant 
attention from Slovakia. While the monetary contribution to democracy and development 
assistance to BiH might not be significant, the Slovak government has shown a willing-
ness to focus on BiH and support the country on the road to European integration. The 
current High Representative is Miroslav Lajčák, a highly regarded Slovak diplomat, which 
is significant for Slovakia and for the other V4 countries. The focus of the Slovak Fund 
for Local Initiatives in BiH (the one relatively systematic method of democracy-assistance 
funding sponsored by the Slovak government) is guided with relative independence by 
the Slovak Embassy.
V4 co-operation on democracy assistance
There is no official co-operation between the V4 countries on democracy assistance to 
BiH. Nonetheless, there are other forums through which the V4 countries co-operate on 
issues related to BiH development assistance in general. However, in order to make V4 
democracy assistance more effective, future V4 co-operation should be strengthened with 
regard to BiH. 
Regional Partnership Initiative
The Regional Partnership Initiative (the Budapest Forum) brings together V4 countries, as 
well as Austria and Slovenia, to co-operate on activities related to six specific fields in 
the countries involved in the Stabilisation and Association Process: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. These six fields are add-
ressed through working groups led by a respective Regional Partnership country. 
The focus of the six fields is as follows: 
regulatory system of the internal market; • 
environmental protection; • 
justice and home affairs issues; • 
utilising EU-assistance instruments; • 
veterinary and phytosanitary matters; and• 
strengthening community relations through assistance with EU integration and • 
enhancing civil society.
to address the problem of the region’s stability through investment in the economic, social 
and military sectors in these countries. To that end, the Orientation of Foreign Policy for 
2007 stressed that the Slovak Republic intends to support the “Euro-Atlantic ambitions of 
the western Balkans [countries]”. 
In the Western Balkans, Serbia has traditionally been the major beneficiary of Slov akia’s 
democracy assistance given its “programme country” status. BiH is also considered a 
priority country, and Slovak development assistance focuses on helping with BiH’s EU integ-
ration, building up civil society, and strengthening democratic governance institutions. 
In 2005, the government launched a scheme of allocating micro-grants via Slovakia’s 
 embassies in two countries: 
Ukraine (SKK 1m for projects not exceeding SKK 200,000, administered by the Slovak • 
Fund for Local Initiatives in Ukraine), and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SKK 1m for projects not exceeding SKK 200,000, admin-• 
istered by the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
The Slovak Embassy in Sarajevo was established in 2005, the same year as the inception 
of the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in BiH. At that time, Slovakia had no embassies in 
a number of the Western Balkans countries, such as Albania and Macedonia. The deci-
sion was made to first open an embassy in BiH because the Slovak government felt that 
BiH deserved immediate attention from Slovakia. The embassy has a diplomatic staff of 
three, including the Ambassador. Currently, the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in BiH 
(providing micro-grants) is the primary source of regular Slovak government funds for 
development assistance in BiH.20 
For example, over the past year, ten projects were sponsored by the Slovak Embassy. 
The process of selecting the projects commences with the release of a public tender ann-
ounced in BiH media and, once all applications are received, the Ambassador decides 
which projects will be funded. The funds were awarded to smaller NGOs that were not 
Sarajevo-based, because the limited monetary value of the funding would not produce 
added value for bigger and more experienced Sarajevo-based NGOs.
The continued funding of the Slovak Fund for Local Initiatives in BiH depends on the per-
ceived success of the projects by the Slovak government. It is not expected that the budget 
for the micro-projects will be increased. 
The beneficiaries of these grants highly value the accessibility, responsiveness, and high 
level of involvement of the Slovak Embassy staff. They indicated that the Slovak Embassy’s 
representative was very involved and helpful throughout the duration of the projects’ 
implementation. 
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However, there is agreement between the embassies currently involved in allocating small 
grants to local NGOs that they should explore ways to work together and co-ordinate their 
activities. They could focus the grants of each embassy on one specific area, for instance, 
youth development or small NGO development, etc. 
Furthermore, the embassies could co-sponsor the same projects. This way the work (such 
as monitoring of the project) could be divided between the embassies in a more efficient 
way, especially given the differing capacities of the V4 embassies in BiH. Such co-opera-
tion would greatly depend on the will of the respective V4 country governments and their 
embassies in BiH to engage in such an endeavour. Moreover, the decision process for 
choosing projects and for funding would have to be streamlined, given that these proce-
dures vary from embassy to embassy.
The aid provided by the respective V4 countries is relatively modest compared with other 
donors in the country. Moreover, there is some skepticism about the interest among the 
BiH authorities and local NGOs in V4 funding, because the supply side (from the various 
international donors) already seems to outstrip demand in the development assistance 
market in the country. 
The lack of demand for assistance from the V4 countries stems in part from the perception 
that BiH citizens, especially the older generation, have a prejudicial view towards the V4 
countries based on historical factors related to regional power dynamics during the com-
munist era. Therefore, it might be beneficial for the V4 countries to collectively invest in 
addressing and dispelling the prejudices of the BiH citizenry, which are often passed from 
generation to generation when such prejudices are not addressed properly.
Fostering a positive image of the V4 countries in BiH and improvement of general knowl-
edge about the Visegrad countries among BiH citizens provides another platform for V4 
embassies’ co-operation. For example, the embassies could work on collectively organis-
ing trips for youth to the V4 countries. Based on the experience of the Slovak Embassy 
that has organised trips to Slovakia, they tend to be a very positive experience for every-
one involved and are beneficial in dispelling negative prejudices that might have been 
imparted on the participants by their parents. Furthermore, the scholarship programme or-
ganised by the Czech Embassy could be replicated by the other embassies. Once again, 
allowing young people from BiH to travel and study in the V4 countries is invaluable in 
demonstrating the progress and opportunities that positive political developments and a 
strengthening of democracy can bring about.
Similarly, the V4 could co-operate in promoting EU integration through co-ordinated 
public events in support of EU integration. Such sessions should preferably be held in 
smaller, more rural municipalities where the ambassadors could promote EU integration 
and discuss the benefits created for their country by EU integration. Given the relatively 
low involvement of the average BiH citizen in promoting democracy and being an active 
As part of the Initiative, the V4 countries plus Austria and Slovenia periodically meet with 
the representatives from the Stabilisation and Association Process countries in order to 
discuss developments and methods for improvement in the six specific areas previously 
mentioned. Each of the regional partnership countries takes the lead for improving the 
conditions in one of the six fields during scheduled conferences in the participating coun-
tries. 
One such conference took place in Sarajevo in September 2006, which was in part 
sponsored by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(BMZ) and supported by the German government-owned technical co-operation agency, 
GTZ. These conferences serve as a way to regulate improvements in the six fields and as 
an opportunity to further co-operate on additional initiatives related to the development 
of the Stabilisation and Association Process countries. They are also an opportunity for 
the South-Eastern European countries to co-operate with each other and to meet and 
exchange information relevant for their progress in strengthening democracy and conver-
gence with EU standards.
Co-operation of V4 embassies in Sarajevo
Currently, there is no official forum for co-operation on democracy assistance among 
the V4 embassies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In fact, the level of involvement of the V4 
embassies in strengthening democracy in BiH is varied. The Czech Embassy is the most 
engaged, given the longevity of its focus on strengthening NGOs in BiH and the recent 
creation of the Development Department in the embassy. 
The least involved is the Polish Embassy, which has shown little initiative in pursuing 
democracy assistance work in BiH due to geographic and political reasons. The other 
two V4 embassies are involved in demo cracy assistance in BiH through their small-grant 
projects, but not to the same strategic extent as the Czech Embassy.
The ambassadors of the V4 countries have good contacts with each other and meet 
weekly through organised meetings attended by all EU diplomats active in BiH. Addition-
ally, the V4 ambassadors meet regularly with the High Representative. However, it seems 
that V4 co-operation on development assistance is usually not one of the themes discussed 
in these meetings. 
For the most part, the embassies pursue their activities related to development assist-
ance in BiH independently of one another. Nevertheless, there are examples of active 
co- operation, such as when the Czech Embassy recommended to the Hungarian Embassy 
projects for funding by the Hungarian Embassy’s mini-grant project programme. Other 
than such occasional and ad hoc co-operation between the Hungarian and Czech Embas-
sies, no substantial initiative has occurred towards standardising co-operation.
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Individuals	interviewed
Name	and	Position Organization
Predrag Praštalo, President European Movement in BiH
Jovan Divjak,  Executive Director Association “Education Builds BiH”
Ivan Barbalić, 
President
Association Alumni of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate 
Studies (ACIPS)
Slaviša Prorok, Project Officer Center for Promotion of Civil Society
Vesna Vukmanić, Director
Milan Mirić, Network Coordinator
International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(ICVA)
Zoran Puljić, Executive Director Mozaik Foundation
Dobrila Govedarica,  
Executive Director
Open Society Fund BiH
Stela Vasić, Adviser BiH Council of Ministers, Cabinet of the Prime Minister
Edin Šehić, Head of Department BiH Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for EU and Council of 
Europe
Amra Hodžić, Adviser BiH Directorate for European Integration
Trefor Williams, Director OSCE Democratisation Department
Vladimir Pandurević, 
Task Manger
Džemal  Hodžić , Manager
Delegation of European Commission to BiH
Ambassador Miroslav Mojžita Embassy of the Slovak Republic
Zoltán Horváth, Second Secretary Embassy of the Republic of Hungary
Lukasz Chimiak, Deputy Chief of Mission Embassy of the Republic of Poland
Irena Götzova, Consul Embassy of the Czech Republic
Anesa Terza, Head of Development 
Department
Embassy of the Czech Republic
participant in civil society, activities in rural and smaller cities should be pursued by inter-
national donors in general and by the V4 embassies, in particular given the fact that most 
of the V4 ambassadors22 are fluent in the local language, so the average BiH citizen will 
be able to relate to them more readily.
Finally, the embassies could promote their positive image and their development efforts in 
BiH through media coverage of V4 activities, such as the micro-grant projects and the Polish 
involvement in aiding the investigation and prosecution of war crimes. The embassies could 
craft a communications strategy that would focus on promoting their joint co-operation 
and commitment. Such a communications strategy could prove useful in making the whole 
larger than the sum of the individual parts - given the limited funding they offer.
Ideally, the embassies will move forward and introduce a standardised way of co-
 operating on democracy assistance in BiH. However, short of that, there should at least 
be an informal forum for meeting and exchanging experiences between the embassy 
representatives in the field of democracy assistance. Additionally, it would be useful for 
the V4 to publicise their involvement in general development activities in BiH, especially 
at a time when the High Representative is a Slovak diplomat. Moreover, if the V4 become 
more active in showing their solidarity and principled co-operation within BiH, it could 
turn positive publicity for one V4 country into positive publicity for all four.
 
References
Individuals	Consulted
Name	and	Position Organisation
Senka Eminagić, Analyst BiH Ministry of Finance and Treasury, Cabinet of the Deputy Finance 
Minister
Milan Nič, Consultant - 
EU Communications Strategy
Office of EU Special Representative for BiH
Kurt Bassuener, Senior Associate Democratisation Policy Council
Jayson Taylor, Deputy Head of Legal 
Department
Office of the High Representative/ European Union Special 
Representative
Reuf Bajrović, Director Method, Political Consulting Agency (also associated with ACIPS)
Vanja Ibrahimbegović, 
Executive Director
Association Alumni of the Centre for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate 
Studies (ACIPS)
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Endnotes
1 The SB comprises the following 11 countries and institutions: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, 
and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) (represented by Turkey).
2 At the December 1997 PIC meeting in Bonn, the High Representative’s mandate was strengthened 
by granting the HR the final authority to make binding decisions on a variety of issues. See PIC Bonn 
Conclusions from Bonn PIC Main Meeting, dated 10 December 1997, and available at http://www.
ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=5182#11 
3 Information available at http://www.ohr.int/
4 For a full text of the Feasibility Study presented by the Commission of the European 
Communities, see: http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/en/whatsnew/report-692.pdf
5 Anna Jarstaad, International Assistance to Democratisation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Macedonia, January 2005, 27.
6 Glenn Cowan et al., USAID Bosnia and Herzegovina Democracy and Governance Assessment, 
May 2007, 5
7 For a complete list of individuals interviewed and consulted for this report, please see References.
8 The results of the polls were communicated to the researcher by the Director of the 
Democratisation Department at OSCE, but were not available for review.
9 Srđan Dizdarević et al., Open Society Fund of BiH Democracy Assessment in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, February 2006.
10 OSF Democracy Assessment, 399.
11 OSF Democracy Assessment, 398.
12 OSF Democracy Assessment, 401.
13 These historical links are of a humanitarian nature and of a diplomatic nature, i.e. Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
(Poland’s former prime minister) served as a Special Envoy of the UN General Secretariat from 1992-
1995.
14 The Polish Embassy’s diplomatic staff consists of the Ambassador and two consuls.
15 This proposal was carried out through the Regional Partnership Initiative of the following countries: 
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. However, the Polish embassy 
representative noted that it was quite difficult to get BiH public administration officials to come to Poland 
for internships, which he assumed was due to a general lack of interest in visiting Poland on the part of 
BiH officials.
16 Hungary invests in infrastructure development in BiH through providing loans to muni cipalities with a 
lower interest rate and under the condition that Hungarian companies undertake the construction, i.e. it 
is “tied aid”. 
17 The Hungarian government invested € 100,000 into the reconstruction, and in that way it also 
positively markets Hungary in BiH.
18 The five projects were: helping build a rehabilitation centre for victims of domestic violence; publicity 
campaign for EU through European Movement in BiH; sponsor seminar about European Security and 
Defence Policy at the Center for Security Studies; publicity projects at the Centre for Cultural Dialogue; 
and de-mining campaign (including marking mined fields).
19 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, the German government’s federally owned 
agency for technical co-operation, which supports the government in achieving its development policy 
objectives.
20 Interestingly, the Slovak government attempted to sign an Agreement on Co-operation regarding 
Slovak development assistance with the BiH government similar to its Memorandum of Understanding 
with Serbia, but its efforts were not successful. The BiH and Slovak governments did not find a model that 
worked for both sides. 
21 EMBiH has received financial support for projects from the Hungarian and Slovak 
Embassies. For example, the Hungarian Embassy also contributed a symbolic sum of 
€ 500 for the “Europe Day 2007” event as soon as they became aware that the project was being 
sponsored in part by the Slovak Embassy. Recently, the Czech Ambassador encouraged the organisation 
to apply for project funding from the embassy.
22 The Slovak, Hungarian, and Czech Ambassadors speak the local language.
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Forging	Alliances	Across	the	
Transatlantic	Divide
Democracy Assistance Policies of the 
Visegrad Four Countries: Cuba
Francesco Guarascio
Cuba is a dictatorship, led by Fidel Castro since 1959 and now under the rule of his brother Raúl Castro, who has been in the government since the first days of the so-
called Cuban Revolution.
Public elections are regularly held - recording overwhelming support for the ruling Com-
munist party. International observers are not allowed to monitor the vote. The authorities 
do not allow public demonstrations of disapproval towards the government, all media are 
strictly state-run, and propaganda is widely used in television, radio, newspapers and in 
public places, with pro-revolution banners and slogans all over the island.
The regime acts decisively to eliminate dissent but refrains from killing and making dis-
sidents disappear, as practised in other totalitarian states. Members of opposition groups 
or human rights and pro-democracy activists are arbitrarily arrested or targeted with 
so-called ‘actos de repudio’ (acts of repudiation), for which the government mobilises 
Communist militants and others to hold a public rally aimed at intimidating and ostracis-
ing them. Although repressive actions are currently decreasing, in the summer of 2008, 
Cuban jails were still host to more than 200 prisoners arrested on political grounds. In 
prison, conditions are harsh, and contacts with family members are highly restricted.
Freedom of speech, association and assembly is de facto not granted, and the authorities 
randomly intervene to tackle “subversive” activities.
The tough restrictions curtailing basic freedoms and the pervasive presence of security 
forces or members of the Communist party have prevented the development of credible 
opposition to the regime. Although general discontent is growing due to bad economic 
conditions, demonstrations of dissent are still limited, and dissident groups appear weak 
and divided. The reasons for this are historical and geographical, but also draw on the 
perceived achievements of the “Revolution”. The Cuban population has never experi-
enced a real democracy, so the prolonged grip on power by Fidel Castro has not been 
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In September 2008, Cuba had conditionally accepted an EU offer to resume formal polit-
ical dialogue. The response came as Cuba was trying to recover from the damage caused 
by two hurricanes, Gustav and Ike. The hurricanes - the most destructive in the history of 
Cuba - passed through the country at the beginning of September.  
perceived as an anomaly. Foreign influences have been severely limited due to the au-
thorities’ firm control over the flow of information in and to Cuba, a task made all the more 
easy by the fact that Cuba is an island.
On top of this, it has to be recognised that Fidel Castro has been successful in creating a 
real nation from a mixed population accustomed to foreign control. He has given Cubans 
the pride of being Cubans. In private, criticism of the authorities is widespread on the 
island, but rarely involves Fidel Castro per se.
The reasons for this have to be found in the charismatic personality of the Lider Maximo, 
globally recognised as one of the key protagonists of the second half of the 19th century, 
but also as the embodiment of the failings of US policy towards Cuba. Failed military 
att acks (such as the Bay of Pigs), terrorist acts against Cuban interests carried out by CIA 
agents, repeated attempts to kill Fidel Castro, the economic embargo against the island, 
and threatening public statements by US presidents have presented the Cuban propa-
ganda machine with a wealth of opportunities to portray the US as an ideological enemy 
and the scapegoat for Cuba’s internal problems.
Today, Washington has a different policy, despatching millions of dollars through clandes-
tine disbursements to recipients on the island to promote human rights and democracy, 
and across the world to support campaigns against Castro.
The tough US stance against Cuba has repercussions also in Europe, where it is still dif-
ficult to approach the subject in an objective way. Critics of Cuba are often labelled as 
being too close to US interests, which in parts of Western Europe is not popular among 
large parts of the population. 
This public perception is translated into the EU’s inconsistent political stance towards the 
Cuban regime, alternating between sanctions and dialogue. The EU’s toughest line against 
Castro’s regime was taken in 2003 after the so-called Primavera negra (Black spring), 
when Cuban authorities arrested 75 dissidents, in many cases linked to the peaceful and 
pro-democracy Proyecto Varela. Spain, at that time headed by the centre-right govern-
ment of José María Aznar, led the EU reaction. 
In June 2003, the annual reappraisal of the EU’s common position on Cuba resulted in 
the adoption of political sanctions against Cuba, including the limitation of high-level 
bilateral meetings and the invitation of Cuban dissidents to national days’ celebrations 
at the European embassies in Cuba. After the change of government in Spain in 2004, 
and the nomination of a pro-Cuban EU Commissioner for Human Rights, Louis Michel of 
Belgium, combined with the new hopes generated by the end of the Fidel era, the EU posi-
tion softened. In June 2008, EU foreign ministers decided to lift the diplomatic sanctions 
adopted in 2003. 
KEy	CONCLUSIONS
The Cuban regime does not kill its enemies, 
but makes their lives very difficult. Basic 
freedoms are not granted, and dissent is 
crushed through a variety of techniques of in-
timidation, including arbitrary arrests. Under 
these conditions, Cuban dissidents struggle 
to organise themselves. 
Due to the difficult situation in the field, recipi-
ents of aid in Cuba, and the donors, agree 
unanimously that the single most compelling 
benefit of the support of foreign NGOs in sup-
porting democracy in Cuba is their physical 
presence on the island (which is clearly more 
difficult for US organisations represented by 
American or Cuban-American nationals). 
The direct help consists of bringing financial, 
material and moral support to selected Cu-
bans. Very often, it also takes the form of 
delivering goods, such as banned books or 
medicines. In certain cases, the “missions” 
bring to Cuba experts from specific fields in 
order to conduct training sessions with their 
Cuban counterparts, and to keep them up 
to date with the latest scientific or political 
develop ments that are otherwise not avail-
able on the island.
Czech and Slovak NGOs, in particular 
People in Need (PIN) and People in Peril 
Association (PIPA) respectively, are the most 
active in direct support to Cubans. Polish 
and Hungarian NGOs tend to work almost 
excl usively in their own countries or at the 
EU level to promote awareness-raising cam-
paigns on Cuban issues.
Apart from the Czech government, the other 
Visegrad Four (V4) states do not have spec-
ific funds for activities related to human rights 
and democracy in Cuba. V4 NGOs are 
largely funded by US organisations, and the 
EU is only marginally involved in funding act-
ivities on the island. 
The V4 countries have to date not lobbied in 
Brussels in a co-ordinated way in relation to 
Cuban issues.
Aid is not delivered in the most efficient way, 
mainly due to a lack of collaboration among 
the actors involved. Big donors tend not to 
share projects among themselves, and the 
lack of collaboration is visible in the field, 
with frequent duplication of supplies from 
different organisations. Pervasive controls 
carried out by Cuban security forces inside 
the country and abroad also make co-
 ordination difficult.
The future is unclear. Raúl Castro is seen as 
a possible reformer, although concrete evi-
dence of that is still lacking. This could have 
the effect of slowing down the flow of sup-
portive actions by foreign activists without 
bringing real advantages to Cubans. 
Outside the island, the approaching Czech 
Presidency of the EU, the launch of the Euro-
pean Partnership for Democracy and the 
revised European Instrument for Democracy 
and Human Rights (EIDHR II) represent new 
elements with the potential to diversify the 
international flow of financial and political 
support to Cuban dissidents.
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POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	TO	
VISEGRAD	FOUR	GOVERNMENTS
Provision of at least minimum funding for • 
the activities in Cuba of their respective 
national NGOs would be a very impor-
tant step, not only for the obvious financial 
reasons, but principally for partially free-
ing them from dependence on US funding, 
which has often constrained their advo-
cacy activities.
Improvement of relations with more mod-• 
erate elements of the Cuban establishment 
in view of a potential transition is definitely 
a challenge. Building up a rapport with 
them while continuing to support the dissi-
dents could be a prescription for effective 
democracy assistance in the island.
Lobbying at the EU level is important. • 
Any diplomatic achievement in Brussels 
is the result of co-ordinated efforts, and 
improved co-operation among the V4 
diplomats/foreign ministries is urgently 
needed to reverse an EU political trend in-
creasingly in favour of a position of “wait 
and see” vis-à-vis the economic reforms 
Raúl Castro has announced.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
FOR	ALL	DONORS
The lack of co-ordination among the top • 
US donors is detrimental to optimising 
the achievements of the financial support. 
More contacts would also translate into 
better exchange of good practices and an 
improved understanding of the real needs 
of the Cuban opposition and population.
The duplication of the aid to the same or-• 
ganisations for similar projects should not 
be a primary consideration. A virtuous 
competition of ideas and solutions to 
problems can be an asset, provided that 
it is preceded and followed by better co-
ordination among the donors themselves.
The monitoring of the actual use of the • 
funding must be carried out in a more 
structured and effective way, provided 
that this increased transparency does not 
become a security risk to the recipients.
When it is possible, the transfer of money • 
to Cuba should be carried out in euros and 
not in US dollars - as it is well known that 
the Cuban authorities apply a 20% tax 
on currency exchanges from US dollars 
(but not on exchanges from euros). That 
means that 20% of the US money bound 
to  Cuban dissidents goes to the regime.
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
TO	VISEGRAD	FOUR	NGOS
It is necessary to secure better co-• 
 ordination among the V4 NGOs active 
in Cuba. This would have an immediate 
positive outcome in terms of the effective-
ness and relevance of the aid delivered 
to Cubans. Duplications, and likewise 
prolonged absences, of support to various 
dissidents must be urgently tackled. At the 
same time, NGOs should continue to exer-
cise their freedom to choose whom among 
the varied members of the opposition they 
want to support.  
The selection of goods to be delivered • 
must be made in a more appropriate 
way, making sure that they meet the real 
needs of the dissidents. For this purpose, 
it is advisable to increase, when poss-
ible, communications with the intended 
recipients, in particular during the period 
immediately before delivery.
On the whole, communications with diss-• 
idents must be improved. Cubans have to 
be more involved in the decision-making 
process when assistance projects are 
 being designed.
The cultural appetite of the Cuban people • 
is increasing. Access to cultural material 
is more important than ever. Taking into 
account the difficulties of bringing these 
goods to the island, it is advisable to 
increase the diversity of the material deliv-
ered. Too often it is possible to see multiple 
copies of the same books on the shelves 
of the various independent libraries. The 
delivery of films banned by the authorities 
that can send important messages to more 
broad-based and not necessarily polit-
icised groups of Cubans is more important 
than ever. Two examples of films with this 
potential are Goodbye Lenin and The Lives 
of Others, two films that chart the lives of in-
dividuals in East Germany both before and 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The recent 
“liberalisation” of DVD players represents 
an important opportunity in this sense. 
The success of projects aimed at training • 
and organising groups of experts, such as 
teachers or journalists, should be coupled 
with other similar initiatives, in particular 
involving groups of society that are often 
neglected, for example youth organisa-
tions.
The spread of critical thinking inside Cu-• 
ban society must be stimulated through 
the use of new channels and milder, non-
 politicised messages. With this purpose 
and without forgetting the related dangers, 
it is crucial to encourage the dissidents to 
literally leave their houses and develop 
some public activities. Civil society groups 
must also be increasingly supported. Cu-
ban intellectuals or musicians that already 
send nuanced messages should be app-
roached. In particular, the potential of 
music as a revolutionary tool should not 
be ignored.
The fragmentation of the Cuban opposition • 
is a major problem that must be tackled. 
At the same time, it is very important to 
train dissidents and experts from different 
sectors not only to conduct activities under 
current circumstances, but also to prepare 
for a transition scenario.
Campaigning in Europe to raise aware-• 
ness about the real situation in Cuba is of 
enormous importance, but requires sensi-
tivity concerning negative perceptions of 
US foreign policy among some western 
Europeans. The risk of being branded as 
ideologically driven American mercenar-
ies is very real, and makes it all the more 
necessary to take a very cautious, diplo-
matic approach to the subject.
Those organisations that combine direct • 
operations in Cuba with a high public 
profi le in Europe on Cuban issues should 
take extra measures to avoid security risks 
facing their missions on the island. The 
best solution would be to improve rela-
tions between NGOs active in the direct 
support of Cubans (such as PIN or PIPA) 
and the ones more active in campaign-
ing in Europe (such as the Lech Wałęsa 
Institute). This would allow a virtuous ex-
change of know-how without endangering 
activities in Cuba.
Lobbying in Brussels must become a priority, • 
in particular for the NGOs that specialise 
in campaigning. A represent ative office in 
Brussels and a well-developed network of 
contacts among EU institutions are a pre-
condition for any further action.
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The other organisations that receive US funds for activities in Cuba (recipients) either use 
them to carry out their own projects or re-grant them to other organisations (turning in this 
second case into what we can call “recipient-donors”). 
Some organisations do both. Among the recipients, the main organisations that re-grant 
to V4 NGOs are NED (which relies on its own funds from the US Congress, but it also 
receives funding from the other two top US donors), Directorio Democratico Cubano, 
Center for a Free Cuba, Freedom House, the International Republican Institute (IRI), and 
the National Democratic Institute (NDI).
Thus, V4 NGOs receive funds directly from donors, but also from the recipient-donors. 
Apart from NED, whose funds reach several Eastern European NGOs, it is known that 
Directorio Democratico Cubano funds PIN and used to fund the Pontis Foundation in Slov-
akia. The Center for a Free Cuba funds missions to the island (including those of PIN and 
PIPA), and IRI supports the activities of both PIN and the Pontis Foundation. NDI funded 
the Lech Wałęsa Institute for a project in 2006 to raise awareness in Poland.
Sometimes, the activity in Cuba is limited solely to the delivery of humanitarian aid to 
Cuban people. In other cases, the financial relations between the donor and an Eastern 
European partner can concern exclusively one-off measures for activities not even rec-
orded in the book-keeping (payment of tickets and accommodation for short trip within 
Europe, or basic support to organise a conference).
There are two main - and somewhat contradictory - shortcomings in the activities of the US 
donors: they seem to carry out their programmes in an overly independent manner, and 
at the same time they suffer from an excess of top-down regulation. 
The first problem is characteristic of the top donors, who often ignore the work of the 
others, thus not taking advantage of possible synergies. Conversely, the recipient-donors 
often complain about the anti-duplication rules. Indeed, the three top donors tend to pre-
vent their beneficiaries from working on the same type of projects that have been chosen 
for implementation through other recipients, or from working with the partners selected by 
other recipients. Even if it seems a rational approach, it can hinder a virtuous competition 
of ideas. 
“It is easier to find a good solution if there are more minds to think about it,” said a repre-
sentative of a recipient-donor. In any case, the advantages of duplication can be exploited 
only if the identification of a solution follows “the sharing of the best ideas and practices, 
which is often neglected because of the understandable discretion exercised by those who 
deal with Cuban issues”, added one donor.
International	Democracy	Assistance	
Programmes	in	Cuba
The United States is by far the biggest financial supporter of pro-democracy and human 
rights protection projects in Cuba. Several EU states have an interest in contributing to 
this policy, but their action is not translated into a consistent EU strategy. As said before, 
the common European policy has so far been very cautious and subject to changes acc-
ording to the different political compositions of the EU Council. This inconsistent line has 
resulted in a lack of funding for projects in the field of human rights and democracy on the 
island. The only support from the EU at the moment comprises funding of cultural activities 
and initiatives in the social sector, amounting to around € 900,000 for three-to-five year 
periods. 
EIDHR II, which was launched in 2007 with a worldwide budget of € 1.1bn for 2007-
2013, foresees direct assistance to activists, but no project has so far been planned for 
Cuba. This means that V4 NGOs willing to operate on the island are forced to rely on 
financial support from the US.
Three US public organisations manage the bulk of the funds available for Cuba: the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID), the US State Department - through the 
Demo cracy, Rights and Labor unit (DRL) - and the National Endowment for Democracy 
(NED). All work through third-party organisations. USAID operates only with American 
NGOs, while DRL and NED rely also on non-American organisations. Extra funding comes 
from private donors, based mainly in Miami, but also from the Ford Foundation and 
smaller advocacy organisations. USAID is the most active organisation on Cuban issues. 
Its goal is the promotion of Cuba’s transition to a democratic, market-oriented society. The 
support goes to Cuban human rights activists, NGOs, independent journalists, ordinary 
citizens - who have received thousands of short-wave radios enabling them to listen to 
foreign programming, and millions of books banned by the regime. Between 2004 and 
2007, the USAID budget for Cuba amounted to around US$ 55m.
DRL has a robust Cuba programme that focuses on democracy, human rights, and the rule 
of law. Exact figures for funding to Cuba are not available, but the total current budget for 
spending in 20 countries in South and Central America is in excess of US$ 25m.
NED devotes significant resources to Cuba. In 2006, 13 projects were in place to monitor 
and implement human rights protection, to develop democratic values among the Cuban 
population, to spread information, and to help build relations between Cubans living 
abroad and Cubans on the island. The budget amounted to US$ 1.5m in 2006, of which 
almost US$ 110,000 went directly to PIN for training programmes for journalists and dis-
sidents, and over US$ 30,000 to PIPA to promote independent research and think-tanks 
in Cuba. 
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is clearly more difficult for US organisations represented by American or Cuban-American 
nationals to be physically present on the island.
Sending people to the island is useful for a number of reasons. First, it represents the saf-
est way to deliver money to dissidents and their families. People who arrive on the island 
on behalf of V4 organisations also bring goods, such as drugs that are difficult or too 
expensive to buy in Cuba - simple medicines like vitamins, pain-killers, aspirins, which 
may seem unnecessary, but are in fact a necessity, given the extremely poor conditions in 
which people are detained in Cuban jails.
Deliveries also include cultural materials (books, films, newspapers) that are impossible to 
obtain in a country sealed off from the rest of the world. These deliveries help dissidents, 
but also ordinary Cubans who have access to independent libraries, to understand major 
political, social and economic trends in the world that are almost completely obscured by 
the state-run media, the only channel of information freely available on the island.
Other crucial goods include electronic items, such as cameras, PCs, and flash memory 
cards, which help dissidents to collect, store and spread information about the violations 
of basic human rights that take place systematically in Cuba and are generally unknown 
abroad, in particular in Europe.
yet perhaps the most important aid delivered by Central Europeans to the Cuban opposi-
tion is the simple moral support to people who struggle every day for their elementary 
rights. The knowledge that people abroad are aware of the situation can be of immense 
importance and encouragement to continue the resistance. Moreover, this help is cher-
ished so much more when it comes from people who have themselves experienced a 
communist dictatorship of the same league as the Cuban regime, and have been able to 
overcome it. The engagement of Central Europeans in Cuba is unquestionably an invalu-
able commodity in the eyes of dissidents in Cuba.
For this reason, the specialist training of Cuban experts carried out by V4 NGOs (in 
particular PIPA and PIN) is very important. Cuban dissidents, journalists, economists and 
teachers can benefit much more from a training session if it is given by individuals with 
personal experience of clandestine activities. These initiatives are of great importance 
because they prepare Cubans for the difficult transition that the country is likely to experi-
ence in the future.
Alongside this crucial activity on the island, the V4 NGOs are raising awareness about 
Cuba in Europe. This is essential on a continent that rarely perceives Cuba as a relevant 
issue, and where various political forces still applaud the achievements of Castro’s Revol-
ution. As an example, it is clear that the majority of Europeans who know something about 
the Cuban healthcare system base their views on the situation that preceded the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The most recent source of information reaching a wider audience 
Visegrad	Four	Democracy	
Assistance	Programmes
Apart from a small budget set aside by the Czech government, there is no public money 
allocated by V4 countries to support NGOs active in the field of democracy assistance in 
Cuba. The Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the V4 countries acknowledge the importance 
of democracy assistance outside the EU but only the Czech government includes Cuba 
among its strategic foreign policy objectives. 
However, this official position does not exclude a direct involvement in Cuban affairs. The 
Slovak Embassy, for example, is one of the few foreign institutions on the island that pro-
vides internet access to Cuban citizens, and in particular those linked to the opposition. 
This is an activity the Cuban authorities clearly dislike. In the past, the stance of the Slovak 
and the Czech embassies was even more explicit, and they used to invite dissidents to 
their offices. Now these open initiatives have stopped, but the support to the Cuban opp-
osition and to civil society continues. 
In the past, the Polish Embassy provided help to the families of Cuban political prisoners 
(mainly in the form of basic support to the families of dissidents, as well as regular contact 
and assistance to publicise their situation abroad). However, the change of ambassador 
in 2007 and a new milder mandate means that there may be a change in Polish policy, 
but it is too early to make an assessment. 
Meanwhile, Hungary has always kept a much more diplomatic stance towards the Cuban 
regime. Across the EU political spectrum, current-day Spain (run by a centre-left govern-
ment) represents one extreme as the advocate of a co-operative line with the Cuban 
authorities, while the Czech Republic occupies the seat furthest to the other end as the 
sharpest critic of Cuba. Hungary places itself at the furthest position from Prague in com-
parison with the other V4 countries, but at the same time maintains a certain distance 
from Madrid. The Hungarian Ambassador in Havana in 2007 described the situation as 
follows: “There is a philosophical approach between direct help to the opposition and 
co-operation with the authorities. That’s our way.” Conceding the violation of human rights 
carried out by the Cuban authorities, the diplomat wondered: “Is it better to help the dis-
sidents or to convince the others not to beat them?”
The activities of V4 NGOs are much more clear-cut. They can be divided into two main 
categories: direct support to Cubans, and campaigns to raise awareness in Europe on 
Cuban issues.
The direct assistance consists of bringing financial, material and moral support to selected 
Cubans. Recipients on the island and donors generally agree that this represents the clear-
est added value brought by foreign NGOs in their support for democracy in Cuba, and it 
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Cuban opposition, and actively participated in the conception and launch of the Euro-
pean Partnership for Democracy (EPD), of which they are now an associated partner 
organisation.
The direct support to the Cubans is carried out through a variety of different projects, most 
importantly support to the families of political prisoners and the training of independent 
journalists. The help to prisoners’ relatives is delivered with a certain regularity by people 
that visit the island on behalf of PIN. They bring money and books (in particular banned 
ones, such as biographies of Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Aung San Suu Kyi, 
Václav Havel, Primo Levi, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, or history books about the transition 
from communism in Central and Eastern Europe), as well as medicines and electronic 
goods (cameras, video-cameras, computers, printers, and flash memory cards).
The support to Cuban independent journalists involves training sessions and the delivery 
of financial and material support to media representatives on the island. Their work is 
banned by the authorities, and their websites are not accessible from Cuba. PIN helps 
them to carry on their work. One of the most significant achievements of Cuban independ-
ent journalists was the launch of the agency CubaNet, which reports stories completely 
obscured by the public media.
PIN supports leading dissident personalities “on a strictly non-partisan basis”, as well as 
assisting the relatives of jailed prisoners. PIN co-operates with almost all the V4 NGOs 
active on Cuban issues.
Pontes
Active in support of circles linked to the Cuban Churches, which are considered to be a 
credible, non-political tool to promote potential change into stagnant Cuban political life. 
As the most important religious organisation on the island is the Catholic Church, Pontes 
works mainly with people linked to this congregation. Among Protestant circles, the most 
significant relations are with the Western Baptist Convention. Support to date has concen-
trated mainly on building small libraries, and delivering films and other materials to the 
respective communities. The added value of this activity lies in the fact that the aid focuses 
on groups located in towns far from Havana, where the bulk of the foreign help is gener-
ally delivered, often neglecting the most remote areas of the island. 
Pontes also plans to follow the example of bigger V4 NGOs by bringing to the island 
scholars to meet theological seminary students. With sufficient funding, Pontes could also 
provide scholarships to Cuban students, enabling them to study theology at a university 
in Europe. 
on this subject comes from Michael Moore’s 2007 ‘docu-fiction’, Sicko, which presents 
an idyllic, and completely distorted, image of the current situation in Cuban hospitals. 
Clearly, the task of dismissing myths about Cuba is still unfinished business in Europe.
V4 NGOs are effective campaigners in their respective countries, and links established 
with NGOs in other countries have served to increase awareness about the situation in 
Cuba elsewhere in the EU as well. 
These activities have the undeniably positive effect of dismissing a range of myths that 
persist on the Old Continent about Castro’s Revolution. Nevertheless, they can have an 
undesired impact on the work of the NGOs that carry out the campaigns, especially if 
those same organisations are also active in the field of direct assistance to Cubans.
Indeed, campaigning against Castro in Europe is still akin to walking a tightrope 
surrounded by critics hurling outdated ideological rhetoric against the “US-backed” cam-
paigners, and obstructing the delivery of objective messages. It is thus very important to 
present an independent image in order to gain the attention and eventually the confidence 
of potential audiences. But since almost all the funding for the campaigns in Europe comes 
from the US, it is difficult for any V4 organisation to demonstrate its political independence 
- let alone financial autonomy. 
There are many examples of this public misunderstanding, often fed by European far-left 
groups or employees of Cuban embassies. For instance, during the screening of a docu-
mentary about Cuban dissidents organised by PIN in Brussels in 2007, several fierce 
critics in the audience accused the Czech organisation of being an extension of the US 
state department.
In addition, campaigning and lobbying activities in Europe are by definition public, and 
thus increase the risks for those NGOs that combine advocacy in Europe with direct activi-
ties on the island. It is well known that some V4 organisations are not welcome in Cuba 
(in particular PIN), and that even citizens of their countries are being increasingly targeted 
by the authorities of the island.
Czech Republic
People In Need (PIN)
Widely acknowledged as the most active non-American organisation engaged in Cuba, 
PIN’s main focus is to bring direct help to the Cubans. At the same time, PIN does not 
neglect its advocacy task in Europe, and promotes the Cuban dissidents’ cause with con-
ferences, documentaries, exhibitions and direct lobbying in Brussels, where the common 
EU foreign policy is decided. PIN hosts the secretariat of the International Committee 
for Democracy in Cuba (ICDC), the most authoritative forum in Europe in support of the 
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Cuban dissidents often mention the work of the Polish NGO. At the moment, the found-
ation is not directly involved in activities on the island. 
Nevertheless, in November 2007 the President of the Institute, Piotr Gulczyński, visited 
Cuba for two weeks, and met political dissidents and Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White, a 
network of relatives of political prisoners - see box on next page). On that occasion, he de-
livered a letter in support of the Cuban opposition from the former Solidarity leader, Polish 
President and Nobel Peace laureate, Lech Wałęsa. Moreover, some Cuban dissidents 
say they have received help from the Lech Wałęsa Institute. The foundation co-operates 
with PIN, mainly exchanging information and contacts related to campaigns in Europe. 
Representatives of the foundation exclude neither future involvement in activities providing 
direct assistance to the Cuban people nor lobbying in Brussels, but they underlined the 
need for sufficient funding to carry out these tasks.
Hungary
Freedom House Europe - Hungary
The Hungarian branch of Freedom House, USA, Freedom House Europe usually runs 
its projects entirely separately from the activities of the US headquarters. In Hungary, it 
represents the most important NGO active on Cuban issues. It has so far worked only on 
projects in Hungary. One included the organisation of educational events for the youth 
branches of Hungarian political parties in order to exercise a bottom-up influence towards 
Slovakia
People in Peril Association (PIPA)
PIPA is one of the most dynamic and innovative organisations involved on Cuban issues. 
Besides delivering financial, material and moral support to dissidents, PIPA has developed 
a range of new approaches that have been regarded as very effective. Active co-opera-
tion with Cuban experts in the field of economics and education has produced two papers 
providing in-depth analysis of the situation in the country in these sectors, and suggesting 
potential changes from a transitional point of view. The works include contributions by 
Cuban experts and comments from their Central European counterparts. This activity also 
includes training sessions in Cuba by European experts in economics and education. The 
most marked outcome has been the creation of civil society groups in Cuba, whose mem-
bers are able to communicate among themselves, notably without foreign help. This is of 
particular importance in a country where freedom of assembly is banned.  
PIPA also helps selected dissidents and their families directly by arranging their adoption 
by Slovak politicians, firms, organisations or individuals, therefore assuring a more stable 
flow of money, and simultaneously raising awareness in Slovakia about the real situation 
in Cuba. PIPA co-operates mainly with PIN and with the Pontis Foundation.
Pontis Foundation
The activities of the Pontis Foundation in Cuba are aimed at supporting the dissident 
movement and helping the families of imprisoned dissidents. The foundation co-operates 
closely with PIPA and PIN. It supplies forbidden literature and material aid to dissidents, 
and organises collections in Slovakia to support civic activists and political prisoners’ 
wives, particularly in the poorest regions of Cuba. The foundation has initiated protest let-
ters addressed to Cuban officials, co-organised visits of Cuban dissidents to Slovakia, and 
organised various events and happenings in support of persecuted dissidents. In 2005, it 
joined an international campaign in Europe and Latin America for democracy in Cuba. 
With PIN, Pontis Foundation participated in the conception and launch of EPD.
Poland
Lech Wałęsa Institute Foundation 
Since 2006, the Lech Wałęsa Institute Foundation has been implementing the project, 
“Polish Solidarity with Cuba”, which mainly aims to raise awareness among Polish peo-
ple about the Cuban civil society and peaceful democratic movement. The project is also 
addressed towards the representatives of Cuban civil society and supports their activities. 
This means mainly editing and publishing their articles, essays and appeals on the web 
portal www.solidarnizkuba.pl available in three languages (Polish, Spanish and English). 
RAISING	TEACHING	STANDARDS:	
A	CASE	OF	CENTRAL	EUROPEAN	
CO-ORDINATION
The Cuban educational system is one of the 
sectors most affected by the new economic 
reality imposed on the island by the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. The financial conditions 
of teachers have since decreased sharply. 
The quality of lessons has fallen abruptly, 
too. To fill this gap, one Cuban teacher par-
ticipated in a project run by a Slovak NGO 
to allow cultural exchanges among Central 
European and Cuban teachers. 
The experience of teachers who had lived 
through communism, the transition and then 
the first stage of capitalism helped him to 
understand better the current situation of his 
country and the possibilities for change. The 
project brings together teachers from all over 
the island to offer lessons in English, infor-
matics, and painting. Both Slovak and Czech 
NGOs were active in providing them with 
computers, printers, and other basic tools for 
teaching.
This is an example of positive co-ordination in 
the delivery of aid. It also shows that Cuban 
civil society can network. The initiative has a 
youth branch, whose members are students 
and young teachers. It is one of the few cases 
of Cuban youth groups that are not part of 
the ubiquitous party-run youth associations.
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Co-ordination	of	Policies	Between	Visegrad	
Countries	-	and	with	Other	Donors
Apart from the examples cited of co-ordination among V4 NGOs and with US donors, 
both for projects in the field and for campaigns in Europe, a distinctive feature of the eff-
orts on Cuban issues remains the insufficient collaboration among the actors involved.
The co-ordination of the foreign policies of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary is very low in relation to Cuba. Even when they share common objectives, 
they generally do not act together - either on the island or at the EU level. This clearly 
diminishes the effectiveness of their efforts, and has repercussions on the work of their 
respective national NGOs.
The lack of co-operation can also be seen among the top US donors who, for reasons 
of security, tend not to share information about their activities and funding. The negative 
impact on the work of the actors in the field is inevitable. This is particularly evident in the 
activities involving delivery of financial and material aid to the Cuban opposition. Due to 
lack of co-ordination, the support is often intermittent and in other cases subject to duplic-
ation. This results in imbalances in the support to different dissidents.
However, Europeans and Americans are not the only ones who need to correct this 
problem. Responsibility also lies with the Cuban opposition, which appears to be too 
fragmented. These internal divisions are also stirred up and exploited by the Cuban auth-
orities to further weaken the overall anti-Castro forces.
Under the circumstances, the flow of foreign aid has had to rely increasingly on a decen-
tralised model, which involves the distribution of money and goods to the final recipients, 
and not to some identified leaders who then would be in charge of the allocations. De-
centralisation has the advantage that it is less vulnerable to crackdowns by the authorities 
- and to a certain extent it is always necessary to have personal contacts with dissidents 
who need moral as well as material support - but it is less effective and does not favour the 
process of community-building that is crucial to the strengthening of the Cuban oppos ition. 
This decentralised approach for the delivery of aid requires even closer co-ordination 
among donors and among carriers.
Another shortfall lies in the sparse communication with the final recipients - with the eff ect 
of sometimes delivering goods that are not necessary or are different from the ones re-
quested, for example medicines. The cultural material is often redundant - the in dependent 
libraries in Havana are filled with multiple copies of the same book about the Czecho-
slovak transition from communism to capitalism and the same biography of Martin Luther 
King.
national decision-makers in relation to the traditionally very cautious stance of Budapest 
about human rights violations. Another project aimed to increase the awareness of Hun-
garian people about the situation in Cuba through conferences and public events. To date, 
Freedom House Europe has not been involved in any project giving direct help to Cuban 
dissidents, although a plan to train journalists on the island was the subject of discussions 
in mid-2008. Freedom House Europe has collaborated with the International Centre for 
Democratic Transition (ICDT).
International Centre for Democratic Transition (ICDT)
This Hungarian government-funded NGO does not work on the island. Its main focus is 
carrying out projects to raise awareness on Cuban issues in Hungary, usually in collabo-
ration with Freedom House. ICDT has contacts with Directorio Democratico Cubano and 
other Cuban organisations in the US. Although ICDT takes funding from other donors, its 
association with the Hungarian government makes it appear closely linked to political 
decisions in Budapest - more so than the other V4 NGOs with their respective govern-
ments.
WAITING	FOR	JUSTICE:	
LADIES	IN	WHITE
Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White) is a net-
work of wives, sisters and mothers of political 
prisoners. Strong financial support is a par-
ticular need of the Damas de Blanco because 
they often rely exclusively on foreign help. As 
relatives of political prisoners, they are usu-
ally prevented from working. 
Moreover, to visit their relatives in jail, they 
often have to take long trips owing to the 
Cuban authorities’ policy of moving political 
prisoners far away from their home areas. 
Transport outside of the cities is very expen-
sive for an average Cuban (a trip of 200 
kilometres can cost one month’s salary). Acc-
ording to one prisoner’s wife, she receives 
money from organisations in Miami and 
support from NGOs based in Germany, the 
Czech Republic, Poland, and Mexico. 
Her experience is an important example of 
the lack of communications that sometimes 
characterises the relations between foreign 
activists and Cuban dissidents. She asked 
for three video-cameras for use in the event 
of harassment from the authorities or Comm-
unist party members. 
The cameras were supposed to be shared 
with other Damas de Blanco, based outside 
Havana. She received only two, and she is 
able to use only one of them. 
Nobody explained to her how the machine 
works. Moreover, the two cameras came 
with only one battery charger and one flash 
memory card, which makes it impossible 
to use them separately. She complains also 
about the medicines they receive to meet the 
basic needs of the prisoners. Often they are 
not useful for the particular necessities of the 
person in jail to whom they are addressed.
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Conferences and campaigns in Europe to raise awareness on Cuban issues (PIN - PIPA)
Promotion of independent research and think-tanks in Cuba (PIPA)
Preparing Cuban intellectuals, economists, and teachers for the transition of Cuba (PIPA)
Publishing and distribution for informal education centres and independent libraries in Cuba (PIPA)
Support to political activists and their families (PIPA)
Humanitarian help to families of dissidents in Cuba and awareness-raising campaigns in Slovakia and 
Europe (Pontis Foundation)
Support to independent libraries in Cuba (Pontes)
‘Hungarian Cuba Democracy Project’ to inform Hungarian public on Cuban current issues (Freedom 
House Europe - Hungary)
‘Polish Solidarity with Cuba’, mainly aimed at raising the awareness of the Polish 
people about the Cuban civil society and peaceful democratic movement (Lech Wałęsa Institute)
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Problems also arise concerning the electronic goods. They arrive without essential com-
ponents needed for their use, like flash memory cards or battery chargers. In other cases, 
they are delivered without the necessary information to allow the recipients to properly 
use them. 
In addition, Cuban recipients often complained that they are rarely given the opportunity 
to participate in the definition and design of the projects run on the island. The foreign org-
anisations come with their own agenda, and the Cubans feel they do not have any say. 
This is clearly a problem of lack of communications, but it is also due to the structure of 
the funding chain. The programmes and the funding are indeed in some cases suggested 
in Washington in the form of guidelines and objectives, and decided in the implementing 
and financial details in Miami by Cuban-American organisations. In such a complex proc-
ess, it is not surprising the Cubans feel left out.
Furthermore, the V4 lobbying activity in Brussels, where the ultimate decisions on the 
common EU foreign policy are taken, is still not co-ordinated and remains intermittent. 
The outcome is the regular reiteration of a scaled-down EU common position towards 
Cuba that has proved to be ineffective, and that in its latest version presents new signs of 
openness towards the regime. The political stalemate has also had a financial side-effect 
as it has so far prevented the European Commission and the European Parliament, which 
manages the EU budget, from allocating funding in favour of the support of democracy in 
Cuba. The V4 governments of course bear the main responsibility for the lack of organ-
ised lobbying activities, but the NGOs also must accept their share of responsibility. No 
V4 NGO operating in Cuba has a representative office in Brussels. The lobbying has thus 
been limited to the final stages of the decision-making process, and personal contacts with 
the relevant actors have not been developed enough. 
The recent launch in April 2008 of the Brussels-based European Partnership for Democracy 
(EPD), promoted by a number of V4 NGOs, partially funded by the Czech government, 
and with a founding board including Czech, Polish and Slovak NGO representatives, 
clearly opens a new chapter. However, EPD is unlikely to undertake any project concern-
ing Cuba during its first year of activity. The Czech Presidency of the EU in the first half of 
2009 represents another opportunity to put Cuba on the EU democracy agenda.
Projects selected for study
Training programme and support to Cuban independent journalists (PIN)
‘SOS Cuba’ to support political prisoners and their families (PIN)
‘Transition Project’ to deliver handbooks about the Czech political transition process (PIN)
Documentary films on Cuban issues (PIN)
‘Hotel Cuba’ to inform European tourists travelling to the island about the political situation in Cuba (PIN)
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Lech Wałęsa Institute, Solidarity with Cuba - http://www.solidarnizkuba.pl/en/index
Freedom House Europe, Hungary - http://www.freedomhouse.hu/
International Centre for Democratic Transition, Hungary - 
http://www.icdt.hu/index.php?lang=en
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Supporting	Elusive	
Consolidation
 
Democracy Assistance Policies of 
the Visegrad Four Countries: Ukraine
Natalia Shapovalova and Olga Shumylo
International Centre for Policy Studies, Ukraine
Ukraine’s transition	 to	 democracy	 -	 first	 steps,	 first	 obstacles: The first decade of Ukraine’s independence was marked by the creation of the nation-state 
and introduction of political and economic freedoms. The first free and fair parliamentary 
and presidential elections were held in the early 1990s, and the multiparty system came 
to life. The Constitution was adopted in 1996, introducing the division of power, and 
political and economic freedoms. The private mass media appeared as an independent 
trumpet, and civil society arose. However, the change of elites did not happen. The Com-
munists were the largest party in the parliament, and the former dissidents were divided 
and in opp osition, whereas the emerging new parties were driven rather by the economic 
interests of their leaders than by a mandate to represent society. 
The semi-presidential system introduced by the 1996 Constitution allowed the presi-
dent to consolidate his power and subordinate the parliament and judiciary, and the 
de- Sovietisation reforms came to a halt. The decentralisation of government was not im-
plemented, the established local government was not empowered and provided with 
resources, and the government machine functioned according to the logic and rules of 
central planning. The privatisation process lacked transparency and competition, and 
only politically loyal economic groups were able to enjoy a share in the state pie. The 
regime sought to maintain the status quo, suppressing economic and political competition, 
leading to the development of authoritarian rule. At the end of the 1990s, Ukraine was 
experiencing a backlash against democracy. 
The	breach	with	the	past	-	on	the	way	to	consolidated	democracy: The Or-
ange Revolution in 2004 was a turning-point in Ukraine’s transition from semi- authoritarian 
regime to democracy. It helped realise free elections, freedom of speech, and free political 
competition. Furthermore, due to the accompanying constitutional reforms, the legisla-
tive branch gained more powers, while the president’s authority became more limited. 
However, despite these fundamental changes in Ukraine’s political system, democratic 
consolidation has still not taken place. Ukraine’s democracy has been characterised as a 
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“vibrant”, but “nonetheless fragile and dysfunctional” one, or as not yet a democracy “in 
the European meaning of the term”.1
Ukraine lacks established and stable functioning democratic institutions, as well as the 
formation of a civic political culture. Institutional weakness is the main issue that needs to 
be tackled - and the main cause of political instability in Ukraine.2 Reform of the judici-
ary, including the Constitutional Court and law enforcement bodies, aimed at ensuring its 
independence, impartiality and effectiveness, has been implemented, but public admin-
istration reform collapsed in an internal dispute between the two centres of power in the 
executive branch. No progress has been achieved in transforming state radio and televi-
sion companies into public-service and private broadcasters, while constitutional reform 
has become reduced to a tug-of-war between the President, Parliament, and main political 
forces. 
Organised civil society (mostly NGOs), which proved to be effective during the Orange 
revolution, remains weak in terms of influencing the policy process. It lacks experience, 
knowledge and weight, remaining dependent on Western support.3 Public authorities do 
not regard civil society organisations as partners in consultations, policy-making, or provi-
sion of social services. The current state regulation of NGOs’ activities is discriminatory 
compared with regulation of the business sector. The main risk for civil society organis-
ations is the weak development of local funding sources and the critical dependence of 
certain kinds of NGOs on international donors.4
KEy	CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusion is that - despite rela-
tively limited funds - the Visegrad Four (V4) 
countries’ democracy assistance is crucially 
important for Ukraine. V4	 government	
and	 NGO	 experts	 are	 closer	 to	
Ukrainians	than	their	EU-15	counter-
parts,	and	their	fresh	transformation	
experience	can	be	readily	used. 
By and large, Ukrainians felt more comfort-
able talking to Polish counterparts when it 
came to the experience of decentralisation or 
combatting corruption, and to Slovak experts 
about improving democratic indicators after 
the fall of a regime with autocratic tendencies 
(e.g. post-Mečiar democratisation), than with 
their EU-15 counterparts. Ukrainian  local 
auth orities on the western border found it 
easier to tackle the problem of national min-
orities in co-operation with their Hungarian 
counterparts, and Ukrainian border guards 
learnt a lot from their Polish and Slovak col-
leagues in terms of border management and 
the fight against illegal migration and corrup-
tion on the border. 
Given the short history of V4 assistance, 
it is difficult to assess its direct impact on 
demo cracy promotion in Ukraine. How-
ever, it is apparent that despite their limited 
funds Polish, Slovak, Czech and Hungarian 
govern mental and non-governmental experts 
also found their way to Ukrainian NGOs and 
governments through projects and initiatives 
funded by other donors (e.g. the United State 
Agency for International Development (US-
AID), the EU, or private foundations). 
The priorities of the V4 governments did not 
differ much from the priorities of USAID, the 
EU, the Swedish International Development 
Co-operation Agency (SIDA) or other big 
donors. But the value of V4 support was hid-
den in the details, for instance in the ability 
of Ukrainian partners to shape projects, in 
the link between Ukrainian needs and ass-
istance, and in the support to small and 
sometimes unknown Ukrainian NGOs. 
Moreover, V4 countries helped fill a gap in 
assistance to Ukraine by creating various 
scholarship programmes that sometimes out-
numbered their big donor partners. 
POLICy	RECOMMENDATIONS	
TO	VISEGRAD	GOVERNMENTS	
Continue their peer pressure on Ukrainian • 
politicians in terms of further democratis-
ation steps, and remain advocates of 
Ukraine’s European aspirations, hand in 
hand with promoting offers of ever closer 
integration with the EU (e.g. deep free 
trade, joint activities in foreign policy and 
security policy, border management and 
migration, etc.) 
Continue provision of support to civil soc-• 
iety, and co-ordinate activities and funds 
to support big strategic projects for civil 
society, e.g. via the International Visegrad 
Fund or another mechanism of re-granting 
for the needs of Ukrainian civil society
Study options for the modification of • 
app roaches to democracy assistance 
to enable Ukrainian NGOs to apply for 
funds directly to the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of the V4 countries
Continue micro-grant schemes (in the case • 
of Poland, study the possibility of revising 
the procedure of applications for grants 
at the embassy level to enable projects to 
start earlier in the year)
Support strategic, long-lasting partner-• 
ships between Ukrainian NGOs and their 
V4 counterparts, and pool resources in 
bigger projects with other donors in order 
to strengthen the impact of V4 funds on 
democracy promotion in Ukraine
Provide expert support to Ukraine’s align-• 
ment with EU norms and standards in the 
framework of the EU-Ukraine enhanced 
agreement (especially regarding the rule 
of law and independence of the judic-
iary)5 
Share the experience of participation in • 
EU agencies and programmes, and help 
Ukraine create the necessary institutions
Since the approximation of legislation and • 
adoption of EU norms will require finan-
cial assistance, identify areas that could 
be supported from funds within bilateral 
assistance to Ukraine
Encourage V4 ministries and other govern-• 
ment agencies to participate in EU-funded 
twinning projects with the Ukrainian gov-
ernment 
Engage the representatives of Ukrainian • 
NGOs in discussions of assistance priori-
ties, and use the experience of Polish MFA 
to hold consultations with the Ukrainian 
government, the NGO community, and 
other donors for the identification of fund-
ing priorities 
Increase the number of scholarships for • 
Ukrainian students to enable them to learn 
about democracy by studying and living 
in V4 countries.
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member states (UK, Sweden, Netherlands and Germany) also targeted their assistance 
to this goal. The priorities of these donors do not differ much. Most of them direct their 
assistance to strengthening public administration (with the US and UK taking the lead), 
establishing an independent judiciary (the US and the EU), supporting political parties 
and parliamentarianism (Germany and the UK), and developing civil society (all donors 
list it as their priority under the democracy promotion heading). The difference becomes 
visible when it comes to projects funded by these donors. Whereas the US, Sweden and 
the Netherlands provide assistance to both the Ukrainian government and NGOs, the EU 
prefers to direct its assistance mostly to the government agencies. 
It is difficult to provide a full picture of democracy assistance to Ukraine by major donors 
as the information is fragmented and sometimes unavailable. The table below shows 
the allocation of official development assistance by the top ten donors to Ukraine with 
approx imate shares of democracy assistance as a general guide rather than hard data on 
international democracy assistance to the country. 
Top	Ten	Donors	of	Gross	ODA	to	Ukraine	(2005-2006	annual	average)	6
Gross	ODA	
(€	million)
Share	allocated	to	
democracy	assistance7	
Government	and	civil	society	
sector	(OECD)	
(%	of	ODA	and	€	million)
1 US 98.22 (33%) 33.28
2 European	Commission 93.46 (43%) 40
3 Germany 46.73 (5.5%) 2.61
4 Canada 13.46 (69%) 9.38
5 France 11.88 (0.01%) 0.146
6 Sweden 11.09 (38%) 4.23
7
Global	Fund	to	Fight	AIDS,	
Tuberculosis	and	Malaria 10.3 -
8 United	Kingdom 8.7 (43%) 3.8
9 Switzerland 8.7 (14%) 1.27
10 Turkey 8.7 N/A
International	Democracy	
Assistance	to	Ukraine
For more than a decade, Ukraine has been receiving assistance from international organi-
sations, from the EU and individual member states. Until the mid-1990s, assistance was 
given on an ad hoc basis. In most cases, it was neither clearly connected to the country’s 
needs nor targeted at the implementation of a specific reform agenda. The situation was 
made worse by Ukraine’s lack of readiness to absorb foreign financial assistance - there 
were no government or civil society structures to ensure that the aid matched the desired 
ends. yet, in spite of these pitfalls, the international donor community has provided signifi-
cant financial support for the development and sustainability of democracy and a market 
economy. 
The main donors engaged in support for the building of democracy in Ukraine are the 
United States (via government and non-governmental support) and the EU. Individual EU 
Include social aspects of democratisa-• 
tion (e.g. assistance to indigent groups, 
human rights and minority rights) as assist-
ance priorities
Engage the Ukrainian government in • 
assistance initiatives for other countries-in-
need (e.g. Belarus)
Highlight the priority of assistance to • 
democracy and human rights in EU’s 
aid instruments and initiatives targeting 
Ukraine (including the Eastern Partner-
ship).
RECOMMENDATIONS	
TO	VISEGRAD	NGOS
Continue co-operation with Ukrainian • 
NGOs trying to cover the regions of 
Ukraine that remain underdeveloped and 
receive less assistance (e.g. eastern and 
southern Ukraine or communities in small 
towns)
Focus on capacity-building projects for • 
Ukrainian civil society organisations, 
transferring knowledge in monitoring 
and advocacy, lobbying for legislative 
changes in regulation of NGOs and 
 donors’ practices 
Engage the representatives of Ukrainian • 
NGOs in discussions of assistance priori-
ties of V4 governments 
Engage Ukrainian NGOs in projects that • 
aim at democracy-building in other coun-
tries-in-need (e.g. Belarus)
Build lasting partnerships with NGOs • 
from other EU member states through 
involvement in joint projects targeting 
Ukraine, and raise the interest of West 
European partners in continued activities 
in Ukraine.
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The first instrument - the TACIS (Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent States) 
programme - primarily provided support to the Ukrainian government, while civil society-
oriented projects were implemented through consortia of large EU-based NGOs and 
consultancies. Around 25% of TACIS assistance in 2004-2006 could be categorised as 
democracy assistance (the total of € 212m under the TACIS programme included € 15m 
for legal and administrative reform; € 10m for civil society, media and democracy, and 
€ 25m for education and training).15 Only a small amount of the € 60m for the Action 
Plan on Justice and Home Affairs was allotted to anything besides illegal migration and 
border control.16 
The second instrument - the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) 
- provided assistance to Ukrainian NGOs for various activities related to the development 
of civil society. In 2005, the EU assigned € 1.025m for human rights issues (out of which 
€ 465,000 went to the fostering of a culture of human rights and € 560,000 to promoting 
the democratic process). The sum slightly decreased in 2006, falling to € 950,000, com-
prising € 300,000 for fostering a culture of human rights and € 650,000 for promoting 
the democratic process.17 
Ukrainian NGOs received around € 4.5 million for the implementation of five macro-
projects (between € 300,000 and € 1m each) and 27 micro-projects (between €50,000 
and €100,000) over the period of 2002-2005.18 However, the “complicated application 
procedures and harsh requirements, as well as NGOs’ unpreparedness to compete for 
such big funds”19 further limited the impact of EU assistance in Ukraine.20 
A change in the EU’s overall policy approach came with the launch of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, with its clear objective of promoting democracy 
[and stability] in the region. The EU assigned a whole chapter to “democratic reform” 
in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, and Ukraine committed itself to the implementation of all 
democracy-related positions. Following this trend, the European Neighbourhood and Part-
nership Instrument (ENPI) puts more emphasis on democracy promotion, and envisages 
30% (€ 148.2m in 2007-2010) of its total budget for Ukraine (€ 494m) being used for 
democratic development and governance initiatives.21
Nowadays, the EU is making small, but significant steps towards Ukrainian civil society 
by engaging it in discussion of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan or the priorities for the new en-
hanced agreement, as well as by providing new funding opportunities within the reformed 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR II). However, the EU still 
lags behind the US in terms of the scope and impact of its democracy assistance. Serious 
shortcomings persist on the side of the EU’s assistance, such as limited funds for Ukrainian 
NGOs and the lack of attention to projects aimed at political parties (a topic of crucial 
importance for Ukraine today).22 
The US, EU, and Canada spent the most on democracy assistance in Ukraine from official 
development assistance (ODA) funds in 2005-6. Among the biggest European donors, 
the largest “democracy promoters” are Germany, Sweden and the UK. In contrast France, 
one of the top five donors to Ukraine, allocated only 0.01% of is total annual assistance 
of € 11.88m to the government and civil society sector. 
Even very rough estimates of the share of democracy assistance in the allocation of V4 
countries’ ODA to Ukraine show that Poland spent a higher share of its ODA allocation 
on democracy assistance to Ukraine than the UK or Sweden.8
US democracy assistance 
US democracy assistance has been (and continues to be) the largest in the case of Ukraine. 
This assistance has focused on a “bottom-up” democratisation through supporting civil 
society.9 It has been streamlined through various government agencies (with USAID tak-
ing the lead10), as well as private funds and non-governmental organisations of global 
scope. 
Within its democracy promotion priority, USAID targeted such issues as elections, in-
dependence of the media, the rule of law, civil society, and local government. In 2007, 
62% of USAID assistance was directed towards democracy promotion, whereas eco-
nomic growth and investment in people received 33% and 5% accordingly.11 
USAID provided support to the introduction of good governance (US$ 7.717m assigned 
in 2004 and US$ 8.117m in 2005), the strengthening of the parliamentary system 
(US$ 1m in 2004), and adherence to the rule of law (US$ 800,000).12 Aid was pro-
vided to media initiatives (US$ 2.158m) and to the strengthening of political parties (US$ 
2.428m) in 2005. 
One of the most informative examples of US assistance to the non-governmental sector 
was provided by the US National Endowment for Democracy (NED). NED supported 
Ukrainian NGOs (both advocacy groups and think-tanks) for the promotion of youth poli-
cies, independence of the media, and free and fair elections; for academic exchanges 
and civic education; for the protection of human rights and other related activities. The 
NED-funded projects covered the whole country (including the Crimean Peninsula).13 
EU democracy assistance
The EU’s assistance to Ukraine has been more modest than that of the US government 
and private sector. The EU has been relatively reticent to emphasize “democracy” in 
relations with Ukraine, both at the level of its strategic documents and in its assistance. 
Nevertheless, the EU directed its assistance to democracy promotion in Ukraine through 
two instruments.14 
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The goals of SIDA’s democracy assistance programmes are to strengthen institutions 
and to promote active civic participation and a democratic culture, including respect for 
 human rights, while SIDA supports Ukrainian NGOs through its Swedish counterparts. 
The develop ment assistance is mainly operated through Swedish organisations, organ-
isations in partner countries, and international NGOs. However, Sweden also provides 
assistance directly to Ukrainian NGOs. 
Despite the substantive economic component of the aid, assistance from the Netherlands 
has a strong focus on democracy and civil society development in Ukraine. This is achieved 
through the government’s MATRA programme that was launched by the Dutch MFA back 
in 1994 with the aim of supporting the transformation and democratisation of the Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe region (including Ukraine). The programme was strengthened in 
2000 when the new objectives were set (for instance, the approaching EU enlargement 
and closer ties with post-Soviet countries). 
MATRA in Ukraine is composed of two main sub-programmes: the programme of MATRA 
(MPP) projects and the programme of small-scale initiatives (MATRA KAP). The MPP 
is aimed at the transfer of knowledge and skills between Dutch and Ukrainian institu-
tions, and is administered by the MFA. The maximum financing available for a project is 
€ 680,000. MATRA KAP is aimed at the support of initiatives calling for societal reform at 
the local level, and is co-ordinated by the embassy in Kyiv. The annual budget of MATRA 
KAP is about € 300,000 - € 350,000, with a project budget ceiling of € 15, 000. 
In total, Ukraine has received around € 16m through the MATRA projects programme 
and the programme of small projects with the support of the Dutch Embassy in Kyiv.28 The 
projects are primarily aimed at the strengthening of civil society and local government. In 
the governmental sphere, projects were initiated that helped the introduction of dialogue 
between local (regional) authorities, civic organisations, and citizens. 
Visegrad	Four	Countries’	Democracy	
Assistance	to	Ukraine
Ukraine	on	V4	foreign	policy	maps: Officially, Ukraine has been on the map of the 
V4 countries’ foreign policy ever since independence. Its geographic proximity, as well 
as historical ties, made Ukraine the target for V4 countries’ foreign policy and assistance. 
Coupled with Belarus, Ukraine has been the number one priority of the Polish foreign 
policy strategy (and it remains there in the new Strategy). It is high on the foreign policy 
agenda of Slovakia whereas, for Hungary and the Czech Republic, Ukraine remains just 
one of a number of priority countries in the post-Soviet space. 
Assistance of old EU member states
 
Democracy assistance to Ukraine is also provided by the EU member states through bi-
lateral co-operation agreements. Germany is the largest donor among the old EU-15, 
ranked third after the US and the EU. By and large, Germany directs its democracy 
assistance through its political party-affiliated foundations. There are five representative 
offices of German political foundations in Kyiv - the Christian Democratic Union’s Konrad-
Adenauer-Foundation, the Bavarian Christian Social Union’s Hanns-Seidel-Foundation, 
the Social Democratic Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, the Greens’ Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, 
and the Free Democrats’ Friedrich-Naumann-Foundation - mainly providing assistance to-
wards political party development, but also European and transatlantic programmes and 
fostering political culture and debate in Ukraine. Over the years, the foundations have 
supported hundreds of roundtables and expert discussions on important issues surround-
ing Ukraine’s democratisation both in Kyiv and in various regions. 
The UK is another strong supporter of Ukraine’s democratisation and integration with the 
EU. From 1991-2008, the UK’s funds have been channelled through the Department for 
International Development (DFID). In 2004-2007, DFID designated around € 9.14m for 
projects that can be classified as democracy assistance projects in Ukraine.23 Around 
three-quarters of these funds went to projects aimed at strengthening government capac-
ities, while one-quarter was spent on civil society organisations’ capacity-building. 
Currently, Ukraine is covered by UK democracy assistance in the framework of the Global 
Opportunities Fund’s Reuniting Europe Programme (GOF). The objectives of the Reunit-
ing Europe Programme are to increase political transparency and good governance, 
strengthen reforms in the justice sector and promote human rights, build capacity in public 
administration, and strengthen economic reforms in line with the Lisbon agenda.24 GOF 
encourages the beneficiaries of the programme to use the expertise of new EU member 
states. Ukraine has a ring-fenced, devolved allocation of € 805,000 (GBP 550,000) 
within the Reuniting Europe Programme’s total budget of € 8.5 million (GBP 5.815m) in 
2007-2008.25 
According to the 2005 report of the swedish International Development Co-operation 
Agency (SIDA), Ukraine was ranked as the fourth largest recipient of Sweden’s foreign 
assistance among Eastern European and Central Asian countries - after Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Russia, and (then) Serbia and Montenegro. In 2005, Ukraine’s share of total aid 
allocated to all countries by Sweden amounted to 0.48%.26 
Almost one-quarter of the Swedish development assistance budget for Ukraine is allo-
cated for democracy assistance. In 2005-2007, Ukraine received around € 10.5m of 
democracy assistance from SIDA - around € 2.3m (SEK 23m) in 2005, € 3m (SEK 28m) 
in 2006, and € 5.2m (SEK 48.6m) in 2007 - for projects that dealt with human rights and 
democratic governance.27 
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V4 non-governmental organisations that worked with Ukraine. • 
The collective action of V4 countries: the International Visegrad Fund 
Initially, the International Visegrad Fund (IVF) was created to support closer co-operation 
between the four countries of the region in the view of their accession to the EU. After 
its launch in July 2000, the Fund focused primarily on activities and projects within the 
Visegrad Group. However, the activities of the Fund were extended to the neighbouring 
countries, including Ukraine, in 2005. Since 2005, assistance to Ukraine has almost 
doubled in two years. The support via grants has been rather small in numbers, whereas 
the assistance via scholarships for Ukrainian students and scholars has been more signifi-
cant. In 2005-2007, Ukrainians received approximately 127 scholarships amounting to 
€ 738,000.31
Grants	and	Scholarships	Contracted	to	Ukraine	via	International	Visegrad	Fund	32	(€)
2005 2006 2007
Small	Grants N/A 4,000 4,000
Standard	Grants 14,000 5,000 47,000
VSP	Visegrad	Scholarship	Programme	 170,000 265,000 303,500
Total	amount	 184,000 274,000 354,500
 Source: IVF annual reports 2005, 2006 and 2007 
According to its 2006 annual report, around 2.3% of total IVF funding from 2000-2006 
was allocated to Ukraine. This placed Ukraine at the top of the list of beneficiaries of IVF 
assistance right after the V4 countries (in comparison, Russia attracted only 0.2% of the 
total budget). In 2007, 8.8% of IVF funds went to Ukraine (accounting for 63% of funds 
going to non-V4 country grantees or scholarships). These figures do not include projects 
including Ukrainian partners, but led by applicants from other countries.33 Ukraine has 
benefited a lot from the IVF assistance, which has provided Ukrainian scholars with access 
to V4 universities and enabled Ukrainian NGOs to participate in long-term cross-border 
projects with V4 counterparts. 
The first example of a multilateral cross-border initiative supported by the IVF in Ukraine 
was a project on the partnership between small cities in Ukraine and V4 countries imp-
lemented by Ukrainian NGOs in 2006-2007.34 The project was carried out with the 
assistance of the V4 embassies in Ukraine. In 2008, three projects in Ukraine were supp-
orted by IVF standard grants to Ukrainian NGOs with total support of € 40,000.35 
V4	countries	take	a	lead	in	Europe’s	democratic	aid	to	Ukraine: The overall 
impact of the V4 countries on Ukraine’s democratisation has been tremendous. It ranges 
from the support to democratic transformation at a very high political level down to expert 
co-operation in, and support to, reform implementation, to daily people-to-people contacts. 
The V4 countries are low-budget donors in comparison with the US, Canada or Sweden, 
but the lion’s share of their development assistance to Ukraine goes to democratisation 
projects. Due to that fact, the V4 countries have become leading European actors in this 
field - with Poland taking the lead in Ukraine. Moreover, the V4 countries have the scope 
to increase their funding over the years to come in order to meet EU targets for a higher 
share of gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to official development assistance.
Furthermore, in the case of Ukraine, certain factors are arguably more important than 
the amount of aid, in particular the peer pressure on the V4 side, combined with their 
understanding of transformation processes, fresh transformation experience, and readi-
ness to share it. The democracy assistance is not necessarily provided in the framework 
of V4-funded projects. A lot of expert support is given through projects funded by other 
donors, for example, the UK’s GOF Reuniting Europe Programme, or the East-East Partner-
ship Without Borders programme of the Open Society Institute, or US funds supporting 
common V4-Ukraine projects where the experience of new EU member states can be 
transferred to countries in transition. 
The	roots	of	co-operation	in	the	1990s: Aside from political support to democrat-
isation, the V4 governments have been active in practical terms, for instance in supporting 
expert exchange and co-operation. This has distinguished V4 governments from other 
donor governments, such as the US or EU member states, that provide funding but rarely 
engage in concrete projects. 
The joint Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative was created in 1999 under 
the initiative of three governments to help share the best practices of Poland’s success-
ful transition to democracy and a market economy.29 Over the decade of its existence, 
PAUCI supported hundreds of projects that led to strong ties between Polish and Ukrain-
ian NGOs, local government, and the mass media.30 No similar joint initiatives were 
launched in terms of geographic coverage or types of activities between Ukraine and 
the other V4 countries. Still, there were examples of fruitful long-term co-operation, as for 
instance between Ukraine and Hungary in the Zakarpatya region or Slovak-Ukrainian co-
operation for effective local governance in eastern Ukraine.
Three channels of democracy assistance from the V4 countries: 
Assistance from the V4 countries was streamlined to Ukraine through three channels:
 
the International Visegrad Fund (IVF), • 
bilateral co-operation agreements (Ministries of Foreign Affairs and embassies), and • 
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About 40% of Polish aid in 2007 was absorbed by NGO projects. Polish NGOs are 
able to submit project proposals to the Polish MFA in annual competitions, and NGO-
driven projects supported by the MFA aim at sharing Polish knowledge and experience 
in economic and political reforms, EU integration, local government developments, and 
technical assistance in economic, social and institutional transformation activities. A total 
of 101 projects were implemented in 2007 in various areas of democracy assistance - 
the priorities in funding included education and youth (29 projects), local government 
and reg ional development (18), NGOs and civil society (15), and EU integration (15 
projects).
Around 47% of the aid was channelled via public administration. Since 2006, along with 
central administration bodies, local government bodies have been able to submit project 
applications to the MFA. In 2007, 13% of the assistance was distributed through the 
micro-grants scheme administered by the Polish embassy in Kyiv. These grants can be ob-
tained by Ukrainian NGOs directly. Apart from MFA-funded projects, many cross-border 
or partnership initiatives also involve Polish regions and local government through EU or 
other international funding.
In 2008, the amount of aid distributed via the embassy declined from € 530,000 to 
€ 144,000, while the pool of funds given to local government projects increased. The deci-
sion was motivated by the low administration capacity of the embassy for grantmaking. 
It is important to mention that representatives of the Polish MFA hold consultations on the 
assistance priorities with representatives of the Ukrainian government and NGOs (as well 
as the international donor community active in Ukraine). The target audience of Polish aid 
varies from scientists, researchers and advocacy activists to government officials at both 
central and local level. Special attention is paid to youth programmes. 
Poland also provides fellowships and scholarships to Ukrainian students and research fell-
ows through government and private initiatives. A total of 12,835 students from Ukraine 
attended Polish colleges and universities between 2000 and 2006, and the numbers have 
risen from year to year (75% more students were recorded in 2006 than in 2000).37 
The “Stipend of the Government of the Polish Republic for young Scientists” has been 
open to applicants from Ukraine since 2003. Within this programme, around 21 Ukrain-
ian students are studying in Poland during the 2007-2008 academic years. Ukrainian 
researchers are provided with scholarships from the Polish-American Freedom Foundation 
via its Lane Kirkland scholarship programme to implement projects that aim at advancing 
democracy, civil society, and a market economy. 
The slovak republic also ranks Ukraine among its foreign policy and aid priority countries. 
In May 2004, the then Slovak Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda declared that Ukraine and 
the Western Balkans would be “the most immediate and central priorities of Slovakia’s 
It is apparent that the assistance (especially scholarships) will have a positive impact on 
Ukraine in the years to come. However, it is difficult to assess the overall impact of the 
IVF’s activities on democracy promotion in Ukraine given the short history of its activities. 
There are no indications of direct co-ordination of the IVF’s assistance activities with V4 
governments’ assistance to Ukraine. The IVF’s assistance runs in parallel with V4 assist-
ance, creating neither clashes nor duplications. However, more co-ordination of efforts 
between the IVF and V4 countries is needed to help create synergies in Visegrad assist-
ance (at least at the level of scholarships for Ukrainian students and scholars). 
Bilateral assistance of V4 governments to Ukraine
Poland is the longest-standing and most active advocate of Ukrainian membership in 
the EU and NATO. Both before and since its accession to the EU, poland has contrib-
uted to the development of the Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(most recently through the initiative of an Eastern Partnership). Poland was also a major 
player in the support to democracy during and after the Orange Revolution. The President 
of  Pol and, Aleksander Kwaśniewski, played a major role in the international mediation 
during Ukraine’s political conflict in 2004. Moreover, ever since 2000, when the ad-
ministration of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma was isolated by the West because 
of breaches of democratic norms, Kwaśniewski was the only European leader visiting 
Ukraine to keep open a bridge to Europe.
Ukraine was chosen as one of the priority countries of Polish assistance, and since 2004 
it has featured prominently as the beneficiary of democracy-promoting activities, funded 
both by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and implemented by NGOs and local government. 
Polish aid to Ukraine can be classified as almost entirely democracy assistance. The main 
priorities are: 
to support Ukraine’s integration to the EU and NATO;• 
to strengthen public administration and local government;• 
to broaden understanding of economic transformation and social reforms  • 
(e.g. education system, youth exchange, healthcare reform); 
civil society building (e.g. media, trade unions).• 36 
Ukraine was among the priority destinations for Poland’s external assistance, both ODA 
and non-ODA, as expressed in Poland’s strategy of development assistance, approved 
in 2003. With the growth of total external assistance, in 2006 Polish aid to Ukraine was 
also significantly increased: in 2006, Poland allocated about one-fifth of its aid to Ukraine 
as a priority country. Ukraine received € 4.9m (PLN 20m) in bilateral aid from Poland 
in 2005 and € 5.5m (PLN 22m) in 2006, falling to € 4m (PLN 15m) in 2007, but rising 
again to € 4.6m (PLN 16m) in 2008.
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agenda. In contrast with Slovakia and Poland, hungary has so far paid little attention to 
the Eastern ENP at the top political level, and this is reflected in the amounts of bilateral 
assistance for democratisation to the Eastern ENP partners. If Poland has seen Ukraine 
as the main strategic partner to the East and a close ally in Europe, Hungary has had an 
interest to develop its relations with Ukraine primarily because of its special attention to 
the Zakarpatya region, where a large Hungarian minority lives (approximately 160,000, 
or 10% of the population of this region).
 
In contrast to “strategic partner” countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, 
Monte negro and Vietnam, Ukraine is approached as a “partner” country within Hun-
gary’s official development assistance. Sharing Hungary’s experience in political and 
economic transition (establishment of democratic structures, creating conditions for the 
transition to a free-market economy and good governance, providing assistance to small 
and medium-sized enterprises) is the first listed goal of Hungarian ODA.
By 2007, the Department for International Development Co-operation (DIDC) within 
the Hungarian MFA had committed to undertake 42 projects worth a total of € 1.1m 
(HUF 275.64m), focusing on governance and the civil sphere, health, education, trade, 
tourism and agriculture.41 In 2004-2007, eight projects were implemented with the 
support of the MFA in the sector of government, civil society, and education related to 
democratic governance. The total amount of funding committed to these projects was 
about € 206,000 (HUF 50.74m), out of which about € 195,000 was actually used.42 This 
represents about one-fifth of Hungary’s ODA to Ukraine distributed via DIDC. The grants 
are given to Hungarian civil society organisations, which have to involve Ukrainian part-
ners in the project implementation. As it is not always easy for Hungarian organisations 
to find Ukrainian counterparts, the MFA is concerned that projects have been delayed or 
a part of the committed funds has remained unspent.43 
In 2007, co-operation came to an end with the Canadian International Development 
Agency (CIDA) in the framework of the Official Development Assistance in Central Europe 
(ODACE) programme and the co-financing of a project aimed at the modernisation of the 
Ukrainian state administration system.44
In 2003, the Hungarian government-funded Nyíregyháza Initiative for Ukraine was 
launched to support Ukraine’s democratisation and integration with the EU in the fields 
of education, environmental protection, student exchange programmes, and the spec-
ified training of local municipality officials. In 2004-2006, more than € 641,000 was 
allocated for these purposes - mainly in the Zakarpatya region where a large Hung-
arian minority lives (in 2004, this amounted to more than € 39,000, in 2005 more than 
€ 357,000, and in 2006 more than € 245,000).45 Around 300 projects were impl-
emented with a focus on civil society development and the strengthening of public 
administration. As in the cases of the Czech Republic and Poland, the strongest channel 
of democracy assistance to Ukraine was the non-governmental sector.46 
foreign policy”. Slovakia stated its ambition to be an advocate for Ukraine and the West-
ern Balkans countries in the EU and NATO, as well as to assist them with reforms and civil 
society development.38 
Ukraine is second only to Serbia in the number of democracy assistance projects sup-
ported under Slovak ODA. In 2004-2007, Ukraine received 3% of bilateral Slovak ODA 
allocated by the Slovak MFA.39 
Slovakia supported 11 projects in Ukraine: all of them were democracy assistance 
projects. The projects were aimed at building and strengthening the capacities of civil 
soc iety, promoting independent print media, assisting the process of transformation of 
local government, and election monitoring. By the decision of the Slovak government in 
2005, Slovak assistance to Ukraine should mainly focus on promoting activities consistent 
with those implemented under EU and NATO assistance programmes, in particular techni-
cal assistance provided under the EU-Ukraine Action Plan. 
Almost all of the projects were implemented by Slovak NGOs in co-operation with Ukrain-
ian counterparts, and were aimed at transferring Slovak transition experience to Ukraine. 
Within these projects, study visits of Ukrainian experts to Slovakia, joint seminars and 
conferences were organised. 
The Slovak Embassy in Kyiv also provided assistance totalling € 27,000 (SKK 1m) per 
year through a scheme of micro-grants (up to € 5,000, or SKK 200,000, per grant) to 
Ukrainian NGOs in 2005-2007. Owing to lack of capacity, in 2008 the Slovak Emb-
assy in Kyiv was temporarily not awarding micro-grants for the implementation of small 
projects.40 Whereas the MFA-funded projects focused on various regions and issues in 
Ukraine, the small embassy grants usually focused on Kyiv-based projects. Special atten-
tion was given to cross-border co-operation, and a number of projects were implemented 
with emphasis on the Transcarpathian region.
In recent years, support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of Ukraine (including membership 
in NATO) has been a predominant focus of projects implemented by Slovak NGOs sup-
ported by the special grant scheme of the Slovak MFA, as well as of projects supported by 
external donors (German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), US National Endow-
ment for Democracy (NED)). 
The Slovak Embassy in Kyiv is the NATO contact embassy for Ukraine, and has been sup-
portive in the implementation by Slovak NGOs of project activities in Ukraine dealing with 
the NATO agenda. Although the embassy does not support these activities financially, 
representatives of the embassy are frequent participants in panel discussions and confer-
ences (also outside Kyiv), and they offer logistical support when it is needed. 
Neither Hungary nor the Czech Republic put Ukraine high on their foreign policy and aid 
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Aside from assistance channelled via special MFA departments, the embassies of the V4 
countries (except Hungary) have provided small grants for projects directly to Ukrainian 
NGOs, even without them having a counterpart in a V4 country. Ukrainian NGOs com-
plain that the small grants of the embassies provide very limited resources and that the 
procedures are cumbersome, in particular in the case of the Polish Embassy.51 However, 
these grants target Ukrainian NGOs, and they could quite easily be secured for the co-
financing of bigger democratisation initiatives. Since 2008, all the V4 countries have 
reduced the amount of funds distributed via their embassies owing to the lack of admin-
istrative capacity. 
The expansion of the network of consulates to the Ukrainian regions has helped V4 ass-
istance to reach local communities and civil society organisations. Poland runs the most 
extensive network of five consular offices, including - apart from Kyiv - Kharkiv, Lutsk, 
“Szeged Process - from Europe to Europe” is another Hungarian initiative, which primarily 
focuses on the Western Balkans, but includes an NGO-driven project implemented by the 
Szeged Centre for Security Policy, with the support of the European Economic Area Grants 
and Norwegian Financial Mechanism Programme in partnership with the Department for 
International Co-operation Programme at the Hungarian National Development Agency. 
The project consists of a series of study visits, training events and lectures for politicians, 
representatives of central government and municipalities, NGO representatives and ex-
perts from the Western Balkans countries and Ukraine. The Embassy of Hungary in Kyiv 
has assisted in the selection of candidates. Ukraine was involved in the project in 2006-
2008, and four study visits were organised every year.
In 2002-2007, Ukraine featured among the priority countries for the czech republic’s 
develop ment assistance; however, this assistance was not aimed at democracy assist-
ance, but at the environment, transport, migration prevention, and nuclear-safety policies. 
In 2004, the Czech MFA introduced the Transition Promotion programme as a component 
of foreign development co-operation. The programme was designed to share the Czech 
transformation experience in the fields of education in key areas of social transformation, 
promotion of civil society and NGO activities, independent media, improvement of the 
standards of work of journalists, assistance in resolving problems related to undemocratic 
rule, and scientific research into aspects of transformation issues. 
Activities and projects are realised either directly by the MFA (diplomatic missions abroad) 
or by partner institutions (including NGOs) in the form of projects partly or completely 
covered from Transition Promotion unit funds. Ukraine has become a country of priority 
interest in the field of transition promotion as a country in transition.47 The assistance is 
provided through the Human Rights and Transition Policy department (HRTP) of the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs.48 
The Transition Promotion unit allocated € 3,000 (one project) for Ukraine in 2005, and 
€ 100,000 (covering four projects) in 2006. In 2007-2008, the programme supported 
six projects in Ukraine.49 The biggest support to Ukraine’s democratisation from the Czech 
Republic comes from the non-governmental sector.50 
V4	diplomatic	 and	 consular	missions	as	 important	 facilitators: Embassies 
remain the crucial gateway to the V4 countries for Ukraine. In particular, they serve 
as information points about scholarships/fellowships that are provided by their national 
governments or private foundations for Ukrainian students and research fellows. For in-
stance, the Polish embassy offers information about stipends for Ukrainian scholars who 
want to study in Polish universities (e.g. Warsaw University, Polish Academy of Sciences, 
univers ities in Lublin, Cracow or Gdansk), for Ukrainian scientists who want to serve an 
internship in Polish organisations, or for Ukrainian historians who want to use the archives 
of the Polish library in Paris. The Slovak Embassy provides information for Ukrainian 
 students, academics and scientists about support for studies in Slovakia.
EAST-EAST	ExCHANGE:	
EUROPEAN	INTEGRATION	
KNOW-HOW
The manager of the OSI East-East: Part-
nership without Borders programme, at 
the International Renaissance Found-
ation in Ukraine, noted that around 80% 
of projects that envisaged inter national 
co-operation were either bilateral 
projects with Poland or projects that incl-
uded the involvement of Polish experts 
or participants. “There is no need to es-
tablish a separate call for proposals for 
Ukrainian-Polish projects,” she added.
In 2008, the East-East programme, 
in co-operation with the Open Soci-
ety Foundation in the Czech Republic, 
issued a call for proposals for a competi-
tion, “Exchange of experience between 
the Czech Republic and Ukraine 
on European integration issues and 
implementation of reforms”. The compe-
tition was open to NGOs, think-tanks, 
education institutions, and media from 
Ukraine and the Czech Republic. 
“We received 31 concept proposals,” 
said the East-East programme manager. 
“The Visegrad experience is great - 31 
concept proposals - and we had never 
expected that 70% of the applications 
submitted would come from the regions 
of Ukraine, and with equal represent-
ation of the south, north, east and west 
of Ukraine. Interest in the Czech exper-
ience is growing. Furthermore, the fields 
of interest are not only public awareness 
on EU integration, but energy-saving, 
corporate social responsibility, public 
health, public policy analysis, citizens’ 
involvement, and government-society 
dialogue.” 
If the project is successful, East-East will 
expand it to the Slovak Republic in the 
format of Slovak-Czech-Ukrainian tri-
lateral projects managed by the OSI 
network across the three countries.
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V4 governments and other donors is received by the V4 NGOs and further dispersed to 
their Ukrainian partners. However, no problems have been registered concerning receipt 
of funds on the Ukrainian side or reimbursement in the framework of joint initiatives. 
Lviv, and Odessa.52 The opening of the Czech consulate in Donetsk in 2007 has not only 
increased the attention of Czech foreign policymakers on the democratisation activities of 
Czech NGOs in the eastern regions, but is also facilitating the solution of logistics prob-
lems in project implementation, such as visas for Ukrainians taking part in study tours to 
the Czech Republic. 
V4 NGOs’ democracy assistance to Ukraine53 
Recent	transformation	experience: The advantage of co-operation with V4 partners 
lies in their recent democratic transformation experience. This experience can be trans-
ferred to Ukraine while the institutional memory of the organisations that have themselves 
undergone the transition is still alive. As one Ukrainian expert put it, “we are travelling the 
road they have already tread in building up civil society, in making reforms, in debating 
about European and Euro-Atlantic integration.” Moreover, V4 counterparts from govern-
ment and local government bodies, NGOs and media demonstrate a willingness to share 
their experience with their neighbours to the East. Ukrainian partners often observe that 
Poles, for example, have been very frank and able to set up a trust-based dialogue with 
their Ukrainian counterparts in areas that can be very tricky for post-Soviet societies, such 
as combatting corruption or engaging NGOs in the policymaking process.
Long-term	partnership: Ukrainian NGOs have a long history of co-operation with 
their counterparts from the V4 countries. The Visegrad countries’ NGOs have become 
important players for the development of the Ukrainian civil society, and they continue to 
expand their partner networks into different regions of Ukraine: the Stefan Batory Found-
ation in Poland or People in Need (PIN)54 in the Czech Republic are good examples. 
At the same time, V4 NGOs have been among the strongest advocates of Ukraine’s Euro-
pean perspective within the EU. The number of advocacy activities in support of Ukraine’s 
accession, organised in Brussels and other EU member states’ capitals by V4 NGOs and 
private foundations (the Warsaw-based Stefan Batory Foundation, the Warsaw-based 
Institute of Public Affairs, the Prague-based EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, and 
the Bratislava-based Slovak Foreign Policy Association), greatly outnumbers the activities 
of Ukrainian NGOs in this area. NGO experts from V4 countries understood the peculiar-
ities of Ukraine’s transition process, and they were able to identify pertinent objectives 
for co-operation. At the very beginning, V4 NGOs were the initiators of joint projects, 
seeking funds and finding Ukrainian counterparts. The situation had changed by the end 
of the 1990s, when Ukrainian NGOs had matured. 
Flexible	and	responsive	project	management: V4 NGOs’ representatives have 
proved to be experienced, highly professional project managers. V4 partners are usually 
flexible, the communications regarding project management issues are smooth, and V4 
NGOs try to accommodate the needs and concerns of the Ukrainian side when necessary 
(both in terms of project design and technical issues). In many cases, the financing from 
POLISH	LESSONS	IN	
FIGHTING	CORRUPTION	
AT	THE	LOCAL	LEVEL
The Association of NGOs “Foundation of 
 local initiatives of Donetsk region”, and one 
of its leading member organisations, the 
Donetsk regional branch of the Committee of 
Voters of Ukraine, started co-operating with 
their Polish partners on one project in 2006 
and, courtesy of the continuing support of the 
Polish government, this has developed into a 
strategic, long-term partnership.
The first project between the Donetsk “Com-
mittee of Voters of Ukraine” and the Polish 
Foundation of Christian Culture “ZNAK” was 
aimed at transferring Polish NGOs’ experi-
ence in combatting corruption (particularly, 
the “Transparent Poland” Action), and was 
implemented in 2006 through financing from 
the Polish MFA. Representatives of NGOs, 
 local government and media from two east-
ern regions of Ukraine - Donetsk and Luhansk 
- had the opportunity to visit Poland and 
learn Polish methods of combatting corrup-
tion at the local level. 
This first project gave birth to another one on 
transferring the Polish experience of involv-
ing local government and NGO communities 
in European integration and improving  local 
governance standards. The project was sup-
ported by the Polish MFA and the Polish 
Embassy in Kyiv. The project results were: 
the Card of Services and Ethics Code for • 
local governance elaborated together by 
Ukrainian NGOs and local government 
representatives, and 
adaptation to the Ukrainian context of • 
Polish NGOs’ six principles for combat-
ting corruption. 
Moreover, together with local government 
experts, the Ukrainian NGOs presented 
a common document on the set of actions 
necessary for the introduction of good gov-
ernance principles in local government 
activities in the Donetsk region.
Despite the short time-span of the study vis-
its to Poland by the Ukrainian NGOs and 
 local government activists, an opportunity 
to see with their own eyes the Polish NGOs’ 
anti-corruption methods in action provided 
insights on how to translate the experience 
to Ukraine.
“The more we work together, the more 
ave nues open up,” said an NGO project 
co-ordinator from Donetsk. “Due to these 
projects, we have developed a strategic 
partnership with our Polish counterpart. We 
have elaborated a major programme with 
six projects and are determined to implement 
this - project by project.” 
“We also observe growing interest in our 
activities: we have received calls from  local 
government in the region, asking us to in-
clude them in our training activities; we have 
been addressed by NGOs from other regions 
seeking assistance in finding Polish partners 
or elaborating similar projects. Now we are 
planning a big project on the introduction 
of changes to local government bodies in 
Ukraine with the participation of NGOs and 
community groups, and we are also looking 
for other donors.”
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aspirations. Again, it was Kwaśniewski who convinced EU leaders, including the EU High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, to come to Kyiv to 
mediate the political crisis during the 2004 Orange revolution. 
Advocacy	 for	 Ukraine’s	 EU	 and	 NATO	 membership	 and	 assistance	 on	
practical	level:	The V4 countries have been the strongest advocates for Ukraine’s EU 
membership perspective. It was Poland that launched a campaign to attract the EU’s atten-
tion to Ukraine as a potential candidate for membership. Later on, it was the Polish MFA, 
in co-operation with Polish NGOs, that proposed an Eastern dimension to the European 
Neighbourhood Policy. The V4 governments also invested in the promotion of people-to-
people contacts with Ukraine by granting visa-free access for Ukrainian citizens (up until 
21 December 2007).
Other V4 member states have been quite modest in their political support to Ukraine’s 
Euro pean aspirations. This should not be considered their fault alone, as Ukraine very 
often failed to work either with its neighbours or with EU-15 member states in building 
partnerships in support of the country’s European aspirations. However, these three coun-
tries found their niche in helping Ukraine in concrete and practical terms (e.g. support 
of the Slovak and Czech governments for the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Action 
Plan56). 
Co-operation	with	long-term	goals	in	mind: The V4 governments are helpful in 
assisting Ukraine with the adoption of EU norms and standards. Two issues are important 
in this context: co-operation between the Ukrainian government and its V4 counterparts in 
the framework of twinning projects, and the sharing of the experience of V4 governments’ 
Strengths	and	Weaknesses	of	V4	Countries’	
Democracy	Assistance	Programmes
Strengths
At the government level: 
Peer	pressure	and	crisis	mediation: The V4 governments (especially the Polish) 
have been the biggest critics of Ukraine’s transformation processes, but their critique was 
greeted much more patiently in Kyiv than, for instance, critical voices from Brussels or 
other EU-15 capitals. It was President Kwaśniewski who maintained a special working 
relationship with Ukraine’s President Kuchma during the latter’s second term in power55 
and, at the same time, Kwaśniewski was the biggest advocate for Ukraine’s European 
CzECH	COURSES	IN	
INVESTIGATIVE	JOURNALISM
Donetsk Press Club and Czech People in 
Need (PIN) organised a common project, 
“Democratisation of media in Eastern Europe: 
methodology of journalist investigations, In-
ternet journalism” in 2007. The project was 
financed by the OSI East-East programme 
and the Czech MFA.
Training courses and seminars were org-
anised in Donetsk for young journalists and 
students of journalism with the partic ipation 
of Czech journalists and lecturers. Well-
known Ukrainian investigative journalists 
also shared their experience. 
The best project proposals submitted by 
Ukrainian participants were selected, and 
the authors were given the opportunity to go 
to the Czech Republic for the training course 
and meetings with Czech journalists and 
NGO representatives. Ukrainian participants 
had to finalise their work and then the com-
mon Ukrainian-Czech commission reviewed 
their work and provided suggestions and 
comments. “It was multilateral work that in-
cluded young participants, Ukrainian and 
Czech experienced journalists, and profes-
sors of journalism. We learned a lot from the 
experience,” said a project manager from 
the Ukrainian side. “We could share views 
and learn from each other, we received use-
ful materials for teaching courses and, as an 
NGO, we have learned how to organise 
work on the move.”
As a result of this project, the majority of 
Ukrainian participants changed their journal-
istic direction. They have become specialised 
in investigative journalism, and Donetsk Press 
Club managed to make its work more sus-
tainable. “After co-operation with such an 
effective organisation as People in Need 
we have grown in self-confidence. We app-
lied for a US Embassy grant to implement a 
project on journalism ethics, and for an Inter-
national Renaissance Foundation grant to 
organise talk-shows on European integration. 
We are considering recruiting someone for 
our organisation to deal with international 
co-operation on a systematic basis.”
POLISH	AND	UKRAINIAN	
CO-FINANCING	FOR	
COMMUNITy	DEVELOPMENT	
IN	DONETSK
Another successful experience of the Donetsk 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine was the 
implementation of a common project with 
the Stefan Batory Foundation from Poland: 
the Donetsk NGO administered a micro-
grants scheme for community development 
projects. 
Ten projects of local NGOs and citizens’ 
initiatives were financially supported (e.g. 
creation of a playground, reconstruction of a 
memorial). The grants were co-financed on a 
50:50 basis by the Stefan Batory Found ation 
and the city mayor. 
Even though only € 5,800 in funding was 
available in the first year of the programme, 
the visible results made it possible to attract 
the city authorities to support community de-
velopment and the building of civil society. 
In 2008, the Donetsk city council decided to 
fully finance the programme with € 7,300 
from the city budget. 
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helping certain sectors of the population  • 
(e.g. Hungarian-Ukrainian co-operation initiative);
protecting human rights (e.g. Czech-Ukrainian co-operation initiative). • 
Projects	reflecting	Ukraine’s	needs: In addition to their understanding of Ukraine’s 
transition process, V4 partners have usually consulted their Ukrainian counterparts in the 
course of project design (e.g. priorities, types of activities and target audience). In some 
cases, V4 experts visited the country and consulted their counterparts before project sub-
mission (e.g. the case of the Polish-Ukrainian project, “More than Neighbours”), and/
or Ukrainian counterparts were asked to submit their recommendations at the beginning 
of the next project stage in the case of long-term projects (e.g. the case of the Polish-
 Ukrainian project for youth). These factors allowed the joint projects to better reflect 
Ukraine’s needs. 
Investment	in	human	capital: One of the most positive developments has been the 
assistance in the form of scholarships. Almost all V4 governments, as well as the IVF, 
provide scholarships for Ukrainian students and scholars, and these scholarships annually 
outnumber the rather modest number of scholarships provided by the US, the EU and its 
other member states in total. 
Assistance	in	solving	technical	problems	on	the	Ukrainian	side: A number of 
problems that occurred on the Ukrainian side in the course of joint projects’ implement-
ation (e.g caused by the flawed Ukrainian legislation in the field of NGO law, the weak 
capacity of Ukrainian target audiences to receive aid,58 or their unwillingness to partake 
in the project59) were solved with the help of V4 partners. 
Weaknesses 
At the government level: 
Limited	 funds,	 largely	 absorbed	 by	V4	NGOs: The V4 governments’ project 
grants are mostly absorbed by V4 NGOs, and relatively little funds reach the Ukrainian 
NGOs directly. This is often a result of restrictive regulations for grant competitions in the 
V4 states. “The Czech budget eats away more money than ours, even though we do 70% 
of the work on the project,” complained a representative of one Ukrainian NGO. 
Cumbersome	procedures	for	small-grant	schemes: Ukrainian NGOs welcome 
the initiative of small-grant schemes administered by some V4 embassies. However, for 
instance in the case of the Polish Embassy, the application procedures remain cumber-
some, leading to short project duration, and making the implementation less effective and 
the impact less visible.60
officials in working with the European Commission and various EC agencies and pro-
grammes.57 Such co-operation may help transfer best practices (and mitigate possible 
negative consequences) during integration with the EU, as well as strengthen the capacity 
of the Ukrainian government for better governance. 
Support	to	small	and	less	known	NGOs: in contrast to big donors, such as USAID 
or the EU, V4 governments were not afraid to fund projects that allowed small Ukrain-
ian NGOs (and sometimes unknown beginners) to partake, develop expertise, and gain 
experience. Moreover, these projects aimed at solving less highly visible aspects of demo-
cracy assistance (especially at the local level) were usually neglected in big USAID/EU 
projects. 
At non-governmental level: 
Equal	 partnership	 and	mutual	 ownership: In all cases, the co-operation with 
V4 countries was conducted on the basis of an equal relationship. The leading role was 
usually assumed by whichever partner was eligible to apply for funds (in the case of V4 
MFA funding, the V4 NGOs took the lead, whereas in projects with US or other funding, 
Ukrainian NGOs often led). Even with V4 leadership in a project, Ukrainian NGOs felt 
ownership as they were able to help shape the project (e.g. objectives, activities, target 
audience), and to express their opinions in the course of project implementation. 
The	variety	of	co-operation	areas: Whereas the co-operation with NGOs from old 
member states has an ad hoc nature and the scope of projects is limited, the co-operation 
with V4 NGOs started from small projects and rolled over to bigger initiatives. Moreover, 
the projects initiated by, or implemented in co-operation with, V4 NGOs covered various 
aspects of democratisation - from strengthening institutions of democratic governance, to 
fostering public participation, to supporting pluralism in the shape of multiparty politics, to 
supporting freedom of expression and strengthening the role and capacities of the media, 
to promoting and protecting human rights, and to helping strengthen the rule of law. 
The	variety	of	activities	in	joint	projects: 
building the capacity of local and central government for good governance  • 
(e.g. Polish-Ukrainian and Slovak-Ukrainian co-operation initiatives); 
providing alternative view on EU/V4/Ukrainian governments’ policies  • 
(e.g. Polish-Ukrainian cooperation initiatives); 
raising public awareness of democratic values and norms  • 
(e.g. Slovak-Ukrainian co-operation initiatives); 
enhancing the capacity of journalists from local newspapers  • 
(e.g. Czech-Ukrainian co-operation initiatives); 
organising study visits of Ukrainian youth and linking the youth with their counterparts • 
in V4 countries (e.g. Polish-Ukrainian co-operation initiatives); 
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Interviewees
Ivan Gerevych, Director of the Civil Information and Counselling Office/ADVANCE Transcarpathian 
Advocacy and Development Centre, Beregovo
Ihor Koliushko, Director of the Centre for Political and Legal Reforms, Kyiv 
Tetyana Kuharenko, Director of the East-East Programme, International Renaissance Foundation, Kyiv
Sviavoslav Pavliuk, Deputy Director of the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation PAUCI, Kyiv 
Oleksandr Sushko, Deputy Director of the Centre for Peace, Conversion and Foreign Policy, Kyiv 
Iryna Scherbyna, USAID project, “Municipal Budget Reform in Ukraine”
Nelya Lavrynenko, Ukrainian Youth Association, Kyiv
Natalia Tereschenko, Media Centre Alliance, Luhansk 
Evhenii Zakharov, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group
Lajos Szabó and Zsolt Lenard, Embassy of Hungary in Ukraine
Balázs Jarábik, Country Director, Pact Ukraine
Olena Dolia, Project Manager, Donetsk regional organisation of Committee of Voters of Ukraine, 
Foundation for Local Initiatives of Donetsk Region
Andriy Melnyk, President, and Kostiantyn Bryzhakha, Vice-President and Programme Director, Association 
for Promotion of International Business and Development, Kremenchuk
Iryna Chernychenko, Donetsk Press Club
Sergiy Danilov, Centre for Middle East Studies, Kyiv
Andriy Nechyporuk, “Tovarystvo Leva”, Lviv
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Endnotes
1 See Michael Emerson, “Policies towards Ukraine, 2005-20: Status Quo Unintended”, in The European 
Union as a Normative Foreign Policy Actor, CEPS Working Document No. 281/January 2008, p. 
26, Iryna Solonenko, “The EU’s impact on democratic transformation in Ukraine”, in Stephen Velychenko 
Lack	of	co-ordination	of	aid	priorities	and	funds: There is little co-ordination 
between the IVF and V4 governments’ aid priorities and funds. Each V4 government pro-
vides support to a number of policy areas; however, projects sometimes overlap, whereas 
some areas remain untouched. In addition, V4 governments rather support small one-year 
limited projects instead of long-lasting partnerships between Ukrainian and V4 NGOs. 
Multilateral projects with the involvement of more than one V4 partner are an exception 
rather than the rule. 
“V4 countries have transformation experience in those domains that are crucial for 
Ukraine, such as strengthening civil society, decentralisation, and empowering local gov-
ernment and public sector reform, and they transfer this knowledge. However, they do 
it separately, each country on its own. There is no co-ordination of actions and funds 
between them. This means the resulting impact suffers”, said one Ukrainian expert.
Difficulties	 in	securing	 funds	 for	spin-off	projects: Some joint initiatives were 
cap able of surviving even after the end of the flow of funds from V4 governments. How-
ever, a number of NGOs (especially small grass-roots organisations) found it difficult to 
secure funds for joint initiatives’ spin-offs. That was often the case for early projects, but in 
recent years Ukrainian NGOs have learnt how to attract funds from bigger donors. 
At the non-governmental level: 
 
Mostly	bilateral	 co-operation: Given their established long-term partnerships, V4 
NGOs very rarely seek new partners in Ukraine. While this has helped ensure the conti-
nuity of joint initiatives, it has also limited the scope for other Ukrainian NGOs to benefit 
from the V4 experience. Moreover, Ukrainian NGOs usually have a partner in no more 
than one Visegrad country, and have very rarely engaged in multi-country initiatives.  
Target	audience	-	imbalance	in	favour	of	experts	and	opinion/	policymakers: 
Most V4 projects were implemented by think-tanks, and targeted experts and opinion/
policy-makers. The number of think-tank conferences reached triple digits; whereas there 
were fewer initiatives at the grass-roots level and focused on indigent groups (e.g. minori-
ties, poor, those whose human rights or other rights were violated). 
The co-operation between the Ukrainian NGOs and their counterparts in the V4 countries 
is by and large a success story. Indeed, aside from the political support of V4 gov-
ernments, the NGO communities of these countries had a genuine interest in Ukraine’s 
democratisation process, which they supported with a vast number of joint projects. The 
co-operation between Ukrainian and V4 NGOs will continue, and will result in a better 
understanding of each other’s needs and capacities. In addition, there is a possibility that 
this co-operation could be extended to assistance projects for democratisation in other 
countries-in-need (e.g. Belarus) - and Ukrainian NGOs will become active promoters of 
democratic values and norms. 
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assistance projects: “Democratising Ukraine: Small Project Scheme” (2003-2008 with a budget of GBP 
1.5m), “GOF/DFID European Integration Co-ordination Project” (2006-2008 with a DFID budget of GBP 
400,000), “Private Sector Development Project” (2003-2007, GBP 1.2m), “Facilitating Reform of Social 
Services (residential, non-residential and community-based) in Ukraine” (2004 2007, GBP 3.185m), 
“Support to Network of Community Resource Centres for MSM in Donetsk and Lugansk” (2006-2007, 
GBP 40,000). See Department for International Development Ukraine, http://www.britishembassy.gov.
uk/Files/kfile/dfid2007.doc
24 During the meeting of the European Council in Lisbon (March 2000), the Heads of State or Government 
launched a “Lisbon Strategy” aimed at making the European Union (EU) the most competitive economy in 
the world and achieving full employment by 2010.
25 Global Opportunities Fund, Reuniting Europe Programme, http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/
servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1070989565087
26 Source: http://www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=563&a=32759&language=en_US 
27 Human rights and democratic governance was the second largest budget item after ‘natural 
resources and the environment’ in the 2005 budget, and the first in the 2006 and 2007 budgets 
of SIDA. Data is taken from SIDA Annual Report 2005 http://www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.
jsp?d=118&a=21077&language=en_US and Fact sheet for co-operation with Ukraine 2006 http://
www.sida.org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=563&a=32759&language=en_US and 2007 http://www.sida.
org/sida/jsp/sida.jsp?d=563&a=3755&language=en_US
28 Around € 6m between 1994 and 2000, and € 10m since 2001. The data is taken from the report 
Ten years of Social Transformation in Ukraine, Kyiv, 2005
http://www.netherlands-embassy.com.ua/media/documents/materialst_eng.pdf 
29 The financial support was provided by the US government whereas Polish experts came to Ukraine to 
share their expertise and experience. 
30 In 2005, PAUCI was transformed into the Polish-Ukrainian Cooperation Foundation with the aim 
of building the capacity of Ukraine to integrate more closely with the EU and NATO through further 
application of Polish and European experience. For more information, see http://pauci.org/en 
31 International Visegrad Fund. Press release, Bratislava/Kyiv, 14 June 2007
32 Based on IVF Annual Report 2005 http://www.visegradfund.org/press/AR2005.pdf 
33 IVF Annual Report 2007, http://www.visegradfund.org/press/annual_report2007.pdf
34 The project goals were the formation of partnerships between Ukrainian and V4 cities, launching 
dialogue between different segments of city communities of partner cities, studying of V4 countries’ 
experience of administrative and market reforms, and municipal management, for its introduction in 
Ukrainian cities.
35 “Development of cities on the Euro-integration route: experience of the Visegrad Group countries for 
Ukraine”, “Cross-border Co-operation as the Platform for Development of the Border Regions” and “Ethnic 
Village - Crimean World”.
36 http://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/Ukraine,186.html
37 E. Kępińska, Recent Trends in International Migration: The 2007 Sopemi Report for Poland, 
Warsaw 2007, Table 27, p. 78 , available at: http://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/obm/pix/029_87.
pdf
38 “Presentation of the Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic Mikuláš Dzurinda”, in Peter Brezáni (ed.), 
Yearbook of Foreign Policy of the Slovak Republic 2003. (Bratislava: Research Center of the Slovak 
Foreign Policy Association, 2004), 11-17. 
39 In 2004 and 2005, SKK 20m were deployed to finance official assistance to Ukraine and Belarus. 
In 2006, projects for Ukraine and Belarus were financed to the total of SKK 10m. In 2007, three projects 
were supported in Ukraine (amounting to 27% of a total SKK 44m designed for priority project countries - 
including Ukraine, Kenya, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan).
(ed.), Ukraine, the EU and Russia: History, Culture and International Relations, Studies and Central and 
Eastern Europe Series, 2007, p. 140.
2 Natalia Shapovalova, The new enhanced agreement between the European Union and Ukraine: 
Will it further democratic consolidation?, Madrid: FRIDE Working Paper No 62, 2008. 
3 Balázs Jarábik and Iryna Solonenko, Is the EU serious about democracy and human rights? The case 
of Ukraine, FRIDE/ECFR, forthcoming.
4 Maxim Latsyba, Development of Civil Society in Ukraine, Ukrainian Independent Centre for Political 
Studies, Kyiv, November 2007.
5 Negotiations were launched in March 2007 
6 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/12/33/1883309.gif
7 Consolidated data is not available on the amount of ODA allocated per donor to democracy assistance 
in Ukraine, but the author estimated the volumes of democratic assistance made by donor governments 
based on their own reports. For instance, a rough estimate of the European Commission’s spending on 
democracy assistance is € 28m (30% of ODA), or in the case of Canada € 5.24m (or 39% of ODA). 
The respective rough estimates for Sweden and UK are € 2.65m (24% of ODA) and € 2.28m (30% of 
ODA) respectively.
8 From an analysis of the V4 MFAs’ reports, the author estimated volumes spent on democratisation 
projects by every V4 country. Comparing these with figures calculated by the OECD for overall ODA to 
Ukraine, a rough estimate indicates that both Poland and Slovakia allocated around 90% of the total ODA 
to Ukraine to democracy assistance. In the case of Poland, however, much of that figure (€ 4.7m) is from 
non-ODA MFA resources, so the actual percentage of ODA to Ukraine spent on democracy assistance 
is lower. A rough estimate for Hungary pointed to a figure of 20% of ODA to Ukraine being devoted to 
democracy assistance. Figures were not available for the Czech Republic.
9 Kristi Raik (2006), Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: How to Step up the EU’s Policy 
towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Document No. 237, February 2006 
10 USAID’s budget was € 7.266m, out of which € 853m was allocated to the promotion of democracy 
and local governance - data taken from K. Raik (2006), Promoting Democracy through Civil Society: 
How to Step up the EU’s Policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. CEPS Working Document, No. 
237, February
11 USAID fact sheet 
12 http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/ee/pdf/121-0224.pdf 
13 For more information about NED, see its website: http://www.ned.org/ 
14 One of the instruments - TACIS - was substituted by ENPI in 2007
15 According to the National Indicative Programme for Ukraine 2004-2006.
16 Jarábik/Solonenko paper, forthcoming
17 http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/worldwide/eidhr/documents/eidhr_annual_work_
programme_2006_annex_ii_en.pdf 
18 Source: the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine: http://www.delukr.ec.europa.eu/
page4363.html 
19 The minimum amount of grant being € 50 000, whereas an average Ukrainian NGO’s annual budget 
is € 18,000 - € 25,000, which means that the capacity to deal with large-scale grants is limited.
20 Jarábik/Solonenko paper, forthcoming
21 This area covers four sub-priorities: 1) public administration reform and public finance management, 
2) rule of law and judiciary reform, 3) human rights, civil society development and local government, 4) 
education, science and people-to-people contacts/exchanges.
22 Ibid 
23 The following projects implemented in Ukraine by DFID in 2004-2007 can be classified as democracy 
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find a niche for Slovak and Czech support. That was made possible due to the active involvement of the 
Slovak and Czech Ambassadors to Ukraine. 
57  The EC agencies and programmes have recently been opened up to Ukraine within the framework 
of the ENP. However, the EC representatives responsible for these agencies/programmes, as well as the 
representatives of the agencies and programmes, are reluctant to provide detailed information on costs of 
participation and possible gains. Only a few are open for discussions with Ukraine. 
58 Spilka Ukrainskoi Molodi provided small grants to local youth organisations in nine oblasts, and these 
local organisations did not have experience in receiving grants in US dollars, so they needed assistance 
to manage this, and it caused delays.
59 ADVANCE’s project had a problem involving the Roma community into the project until the issue was 
solved with the help of the Hungarian side
60 The call for proposals is announced in spring (e.g. March), the applications are assessed until summer 
(e.g. June-July), the decision is usually made in autumn (e.g. September), and contracts are usually signed 
at the beginning of November. However, there is a strict rule in the case of the Polish Embassy assistance 
that all funds in any given year should be spent by 17 December the same year. This means that Ukrainian 
NGOs have to complete their projects (that are usually planned for up to six-to-seven months) in no more 
than five-to-six weeks. 
40 National Programme of the Official Development Assistance, Slovak Republic, 2008.
41 Report on Hungarian International Development Co-operation Activities in 2007
42 Calculations made upon materials provided by the Hungarian MFA DIDC.
43 Interview with a Hungarian diplomat.
44 Report on Hungarian International Development Co-operation Activities in 2007
45 Jarábik/Solonenko, forthcoming 
46 Special attention was paid to the border regions with a large Hungarian minority. A good example is 
the Office of Civil Information and Counselling that was opened in Beregovo (Zakarpatya oblast) with the 
support of Hungary’s Interchurch Aid. 
47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, Tansition Promotion programme concept, www.mzv.
cz/servis/soubor.asp?id=12443
48 The Human Rights department and Transition Promotion unit in the Czech MFA were merged into one 
department in 2007. 
49 Three projects in 2006: a project “When the old regime ends and a new one begins, what to 
avoid and what to support?”, implemented by the Brno-based Democracy and Culture Studies Centre, 
was financially supported by a grant from the MFA Transition Promotion unit (€ 57,431) and the city of 
Brno, with the total amounting to € 71,173; “Transferring the Czech experience in the transformation of 
a functioning security system to Ukraine and Moldova”, implemented by Prague Security Studies Institute 
(PSSI) in 2006, received € 18,099 from the Transition Promotion unit, and was also supported by the 
East-East: Partnership Beyond Borders programme of the Open Society Institute (OSI). In addition, the 
University of Hradec Králové received support for a project aimed at teaching a group of students from 
Iraq, Belarus and Ukraine in 2006. 
 Three projects in 2007: “Transfer of European integration-related know-how of Czech NGOs 
to Ukrainian partners, implemented by the Prague-based EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy in 
2007, was supported by € 18,141 from the Transition Promotion unit, and co-financed by the OSI 
East-East programme; other projects funded included “Southern and eastern Ukraine - democratisation of 
governance, participation of citizens and the media in decision-making processes” by People in Need, 
and “European alternative to eastern Ukraine” by the Association for International Affairs (AMO). 
 Four projects in 2008: “Strengthening of democratic mechanisms in eastern and southern 
Ukraine” by People in Need; “Transfer of experience with the process of European integration - Czech 
NGOs, Ukrainian partners - II” by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, “Alternative school for eastern 
Ukraine” by Association for International Affairs (AMO), and “Strengthening democracy and civil society 
structures in Ukraine” by the Center for the Study of Democracy and Culture.
50 Several projects were implemented by one of the biggest Czech NGOs, People in Need. These 
worked on strengthening the capacity of local government (through training and joint meetings), and on 
building the capacity of local media (e.g. the project implemented in co-operation with Luhansk media 
NGO - workshops and study visits for Ukrainian journalists in the Czech Republic). 
51 No evidence was found about the procedures and rules of small embassy grants from Slovak and 
Czech embassies as projects supported by them did not cover democracy assistance issues.
52 In contrast, outside Kyiv the Czech Republic has two general consulates (Lviv and Donetsk), while the 
Slovak Republic and Hungary each have only one general consulate (both in Uzhgorod).
53 This part of the report is prepared based on interviews with the representatives of Ukrainian NGOs. 
The list of interviewees appears at the end of the chapter. 
54 PIN has developed a network of partners in Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea. 
55 President Kwaśniewski managed to persuade Kuchma to refrain from a number of anti-democratic 
steps (e.g. severe breach of human rights, or suppression of the press)
56 A number of meetings with the participation of Ukrainian NGOs and government officials were held 
in the Slovak and Czech embassies in order to identify priority areas in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, and to 
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